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The thesis has three objectives. First, to examine the relationship between reason and 
freedom, and their experience in modernity. Second, to employ Adorno’s critical 
philosophy to address the problem of ideology from a contemporary perspective. Third, 
to suggest what a ‘truth of the subject’ can amount to: how can the experience of the 
subject be a source of claims to truth under the conditions of modernity? The thesis 
investigates forms of ideology undergirding postmodern politics and the socio-historical 
experience of ‘instrumental’ forms of rationality, such as the objective determination of 
experience by modern technology. Elements of Adorno’s critique, such as his notion of 
the possibility of experience ‘unreduced’ by socially pervasive ideologies, are thereby 
introduced. The ideas of spontaneity, as related to the concept of freedom, and of 
causality, as related to the concept of ideology, are examined via Kant to show how 
contradictions between them can be reframed as a question of the epistemological 
relationship between nature and reason. The framework for a dialectical approach to 
experience is established via Adorno’s criticisms of the limitations of epistemology in 
explaining mediation of social phenomena. The centrality of mediation to a critical 
rationality and critique of normativity is demonstrated concretely via the historical 
example of the Holocaust. Consequently, Adorno’s theory of ‘negative dialectics’ is 
explained via and contra Hegel, in relation to his notion of non-identity between 
conceptual reflection and the objective world, and with regards to his “priority of the 
objective”, which refuses to ground knowledge and experience in consciousness. In 
demonstrating tensions between objectivity of truth on one hand, and the subject as that 
which constitutes truth on the other, a theoretical model becomes available for the 
critique of contemporary socio-political issues. The thesis concludes as an account of the 
truth of the subject in the context of modernity.   
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The objective of this thesis is threefold: 
 
1) To examine the relationship between reason and freedom to give an account of 
the ‘truth of the subject’. What is the relationship of the individual to modern forms of 
rationality, and how does that relationship determine individual experience? Can the 
experience of the individual be a source of claims to truth under the conditions of 
modernity?  
  
2) To resituate Theodor W. Adorno and place his thought in a contemporary 
context by evaluating it alongside subsequent intellectual and social developments, 
highlighting the merits of his theory with regards to contemporary problems and 
suggesting its deficits, and 
 
3) To use Adorno’s ideas in the development of theory relevant to the problem of 
ideology from a contemporary perspective. The thesis uses inter-disciplinary insight and 
examines ways Adorno’s thought has been developed by subsequent thinkers to suggest 
new ways of interpreting the problem of ideology germane to contemporary problems.  
 
0.1 Introducing Adorno 
 
Interest in Adorno ranges from recognition of his philosophy as having concrete 
implications for the social conditions of the early 21st Century, to a corresponding 
interest in the emancipatory nature of the thought with which he engaged a wide 
repertoire of subjects. Reasons for a simultaneous rejection of his thought range from 
philosophical opposition to Adorno’s Hegelian ancestry - notwithstanding renewed 
interest in Hegel in some quarters - to the contemporary preoccupation with 
‘postmodernity’, which sits uneasily with much of Adorno’s work. Rejections of Adorno 
within the context of ‘postmodern’ thought, for example, focus on the ‘mandarin’-like 
concern for high culture that Adorno is perceived to have exhibited, and his equally 
‘mandarin’-like style of writing, which tends to obstruct understanding of his thought.1  
                                                
1 The caricature of Adorno as the stereotypically dour, ‘ivory tower’ academic is dispelled by recently 
published lectures (in English) from the 1960’s, revealing him to be empathetic, clear in his exposition 
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Nevertheless, Adorno is rarely read with indifference, and one reason is that 
questions he addressed remain central to any investigation of the ongoing problems of 
modernity, and the responses he proposed are construed as equally pertinent. Whereas 
Adorno is read primarily as a philosopher and cultural critic, his writings extend into 
every major humanistic field, and his thought has had important implications in several. 
Adorno variously worked as a musicologist, sociologist, literary critic, composer, cultural 
commentator and philosopher, and there are other parallel areas in the humanities, such 
as psychoanalysis, which influenced Adorno and the Frankfurt School to which he 
belongs.  
 
For example, although Adorno never practiced psychoanalysis, there are areas in 
that field (in light of recent writings suggesting as much2) where parallels can be drawn to 
Adorno’s philosophy, such as in some of the theory propounded by the most well-
known contemporary exponent of the Lacanian school of psychoanalytical theory, Slavoj 
Žižek. At a time when many ask themselves whether philosophy is a dead practice in a 
world absorbed in scientific progress, and at a time when the Freudian project of 
practicing a ‘science’ of humanity, e.g. through psychoanalysis is being questioned, 
Adorno’s writings counter facile assumptions about the nature of rationality. They also 
reject a reliance on natural science to determine issues of meaning, whether in the 
context of social progress, or the relation of individuals to their social experience.    
 
Where, however, does Adorno fit into contemporary discourse and theoretical 
matrices? Is there any place for Adorno’s so-called ‘modernist’ position, still, albeit 
critically, in service of Enlightenment, and conceived of at a time when Adorno was well 
placed to observe the disappearance of bourgeois mores in society? With the 
replacement of these by a de-centred locus of culture lacking central symbolic authority 
in the so-called postmodern era, one central accusation against Adorno is that he is no 
longer relevant. Politically speaking, it is not clear, either, that Adorno’s theories lend 
themselves to contemporary political movements opposing the ‘totalising’ effects of 
                                                                                                                                      
and humorous. The perception of Adorno as a ‘mandarin’ has to do with the sometimes extreme tone 
and deliberate complexity of his critical writings, something that can be attributed partly to the urgency 
with which he perceived social conditions. See Chapter 5.  
2 See e.g., Žižek 2001. Žižek often references Adorno, though usually in a theoretical psychoanalytical 
context, drawing parallels between Adorno’s philosophy and how something can be interpreted in a 
psychoanalytical context. See also Žižek 2005, pp. 16-21.     
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global capitalism (although this type of politics shares with Adorno a commitment to 
social justice). Furthermore, social and technological developments since Adorno’s time, 
such as the Internet, mean there is a gulf between Adorno’s concrete writings and 
contemporary realities. This is not to suggest, however, that Adorno’s diagnosis of 
contradictions in societies proclaiming their freedom while curtailing it through systemic 
mechanisms no longer applies. The problem, rather, is how to arbitrate between 
Adorno’s philosophy and the postmodern world at a time which seems to have borne 
out his greatest personal fears regarding the ideological domination of modern 
consciousness, yet which also seems to hold out promise of individual emancipation.  
 
For example, the global hegemony of Western culture, and the extent to which 
technology dominates social experience in the early 21st century are, if anything, even 
more extreme manifestations of Adorno’s concerns with ‘instrumental rationality’, and its 
ensuing alienation and reification, than the social circumstances in which he wrote. 
Conversely, technology and Western culture are viewed by many as liberating factors, 
irrespective of the extent to which they result from socially dominant forms of 
‘instrumental rationality’. How does Adorno’s theory of freedom from instrumental 
rationality relate to a society experiencing more material freedom than at any other point 
in history, in part because of its possibilities? Moreover, how is Adorno’s thought relevant 
to objectives professed by today’s social movements, given criticism that his views did 
not apply even to movements of his own time? How would Adorno’s thought apply to 
movements targeting social injustice, e.g. cheap labour used by Western multinationals in 
the developing world? Or, how would it apply to institutions addressing such problems 
as economic imbalance between the West and the developing world, at a time when 
globalisation elicits heated debate over whether it helps to narrow or widen that gap?  
 
Additionally, as Hammer (2006) suggests, political groupings that consider 
capitalism to be a totalising phenomenon, a precept shared by Adorno, manifest 
themselves by looking for new places in which to exercise their autonomy, such as the 
Internet, itself a product of, and vehicle for, global capitalism. What, then, would 
Adorno’s answers be to, first, economic realities of the globalising world in the 21st 
century, and second, the seeking of autonomy in social arrangements that themselves 
contain repressive structures of domination? While Adorno’s work explicitly addresses 
the second question, it is not immediately clear that answers to the first can be extracted 
Prospects Beyond Ideology: Reason, Freedom and the Truth of the Subject – 
Towards Political Models for the Critical Thought of Theodor W. Adorno 
 
 7 
from his writings, aside from condemnation of class structures more closely reflecting 
social realities of the 20th century than those of the 21st. According to Hammer,  
 
[i]t is far from obvious that Adorno's thought contains resources for conceptualising their 
[various groups involved in politics of emancipation] activities. What is clear… is that the 
dynamics of such commitment calls for a serious rethinking of contemporary culture and the way 
in which the experience of specific forms of injustice demands an analysis of society as a whole. 
If the invention of new styles of political and social intervention can be effected by the 
establishment of new and experimental spaces in which imaginary signification can be projected, 
then these should be supported and not immediately rejected as mere examples of counter-
cultural production (Hammer 2006, pp. 96-97). 
  
Such ‘new and experimental spaces in which imaginary signification can be projected’ 
abound with the introduction of new technologies revolutionising the way people relate 
to their social environment. It follows there is a necessity for modes of thought and 
political action to correspond to such new realities, and that these cannot merely be 
discarded as successors to previous ideologies. It is in such light that assessments may be 
made whether Adorno’s theory remains relevant in a social context already so different 
to the one he reacted to. For all the ways society has changed since Adorno’s time, 
however, the phenomenon of ‘instrumental’ forms of rationality, resulting from the 
human attempt to dominate nature that Adorno was preoccupied by, remains a serious 
concern in appraising modern life.  
 
Part of the difficulty in resituating Adorno today also has to do with the 
alternative path to Adorno’s social critique taken by the second generation of Frankfurt 
School thinkers. The most prominent of these, Jürgen Habermas, has largely discarded 
Adorno’s critique of reason (mainly focusing on its earlier versions, e.g. those 
propounded in the Dialectic of Enlightenment). The social role of this critique, more fully 
developed in Negative Dialectics, has been criticised as nihilistic and an unrealisable 
response to the discontents of modernity. Habermas, himself engaged in a normative 
critique of reason tailored towards specifically political ends, and in the development of a 
system of ‘communicative reason’ to counter the alienating effects of scientific and 
technological rationalisation, has largely moved the theoretical orientation of the 
Frankfurt School in his direction. Adorno, from this perspective, is left in a position of 
ancillary interest, and not as a central thinker relevant to today’s increasingly complex 
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socius, where his concerns may not seem as pressing from the perspective of introducing 
pragmatic solutions to immediate social problems. 
 
 However, such assumptions do not pay the sheer breadth and depth of 
Adorno’s thought its due, and the revival of interest in Adorno has happened to the 
extent that his thought is recognised as remaining pertinent to contemporary problems.3 
From Adorno’s contributions to contemporaneous concerns with alienation and 
assimilation at a time where an additional ‘virtual’ dimension has imposed itself on social 
life, to his perceived contributions to postmodern celebrations of the ‘exchange’ of 
identity, Adorno’s theory provides resources that can be used to reflect on continuing 
social and philosophical debates. This is why he remains both a contentious figure and a 
revered reference point for the German philosophical tradition, and central to the 
broader modern debate about the nature of the relationship between individuals and 
their social context.   
 
My initial justification for exploring Adorno’s thought with a view to examining 
contemporary problems is twofold:  
 
1) Many of Adorno’s concerns, such as the ‘totalisation’ of society, the fate of 
Enlightenment, the usefulness of philosophy, the threat of human standardisation, etc., 
remain germane to contemporary debates. Adorno’s theories can be connected to 
contemporary debates concerning globalisation, the Internet, the hegemony of scientific 
discourse and, given the latter, remaining questions of the relevance of philosophy, even 
where connections between these debates and Adorno’s theory are not explicit in his 
writings. What guidance can philosophy provide in the experience of modernity, and 
what are its limitations?  
 
2) On a specifically philosophical level, Adorno’s theory remains an alternative to 
theories pursued in French post-structuralism and Anglo-American postmodernism 
emphasising the end, or ‘death’, of the subject. 4  For all the advances claimed in 
                                                
3 See e.g. Jarvis 1998 or Cook 1996. 
4 The ‘death of the subject’ refers to a challenge in poststructuralist thought, originating with Michel 
Foucault’s idea of the ‘death of man’, to the traditional idea of the constitutive subjectivity of the 
individual. By this account, subjectivity as the source of human meaning is displaced from the 
traditional subject, as a matter of its metaphysical essence, and orientated towards a ‘decentred’ 
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conjunction with the ‘break with modernity’ advocated by the postmodern movement, 
this does not mean the broader problems of modernity have been resolved. 
Furthermore, considering the integration of institutional power in the early 21st century, 
and the widening gulf between this power and public accountability, it is not clear 
‘decentred’ approaches to subjectivity of the postmodern school have succeeded in 
legitimating the fragmentation of the modern era in their celebration of it. What guidance 
can Adorno’s philosophy provide?   
 
0.2 Whither Modernity? 
 
Any discussion of Adorno must investigate the notion of modernity, considering 
the centrality of the objective social context to his thought. Additionally, the problems of 
modernity are impossible to dissociate from the central problem of modern philosophy: 
freedom. According to Robert Pippin’s Idealism as Modernism (1997), assessments of 
European modernity involve entrenched Enlightenment positions and values. Such 
positions include ‘the conception of nature required by modern science’, political 
standards of ‘liberty, rights and equality’, pragmatic views of individuals as ‘self-reliant, 
responsible agents’, and the notion of a commonly held rationality binding society 
together and allowing it to measure its evolution by commonly agreed-upon evaluations 
of progress. Equally entrenched in modernity are so-called ‘anti-Enlightenment’ 
positions, such as the positing of imagination above reason, the onus on creativity as a 
prerequisite for expression, and a tendency towards relativism in the celebration of 
diversity.  
 
According to Pippin, these latter positions owe much, despite themselves, to the 
accomplishments of modernity and Enlightenment positions entailed therein, yet all 
these positions contain philosophically contestable claims. Considering all these positions 
entail orientations towards a better future, the philosophical dispute about modernity 
concerns the ‘general claim for the universal normative superiority of distinctly modern 
institutions and practices’ (Pippin 1997, p.3). In other words, the question of modernity 
becomes one of the extent to which it is assumed that the orientation towards a better 
future is adequately provided for by the predominant role of ‘modern institutions and 
                                                                                                                                      
plurality of meaning(s), none of which can be accounted for fully by the individual subject. See e.g. 
Foucault 1991 
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practices’. While these often claim to exist on behalf of universal principles, they also 
often fail to provide for distinctly individual needs. 
 
Modernity, at various times, has come to mean a plethora of different things. It 
has been interpreted, according to Pippin, as a dispute between ‘modern’ (19th Century 
onwards) and ‘pre-modern’ conceptions of civilization, as the ‘philosophy of 
consciousness’, as ‘the technological will to power’, as ‘Western imperialism’, and as the 
starting point, and bane, of postmodernity.5  Irrespective of the dominant narrative 
applied to the discussion of modernity, questions as to its nature multiply in the process 
of their reflection. The panorama of interpretations also suggests, beyond the ‘modern’ 
nature of questions concerning identity, race, justice, equality, etc., a plethora of 
philosophical approaches relying on developments in the period of ‘radical historical 
change’ that modernity represents.  
 
For example, philosophical investigations ranging from the ‘linguistic turn’ to the 
Frankfurt School’s developments of Hegelian dialectics have influenced, and been 
influenced by, the modern period within which they developed. It is therefore possible to 
consider the question of modernity from philosophical perspectives as well as from 
historical ones. According to Pippin, an instance of the continuing relevance of 
philosophy, e.g., can be seen in the way modern practices such as science, law, aesthetic 
appreciation, socio-political practices, etc., are required to justify themselves in normative 
terms - in terms adhered to by all who participate in them - in order for these practices to 
be considered legitimate. The question, then, following Pippin, is why the problem of 
freedom, if assumed central to modernity, is worth pursuing. Why is the ideal of freedom 
held to be sacrosanct in advanced democratic, capitalist societies as a means of 
guaranteeing the development of other satisfactions and needs?  
 
One reason is that if individuals do not feel ‘free’, or they do not feel the ends to 
which they labour result in something compatible with their conception of freedom, they 
will likely not find that their existence, or labour, is legitimate on its own terms. This 
identification with the concept of freedom is as central to one individual’s right to 
religious worship as it is to another’s right to challenge decision-making processes in the 
                                                
5 With all the various intellectual groupings, such as post-structuralism and feminism, that the term 
implies See Pippin 1997, pp. 3-6. 
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workplace. In light of the lack of freedom that pervades so many aspects of human 
existence, then, ‘[t]he claim to be defended concerns why this ideal, human freedom, 
understood ultimately as being a law, a compelling norm, wholly unto oneself, in a 
wholly self-legislated, self-authorised way, should be touted as a supreme or absolute 
ideal…’ (ibid. p.7)  
 
Another reason for raising this question can be found in the identification of 
elements determining the experience of modernity, thereby providing benchmarks 
against which the experience of freedom can be judged. A social reliance on technology 
has historically been central to the process of modernisation, and the possibilities of 
technology have been widely promoted as the modern catalyst and incarnation of 
freedom. Technology influences most, if not all, features of modern life – many forms of 
communication and the production and distribution of goods and services central to 
economies have become unthinkable without it, and it has become central to gathering 
information pertaining to any human, institutional or natural entity.  
 
Technological power has, therefore, also become central to sustaining the idea of 
liberal democracy. According to Pippin, it is credited with containing, within the sheer 
power of its reach and possibility, the impetus for a more egalitarian society, and it is 
thus understood that its power is justified in a manner compatible with ‘democratic 
notions of accountability’. The collective benefits of technology are also exemplified by 
the levels of technical expertise that allow it to be of service to the overall commercial 
system of production and distribution by abetting the individual pursuit of self-interest in 
the free market central to Western capitalism. However, the increasing power of 
technology requires the critique of that power if it is to be legitimated, a critique extending 
to a swathe of political and philosophical problems central to the ‘discontents of 
modernity’.  
 
Certainly, the extensive reliance on technology inevitably creates specific social 
costs, and new ethical problems that change the context of political discourse, as 
technology plays its role in altering concepts by which individuals understand themselves. 
For example, as technology develops, the power structures it serves arguably become 
increasingly unaccountable to the vast majority of the global populace it affects, because 
individuals are susceptible to its social effects at all times. There is therefore a schism 
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between the increasing power of technical accomplishment, and how that power is 
allocated throughout society, particularly considering the vast majority of the global 
populace lacks access to many benefits the latest technology provides. Concurrently, the 
sway of technology over the development of modern societies demonstrates how 
numerous areas of life are modified to suit technical ends, rather than conversely, 
suggesting that the balance between human and purely technical needs - an integral 
centrepiece of democracy - is possibly threatened.  
 
One example of technology threatening democratic standards is illustrated in the 
manner ISP’s track web traffic of specific users, and subsequently sell that information to 
third parties. Such information can be used for a variety of purposes, e.g. to determine 
habits in order to target web-based advertising, or, worse, to reveal personal details that 
could compromise individuals. For example, as Cohen suggests, ‘there is no guarantee 
that… information stay[s] with the company (or ISP) that collected it. It can be sold to 
employers or insurance companies, which have financial motives for wanting to know if 
their workers and policyholders are alcoholics or have AIDS.’6 Such breach of privacy 
compromises the status of individuals and thereby their livelihood, posing a threat to 
wider democratic freedoms as it becomes a socially widespread occurrence.  
 
Another example is how skill-sets considered relevant by contemporary social 
standards come to be determined by what technocratic administrative forces consider to 
be relevant for their own needs. A social revolution in which skill-sets are transferred to 
unique, specialised mediums developed through modern technology can render a labour 
force more systematically de-skilled, instead of increasingly competent, as requirements of 
technological automation enforce hierarchical and increasingly constraining demands on 
the work force. As Pippin suggests, ‘job simplification, greater risks to worker safety 
resulting from conformity to more efficient machines, and a variety of organisational 
strategies, [are] all relatively inconsistent with basic post-Enlightenment ideals of self-
respect, dignity and autonomy’ (ibid. p.186). Job training, for example, often emphasises 
skills like repetition and efficiency over creativity or critical thought. Such considerations 
touch on preoccupations of Adorno’s work, and it is by bearing these in mind that 
possibilities exist of reworking the kernel of his thought in correspondence with 
contemporary problems.  
                                                
6 See Cohen 2008. 
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Even more relevant to the past half-century than the immediate post-war period 
during which Adorno developed his critique of the concentration of power in late 
capitalism, moreover, increased spheres of specialisation in the workforce and at 
managerial levels of decision-making arguably reduce the range of topics available for 
public qua political debate. As various areas to which technical progress contributes 
require specific debates between experts in those areas, debates themselves become more 
distant from the general public’s understanding of them. This is a serious concern for the 
very notion of democracy, and is addressed in depth in the work of Habermas.7  
 
If political debate about the validity of these areas of technical progress is limited 
to internecine struggles between competing experts in those fields, the notion of the 
schism between human and technological needs becomes clearer. If technology develops 
at a rate that the public cannot understand it – or its social implications - there can be no 
substantial political debate about the common direction that a society based on the 
premise of technological progress should take, thus undercutting the democratic 
legitimacy of that direction. Furthermore, the social power of technology is seemingly 
concentrated in ever fewer hands as a result of corporate competition, ensuring that the 
power of technology is exercised in social configurations from top to bottom, moving 
from the private to the public realm. This contrasts with the ideal associated with 
technology, in which social power is exercised in democratic configurations in which 
equal access to information and knowledge enables democratic accountability as to the 
direction of that power.  
 
At the heart of these dilemmas lies the notion of reason. What is rational? Where 
it is perceived as ‘rational’ to correlate social progress and increasing technical efficiency 
as a single objective, a vital question emerges: how rational is a functional – or 
instrumental - rationality that becomes socially predominant to the extent that it 
permeates every aspect of life, to the point of becoming ideological? Without a critical 
account of such a phenomenon, how would such rationality justify its character without 
mere recourse to the ideological elements that make it predominant?  
 
                                                
7 See e.g. Habermas 1992 
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The problem at the heart of this notion of reason, if indeed it is ideological, is 
that technological imperatives are often satisfied first, particularly because of benefits they 
are expected to provide to the ever-increasing demands of global economic competition. 
Considerations as to possible social costs or other ethical dilemmas are often only made 
in hindsight. The question, in that case, becomes one of separating reason from ideology. 
If ideology is taken to mean the pre-eminence of a given set of ideas in the social process 
that are automatically validated as part of the instrumentality of that process, and 
therefore no longer submitted to a normative process of justification, it follows these 
ideas are not being substantiated as a matter of continual reasoning. This question leads 
to a problem at the heart of ‘postmodernity’.  
 
Where ‘postmodernity’ refers to cultural, political and social changes during the 
period extending from the late 20th century through the present and beyond, the term 
‘postmodernism’ references a variety of thought pertaining to this era, including in 
architecture, philosophy and the arts. Whereas ‘modernity’ is identified with 
Enlightenment and the industrial revolutions characterising Western society in the 19th 
and 20th centuries, ‘postmodernity’ addresses the post-industrial ‘information age’ 
marking the shift from the industrial age to the knowledge economy, with postmodern 
philosophy often concentrating on perceived shortcomings of Enlightenment rationality.  
 
For theorists such as Jameson, postmodernity coincides with the passage to 
Mandel’s definition of ‘late capitalism’. Mandel characterised capitalism in three phases: 
the first, market capitalism, occurred from the mid-19th century onwards, the second, the 
monopoly or ‘imperial’ stage of capitalism, occurred from the late 19th century onwards, 
and the third, ‘late capitalism’, occurs from the mid-20th century onwards. For Jameson, 
late capitalism is marked by the ‘completion’ of modernisation and is defined by 
multinational corporations, the fluidity of capital, and the ‘prodigious expansion of 
capital into hitherto uncommodified areas’:  
  
[m]odernisation was the process of transformation: the generalisation of industrial production, 
the mechanisation of various spheres of social life, and generally the subsumption of society 
under capital. The completion of modernisation means that there is no more “nature” in the 
sense that nothing remains outside the forces of modernisation. All of society… indeed the 
entire world, have been subsumed under the rule of capital (Hardt & Weeks 2000, p.16).    
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According to this passage, industrialisation coterminous with modernity has been 
completed, and has become a feature of modern life to the extent that the sense of 
nature as something ‘outside’, and distinct from, industrial society has disappeared. 
Instead, forces of modernisation encompass all aspects of modern life, to the point that 
the ‘rule of capital’ has become perceived as ‘natural’ in its own right. Such a claim can be 
illustrated by e.g., the extent to which the marketplace has entered the private sphere of 
the home through the possibility of financial transactions of any kind, to and from 
anywhere, at any given time.  
 
Furthermore, technology as a ubiquitous feature of late capitalism both facilitates 
and encourages market transaction: technology destined for the marketplace is 
increasingly easy to use and continually updated to remain competitive, ensuring the 
permanence of technology itself as a feature of modern life. Finally, the claim that 
‘nothing remains outside the forces of modernisation’ becomes clearer if it is considered 
how, at times, indiscernibly, technology becomes an extension of the self, often to the 
degree that behavioural patterns are determined or profoundly influenced by the 
quotidian interaction with it. ‘Postmodernity’, then, is defined, in part, by the social 
power exerted by capitalism, the ubiquity of technology as the most powerful and 
persuasive component of capitalism, and the notion that all aspects of modern life are 
co-determined by capital and technology. 
 
Postmodernity is also understood in the context of ‘breaking’ with modernity, 
and as such, according to its theoreticians, with the Enlightenment project central to it. 
According to Baghramian,  
 
Postmodernism scorns the quest for universal values, cognitive and moral, as a manifestation of 
the will to power masquerading as objectivity. The Enlightenment is seen as a monolithic, 
authoritarian movement closely allied with Western imperialism and colonialism, while 
postmodernism is an ally in the fight for emancipation from tyrannies of all sorts (Baghramian 
2004, p.106). 
 
It follows for its proponents, postmodernity, with its scope of consumer choice, personal 
possibility and free information, presents the opportunity to eradicate repressive 
narratives of reason, borne from Enlightenment thinking, that have served authoritarian 
objectives. Such objectives, according to these opponents of Enlightenment rationality, 
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routinely include Western economic and military domination of the rest of the world, 
European colonisation, racial and minority subjugation by powerful elites and deliberate 
urban segregation, among other things.  
 
From this perspective, the universal values and rationality associated with 
Enlightenment are understood to be means for serving interests of specific identities by 
facilitating the subjugation of other identities, particularly according to hierarchical 
conceptions of identity along racial lines. By this account, in what Gilroy calls ‘European 
particularism dressed up as universal’8, the conception of Western civilization as ‘rational’ 
because of its espousal of ‘universal values’ facilitated the designation of other cultures 
and peoples as ‘unenlightened’. This, so this narrative goes, provided moral justification 
for economic expansionism, colonialism, and the hierarchical structuring of society, 
under the guise of spreading universal values and Western rationality beyond Western 
civilization.  
 
Western power, by this account, was in large measure cemented through its 
emphasis on identification, and attribution of identity according to racial and cultural 
stereotypes - a repressive measure to ensure that the hierarchy of power would remain 
unchallenged. The ‘break with modernity’, therefore, is seen as the opportunity for 
emancipation from these repressive structures of reason and for empowering individuals. 
It follows that the ‘postmodern condition’ of high social mobility, globalisation, 
technological egalitarianism, etc. serves to challenge and overthrow narrow conceptions 
of identity, and the hierarchical structuring of social power, by redefining social 
objectives in terms of subjective needs and interests.    
 
Habermas, however, points out Enlightenment thought cannot simply be 
identified with the Western ‘will to power’, that challenging repressive structures of 
thought is a central Enlightenment objective, and that, contrarily, postmodern ambitions 
of doing away with Enlightenment thinking as the source of those structures only serves 
to further consolidate them. ‘The idea of postmodernism,’ he writes, ‘appears among 
theoreticians who do not see that any uncoupling of modernity and rationality has set in’. 
In postmodernity, he explains, ‘reason makes known its true identity – it becomes 
                                                
8 Quoted in Murphy & Choi 1997, p.41 
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unmasked as the subordinating and [simultaneously] the subjugated subjectivity, as the 
will to instrumental mastery’ (Habermas 1990, p.4).  
 
From this perspective, abandoning the Enlightenment search for objective 
rationality culminates in a dangerous subjectivism because it relies on the immediacy of 
the given world, where reason is reduced to instrumental processes through which the 
subjective will is exercised. Without a continual search for objective measures, reason is 
reduced to being ‘the will to instrumental mastery’, and, as such, is both victim and 
aggressor – the source of both subjective suffering and of subjective primacy. Subjective 
primacy, it follows, is a source of suffering in two ways: First, individuals cause suffering 
if, in their will to satisfy subjective needs, they do so in ways harming others. Second, if 
‘the will to instrumental mastery’ is, at least partly, a means to achieving subjective 
primacy, individuals become oblivious to ways they harm others and (especially) 
themselves, as a consequence of the social emphasis on instrumental mastery and 
disregard of objective measures to judge this mastery by.  
 
The culture of postmodernity is rife with conditions emphasising subjectivity 
over objectivity, illustrated by how technology often serves to reinforce subjectivity, 
rather than encourage objectivity, considering e.g. that for all available information on 
any topic on the Internet, individuals are likely to go to sources already conforming to 
pre-existing beliefs or ideological inclinations. We may also consider how technology 
facilitates consumption of products in conformity with pre-existing ideas of self, in the 
sense that technology facilitates satisfaction of subjective desires while blurring 
distinctions between legitimate and socially engineered needs. Without objective 
measures to judge by, subjective primacy can easily be interpreted as a ‘legitimate’ form 
of reason, particularly if it dominates everyday social practices.  
 
Certainly, postmodern thinking considers itself emancipatory, and stakes its own 
claims to objectivity, examined below. The question is how a form of reason, whatever its 
emphasis, comes to be legitimated in the social realm. This thesis submits there is cause 
to think that ‘instrumental’ types of rationality subtending the predominance of 
technology in modern society are self-legitimating and have limited recourse to standards 
of objectivity outside themselves and indeed, that forms of subject-centred reasoning 
determine the dominant practices of modern society.  
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Conversely, pace Pippin, a Hegelian conception of the ‘rational’ in modern social 
reality should be considered. This notion holds that social reality is sustained and 
reproduced by recourse to the legitimacy of the ‘rational’ and ‘free agency’ arising from it. 
This means a social reality becomes as such as a result of the legitimacy of the process 
that created it. That legitimacy hinges on a form of reason that has been consented to by 
participating members of society, and consented to because it is mutually beneficial to all. 
As suggested, a measure of how individuals evaluate their existence is the extent to which 
they consider themselves to be free; a form of reason consented to because it buttresses 
individual conceptions of freedom is therefore legitimated in social reality. From this 
perspective, then, how is it claimed that technology is self-legitimating when it has the 
consent of most members of society, precisely because of the perception that it helps to 
increase their individual freedom?  
 
Thus arise competing conceptions of reason: one in which reason essentially 
derives its legitimacy from itself and the manner in which it is used to pursue subjective 
ends, and one in which its perpetuation depends on a mutual consent of all and is 
thereby legitimated. While these conceptions seem complementary, however, they are 
equally at odds. For example, mutual consent of all members of society to modern forms 
of rationality enables individuals to pursue subjectively chosen ends. However, 
consequences of the pursuit of individual ends can conflict with the mutual, democratic 
consent of all, and may be realised only by undermining that consent.  
 
Conflicting interpretations of what reason is, characteristic of attempts to explain 
postmodernity, thus raise central questions concerning which elements of reason 
dominate postmodern life. Has the Western intellectual tradition surrendered to its own 
internal contradictions, ultimately accepting what Pippin calls a culmination in ‘nihilism, a 
technological will to power or a thoughtless hegemonic subjectivism’ (Pippin 1997, p.8)? 
Or, as Pippin suggests, is the tradition of Enlightenment still upheld by ‘[the] defensible 
moral aspiration: to live freely’ (ibid.)? Contradictions between freedom, legitimacy and 
subjectivity begotten by modern rationality suggest the question of whether the 
aspiration to ‘live freely’ is complemented in ideological fashion by technological progress, 
the prerogative of subjectivism accompanying it, and nihilistic social attitudes resulting 
from it.  
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Indeed, each of these elements depends on the concept of freedom to justify 
variations of rationality they claim to pursue. Perceptions of reason encompassing these 
competing factors, then, have done little to quell the question, stretching back to Kant, 
about the relationship between reason and freedom. The potential for arguments in 
favour of an irresolvable, contradictory relationship between reason and freedom is as 
old as questions concerning civilization itself. As Freud remarked:  
 
It is remarkable that, little as men are able to exist in isolation, they should nevertheless feel as a 
heavy burden the sacrifices which civilization expects of them in order to make a communal life 
possible. Thus civilization has to be defended against the individual, and its regulations, 
institutions and commands are directed to that task… human creations are easily destroyed, and 
science and technology, which have built them up, can also be used for their annihilation (Freud 
1995, p.687).  
 
Or perhaps Eagleton put it best: ‘…the drive to regulate Nature is madly in excess of 
necessity. There is also something pathological about this rage for order: it conceals a 
ferocious inner compulsion which is the very opposite of freedom. In the name of a 
desire for absolute security, cities are shattered, blameless civilians burnt and 
dismembered…’ (Eagleton 2005, p. 12). This idea that civilization must be defended 
against individuals, and is willing to go so far as to destroy itself in order to do so, for 
example, takes on particular significance in view of the contemporary ‘Global War on 
Terror’, a recurring discussion in this thesis.  
 
A central problem, then, is the aporia of the subjective instinct of freedom 
posited against an objective reality over which individuals have limited control. It could 
be suggested that ideological undertones associated with modern experience have 
enabled the institutionalisation, or social acceptance, of this state of affairs. In the sense 
discussed above, with diminishing public deliberation as to what technological 
development should imply, it would seem that technological power, vindicated in the 
court of scientific reason, has become self-legitimating, with no democratic recourse to 
the public it is supposed to serve. It could further be suggested that technology, by acting 
as an intermediary between individuals, actually does more to divide them through their 
dependence on it for their communication with one another, than it does to unite them. 
This would indicate conflicting demands of freedom and reason have been ‘resolved’ by 
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making the impetus of technological progress inseparable from the freedom touted 
ideologically in democratic societies. It would suggest that the claim that reason and 
freedom are the same is little more than an ideological statement supported by a social 
reality of ‘exchange-value pragmatism’.9 The notion that freedom amounts to nothing 
more than modern forms of rationality driven by pragmatic and economic concerns is 
clearly problematic. What, then, is the positive essence of postmodernity, and what are 
the claims made on its behalf? 
 
0.3 A Postmodern Intervention 
 
According to Jean-François Lyotard, the ‘postmodern’ is the ‘unpresentable in 
presentation itself’. At the historical moment where transmission of knowledge 
‘suppl[ies] the system with players capable of acceptably fulfilling their roles at the 
pragmatic posts required by their institutions’, the ‘old principle that the acquisition of 
knowledge is indissociable from the training (Bildung) of minds, or even of individuals is 
becoming obsolete and will become ever more so’ (Lyotard 2001, p.4). This suggests 
how the new scientific-technological system of information-sharing has replaced the 
traditional manner of knowledge sharing between individuals, and that the speed with 
which information is developed, shared and discarded is compromising the ‘traditional’, 
‘verified’ system of training minds.  
 
Lyotard also maintains that ‘scientific knowledge does not represent the totality 
of knowledge’ (ibid. p.7), offering as the alternative a form of ‘narrative’ knowledge – 
knowledge communicated between individuals where its transfer is the object of the 
narrative. For example, Kant’s assumption that things cannot be known in themselves, 
and therefore that objects of knowledge conform to human faculties of representation, is 
an example of ‘narrative’ knowledge. At the time of publishing The Postmodern Condition 
(1973), Lyotard couldn’t be expected to foresee how, under auspices of social progress, 
the labour of science has since fused with a near-universally employed technological 
vehicle to communicate narrative forms of knowledge: the Internet. The Internet, with 
                                                
9 ‘Exchange-value pragmatism’ refers to Marxian distinctions between the use-value and exchange-
value of commodities. For Adorno, ‘society has come to be organised around the production of 
exchange values for the sake of producing exchange values, which, of course, always already requires a 
silent appropriation of surplus value’ (Zuidervaart, 2011). Baudrillard has argued the concept of use-
value no longer exists in ‘the system of objects’, exchange-value having replaced use-value as the only 
relevant idea in that system. See Baudrillard 2001.   
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its technical and communicative possibilities, has become the staple of progressive 
society and the vehicle for the postmodern civitas maxima: The release of obligation from 
traditional bourgeois mores of identity, and its replacement by a free exchange of 
subjective choice.  
 
Implicit in this exchange is the desire for release from the constraints of identity 
in determining knowledge. What Castells defines as specific to the informational mode of 
development as ‘the action of knowledge upon knowledge itself as the main source of 
productivity’ (Castells 2000, p.17), is precisely how science converges with narrative 
flows of information to create knowledge. This facilitates access to knowledge for all 
members of society, provided they have access to means of obtaining information. 
Leaving the issue of discrepancies between first and developing world access to such 
means aside, the problem with this dominant form of utilitarianism is it leaves 
unresolved issues of legitimacy, and, specifically, those of its own legitimation.    
 
Legitimation, according to Lyotard, is, first, ‘the process by which a legislator is 
authorised to promulgate… law as a norm’ (Lyotard 2001, p.8), and, emphasising 
scientific legitimation, the process by which ‘a legislator dealing with scientific discourse 
is authorised to prescribe the stated conditions… determining whether a statement is to 
be included in that discourse for consideration by the scientific community’ (ibid.). 
Second, legitimation refers to the problem of legitimating narratives as ‘the quintessential 
form of customary knowledge’ (ibid, p.19), presumably in the sphere of the public agora. 
For precisely, as he asks, ‘who decides what knowledge is, and who knows what needs to 
be decided’ (ibid, p.9)?  
 
Accordingly, this process finds its parallel in what Lyotard terms ‘language-
games’, and the essence of these is that ‘the observable social bond is composed of 
language “moves”’ (ibid, p.10), which are ever-changing even within the strictures of 
social strata. The interchange of dialogue in the social context is guided by what Lyotard 
calls agonistics - literally meaning conflict between members of a species - and in this 
case referring to differences in opinion held by individuals, as a result of which language 
games are played. It follows that agonistics give rise to ‘paralogisms of newness’ – new 
situations and paradigms of knowledge that then compete between themselves, ensuring 
a constant renewal of understanding.  
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Knowledge is a process that ‘goes beyond the simple determination and 
application of the criterion of truth, extending to the determination and application of 
criteria of efficiency (technical qualification), of justice and/or happiness (ethical 
wisdom), of the beauty of a sound or colour (auditory and visual sensibility), etc.’ (ibid, 
p.18). According to Lyotard, the problem of legitimation can be determined as follows:  
 
There is, then… incommensurability between popular narrative pragmatics, which provides 
immediate legitimation, and the language game known to the West as the question of legitimacy - 
or rather, legitimacy as a referent in the game of inquiry. Narratives… determine criteria of 
competence and/or illustrate how they are to be applied. They thus define what has the right to 
be said and done in the culture in question, and since they are themselves a part of that culture, 
they are legitimated by the simple fact that they do what they do (ibid., p.23). 
 
It follows that traditional institutional bodies, such as religion, are no longer in a position 
to exercise conventional roles of embodying fixed social meanings, accounting in part for 
the ‘loss of meaning’ or ‘disenchantment’ accompanying (post)modernity. In place of 
such traditional social frameworks, a constant uprooting, transformation and displacing 
of knowledge and understanding has become a staple of modern life – in part due to the 
technology made possible by science – thereby changing social frameworks of 
understanding continuously, making it near-impossible to ascribe fixed and commonly 
recognisable meanings to them.  
 
The same applies to the realm of ‘narrative knowledge’, where the narrative chain 
of knowledge is changed by each individual in that chain so there is no longer a unified 
‘narrative’ by which people, as individuals or collectively, identify themselves. As such, 
Lyotard holds that ‘[l]amenting the “loss of meaning” in postmodernity boils down to 
mourning the fact that knowledge is no longer principally narrative. Such a reaction does 
not necessarily follow. Neither does an attempt to derive or engender… scientific 
knowledge from narrative knowledge, as if the former contained the latter in an 
embryonic state’ (ibid., pp. 26-27). In other words, the notion that narrative knowledge 
no longer provides fixed meanings with which individuals traditionally identified should 
not be cause for concern that meaning has disappeared entirely. For example, scientific 
knowledge relies on a continuous process of refuting hypotheses that doesn’t rely on fixed 
narratives, and where ‘meaning’ is in constant flux.  
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Conversely, Lyotard suggests attempts to preserve a narrative – such as, e.g., the 
‘meta-narrative’ of Enlightenment – is a false response to the supposed freedom offered 
by this revolutionary state of affairs: the freedom, e.g., from fixed identities or concepts of 
knowledge. What then, however, happens to reflection on standards of truth by which 
individuals understand themselves, if social concepts of knowledge and understanding 
are forever changing? How, if standards of truth are to be gathered from awareness of 
the ever-changing nature of meaning itself, can individuals develop reliable concepts 
according to which they may judge and legitimate those standards? 
 
 The idea central to postmodernism is that the ‘self-conscious, self-identical 
subject’ is subjected to ‘coercive unification’ (ibid). Such ‘coercive unification’ of 
individuals is, accordingly, provided by meta-narratives such as the Enlightenment, which 
strictly defines and measures parameters of human behaviour according to allegedly rigid 
conceptions of reason. Conversely, Lyotard argues that individuals’ conceptual 
representations of worldly intuitions cannot be monopolised by a single narrative 
claiming to account for them all, instead suggesting an ‘irreducible plurality’ of views 
where no one particular narrative takes precedence. This idea appears to mirror one 
sense of modern science, which is not to achieve absolute knowledge but to judge 
hypotheses against experience in the interests of advancing objective understanding. By 
this token, competition between the ‘irreducible plurality’ of narratives would fulfil a 
corresponding function to the objective process of science in the modern world, in the 
continual displacement of narratives by temporarily stronger ones that help liberate 
individuals from the ‘coercive unification’ of any particular ‘meta-narrative’.  
 
It follows that the postmodern project designates the overall Western concept of 
Enlightenment as just one narrative among others, and one whose precepts of 
universality have come to be over-represented within the overall narrative of modernity – 
so much so that it is a popular claim in postmodern thought that Enlightenment itself is 
‘totalitarian’ (or a variation thereof).10 To this accusation, Habermas has responded that 
                                                
10 The accusation that ‘Enlightenment is totalitarian’ was initially made by Adorno and Horkheimer in 
the Dialectic of Enlightenment (2002, p.4). The claim will receive due treatment, but suffice to say 
presently that their version referenced the idea that Enlightenment indirectly led to the fascism they 
witnessed in Germany in the 1930’s primarily because of its ‘instrumental’ rationality. In Lyotard’s 
context, the ‘totalitarian’ charge applies to the extent that the meta-narrative of Enlightenment ‘crowds 
out’ alternative narrative strands of history, society and philosophy.    
Prospects Beyond Ideology: Reason, Freedom and the Truth of the Subject – 
Towards Political Models for the Critical Thought of Theodor W. Adorno 
 
 24 
postmodern movements find themselves trapped in ‘the possibility that neo-
conservatism and aesthetically inspired anarchism, in the name of a farewell to 
modernity, are merely trying to revolt against [modernity] once again. It could be’, he 
suggests, ‘that they are merely cloaking their complicity with the venerable tradition of 
counter-Enlightenment in the garb of post-Enlightenment’ (Habermas 1990, p.6).  
 
Habermas’ point about ‘neo-conservatism’ alludes to a conflicting interpretation 
of the effects of science and technology on the public sphere to the more hopeful 
interpretation implicit in Lyotard’s theory, namely the notion of the ‘subjectification’ of 
meaning, also treated by Adorno as the ‘complement of reification’, and continued in 
some of Habermas’ work. The premise of ‘subjectification’ is that individuals become 
‘secondary to and dependent upon the societal process’ (Pickford 2002, p.316) because 
of the ‘totalisation’ of factors such as the economy, bureaucratic administration, culture 
and technology in social life, and thereby in the lives of individuals.  
 
Rather than acting as ‘irreducible and democratic determinant[s] of society’ 
(ibid.), purposefully contributing to each of those social endeavours, individuals by this 
account have little choice but to accept the extent to which these elements determine 
their lives. One consequence of this powerlessness is that individuals internalise 
dominant ideological narratives about, e.g., the economy, popular culture, modern 
technology and science, as their own benchmarks for evaluating truth of competing 
narratives. For example, individual preferences pertaining to economic doctrine are more 
likely to reflect background, social experience and traditional political allegiance than 
analyses of competing economic theories, including their demonstrable social effects. By 
a similar token, the social consensus that technology reflects progress likely has more to 
do with the fact that most people in industrialised societies depend on technology in 
their daily lives, than it does with reflection on the meaning of ‘social progress’.  
 
In these ways, the modern world encourages individuals to rely on subjective 
intuitions derived from ‘immediate’ experience, as opposed to encouraging the search for 
objective points of reference beyond this immanent experience from which to conduct 
inquiry. From this perspective of the ‘subjectification’ of experience, then, the 
postmodern ‘revolt’ against modernity and, by extension, Enlightenment, is based on 
dogmatic, ‘conservative’ assumptions that the ‘immediacy’ of the modern world to 
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individual intuition is an adequate philosophical measure by which to conduct objective 
inquiry. Similarly, where postmodern thought attacks Enlightenment as out-dated 
ideology, the extent to which it relies on the immediacy of social experience as it is 
‘given’ to individuals suggests how it neglects to consider its own reliance on a form of 
ideology.  
 
Zygmunt Bauman has characterised a problem with the postmodern attitude as 
follows:  
 
The threats related to postmodernity are highly familiar: they are… thoroughly modern in nature. 
Now, as before, they stem from that horror vacui that modernity made into the principle of social 
organisation and personality formation…The sin of postmodernity is to abandon the effort and 
to deny the belief (the modern mentality that “the job can be done”); this double act appears to 
be indeed a sin, once one remembers that abandoning effort and denying belief does not, by 
itself, neutralise the awesome propelling of the fear of the void; and postmodernity has done next 
to nothing to support its defiance of past pretence with a new practical antidote for old poison 
(Bauman 2001, p.198). 
 
Bauman suggests how postmodern attempts to move beyond their nemeses of ‘coercive 
unification’, ‘social organisation’ and ‘personality formation’ by attributing them to 
modernity rely on a false assumption: That freedom from fixed social concepts of 
meaning in the post-industrial information age no longer relies on the same axiom of 
social organisation that modernity did: the horror vacui.  
 
This ‘fear of the void’ is essentially the search for meaning and comfort in the 
face of the indifference of nature that characterises human behaviour. Postmodernity 
offers criticism of previous attempts at filling this void, pace Bauman, without providing 
its own solutions. Instead, it ‘abandons effort’ and ‘denies belief’, a reference to the 
insouciance with which postmodern thought sometimes fails to recognise how freedom 
from fixed concepts of meaning can itself be an instance of coercive unification, and how 
postmodern thought often attacks beliefs arrived at through tried and tested reasoning 
out of a contrarian impulse, as opposed to presenting demonstrable alternatives. The 
reaction against Enlightenment, and by extension, Enlightenment rationality that is itself 
central to being able to articulate the tenets of postmodernism, begs questions as to 
what, precisely, its own delineation of rationality is supposed to be.  
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If the central tenets of postmodernity are an ‘irreducible plurality’ of narratives, 
combined with an exalted position for ‘alterity’, or ‘otherness’, which are not accountable 
to any singular narrative of reason, and if it is then assumed that the idea of 
postmodernity relies to large degrees on possibilities created by the technological 
determination of society, then it isn’t clear how postmodernity has avoided the perils of 
falling prey to ideology that it claims the Enlightenment did. What, then, might function 
as the ‘practical antidote for old poison’, or, put differently, as a form of reasoning that 
might avoid succumbing to ideology? What choices remain available to individuals when 
confronted by the ‘fear of the void’ – the fear, that is, of the emptiness and lack of 
meaning in modern life and, more broadly, of the relative insignificance of single lives 
against the larger indifference of nature?  
 
0.4 The Ideology of Technology 
 
To the end of confronting this horror vacui, is technology just another form of 
ideology? The faith in technology could well be rooted in the possibilities of technology, 
rather than in weighting its experience. Pippin suggests that ‘ironically, an energetic 
technological optimism is required precisely because of a kind of philosophical 
pessimism, a great reduction in expectation about what sort of “guidance” philosophy 
might provide’ (Pippin 1997, p. 199). Pace Pippin, the critical concept of technology as a 
form of ideology is made possible by the central claim in Kantian philosophy that there 
can be conditions of experience not derived from experience, but constitutive of the 
possibility of experience.  
 
Kant’s ‘transcendental unity of apperception’ concerns the necessary conditions 
of experience, and the principles giving rise to consciousness. It follows that the 
necessary condition for individuals to have conscious experience is to recognise 
experiences as their own, where the act of reflecting upon experience is what Kant calls 
‘apperception’. The ‘transcendental unity of apperception’ is the unity of individual 
subjectivity brought about by recognition that experience of the world is through a single 
consciousness, which is the individual’s own. This unity is ‘transcendental’ because it also 
denotes the limitation of cognition: individuals cannot experience beyond their own 
cognition. This single consciousness – the unity of the self - is the continuous process of 
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self-recognition as an object of experience, which also allows for the possibility of 
making judgements and regarding oneself as a free agent. However, this unity of the self 
relies on acts of synthesis between the self and its objects of experience that are not 
themselves experienced.  
 
According to Kant’s transcendental logic, these acts of synthesis are conditions 
of consciousness and experience, but cannot themselves be experienced because they are 
already universally necessary for experience to take place: they are the a priori elements 
making thought possible in the first place. A priori knowledge, therefore, is that which is 
known not through experience of the world but independently of experience, through 
synthesis with standards of thought which must be universal and necessary, such as time 
and causality. Kant calls these ‘forms of intuition’. These a priori forms are constitutive of 
subjectivity in as far as they are among elements necessary for experience to take place. 
However, this notion of a priori knowledge that is not experienced also enables the idea 
of a priori constraints on experience, or on the formation of beliefs. This idea suggests 
that sensuous experience of an object must always already conform to a priori cognitive 
faculties of the subject, meaning it cannot be known purely in and of itself. Experience 
of the world must, in this case, first submit to the cognitive faculties and consciousness 
of individuals, meaning there is an a priori constraint on experience itself.  
 
The idea that things cannot be known purely in themselves also means that a 
large part of cognition takes place on the basis of belief formation – meaning, experience 
of something either reinforces or diminishes belief pertaining to it. This belief formation, 
and therefore consciousness itself, can be ideological in any number of ways, precisely 
because cognition relies on beliefs that exclude other beliefs. If there are a priori 
constraints on belief formation and consciousness in general, then it also becomes 
possible to criticise consciousness as potentially ‘false’, which is the task of ideology 
critique (Ideologiekritik). To claim an outlook is ideological is to claim this consciousness 
does not allow for contrary evidence, where contrary argument is vital in order to make 
claims about the truth of the experience given to the consciousness in question.  
 
Ideology critique has historically been central to debunking religious, moral or 
political beliefs. In the case of religious practices, ideology critique has been able to show 
that propositions subtending these practices have consisted of claims falling short of 
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objective corroboration, in the sense of offering tangible proof of the existence of God. 
Instead, ideology critique shows that postulating the existence of God relies instead on a 
community of ‘believers’ in the claim that a real entity in the world (God) guides their 
beliefs. The reinforcement of the claim that God exists by communities favouring such 
beliefs reveals how the notion of ‘God’ can be an ideology in fact tying those believers 
and their belief-systems together. Similar emphases on ideological undercurrents of 
shared belief systems can equally be applied to political movements based on core sets of 
moral or pragmatic belief. They especially extend to daily life at its most basic, whether in 
how family structures and concomitant values develop at given historical epochs, or how 
social norms are internalised and obeyed without individuals really asking the question 
why they are as they are.  
 
More recently, ideology critique has been instrumental in challenging claims that 
the technological drive represents progress, or whether it merely presents itself as such to 
ensure its perpetuation as part of a broader economic ideology. It would, however, be 
difficult to make generalising claims that technology is only the vehicle for ideological 
conceptions of progress on behalf of all forms of technology. Many technologies, e.g., 
developments in medicine such as improved cancer or AIDS treatments, are to the 
benefit of individual welfare and universal alleviation of human suffering. The question 
concerning technology and ideology is therefore not simply one of either/or - either 
technology serves an ideology of progress tying its believers in the community together 
in an uncritical manner befitting the overall structure of capital, or technology is a force 
for the human good. For example, an important degree of the social power of 
technological forces can be attributed to the extent to which their continual innovation 
allows individuals to discover novel contexts and parameters of experience, and express 
these in hitherto unchartered ways: the productive powers of these forces themselves can 
therefore not only be attributed to a broad, uncritical acceptance of technology as social 
progress. Conversely, the question from a critical standpoint is also to show, however, 
that technological rationality itself becomes overwhelmingly powerful because of the 
degree to which it is integrated into material life, which also results in its political and 
democratic unaccountability. The question, then, is also whether the ability to assess and 
challenge the way technology alters human relations to the natural world has been 
compromised.  
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Have the social effects of technology resulted in experience of social, political, 
and personal life as taking place predominantly, and increasingly only, through filters 
created by technological imperatives? If so, does this reflect the emergence of a 
dominant form of rationality ideologically dependent on perpetuation of technology for 
its own sake, and is that rationality detrimental to the critical and reflective abilities of 
individuals? Ideology critique often bears upon what remains unexpressed in the 
experience of technology and its underlying rationale, and what technology, often 
ideologized as value-neutral, mediates, hides, and distorts. Accordingly, what is mediated 
‘automatically’ through technology, but accepted as self-evident by individuals, can be 
understood as being constitutive of ‘false consciousness’, where what serves particular 
interests is portrayed as having universal benefits, and what in fact is contingent, 
historical experience is assumed to be ‘natural’.  
 
Such concerns originated in Marxist thought, in which claims of capitalist 
rationality are designated as ideological. In Marxist criticism, the truth of the statement 
that capitalist efficiency dependent on technology is factually efficient, is only temporary. 
Following initial phases of capitalist development, the effectiveness of technological 
progress diminishes into a socially necessary illusion in order to stabilise forces of 
domination arising as a consequence, also to obscure them from public view. In classical 
Marxism, the ‘base’ represents the productive forces of society, where social 
consciousness of those productive forces would translate into dominant social ideas, 
eventually giving rise to an economic, social, political and legal ‘superstructure’. In this 
‘base-superstructure’ relationship, conflicts in relations between productive forces could 
foment social revolutions leading to reorganisation and change at the level of the 
superstructure.  
 
However, social consciousness of the productive forces is itself transformed by 
ideology at this level. The idea of social progress as complementary to technological 
development, however, combined with the realities of state interventionist (‘welfare’) 
capitalism and the broadening middle classes characterising many Western social 
democracies in the 20th century, forced changes in the Marxist critique of political 
economy. Instead, another acute way of assessing the problem of technology became 
suggesting that the stimulus for growing the forces of production comes not from the 
workforce as such, but from vested interests in technology and the sciences themselves. 
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The social system – the superstructure - based on doctrines of technological progress 
thereby becomes self-legitimating because of how productive forces – the base - become 
dependent on the equally self-legitimating imperative of technological efficiency.   
 
Marx himself held science and technology to be thoroughly progressive, and saw 
solutions to contradictions immanent to capitalism as being in the hands of the 
workforce itself. His doctrine of the productive forces, according to Adorno, was rooted 
in the idea that ‘society should be understood from the standpoint of technology and 
that technology should, up to a certain point, be made the key category for 
understanding society in general’ (Adorno 2002, p.13). Developments subsequent to 
Marx’s time suggest that even as technology became more available to the workforce and 
improved social conditions, it also had far-reaching social consequences that would call 
for re-evaluations of the relationship itself between individuals and technology as the 
means of production.  
 
Adorno’s dialectical theory of society, for example, suggests the balance between 
‘relationships of production… changes according to the state of the conflicts within 
society’ (ibid.). One endeavour reassessing the social role of technology was Adorno’s 
and Max Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (henceforth DoE), in which the problem 
of technology, and the mastery of individuals they associated it with, was related to the 
overall attempt to control nature. This attempt to master nature, purportedly for the 
human good, in turn legitimised gross abuses, such as human domination and 
psychological repression, factors readily observable in the Nazi period during which they 
wrote DoE. The overall line of reasoning in DoE is that what appears in modernity as 
rational attacks on myth and superstition, and on religion and pre-modern ways of life, 
also encourages forms of thinking simultaneously incapable of, and resistant to, critical 
thought. The same thinking which identifies itself with the universalising of scientific 
rationality results in, among other things, the control of human consciousness. As 
consciousness ‘narrows’ according to imperatives of instrumental rationality, and 
reflection upon social life and its Enlightenment currents is curtailed, Enlightenment 
itself becomes a myth and an ideology.  
 
While Adorno criticises Enlightenment, however, it is not the same attack made 
by postmodernists. Adorno attacks the a priori belief in Enlightenment rationality at the 
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expense of its actual experience - which, Adorno claims, is what reveals it to be a myth, 
particularly in the context of e.g., Auschwitz, but also in terms of daily life and what he 
calls the ‘Culture Industry’. Adorno does not, however, target the ideal of Enlightenment, 
meaning the search for reason neither dogmatic nor ideological, and he stays true to that 
search by turning that ideal of Enlightenment on Enlightenment itself. This is not the 
same as arguing for de-centred and relative approaches to truth and legitimation, even if 
these arguments do often also coincide with postmodernist Enlightenment critiques. 
 
The problem with this account of the relationship between modernity and 
nature, however, is that it presupposes there is an alternative account of that relationship 
in the human or natural sciences. Such an account could purport to satisfy the same 
criteria of scientific and humanistic inquiry, but would not embody the relations of 
domination that Adorno suggests are characteristic of modern life, and which would not 
have as its ultimate objective the subjugation of nature. It is not clear, however, that 
there can be such an alternative account, and Adorno’s philosophy of ‘negative dialectics’ 
is the attempt to think through the problem of domination in the endeavour of articulating 
a rationality which does not ‘dominate’ its object, as opposed to just creating another 
alternative, systemic account. More is made of this later.  
 
The wider problem with this kind of ideology critique, however, is that, as Pippin 
suggests, ‘(w)hoever is in charge of the design and implementation of technology will be an 
agent deeply socialised in a modern ethos… it is still not clear that such an ethos 
possesses the resources to sustain a political and ethical appeal to reform that may result 
in a system just as efficient, but more humane and just’ (Pippin 1997, p.195). Pippin 
suggests, in contrast to Adorno’s ‘totalising’ account, that the proper kind of doubt to 
have about modernisation and its ever-intensifying dependence on technology, alongside 
the others about domination, metaphysical orientation etc., is that of ‘the uniquely 
modern understanding of the necessity for an ever expanding control over the forces of 
nature’ (ibid. p.197). It is not merely the case that technology reflects the human attempt 
to control nature; it is also the case that humanity provides for itself a reason to continue 
extending that control. The question then becomes how that form of rationality is 
legitimated, particularly when measured against the fundamental human imperative of 
freedom. To what extent does rationality extending control over nature coincide with 
human freedom, and to what degree does it compromise it?   
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If, moreover, as Adorno claims, control over nature is a matter of ideology, then 
it should be distinguished where that control is rationally legitimated, and where it is a 
matter of ideology. One way of approaching the problem is acknowledging that 
technological power is politically and socially legitimate when it is contingently necessary, 
requiring continuous distinction between legitimate technological power in the sense that 
it satisfies human needs, and technological power for its own sake. For example, it would 
be impossible to argue that ‘controlling nature’ in the form of benefiting from MRI’s, 
pacemakers or arterial stents in order to prolong life as opposed to dying ‘naturally’ is an 
abuse of the power of modern technology (unless one simply no longer wishes to live).  
 
Such examples, however, can be expanded to suggest scenarios in which 
advancements are made available only to certain social groups, be it for lack of health 
insurance, finances, accessibility or the social will to extend such possibilities to all. In 
this case it could be argued that technology is used to serve elements already possessing 
social power to the detriment of others, but what then does this say about technology 
itself? The question concerning the mastery over nature needs to be considered, 
therefore, in the context of the social relation of individuals to modernisation and 
technology. If technology is a manifestation of the human will, then the question 
becomes the extent to which the human will itself can be understood in terms of the 
desire to master nature, and the extent to which the social world as it is experienced is 
representative of that desire.  
 
For example, attempts to comprehend reason itself would be incomplete without 
considering how human passions have historically influenced its labour. To what extent 
can reason be understood as something which has arisen instinctually, especially where it 
is invoked in the sense of satisfying desires, where these coincide in some way with the 
mastery of nature? Further, if one of humanity’s ‘passions’ has been to master nature, 
does the predominant role of technology in modern society serve to shape and reinforce 
this understanding of the human will – as ‘reason’ – at the expense of alternative 
approaches to understanding both nature and reason?11 Any evaluation of what modern 
                                                
11 In ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, Heidegger observes that regardless of the extent to which 
humanity becomes capable of controlling nature due to technological advances - to the point of 
possessing enough power to submit nature to large-scale destruction - nature’s mode of ‘revealing’ 
itself happens on its own terms, and not as a result of human control. This means the aspect of human 
control over nature has to do with ‘enframing’ nature according to possibilities afforded by technology, 
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democracy means has to take into account these conflicting interpretations of human 
relations to nature, what is understood as ‘reason’, and the predominant social role of 
forces such as technology in how modern rationality comes to be understood.     
 
According to Pippin, the ‘possibility of modern democracy, under the 
assumption that human beings are egoistic, passion-satisfying engines, would… depend 
essentially on a qualitatively improved, “world-historical” leap in technological power’ 
(ibid. p. 198) seeking to remedy existing political and socio-economic imbalances. Pippin 
suggests the kind of technical power which would permit new kinds of politics depends 
on a new social ethos – one in which all links of the process of modernisation are 
considered simultaneously. For example, he suggests that modern hopes of coordination 
between different sectors of the workforce (an element emphasised heavily in 
globalisation) are connected to, as well as being a break from, pre-existing conceptions of 
the relationship between individual ethics and public life. These aspirations, in turn, are 
connected to the expanding powers of technology, which depends for its progress on the 
process of increased socialisation and integration, and the factors of supply and demand 
inherent to that process.  
 
If the rejection of older forms of politics is understood as being provoked by 
social and intellectual crises, the manner in which technology is employed to provide 
solutions becomes a clearer framework for understanding those crises. Consequently, it 
can be evaluated how well technology succeeds in addressing those crises. It is therefore, 
pace Pippin, impossible to dissociate the question of technology from the question of 
modernity. If there has been a complete break with the ‘pre-modern’, traditional world, 
and if technology is so prevalent that it has reversed the values of that pre-modern world, 
then it would be legitimate to speak of an authentically ‘modern’, or even a ‘postmodern’, 
era. However, as seems a valid proposition in light of global socio-political developments 
at the dawn of the 21st century, the drive to technological power has, at least partially, 
resulted in a ‘dialectical antithesis’ in the form of a harkening back to pre-modern 
standards.  
 
                                                                                                                                      
but not according to nature itself. The danger of such ‘enframing’ is ultimately that humanity blinds 
itself to ways in which nature continuously reveals itself. See Heidegger 1977, pp. 287-317.     
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This is evident in the manner in which respective agents in the so-called ‘Global 
War on Terror’ seek to legitimate often violent agendas by appeal to a ‘higher authority’ 
(usually in the form of ‘God’), whose ‘will’ is to be institutionalised on earth through an 
exalted position for religion in the socio-political, public sphere. As this is widely 
understood to be a backlash at specifically Western modernity, this is a development that 
potentially collapses distinctions between ‘modern’ and ‘pre-modern’ designations of 
history. In light of such considerations, the question of technology and its ideology 
should be measured once again as a matter of contingency, as opposed to merely 
considering it in a historical context marking a radical break with the past. Where does 
this leave the question of the relationship between technology and ideology?  
 
According to Habermas’ account, the problem of technological modernisation 
concerns the scope of its influence on society, in turn legitimating predominantly 
‘instrumental’ appeals to rationality, and concomitantly de-legitimating practical and 
political solutions to problems posed by that understanding of rationality. In short, the 
specific form of rationality central to communicative action has been distorted by the 
demands of technical efficiency. If there are ‘categorically distinct’ forms of 
communicative rationality, then science and technology, by ‘instrumentalising’ that 
rationality, can be considered to be, in part, ideological processes. The development of 
‘purposive rationality’ is, in this instance, restricted to a kind of power that is exercised 
hierarchically, which in turn is legitimated in cultural terms and because culture comes to 
depend on it.  
 
As capitalism seeks rationality in its own perpetual expansion and assumes the 
task of being the provider of basic human needs, traditional worldviews such as religion 
and other traditional cultural mores of the pre-modern era are forced into the private 
sphere of belief, where they can no longer aspire to the universal appeal central to their 
beliefs. Social power is thus claimed through the seeming legitimacy of capitalist 
assertions of having provided universal satisfaction of interests – or at least as close to 
this as any political system has ever come. Measured against the pre-modern era, where 
communication is taken to have been ‘systematically distorted’ and beholden to the 
‘fateful causality of dissociated symbols and suppressed motives’ (Habermas 1992, 
p.127), the success of the claims of capitalism is cast into doubt when it prevents the 
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‘reestablishment of a genuinely interactive life among modern subjects’ (ibid.) and 
thereby becomes an ideology, rather than prevailing as a liberating force.  
 
For Habermas, the question of technology is not that it represents some new 
historical era dissociated from the past, but that it is an extension of the ‘rational action’ 
central to purposive human behaviour – in other words, to continually improve upon 
what humanity has already achieved by improving tools available to it. The question 
eluding this formulation is, pace Pippin, why the ‘imperatives of purposive-rational action’ 
became so much more important in the modern age, and why humanity would go to 
such lengths to ensure the mastery of nature. If the technically efficient mastery of nature 
is taken to be consistent with the highest human good, and thereby rational, then an 
appeal should be made to the elements that constitute modernity in order to understand 
why this conception of mastery as rational is narrow, and why it excludes other possible 
forms of rationality. Such an appeal involves Habermas’ claim that there is an alternative, 
based on ‘freeing communication from arbitrarily imposed limits and distortions caused 
by the interests of money and power, and so promoting an “ideal speech situation”’ 
(ibid.). 
 
Where do such developments leave Adorno’s ‘totalising’ perspectives on modern 
rationality and subjectivity? Adorno’s difficult claim that the ‘whole is untrue’ is an 
assumption subtending much of his theory, and refers to the idea that consciousness in 
modern life is under the constant strain of an instrumental rationality threatening 
individuality and, thereby, the possibility of critical thought. This claim is a prime source 
of objection to Adorno for many commentators, including Habermas. The question is 
whether that claim unequivocally must be accepted in order to work through Adorno’s 
theory of ‘negative dialectics’, or whether it is possible to justify Adorno’s position in a 
manner acknowledging the problem of ‘totalising’ claims, without undermining his 
theory. One of the problems this thesis seeks to address, therefore, is how to pursue the 
critique of technology without ‘totalising’ it, on one hand (e.g. allowing for claims of its 
experience as both innovative and potentially democratic), while demonstrating how these 
claims simultaneously lead to the integration of technological rationality into material life 
to the extent that it becomes politically and democratically unaccountable, on the other.   
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This is also crucial in terms of accounting for Adorno’s notion of ‘non-identity’ 
and relating it to theory about the nature of the relationship between subjectivity and 
reason. Adorno’s theory is addressed in the following chapters. For now, I direct 
attention to the overall theoretical task of this thesis. The question was asked above: 
what possibilities are available to individuals when confronted with the ‘fear of the void’, 
the fear, that is, of the disappearance of what Bauman calls the ‘universality-claiming 
truths’ that successive incarnations of reason, from the era of religious dominance 
through the Enlightenment conception of scientific rationality and beyond, have 
attempted to provide? 
 
0.5 Theoretical possibilities 
 
How might an account of the ‘truth of the subject’ be possible? I have outlined 
some modern forms of rationality and ways they influence individual experience. A 
substantial part of this thesis is devoted to examining the experience of modernity, and 
the influence of instrumental forms of rationality on individuals. The question of the 
impact of technology on experience as one of the prevalent conditions of modernity has 
been introduced, as has the question of the relationship between reason and ideology. 
Under these conditions of modernity, and its contradictory conceptions of rationality, 
what happens to notions of truth, and how do individuals relate to them?  
 
Has ideology become predominant in modern society to the degree that it has 
become impossible to think in ways that don’t involve ideology, for lack of accessibility 
to reference points outside the manifold areas of modern life influenced by it? Pace 
Adorno, is the domination of nature such a prevalence of human activity that it 
underscores all normative standards of thought and action? In raising such questions, it is 
imperative to distinguish reason and ideology, and to consider each in its own right: Not 
all reason is ideology, and not all ideology aspires to reason. Moreover, when critically 
considering such categories, it is important to keep in perspective how critiques of reason 
or ideology themselves become ideological, particularly when they ‘totalise’ their object 
of critique and, thereby, also their theoretical response.  
 
Peter Dews has advanced an argument why Adorno’s theory offers conceptual 
tools with which to progress beyond increasingly ‘self-destructively indiscriminate and 
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politically ambiguous assault[s] on the structures of rationality and modernity in toto’ 
(Dews 1995, p.20). He suggests Adorno’s critique of modern identity cannot simply be 
incorporated in deconstructionist or postmodern attacks on reason, irrespective of how 
Adorno totalises his own critique of instrumental rationality. Echoing Pippin, the point is 
to move beyond such destructive critiques of reason, so as not to succumb to increasingly 
narrow strictures within which they operate, simultaneously avoiding entrapment in 
equally instrumental variations of rational thought.  
 
The problem confronting postmodern theory, according to Dews, is the problem 
of how ‘to reject simultaneously both the repressive rigidities of self-consciousness and 
conceptual thought, and the available dialectical alternatives’ (ibid, p.23.). This problem 
may be considered by proposing a philosophy that does not reject conceptual or 
dialectical thought, but rather works its way through both, each using the other to 
overcome the respective ‘rigidity’ of their positions. Adorno’s theory does precisely this, 
and can be used to contribute to contemporary discussions beyond the historical context 
of his own writings. An effort to extend Adorno’s philosophy to contemporary theory 
without falling prey to ‘totalising’ attacks on reason, while not providing a ‘definitive’ 
essence of ‘post-postmodern’ rationality, can help elucidate strictures within which 
modern reason operates, and, importantly, suggest ways of overcoming them. 
 
According to Žižek (2001), Adorno’s principle of ‘negative dialectics’ is an 
‘inconsistent’ process of thought, in the sense that it is not a doctrine purporting to 
definitively explain a system of thought, but instead emphasises a process of thought. In 
order to understand what Žižek means by ‘inconsistent’, I address why Adorno considers 
subjectivity itself to be ‘inconsistent’, and why claims purporting to standards of truth 
and meaning are similarly so. Such a claim may appear surprising, considering Adorno’s 
emphasis on how instrumental rationality limits the scope of individual experience and, 
thereby, possibilities for subjective development, and on how modern culture encourages 
a narrow sense of identity formation. However, such assertions relate to structures of 
rationality, rather than to subjectivity itself.  
 
‘Constitutive subjectivity’ is a central term in Adorno’s philosophy. Constitutive 
subjectivity is, first, part of how Adorno characterises Idealism: the domination of the 
object by the subject, meaning the domination of conceptual reflection over its object of 
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knowledge and, more broadly, the attempt to control the objective world and nature. 
History may thereby, from an Idealist perspective, be understood as a process infused 
with meaning, which unfolds according to an objectively meaningful course. This idea is 
exemplified in the notion that individual activities help to improve society, and that 
history reflects that purpose.  
 
Second, constitutive subjectivity is the concept that individuals become 
‘reconciled’ with history as a result of their growing consciousness of their place in it, 
where individuals are both the subjective force with regards to the objective world, and 
the objective force that creates history. Third, this growing self-consciousness as actors 
in history – their ‘constitutive subjectivity’ – enables individuals to act upon the world and 
things in it, where they either create new objects or try to dominate objects already of the 
world, or in nature. The ‘constitutive’ nature of the subject then comes to depend on 
individuals mastering objects with which they engage in the course of their experience, 
whether the object is something created through labour, an object of knowledge in the 
natural world, the conceptualisation of history, or other individuals. Adorno writes in the 
preface to Negative Dialectics that he wants to ‘use the strength of the subject to break 
through the fallacy of constitutive subjectivity’ (Adorno 1973, p. xx). Why, then, for 
Adorno, is ‘constitutive subjectivity’ a fallacy, and how does he want to use the ‘strength 
of the subject’ to break through it?  
 
Constitutive subjectivity is a fallacy because it ignores what Adorno calls the 
‘priority of the objective’. This ‘priority’ means that nature, society and history always 
already precede the individual: individuals derive cognition of the world and their 
understanding of it from nature, and from already existing social frameworks and 
inherited ways of thinking. The problem with constitutive subjectivity, therefore, is that it 
prioritises subject over object. In constitutive subjectivity, the subject is considered from 
perspectives of how it acts upon the world, but not of how it has been, and is being, acted 
upon by the world. One consequence of privileging subjectivity in this manner is the idea 
that history is attributed an objectively meaningful course that is dependent on individual 
actions, ergo that history is meaningful because individual actions are meaningful, and that 
history therefore objectively represents progress as some absolute idea. This ‘absolute’ 
idea is the cornerstone of Hegel’s account of history as a dialectical process of inter-
subjective mediation in which social rules, norms and conceptual practices become 
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progressively legitimated in the course of history as a matter of the self-determination of 
human thought. Adorno objects to Hegel’s ‘totalisation’ of this dialectical process on the 
side of history, human activity and the subject, on the grounds that it occurs only as a 
function of the human attempt to control nature, as a matter of self-preservation and 
subjective attempts to identify the objective world. Adorno’s conception of self-
determining thought, by contrast, depends on a dialectical relationship between history 
and nature where the objective world is not reduced to consciousness or conceptual 
practices.  
 
It follows that while concepts of history, progress and meaning depend on 
individuals, they are concepts limited by the extent to which they are defined in 
consciousness. Furthermore, these concepts, no matter how developed, can never 
capture the entire reality of what they seek to identify. Individuals derive meaning from 
their experiences in specific historical contexts, and are therefore dependent on those 
experiences in terms of accounting for that meaning. This means any conceptualisation, 
be it of meaning, truth, subjectivity, etc., depends on both cognitive faculties derived 
from nature, and networks of socialisation already carrying meaning-bearing properties, 
both of which form a given objective historical context individuals are dependent on. 
The fallacy of constitutive subjectivity, therefore, is threefold. First, it is the deception 
that history has an objectively meaningful course: ‘Progress’ is a concept attributed to 
history by individuals and does not exist ‘for-itself’ in a purely objective sense. This 
means individuals mistakenly impute concepts of meaning to the objective world that in 
fact remain subjective concepts.  
 
Second, it is the deception that individuals are ‘reconciled’ with history through 
growing consciousness of themselves and history as intertwining elements. Because 
individuals are dependent on the objective world for their ability to conceptualise it, and 
because individuals are limited to and by concrete historical circumstances, it follows 
there are always elements of the objective world inaccessible to individuals, ergo that the 
ability to conceptualise the world is always limited in some way. This means individuals 
make the mistake of reconciling themselves with history at the expense of what their 
conceptualisation of history and the objective world fails to take into account.  
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Third, individuals deceive themselves when they assume their subjectivity is 
‘constituted’ by their ability to master elements in and of the world, conceptually and 
otherwise. Individuals achieving identity through concepts of the world do so by 
imposing their own concepts onto objects of knowledge, at the expense of differences 
remaining between their conceptualisation of these objects, and the objects themselves. 
This means concepts by which individuals define their subjectivity, including categories 
of ‘truth’ and ‘meaning’ in relation to objects external to them, are always incomplete 
because they are always (ideologically) limited to conceptual identifications, achieved at the 
expense of what always remains ‘non-identical’ between individuals and their objects of 
thought.  
 
If the notion of constitutive subjectivity suggests arrays of shortcomings 
regarding the relationship between reflection and the objective world, what kind of role 
does Adorno envisage for subjectivity, assuming that concepts such as meaning or truth 
can be evaluated in ways that don’t, one way or another, prioritise subjective concepts 
individuals use to make sense of the world? Rather than suggesting subjectivity is 
somehow nullified by its dependence on the objective world, Adorno’s fundamental 
point is that subjectivity and objectivity cannot be thought of independently of each other 
in some non-contradictory manner. Instead, they must always be thought together, taking 
into account all antagonisms consequently arising. This is the essence of what Adorno 
calls the ‘priority of the objective’, which is the key term of his negative dialectics, and is 
outlined as follows by Habermas: 
 
First of all, objectivity denotes the coercive character of a world-historical complex that stands 
under the causality of fate, can be interrupted by self-reflection, and is contingent as a whole. 
Next, the primacy of the objective means suffering from that which weighs upon subjects. 
Knowledge of the objective context thus arises out of an interest in warding off suffering. 
Further, the phrase means the priority of nature in relation to all subjectivity it establishes outside 
itself. The pure I, in Kantian terms, is mediated by the empirical I. Finally, this materialist 
primacy of the objective is incompatible with any absolutist claims to knowledge. Self-reflection, 
and precisely self-reflection, is a finite power, for it itself pertains to the objective context that 
penetrates it. (Habermas 2000, p.193)    
 
By this description, the priority of the objective is a process of self-reflection pertaining 
to truth in the context of the relationship between reflection and the objective world 
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comprising successive stages of awareness. First, individuals are pitted against an 
objective world they are dependent on. Their existence is conditional on structures 
already inherent in that world, and they are thus determined in ways beyond their 
control. Awareness of this lack of control leads to suffering, and therefore also to 
attempts to reduce suffering, among other things by attempting to validate individual 
identity.  
 
However, in attempting to reduce suffering, individuals also inherit structures of 
rational thinking prevalent in their immediate social context, and reproduce them as part 
of their subjectivity. Individuals try to understand the objective context of the world they 
have been thrust into by trying to master aspects of that context in order to alleviate 
suffering, using ‘given’ structures of rationality in their immediate social context to that 
end. Further understanding their objective context, however, requires individuals to 
separate relations to their immediate social context from relations to nature itself. 
Individuals are dependent on both their immediate social context and on nature, which 
also means that society, and its structures of rationality, are ultimately dependent on 
nature. This means individuals must consider how they, their social context, and their 
structures of rationality, are all equally dependent on nature.  
 
Finally, individuals must recognise that because they are dependent on their 
objective social context, and ultimately on nature, their reflection is finite in the sense that 
while thought can challenge rational structures in the objective social context, it 
ultimately cannot transcend nature. This means the inability to transcend nature extends 
to larger structures of rationality as well. The priority of the objective, then, is the priority 
of nature in all reflection as that which cannot be transcended. Emphasising this priority 
is indispensable to Adorno’s theory that reason, and particularly ‘instrumental’ forms of 
rationality common to modernity, validate themselves by dominating their objects of 
knowledge, and by impressing themselves upon nature, often failing to recognise how 
they always remain a part of nature, and therefore cannot transcend it. The priority of the 
objective therefore reveals a crucial contradiction that cannot be resolved by simply 
prioritising subjectivity or objectivity: rational thought isolates its object of knowledge 
from nature in order to understand it, and ultimately to identify it. However, in reality, 
both the object of knowledge and the reflecting individual remain subject to nature.  
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It follows that identifying the object of knowledge according to conceptualisation 
and its categorisation, to the extent that the object is identified and ‘known’, creates the 
illusion that how this object comes to be known – its identity – is how it is in nature, 
whereas in reality this identity is the result of finite reflection. This identity attributed to 
the object creates the additional misconception that relationships between the reflecting 
subject and the object of knowledge, and between this object and the rest of nature, can 
be ‘resolved’ in the ‘positive’ identification of the object, where in reality these 
relationships must be continuous precisely because reflection is finite.  
 
This means there is a contradictory relationship between the finite reflection of 
the subject and the infinitude of an object of knowledge that not only changes according 
to the socio-historical context in which it is identified, but is also subject to the finite 
thought of other individuals, and its mediation between individuals. Reflection, 
particularly self-reflection pertaining to issues of meaning and truth, is therefore limited 
in three ways: First, it is dependent on both objective social conditions and on nature, 
and therefore cannot be reduced to immediate subjectivity if it is to pursue standards of 
truth. Second, reflection is limited because it can never encompass the totality of either 
its objective social conditions, partly because these are always interpreted according to a 
specific historical contingency, or of nature, because nature cannot be encapsulated by 
any form of rationality, regardless of how powerful that rationality may be socially. Third, 
the relationship between nature, rationality and the individual is forever evolving, often 
in ways initially imperceptible to cognition, not least because the manner in which 
objects are identified obscures what remains unaccounted for in this identification.  
 
This means, not only that reflection is finite, but also that claims to truth must 
always take into account ways in which they are finite, not least because they are subject 
to evolving objective conditions to some extent beyond the grasp of individuals. In 
effect, the ‘priority of the objective’ entails all these elements of self-reflection be thought 
of concurrently: if there is a ‘truth’ of the subject, it can only be pursued by referring to 
activity of thought that does not become ensnared in a non-contradictory subjective or 
objectifying conceptions of the world. Instead of attempting to eliminate contradictions 
between reason, nature and subjectivity, the ‘priority of the objective’ signals the attempt 
to continue thinking through divergent elements constituting these contradictions, such 
that reflection does not foreclose itself to these elements by simply accounting for them 
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with recourse to non-contradictory categories - such as elementary conceptualisations of 
‘true’ or ‘false’. 
 
The ‘strength of the subject’ Adorno wants to use to break through constitutive 
subjectivity, then, refers to the self-determination he ascribes to individuals in the context 
of their relationship to their objective conditions. The subject is neither entirely 
determined by the objective world, given its capacity to make judgements through 
experience, or in the position to entirely master the objective world, due to limitations 
imposed by the objective world and constraints on attempts to conceptualise it. It 
therefore follows there is an active role for the subject to play in its self-determination that 
does not merely rely on reproducing structures of domination in thought as encountered 
in the social world, while also acknowledging subjective dependence on the objective 
world - without ceding its own particularity to it.  
 
This means Adorno’s theory designates a place for subjectivity neither irrational, 
in the sense that it is prioritised over the objective world, nor completely dependent on 
rational structures predominant in the objective world, in the sense that individual 
judgement is required to determine issues of truth and meaning. The ‘strength of the 
subject’, then, is the individual’s ability to experience spontaneous thought, by breaking its 
determination by ideological structures of rationality, while simultaneously pursuing 
objective truth without reducing it to its own subjective concepts and categories. 
Experience for Adorno can only be free if it is freed from constraints on thought and 
sensibility by both the individual’s own constitutive subjectivity, and the ideological 
shortcomings of all forms of rationality: ‘unreduced’ experience, as he calls it, depends, 
therefore, on a continual process of reflecting on what exceeds thought and sensibility.  
 
It follows that because it is impossible for sensuous intuition, concepts, language, 
and other tools of thought to grasp an object of knowledge independently of itself, and 
because individuals express themselves and knowledge conceptually, there must always 
be something about an object of knowledge that remains ‘non-conceptual’. For Adorno, 
this ‘non-conceptuality’ is the particularity of the object that both guides its experience, 
yet escapes the subject’s ability to identify it in any absolute sense. This means it is 
impossible to conceptualise objects in a manner accounting for all the ways they are 
experienced, and that for as long as they remain elements in the objective world, they will 
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always be experienced differently because of the changing objective socio-historical 
circumstances in which they are experienced.  
 
The object of knowledge therefore guides its experience because its experience is 
finite. Furthermore, every attempt to identify the object reveals elements entirely 
particular to that object, which, in guiding its experience, elicits novel subjective 
responses transforming the subject, thus creating moments of spontaneous experience. 
The active role subjectivity can play in Adorno’s thought, therefore, is of continually 
attempting to conceptualise what remains non-conceptual and particular to the object of 
knowledge - without, however, reducing it to a prescribed conceptual scheme. Recognising 
there is always conflict between how an object is identified and the particularity of the 
object that escapes that conceptualisation, means the subject’s attempt to conceptualise 
the object must be continuous in order for experience to remain truthful. In so doing, the 
subject recognises that every attempt to reach the ideal conceptualisation fails, because 
conceptualisation fails to grasp the particularity of the object independent of human 
perception, but the subject also recognises that each such failure changes the subject itself. 
The subject’s own categories of conceptualisation are thereby changed through its 
experience of the object.  
 
It follows the subject cannot subsume the non-conceptuality of the object to its 
own predominant conceptualisation while remaining true to its experience, because 
experience of the object has already changed that conceptual system. A further implication 
of the priority of the objective is that the subject’s own identity is changed, meaning, it no 
longer conforms to its previous conceptualisation, by itself or others. This has 
implications for self-determination, and the broader relationship between freedom and 
reason. Adorno’s notions of the ‘non-conceptual’ and ‘non-identical’ are central to his 
theory of negative dialectics and are examined in depth in this thesis. At present, it is 
important to recall these essential tenets of Adorno’s theory, and suggest how they may 
relate to the notion of a ‘truth of the subject’.  
 
How are we to go about investigating this truth of the subject, if the subject is 
always precluded from some measure of objective reality? In Lacan’s words, the hinge of 
this thesis could be said to be as follows:  
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…Freud was exploring a line of research which is not characterised by the same style as other 
sciences. Its domain is that of the truth of the subject. The quest for truth is not entirely reducible to 
the objective, and indeed objectifying, research of the normal scientific method. It is a matter of 
the realisation of the truth of the subject, as a specific dimension which must be detached in its 
originality from the notion of reality [italics mine]. (Lacan 1995, pp. 20-21) 
 
This suggests there may be ways of thinking about truth relating specifically to the 
experience of the subject, and not only the study of the subject from objectifying or 
scientific perspectives that, sometimes despite themselves, minimise the subject’s 
experience itself. Subjectivity itself is an area of inquiry that cannot simply be reduced to 
either objectifying or purely subjective perspectives.  
 
Rather, inquiry into subjectivity itself must involve continuous mediation 
between the subject and the objective context to which it belongs. How does this 
mediation relate to truth, and how can the truth of the subject be investigated in ways 
not presupposing pre-determined methodologies? First, if Adorno’s objections to 
constitutive subjectivity are granted, truth is not found strictly in subjectivity or in the 
objective world, but in continual mediation of the interrelationship between the two. 
This means there can be no seamless standard, or identity, of truth pertaining to any 
object of knowledge, including individuals themselves. However, this does not mean 
there is no truth at all because of the ‘[notion of the] wholly ideological character of all 
society-related consciousness’ (Adorno 2002, p.11). If there is such a thing as false 
consciousness, there must also be a form of consciousness that can make legitimate 
claims to truth.  
 
Second, in order to pursue the concept of truth in the first place, the subject 
must become aware, not only of the primacy of the objective social world and nature to 
reflection, but also of the ways subjective concepts of these can be distorted. This, as we 
will see, involves the centrality of Ideologiekritik to Adorno’s notion of being ‘against’ 
epistemology, suggesting the ideology critique of epistemology itself. Third, Adorno 
locates notions of truth in continuous contradictions embodied in objects of knowledge 
and by what resists conceptualisation of their experience, and not in the subject’s 
immediate experience of them. Adorno is apprehensive about how individuals 
experience modern society and the determination of this experience by instrumental 
forms of rationality. He is equally apprehensive that questions about the relationship 
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between individuals and how they experience objects of inquiry are compromised by the 
experience of modernity as a whole. This means he doesn’t consider immediate 
experience of the objective world to be an adequate benchmark for questions pertaining 
to the truth of experience, albeit nevertheless remaining an ineluctable element of 
experience.  
 
Fourth, while notions of truth are ultimately dependent on the nature of the 
subject’s relationship with the objective world, the notion of a ‘truth of the subject’ is 
also dependent on the individual’s ability to consider its own notion of truth as an object 
of knowledge. This means not only that truth evolves through the subject’s engagement 
with it, but also that its conceptualisation is, by necessity, finite. In essence, then, any 
notion of truth has its own particular qualities that remain non-identical to it, by virtue of 
the inquiring subject also changing as a result of its engagement.                   
 
‘It is a standard argument against Adorno’s “negative dialectics,”’ writes Žižek,  
 
to reproach it for its inherent inconsistency; Adorno’s answer is appropriate: stated as a definitive 
doctrine, as a result, “negative dialectics” effectively IS “inconsistent” – the way to grasp it 
correctly is to conceive of it as the description of a process of thought…. “Negative Dialectics” 
designates a position which includes its own failure, i.e. which produces the truth-effect through 
its very failure. To put it succinctly: one tries to grasp the object of thought; one fails, missing it, 
and through these very failures the place of the targeted object is encircled, its contours become 
discernible” (Žižek 2001, p.88).  
 
By producing a ‘truth-effect through its very failure’, Žižek means that because no 
concept can circumscribe an object of knowledge, each successive attempt to grasp it 
fails, but nevertheless creates a ‘truth-effect’ because the misidentification of the object 
of knowledge has been articulated in clearer fashion than previously, paving the way for 
subsequent attempts to identify it truthfully.  
 
Such a process is also what Hegel calls ‘determinate negation’ - the ability to 
show what is lacking in an explanation is the condition of the possibility of a better 
explanation. This mediation of the object consequently creates better conditions for the 
possibility of conceptual claims concerning the truth of its experience. For Adorno, 
however, the truth of this experience cannot be reduced to its conceptual identification but 
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is a matter of re-orientating experience towards the object itself, so as to determine ways 
in which its identification comes up short. It is important to emphasise that Adorno does 
not deny the necessity of conceptual identification. Instead, he suggests that thought can 
only criticise existing concepts to recognise areas in which these identifications come up 
short, or are made at the expense of eliminating contradictions. It follows that any 
identification of any object is incomplete and that constraints on conceptual reflection 
ensure identification of the object always remains incomplete.  
 
We now have a clearer conception of why Žižek describes Adorno’s thought as 
‘inconsistent’, and why Adorno’s conception of subjectivity is similarly ‘inconsistent’. 
‘Consistent’ thought refers to reflection that has come to a standstill, and which assumes 
its concepts to be absolutes, relies on ideological conceptions of truth and reason, and 
equates objects of knowledge with the limits of subjective perception. Similarly, a 
‘consistent’ conception of subjectivity would be one stabilising its identity according to 
predominant concepts and reducing its experience to pre-existing, instrumental 
procedures common to its social context. It follows, therefore, that ‘truth-effects’ can be 
created through the failure to harmonise subjectivity with the instrumental rationalities it 
is determined by.  
 
At first glance, such a ‘truth-effect’ suggests there are possibilities for subjectivity 
beyond its determination by ideology and instrumental rationality, even to the extent that 
Adorno’s critique claims these have become ‘total’, the reasons for which are elucidated 
throughout this thesis. We now have a point of departure for giving an account of the 
‘truth of the subject’ through Adorno’s philosophy. What follows is an examination of 
elements that make such an account possible: Chapter 1 examines the concept of 
ideology with relation to critical categories of alienation and false consciousness. Chapter 
2 continues this investigation by analysing instrumental and subject-centred forms of 
reason, and introduces categories of Adorno’s thought. Chapter 3 explores the 
relationship between reason and freedom, some forms of immediacy in the modern 
world, and the question of the relationship between reason and nature, following 
elements in Kant adopted by Adorno. Chapter 4 considers Adorno’s approach to these 
questions from beyond what he considers to be the limitations of epistemology. Chapter 
5 addresses problems of locating critical perspectives from which to tackle concerns 
explored in previous chapters that account for their own place in the social space they 
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criticise, particularly with regard to Adorno’s ‘totalising’ claims. Chapter 6 explains 
Adorno’s dialectical method with relation to Hegel’s, and Chapter 7 provides a thought 
model of Adorno’s negative dialectics ‘in praxis’. Finally, to conclude, an account of the 
‘truth of the subject’ from considerations undertaken in this thesis is given, before 
concluding with a brief suggestion for a theoretical continuation of Adorno’s philosophy.  
 
The thesis employs Adorno’s theoretical tools to investigate the following 
questions: First, to suggest that ‘the quest for truth is not reducible’ to purely objective 
research, but must also include subjectivity itself as a part of the nature objective research 
seeks to account for. Second, it is a question of explaining why objective reality is always 
in some measure unattainable and how the failure to recognise this leads to dominant 
ideological discourses which themselves prevent further access to objective reality. Third, 
the question is one of continually finding new forms of self-reflection that can attempt to 
justify claims to truth. The point, then, is not to suggest an infallible theory of the ‘truth 
of the subject’, but to investigate the very paradoxes and inconsistencies that might 
constitute the possibility of such truth. Aspects of explicating Adorno’s thought will 
include discussions of how it relates to problems of freedom, reason and ideology in the 
contemporary world. What follows is an exposition of Adorno’s key concepts, elaborated 
in central works such as Negative Dialectics (ND), Dialectic of Enlightenment (DoE), in his 
lectures and overall body of work, considerations of the criticisms of these ideas, and 
suggestions as to how his work can be continued and why his thought remains relevant 
to discussing the problems of modernity. The thesis is, by necessity, limited to the 
objectives outlined in 0.1 above, considering the expansive scope of Adorno’s writings 
and vast areas of experience his philosophy can be employed to complement. For 
example, while the thesis emphasises contemporary socio-political circumstances and 
phenomena that can be mediated through Adorno’s philosophy, it generally does not 
venture into Adorno’s many other concerns, such as literature or aesthetics more broadly 
(or as political acts in themselves), and touches only lightly on certain psychoanalytical 
implications of his thought.  The reasons for this are practical, yet I hope that the thesis 
provides sufficient basis for further exploration in such areas for the reader - and for this 
author’s research. Additionally, the thesis does not claim to have achieved a definitive 
extraction of possible political models from Adorno’s oeuvre; it only claims to 
demonstrate that working through his philosophy and concerns may well yield such 
models through the kind of continuous intellectual effort he entreated. The thought 
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model in Chapter 7 is a suggestion of how such a model might function.  Finally, where 
secondary literature on Adorno (or other thinkers) is employed, it is with a view towards 
clarifying central points that can sometimes be difficult to extract with brevity from 
Adorno’s own rather dense prose. It is not intended as a comment either on the 
secondary literature itself or on Adorno’s work, but was rather assessed to play an 
adequate explanatory role while remaining faithful to (my interpretation of) the original 
intent.   
 
In summary, then, the thesis elucidates what the seemingly ideological notion of a  
‘strength of the subject’ amounts to with relation to Adorno’s critical theory in toto, and 
particularly with regards to contradictions arising, on the surface, from such a phrase in 
connection with Adorno’s stringent criticism of ‘constitutive subjectivity’ and subject-
centred forms of rationality more broadly.  It will be suggested how Adorno’s particular 
conception of this ‘subjective strength’ becomes an ineluctable component of the truth 
of subjective freedom when considering the political and cultural ramifications of the 
objective determination of social experience by dominant forms of instrumental reason, 
and indeed forms a critical element of the critique of ideology necessary to mediate the 
philosophical foundations underpinning such forms of reasoning, several of which are 
examined throughout the thesis.  The investigation undertaken in this thesis, then, will 
lead to ways of articulating and thinking about paradoxes experienced by the subject in 
its relationship with rationality and the objective world, and to ways of thinking about 
how acknowledgement of the limits of reason can serve as illumination for the 
possibilities of subjectivity. In order for this to be explored, I first discuss what freedom 
in the context of modernity may amount to, some of the philosophical deliberation 
concerning the relationship between freedom and reason and their intersection with 
ideology, and some of the key concepts permitting such a discussion in the first place. 
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II. CHAPTER 1: IDEOLOGY, AND ITS OTHER  
 
The following two chapters discuss the concept of ideology by considering it, in 
this chapter, in the context of problems raised by ideology and critical responses to it, 
and in the following chapter, by considering its social effects and introducing elements of 
Adorno’s theory. This chapter gives a working definition of the concept of ideology, and 
discusses some contexts in which it can be identified. Critical categories of ideology 
critique, such as reification, alienation, and false consciousness are then introduced, and I 
consider how these might affect experience. Briefly, the notion of the ‘truth of the 
subject’ is elaborated upon. 
 
1.1  The Concept of Ideology 
 
What is ideology? Ideology is a term used to refer to ‘a kind of obstacle to 
rational thought and clear perception… ideology is regarded not just as a set of errors of 
reasoning, but rather as a systematically distorting factor that causes errors in the thought 
of its victims’ (Mautner 1996, p.266). The term is often used to indicate shortcomings in 
the thought of political opponents, but it is also used descriptively, in terms of 
designating beliefs that broadly constitute perspectives on the world, such as 
characterisations of ‘liberalism’, ‘socialism’, or ‘conservatism’. The more individuals 
subscribe to a particular ideology, the more that ideology consists of a variation of - 
often conflicting - beliefs and interests, tied together by a unifying strand expressing the 
actual common ground individuals share. In the U.S., the political label of ‘Republican’ 
might unite socially conservative, religious voters with secular-minded, fiscally 
conservative proponents of small government, just as the label of ‘Democrat’ might unite 
progressive advocates of state intervention in the economy with liberal civil rights 
activists.  
 
In its more pejorative sense, designating perspectives as ideological is to imply 
the reasoning behind them is flawed, and that such flawed reasoning goes unnoticed by 
individuals holding those perspectives. As an ‘obstacle to rational thought’, ideology is 
assumed to hinder clear thinking and ‘distort’ accounts of the world, because of how it 
reduces experience to its own central concepts, and prioritises explanations aspiring to be 
all-encompassing, as opposed to accurately reflecting a set of conditions in the world, 
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and paying attention to how these change over time. This characteristic lays ideologies 
open to charges they are ‘irrational’, in the sense that they rely more on subjective belief 
than on engagement with objective conditions.     
 
Ideology is a central concept in any critical account of modernity. Historian Eric 
Hobsbawm, for instance, labelled the 20th Century the ‘Age of Extremes’, characterised 
as it was by struggles between competing ideologies of capitalism, communism, and 
fascism.12 Modern societies have also emerged as a consequence of the development of, 
and competition between, conflicting political ideas in response to both previously 
dominant ideas, and emerging social needs. While these ideas culminate in the broad 
designation of a society as governed under the auspices of a particular ideology (‘social 
democracy’ in Sweden, ‘state socialism’ in Cuba, etc.), there are also broader ideological 
currents extending beyond the borders of nation-states in the form of economic doctrine 
and political currency (‘neo-liberalisation’, ‘free trade’, ‘the single market’). Ideology can 
also be religion enshrined in state doctrine (the Shi’ite theocracy in Iran), or inscribed as 
broad currents of personal persuasion (Judaism, Christianity, etc.).  
 
In Western society specifically, the exchange of competing political ideas serves 
to characterise modernity as ‘democratic’, and the competition between these ideas 
accounts for the overall political process. However, when one of these ideas becomes 
predominant, and accepted as near-universal ‘truth’13, it is likely to become ideological, as 
opposed to comprising a rational response to objective conditions. Whenever theoretical 
ideas concerning anything are taken for granted, irrespective of whether relation is borne 
to objective conditions, they can become a source of ideological distortion. If ideology is 
a term used to describe ‘a distorted or illusory form of thought which departs from a 
criterion of objectivity… also used to describe, usually in negative terms, the world-view 
of collective beliefs and attitudes of a class or social group’ (Macey 2000, p. 198), then it 
becomes clearer how ideology is connected to subjectivity. Any perspective on the world, 
or any set of ideas subscribed to by individuals, is indispensable to the notion of identity, 
tying together shared beliefs via which a collective of individuals define themselves.  
 
                                                
12 See Hobsbawm 1998.    
13 The misinterpretation of Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ of the market as an irrefutable argument for 
de-regulation of the economy is a common example of such a phenomenon. 
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The very idea of ‘being’ something, e.g. ‘being English’, presupposes a whole set 
of beliefs as to what it means to be ‘English’, such as: being born in England or of 
English parents, practicing a set of customs traditionally regarded as being part of 
English culture, being fluent in that language, etc. Consequently, it becomes clear how 
any identity, even prior to lending itself to political perspective, depends, to some degree, 
on ideological precepts of inheriting a national or religious identity (purely, it should be 
said, by chance). This dependence is not to mention the inheritance of genetic traits 
shaping inclinations of behaviour and thought. How, then, would such seemingly 
normal, everyday facts, square with the notion of ideology as ‘illusory’ and departing 
from a ‘criterion of objectivity’, especially if individuals aren’t responsible for the initial 
set of beliefs with which they are equipped upon entering the world, and with which they 
go about developing their consciousness? 
 
Part of the answer may be the extent to which individuals engage critically on two 
separate, yet related, levels: individuals engage both with the world and themselves as 
sources of ideology. The extent to which they do determines the degrees to which they 
are influenced ideologically by the objective world, and the extent to which they place 
themselves in a position to recognise where their actions or thoughts are products of 
ideology. It follows that as a result of critically challenging ideology, individuals 
conceivably have more freedom to exercise self-determination, as opposed to being 
determined by the immediate world, or the randomness of being born with a set of 
biological characteristics, or by being thrust into social circumstances promoting specific 
behavioural characteristics.  
 
However, it is not evident that it is possible to step ‘outside’ of ideology entirely, 
to the extent that one is not affected by prejudice at all - or indeed, that it would be 
desirable to do so. We may consider Gadamer’s evaluation of prejudice as something 
necessarily involved in the process of understanding. Prejudice can have both positive 
and negative value, in the sense that individuals inevitably possess prejudices according 
to objective socio-historical conditions in which they find themselves. Individuals would 
be incapable of developing their understanding of the world without reference to their 
prejudices, just as it would be impossible to change those prejudices in view of 
developing their understanding, without reference to them in the first place.  
 
Prospects Beyond Ideology: Reason, Freedom and the Truth of the Subject – 
Towards Political Models for the Critical Thought of Theodor W. Adorno 
 
 53 
Gadamer notes the negative connotation of prejudice was something born with 
Enlightenment, which ‘takes tradition as an object of critique’, whereas ‘prejudice’ as a 
positive value simply means ‘a judgement that is rendered before all the elements that 
determine a situation have been finally examined’ (Gadamer 2004, p.273). It follows 
Enlightenment attacks on all forms of prejudice result in their own form of prejudice: the 
continuous attack on tradition and authority culminates in its own prejudice of the pre-
eminence of reason: 
 
The overcoming of all prejudices, this global demand of the Enlightenment, will prove itself to 
be a prejudice, and removing it opens the way to an appropriate understanding of the finitude 
which dominates not only our humanity but also our historical consciousness. Does being 
situated within traditions really mean being subject to prejudices and limited in one’s freedom? Is 
not, rather, all human existence, even the freest, limited and qualified in various ways? If this is 
true, the idea of an absolute reason is not a possibility for historical humanity. Reason exists for 
us only in concrete, historical terms – i.e., it is not its own master but remains constantly 
dependent on the given circumstances in which it operates…. The self-awareness of the 
individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of historical life. That is why the prejudices of the 
individual, far more than judgements, constitute the historical reality of his being (ibid, pp. 277-78). 
 
The awareness that individuals inevitably form prejudices, therefore – whether grounded 
in tradition or in the belief of the perfectibility of reason – in relation to their historical 
context allows for the insight that neither tradition nor reason can become absolute. 
Similarly, to assume prejudice as something uniquely ‘negative’ masks the extent to which 
individuals depend on their historical context. It follows that prejudice is necessary for 
understanding one’s historical context, but the problem arises when prejudice becomes 
ideology. This idea of prejudice as ideology is specifically relevant to criticism of structures 
of thought that take themselves as absolute. In the contemporary historical context of 
the dominance of social experience by science and technology, the question becomes: 
what happens when understanding of reason upon which science and technology is 
based determines social experience to the extent that it is assumed by individuals to be 
their own subjective rationality?  
 
It may be suggested how modern individuals are divided by two sets of 
prejudices: those inherited ‘traditionally’, and those derived from predominant forms of 
reasoning in the individual’s historical context. The problem arises when predominant 
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forms of rationality become subjective prejudices by default because of the degree of 
social power they exert. They become prejudices that the individual does not challenge, 
indeed, cannot challenge, because of the extent to which i) the individual is dependent on 
them, and ii) there is no competing form of rationality available in the pragmatic structures of 
the world experienced by the individual. Stating the problem in this way presupposes the 
hypothetical context of a rationality that indeed acts as if it were absolute – and thus 
inevitably exerts itself ideologically - which suggests the problem of ‘instrumental 
rationality’.  
 
What, then, can critical engagement with the problem of ideology amount to, if 
one accepts that individuals will always, to some degree, be bound up in it? If the 
endeavour of critical engagement with ideology is not undertaken, conditions are 
germane for individuals to embrace identity as naturally ‘given’, and thus to depend on 
ideology in order to sustain it. While there may be nothing wrong in taking measured 
pride in one’s nation, heritage or religion, relying on what one assumes one knows as a 
result of any one of those factors easily leads to the kind of ideological outlook that can 
undermine an objective evaluation of a social state of affairs.  
 
Similarly, when it is felt that a ‘basic identity’ is under threat by external forces, as 
in the case of any war, or in political battle between ideological antagonists, there is a 
tendency to fall back on the ideological premises of that ‘basic identity’ by default. It 
follows that irrational responses to problems between different agents, which can result 
in loss of life, have their roots in the over-reliance on shared beliefs that come to define 
ideas of community and belonging. The seeking of true resolutions, however, to 
problems between individuals with varying beliefs requires both the objective evaluation 
of prevalent conditions, and enough distance from subjective positions in order to 
overcome the roots of conflict between them. How might such conflict be reflected in 
light of contemporary experience?           
 
In the Introduction, a contemporary problem related to ideology was briefly 
identified. The ‘Global War on Terror’, in its regressive appeal to pre-modern standards 
on both sides of its divide, is a contemporary global chasm collapsing distinctions 
between ‘pre-modern’ and ‘modern’, in terms of evaluating social progress according to 
historical standards -  particularly if it is held that the label of ‘modernity’ had any such 
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useful distinction previously. For Weber, for example, modernity is the ‘disenchantment 
of the world as traditional beliefs and the unified complex of religion, metaphysics and 
superstition collapse under the impact of a substantive reason or the instrumental 
rationality which subordinates means to ends. Politics, public life, private life and religion 
become separate spheres of existence as reason itself divides into the distinct realms of 
science, morality and art’ (Macey 2000, p. 260). For Bauman, conversely, modernity ‘is a 
project, and not only a period, and it is, or was, a project of control, the rational mastery 
over nature, the planning, designing and plotting which led to planomania and 
technocracy’ (Beilharz 2001, p.6). Both designations of modernity mark the departure 
from ‘pre-modern’ conditions in which religious influence was prevalent in the conduct 
of social affairs.     
 
In the West, appeals to moral righteousness couched in increasingly religious 
vocabulary made by elected politicians in the years immediately following the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks, combined with resorts to military force, appear incompatible 
with progressive, liberal goals officially espoused by modern democracies. On the other 
end of the spectrum, the war of attrition waged against Western power is by and large 
grounded in deep-seated animosity towards modernity and is a desired reversion to de-
secularised forms of polity in which religious law would be paramount and where, 
similarly, religion is invoked as justification for force. Both, explicitly or not, subscribe to 
the notion that their vision of human society is morally superior to the other, and that, 
implicitly or explicitly, they have the blessing of ‘God’. We may consider the following 
quotation from former U.K. Prime Minister Blair to get a sense of how the appeal to 
‘God’ also permeates some of contemporary Western political discourse in light of global 
developments: 
 
When you're faced with a decision like that [whether or not to invade Iraq], and some of those 
decisions have been very, very difficult, most of all because you know... there are people's lives... 
and, in some cases, their death... I think if you have faith about these things, then you realise that 
that judgement is made by other people... and if you believe in God, it's made by God as well.14   
 
While such invocation of the divine has always been part of quasi-political discourse in 
the U.S., and while the same cannot be said of political discourse in, say, France, which 
                                                
14 See Blair 2006.  
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remains secular, the September 11 attacks and the subsequent declaration of the ‘War on 
Terror’ strengthened beliefs that political actions are undertaken with the blessing of 
God. Conversely - the extent to which this contributes to actual policy-making 
notwithstanding - the invocation of God as justification for action has long figured 
prominently in the political discourse of Islamic leaders.15 In such instances, there is 
often distance between what is literally said in ideological invocations of God and the 
reasons why that invocation is made, which is grounded in a specific set of social 
circumstances. In the Arab world, e.g., the rise of fundamentalist Islam is partly a 
response to the demise of Marxist and other responses to longstanding social problems. 
As such, invocations of God serve to appeal to a unifying form of identity in order to 
generate political support. 
 
‘Globally’ speaking, however, it may be suggested how religion has re-emerged as 
a reaction to Enlightenment values and corresponding notions of progress in scientific 
and technological development, or the liberal prerogatives of Western societies, as 
opposed to being ‘swept away’ by Enlightenment in a ‘higher synthesis’ of human 
development. It follows the scientific ‘disenchantment of nature’ resulted in a ‘loss of 
meaning’, forcing the traditional sphere of influence of meaning-providing institutions 
such as the church into a more private realm, and making it off-limits to the realm of 
deliberation concerning understanding and implementation of social ‘progress’.16 The re-
appearance of the search for meaning within religious strictures on a global scale as 
reaction to modernity seems to have provoked a counter-reaction in many Western societies 
that is sometimes also dependent on faith, dealing what appears to be a blow to 
Enlightenment values.  
 
Among the consequences of this development, there is the resort to terror in the 
name of Islamic fundamentalism, often personalised in the example of the suicide 
bomber, and usually justified both in the name of God and resisting Western influence. 
Conversely, the Western reaction following the September 11 terrorist attacks has been a 
resort to large scale warfare, politically justified initially in vague terms of a struggle 
                                                
15 To reference just one diatribe against the West by Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of the terrorist 
organisation Hezbollah (“Party of God”),”the… effort was spreading the word [of God] among the 
people, first, in a bid to raise their morale, and second to instil in them a sense of animosity towards the 
enemy, coupled with a spirit of resistance... this required us to use the language of indoctrination rather 
than Realpolitik. People then were not in need of political analysis, they were in need of being incited 
and goaded." See Jaber 1997, pp.49-50.  
16 Former Pope Benedict XVI sought to address this trend: see Ratzinger 2006.  
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between good and evil17, and which, in the U.S. at least, implicitly relies on a conception 
of Western progress and freedom as depending on the grace of God. Such reactions, 
however interpreted, imply those partaking in or glorifying either terrorism or wars of 
choice in the name of belief systems are at least partially alienated from their interests, if 
the argument is made that the preservation of life, and human rights pertaining to it, 
should be the most fundamental normative issue at stake in any collective politics.  
 
This has not historically been the case, although it has been in the belief in the 
interests of polity or nation that wars have been launched and casualties counted. The 
(relatively recent) political phenomenon of universal human rights notwithstanding, the 
general preservation of life and its possible fulfilment is the governing idea and political 
impetus of most human communities. There are exceptions: certain religious societies 
determine matters of life and death according to selective interpretations of religious 
laws. However, the idea that life is preferable to death, for its own sake and for its 
potential contribution to society, is at the root of all modern, democratic political 
thought. Ideological distortions of this premise arise when it is assumed that the 
preservation of one form of life, or identity, implies the destruction of another, although 
admittedly the idea that there can be ‘ideological distortion’ in the first place applies to 
human, as opposed to animal, consciousness.  
 
However, if acts intended to kill or harm others presuppose the presence of a 
form of alienation in perpetrators from their victims, what is a source of this alienation, 
and why would it arise in the first place? One source of the devaluation of life is the 
elevation of ideological beliefs over the actual experience of and between fellow 
individuals: consider, briefly, the millions slaughtered as a result of totalitarian political 
belief systems, such as fascism and communism, in the 20th century, or the rate at which 
life is still lost due to religious differences. In such cases, the value of life is supplanted by 
the value attributed to the belief system itself, alienating individuals from each other, 
from themselves, and placing them at the mercy of social forces beyond their control.      
     
 
 
                                                
17 E.g., President Bush’s declaration of an ‘Axis of Evil’ in his 2002 State of the Union address: See 
Bush 2002.  
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1.2 The Subject: Alienation and False Consciousness 
   
Alienation is not only present at the root of violence. It is equally present in the 
relation of individuals to their society and its institutions, between individuals, and 
between individuals and their conceptions of self. Excessive measures are taken, for 
example, in the name of desperation or faith, or driven by short term interests or 
sentiments of powerlessness (often a combination of these), suggesting alienation today 
is as real as it ever was. Far from being some discredited notion from the annals of 
Marxist theory, it is an explicitly contemporary concern.  
 
Honneth, for example, has written of the Marxist concept of reification 
(Verdinglichung), which means to treat an abstraction (e.g. the idea of a higher being) 
literally as if it had material existence - as if an idea had living properties of its own. In 
Marxism, reification is a form of alienation in which human relations come to be 
identified with the physical properties of things, e.g. in the way properties existing in 
human relationships are attributed to inanimate objects, or, vice versa, in the way 
relationships are objectified and individuals are treated as if they were objects. Honneth 
suggests reification remains a significant concept in understanding experience of the 
contemporary world, where it occurs, among other things, as a form of alienation 
resulting from estrangement induced by modern capitalism. According to this account, 
reification is present in three spheres of modern experience: in relations with the 
objective world, in relations with other individuals, and in individual relations with 
themselves.18 For our purposes, alienation giving rise to reification can similarly be 
classified according to these categories.   
 
What exactly, then, is ‘alienation’? Is it a condition that can be ascribed to a 
correlation of subjective symptoms dependent on the individual, or is it a general term 
for symptoms arising in individuals as a result of their relationships with the objective 
world? A notion often employed in relation to alienation, which helps explain it, is the 
term ‘false consciousness’. Being alienated can presuppose being affected, in various 
measures, by false consciousness, which, in its most basic form, according to Rosen, is a 
                                                
18 Honneth suggests the essential character of reification is in the notion of ‘forgotten recognition’ 
(Anerkennungsvergessenheit), through which he explains the three categories of reification. He 
develops this idea from Adorno and Horkheimer’s argument in DoE that ‘all reification is a forgetting.’ 
See Honneth 2005.  
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form of consciousness that ‘prevents the members of a society from behaving as their 
interests would otherwise dictate’ (Rosen 1996, p.1). It follows false consciousness 
originates immanently to society and its structures, and that individuals are enticed to do 
things that, while often in the interests of maintaining various social conventions, are 
against their interests.  
 
It follows that by internalising objective demands for society’s stability and 
chances of perpetuation, individuals may become alienated from their ‘true’ selves - 
meaning, from what they perceive to be integral to themselves, but which they are 
prevented, in various ways, from pursuing. While what can be taken to be the best 
interests of individuals are themselves socially conditioned, it is in the relationship 
between individuals and society that the relative alienation of individuals may be 
estimated. One condition of alienation is when individuals are powerless vis-à-vis the 
manner in which they are objectively determined by social conditions they are thrust into. 
Where such powerlessness is accepted as fact - or, worse, as something to be celebrated - 
it can equally be suggested that individuals suffer from false consciousness.  
 
Adorno’s essay on the ‘Culture Industry’ in DoE, for example, is a critique of 
how individuals embrace powerlessness through injunctions by modern culture to accept 
what is presented in an easily accessible and non-critical manner, in the media and 
elsewhere. Accepting such powerlessness through, among other methods of persuasion, 
the continual injunction to consume and to ‘enjoy’ oneself (following Žižek19 ) is, 
accordingly, tantamount to resigning one’s responsibility - to oneself and to one’s social 
environment - and, ultimately, self-determination itself. From such a perspective, the 
elements of alienation and ideology are clearly related, in the sense that individuals may 
internalise objective ideological demands as their own (temporary) personal desires, 
without being aware of how – or why - they have been influenced so. However, for a 
consciousness to be ‘false’, it must be inquired whether there can be a ‘true’ 
consciousness. Labelling consciousness as ‘false’ has theoretically been easier than 
ascertaining consciousness as ‘true’. It is thus imperative that grounds be established first 
to discuss consciousness at all, bearing in mind that alienation or false consciousness are 
thought to be sub- or unconscious, as opposed to being conscious.  
 
                                                
19 See Žižek 2001. 
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An outline of what might constitute a quintessentially modern form of 
consciousness is one uncertain about its basic identity. Modern individuals are told they 
are free, yet cannot exist independently of modern society - a society that uproots, 
disorientates and disperses its members by making its collective identity dependent on 
constant renewal and change. The effects of this deracination are especially felt in the 
workforce, where individuals increasingly feel too insecure in the long term due to 
technological upheavals, economic downturns, etc., to form a stable identity in relation 
to their labour. This insecurity, in turn, undermines foundations for the stability of a 
given polity, placing it in a paradoxical situation: Western societies depend on their own 
constant renewal, but depend equally on the allegiance of their members to provide them 
with such renewal. How, then, is it in the interest of labouring individuals to contribute 
to something that may eventually undermine them or their conceptions of stable 
identity?  
 
The ‘crisis of uncertainty’ engendered by the endlessness of expectations in 
modern life is at least partially responsible for the reversion to faith in some Western 
societies, but perhaps the more interesting point to note is that while faith is turned to in 
order to counter crises of identity, it is also appealed to by forces engendering that very 
crisis. For example, religion plays a major socio-political role in a highly technically and 
economically advanced society such as the U.S., not to mention having a substantial 
industry devoted to it, and American politicians advocating the free market rarely do so 
without also invoking faith. The constant upheaval in capitalism, however, is effectuated 
in the name of the individualistic profit motive, which is intimately connected to the idea 
of freedom. In considering the extent to which the idea of freedom is used to justify such 
motives, a case can be made that the idea of freedom itself becomes ideological when it is 
assumed to be a ‘given’ in society. The notion of freedom is in particular danger of 
becoming ideological when it is used as justification for unilateral motives, as opposed to 
being practiced with reference to interests of combined social elements likely to be 
affected by their practical implementation.  
 
Similarly, a society defining itself and its interests by its freedom does not 
guarantee it is ‘free’; it suggests only that the idea of freedom is used, in its presentation 
as an indefeasible norm, to politically secure the support of enough people for motives 
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pursued under the aegis of the freedom to act of particular agents.20 Moreover, the 
constant upheaval provoked by capitalist practices depends, to a large extent, on the very 
Enlightenment values – scientific progress, technological development, consumerist 
logic, etc. – that reversions to faith may be a reaction to. It could thus be speculated that, 
in the West at least, the modern emphasis on religion actually subtends the 
Enlightenment ‘drive’, or at least its interests – and that the two opposites co-exist in the 
consciousness of the modern individual, each outwardly hostile to the other but inwardly 
complementary (albeit perhaps not consciously so).  
 
Conversely, hostility towards the West and its Enlightenment values in certain 
regions of the world is very much directed at Enlightenment itself. Here, the imperative 
of faith unifies individuals with their identities in a manner that does not measure itself 
with regard to ‘social progress’, as would be in the case in, say, measuring increases in 
GDP. Instead, the imperative of faith here defines social progress by the extent to which 
it can be submitted to the will and identity of the society in question, which is sometimes 
ideologically coterminous with how the will of God is interpreted. From this perspective, 
the more de-secularised the social sphere, the more ‘progress’ is essentially achieved. 
Such examples are at either extreme of the reaction to modernity, but regardless of 
degree, speaking of alienation in the context of some of the problems of modernity 
remains valid. It is as difficult to see why faith in some divine power - or in social 
progress - should be necessary in order to go to work and earn an income, as it is to see 
why a similar belief should justify a suicide bombing. From the perspective of behaving 
according to one’s interests, neither of these configurations makes much sense if indeed 
a philosophical goal common to mankind is conceivably to live, and as well as possible. 
A factor underpinning modernity from every perspective, and which goes far in 
explaining why people become alienated in the first place, then, is ideology.  
 
As ideology is indispensable to the notion of identity, it is also central to the idea 
of subjectivity, tying together shared beliefs via which collectives define themselves. 
                                                
20 The re-definition of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, for instance, as a project to spread democracy 
throughout the Arab world, from its originally stated purposes of liberating Iraq, fighting terror and 
preventing the spread of WMD, was a consequence of worsening conditions as a result of the 
occupation. As public awareness of these grew, culminating in the 2005-07 Iraqi civil war, the invasion 
in the first place was increasingly questioned. It therefore became politically necessary to make another 
ideological supplement to the original arguments for invasion, namely that spreading freedom in the 
Middle East via Iraq’s example was a noble cause demanding additional sacrifice. See Woodward 2006 
for a historical account of how the stated purpose for the occupation changed over time, and Bush 2005 
for the declaration of the new, wider objective of ‘spreading freedom’.     
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Overt reliance on such shared assumptions, in contradistinction to rational, objective 
evaluations of given states of affairs is generally, then, what is meant by ‘false 
consciousness’, but then, as Rosen inquires, what conditions ‘must be met for a form of 
false consciousness to count as “ideological”’ (Rosen 1996, p.28)? Discerning what is and 
isn’t ideological may seem easier, at present, than distinguishing between whether 
consciousness is ‘true’ or ‘false’. If ‘false consciousness’ is bound up in ideology and is 
inherent to potentially irrational shared beliefs that are nevertheless necessary for the 
rational ends of sustaining a collective, then what is rational? If modern society holds 
itself to be guided by precepts of a commonly agreed-upon rationality, and substantiates 
its claim to being ‘enlightened’ as a result, we are compelled back towards the historical 
association between reason and Enlightenment.  
 
The original Enlightenment rationality purports to be critical of traditional 
authority, in particular that associated with religion, and has as its aim to establish a social 
order based on reason and natural law by replacing the fear and superstition of pre-
modern times with objective consensus and the search for truth. According to Pinkard,  
 
Common to a wide body of thought in the Enlightenment was a very widespread and imprecise 
consensus that the seemingly different ideas of reason, happiness (sometimes identified as 
“utility”), sentiment (and later emotion) were all in fact in harmony with each other, and that only 
the vagaries and prejudices of tradition and (particularly priestly) authority had prevented this 
harmony from establishing itself. Part of the Enlightenment’s faith was that the use of reason, 
unfettered by such tradition and authority and accompanied by a proper attention to 
“sentiment,” would be enough to put things right. What had only been a project for the early 
modern period – that reason and reality are one – seemed to come to self-conscious fruition in 
the Enlightenment, which produced an account of itself that took reason, in Hegel’s words, to be 
“certain of itself as being all reality.” Its various accounts led to the conclusion that taking an 
impersonal, observational point of view (which many Enlightenment figures identified as 
following the dictates of reason) would eventuate in some kind of overall social and even 
personal “harmony” (Pinkard 1996, p.125).  
 
It was thought that this drive towards ‘social harmony’ would reveal the universality 
common to humanity, and that its discovery would provide humanity with the conditions 
in which it could ameliorate itself. The source of this universality was to be reason itself.  
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For Kant, this reason was ‘the faculty which tried to think the whole, as against 
understanding which operated in the immediate context’ (Taylor 1975, p.116). Reason 
would liberate individuals from the ‘determining influence of the world of sense’, 
allowing them ‘to act according to principles… independent of nature’, and encouraging 
them to ‘make inferences about the world which exceed the limits of the understanding’ 
(Caygill 1995, p.347). It follows for individuals to recognise themselves as capable of 
being responsible for their actions, they would cease to see themselves as the result of 
the causality of nature, and would instead employ reason towards self-determining ends 
and, consequently, social legislation. Social harmony would thus become possible to the 
extent that the social realm would reflect a community of beings acting simultaneously in 
their own best interests, and in the interests of the community.  
 
These are standards by which modern societies still evaluate themselves, but the 
way reason is understood changes in different historical contexts. It can never be 
assumed that the manner in which reason is identified intellectually or employed socially 
at a specific point in time is available to all members of a community. As understandings 
of reason change to meet criteria compelled by objective social conditions, they can 
entail a radical divide between those capable of employing such reason towards their own 
wellbeing, and those for whom that reason becomes an obstacle – indeed, an alienating 
factor – in the pursuit of their interests. This paradox, alongside empirical conditions, 
such as the radical economic imbalance between different parts of the world or the 
maligned predominance of Western culture, can account for why huge swathes of 
mankind find themselves out of harmony with the Enlightenment conception of reason.  
 
There is also the notion that what individuals perceive to be crucial elements of 
experience, in terms of how they account for their perception of the world, is not 
accounted for in the manner that reason comes to be employed socially. Where reason, 
by traditional accounts, is supposed to liberate individuals from the causality of nature, 
the modern notion of reason seems to impose a causality of its own – one leaving 
diminishing space for distinctively spiritual and subjective needs. Social antagonism can 
be traced to both objectively empirical conditions and this perceived ‘lack’ in reason – 
and if it is claimed that a social order is based on reason, that reason has to account for 
what it can be accused of lacking. If such claims are ignored, then the rationality in 
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question can be accused of being ideological – meaning, it depends, for its coherence, on 
excluding thoughts and sentiments that might challenge its claims to ‘universal’ validity.          
 
From the industrial revolution to today’s information revolution, for example, the 
submission of individual needs to the overarching needs of industry provided the stage 
upon which recent history has played out. One significant pan-global development in 
recent history, emerging from the ashes of the Cold War logic of ‘mutually assured 
destruction’, represents a dialectical development of sorts. This development moves 
from a rationalised bipolarity, in which both superpowers staked respective social 
progress partially on the threat of the destruction of the other, to the rational 
consciousness embodied and espoused by a sole hegemon (or more precisely, with 
exceptions only of degree, a hegemonic Weltanschauung), to which large portions of the 
globe take exception, be it in the guise of religion, nationalism or other beliefs. Where 
the Cold War provided a semblance of parity between competing ideologies, and 
therefore a perception of ideological choice, the near-total victory of one ideology has 
created even greater distance between those immanently experiencing that form of 
rational consciousness, and those left outside of it. In addition, a gulf between rich and 
poor has since been revealed which is much wider in terms of power-relations and 
geopolitical bargaining between first and developing worlds than was perceived during 
the Cold War.  
 
This gulf hitherto shows limited potential for reconciliation, and it may be 
suggested that the lack of a rational meeting ground between the dominant pragmatist 
rationalism governing the West and the economic and existential desperation 
characterising much of the rest of the world, is part of what leads to respective 
resumptions of faith. A measure of such ‘existential desperation’ is exemplified by how 
developing countries are enjoined to ‘catch up’ with the West by importing economic 
and political systems more harmonised with those first-world systems powering the 
global economy than they are with local conditions. The forced choice between global 
and local in many instances drives a wedge of misunderstanding between those operating 
locally who, consequently, are forced to compete globally, and those operating globally 
with limited concern for local conditions and traditions. Existential desperation is thus 
experienced by individuals forced to trade tradition and local know-how for the 
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uncertainties of globalisation and a low place on the globally competitive food chain.21 
Simply put, the locus of conflict has shifted from an ideological balance of power to a 
radical imbalance of global power, and the explicitness of this imbalance highlights one 
root cause of contemporary alienation.  
 
Contemporary alienation, in this constellation, could indeed be considered 
threefold: Alienation from ‘the other’ - from other individuals experiencing conditions 
one has no understanding of; alienation from objective conditions in which individuals 
struggle to find meaning, and alienation from oneself – the conflict between how 
individuals wish to perceive themselves, and how they are determined by objective 
factors beyond their control. The Hegelian formulation of the concept of alienation as 
being the ‘unhappy consciousness’ (unglückliches Bewusstsein), in which individuals are 
conscious of themselves as divided, and for whom the aspiration towards ‘universality’ 
has been compromised, is germane to this discussion. In this formulation, individuals are 
divided because they are not part of, or on the way to, ‘universality’. It follows divided 
individuals are alienated from the universality of the world – the individual’s 
consciousness is not ‘one’ with how it is objectively determined, although it still depends 
on the objective world.  
 
This concept of alienation found vivid expression in its Marxist characterisation 
as a feature of the modern world intrinsic to capitalism and the social mobility it 
engenders. In this characterisation, alienation from labour proper divides individuals 
from the labour of their own bodies, thus compromising their potentially universal 
essence. The product of labour, it follows, becomes independent and potentially more 
powerful in terms of exchange value than labourers themselves. By this account, the 
process of labour is alienating because it is experienced, not as a relationship between 
workers and their labour, but as a loss of the worker’s own reality. What, then, can be 
understood as an individual’s reality, and how does ‘universality’ feature in such reality?  
 
If the truth of individuals’ consciousness depends on the nature of their 
relationship to reality, how can an adequate framework for reality itself be provided, 
considering no one single individual encompasses the scope of reality? To some degree, 
the appeal to the ‘universal’ seeks to answer the notion of a reality shared by all. The 
                                                
21 See Stiglitz 2002.    
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notion of the universal, however, cannot count as more than a belief, and as such is a 
‘non-rational determinant’ (Rosen) on par with religion, or with the notion of the 
existence of a ‘spiritual essence’ of a community. However, the Enlightenment drive 
towards the universal is precisely where non-rational beliefs about the nature of reality 
and their continuous critique in the drive towards justification are supposed to meet. 
This dialectic between belief and rational justification has been present in the ebb and 
flow of any of the major beliefs that have characterised the Western mind.  
 
By the account of the emphasis on justification in Enlightenment rationality, the 
idea of false consciousness and its relationship to society has been carried by rationalist 
assumptions that human nature is constant, such as Hume’s judgement, in the Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding, that the purpose of history is the discovery of ‘the 
constant and universal principles of human nature’. Assuming that ‘human nature’ is ‘the 
part of nature that is human’ and is bound up in the objective conditions of the world 
(leaving aside essentialist notions of ‘inner human nature’), it could well be said to be 
constant. It follows while the specific form of false consciousness may change according 
to the social conditions it pertains to, its subject matter – human nature - changes only by 
degree, and not in substance.  
 
However, it does not follow that because some form of repression of human 
nature has been inherent in every historical stage of experience, that human nature has 
remained essentially unchanged. This assumption may be correct, but it does not follow 
from the point that repression of human nature is characteristic of a society assumed to 
be rational in the manner that it weighs its ends and the means used to achieve them. If 
we accept, however, that some form of repression is characteristic of rational society – if 
rational society entails at least the partial repression of human nature, even to the extent 
that it provides the greatest possible benefits for the greatest number of people, then, 
pace Pippin, the justification for its control and ensuing repression should be addressed. 
Here, then, the question must be asked: how, or where, can modern subjectivity be 
situated, and examined?  
 
So far, we have seen that the modern subject moves between a dualism of belief 
and rational justification; that the subject always exists in relation to the objective world – 
both society and nature - outside itself, and that it experiences contradictions between 
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freedom and fulfilment, and repression and alienation, in its experience of the modern 
world. How does the individual, ‘susceptible to suffering’, find meaning ‘in a world that – 
however much he and his kind may have transformed it – ultimately, he has not made’ 
(Rosen 1996, p.22)?   
 
The notion of false consciousness provides a useful starting point for inquiring 
into ideology and the ways it distorts individuals’ ideas of their interests, and the extent 
to which this distortion can be repressive. Rosen divides approaches to false 
consciousness into three categories: Cognitive false consciousness (disorders of belief, 
attitude, and perception), practical false consciousness (disorders of desire/will, values, 
ends and norms, emotions) and ‘distortions of identity’ (disorders of individuality, the 
collective, or the metaphysical). Any of these approaches offers something to an overall 
conception of false consciousness and its relationship with reality, and the element tying 
each possible ‘deficiency’ to the other is ideology. False belief easily fits as a category in 
the rubric of ideology, as does false desire or the misinterpretation of identity as being 
entirely dependent on a particular collective consciousness or metaphysical belief. If 
ideology is the manner in which a form of consciousness is shaped so as to support a 
given social structure, then it is relevant to any conceivable human realm that implies 
social activity – religion, politics, science, business, etc. For an ideology to successfully 
take hold, therefore, it must ensure individuals in its sway act proficiently under its 
assumptions. Most importantly, the competence of individuals in executing objectives 
based on those assumptions contributes to perpetuation of the ideology in question.  
 
As such, the more powerful an ideology, the more it is capable of inducing agents 
to act in the service of interests not necessarily their own. The more it harmonises its 
own criteria for right and wrong with the general and substantive beliefs held by 
individuals operating within it, the greater its chances of continuing in a dominant form. 
Marx, in The German Ideology, alleges that ‘[i]f in all ideology men and their circumstances 
appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from 
their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their 
physical life-process’ (Marx 2001, p.253). This, following Rosen, means ideological 
beliefs both reproduce structures of reality and invert them at the same time, presumably 
to the point where they become barely perceptible. This, then, would be a condition in 
which ‘false consciousness’ arises – a consciousness both true in terms of the reality that 
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it is perpetuating, and false in the sense that its contribution eventually becomes 
ideological.     
 
It follows that false consciousness resulting from ideology compromises human 
experience, undermining its unity. Yet, another example of false consciousness would be 
the claim that unity and continuity, whether of experience or the ego, are themselves 
‘false’ notions, and that the very search for a unified ego or self is itself ideological, 
alienating individuals from comprehension that there may be no such thing. Accordingly, 
the idea of the ‘unified subject’ itself would be a source of false consciousness. Any 
approach to ideology has a problem in common, however. Where does one stand with 
relation to the critique of, and emancipation from, ideology, if one can never really stand 
outside it?  
 
This problem is a feature of modern subjectivity, in terms of the global power of 
one particular form of political economy, the kinds of ideology it gives rise to, and the 
paucity of reasonable alternatives to it. However, the problem is not only modern: 
regardless of particular historical contingency, ideology is a prerequisite for creating 
common belief systems and the ideological forms consciousness takes in relation to its 
needs. On one hand, the social experience of individuals is guided by language, and 
specifically by distinctions between true and false propositions. The submission of claims 
to a commonly held ‘space of reasons’ between individuals thus acts as a rational 
constraint on potentially false propositions, and on individuals making them.  
 
This suggests while ideological forms are dependent on language in order to 
become dominant among a given collective, they can also be challenged by language. If, 
conversely, subjectivity is always determined in ways individuals may not be aware of, or 
have the possibility of being aware of, this presupposes a degree of false consciousness in 
the ideological conception of anything particular in the world irrespective of language, 
because of the numerous ways experience can be constrained. What, then, can a ‘truth’ 
of the subject itself amount to? Any such conception depends on conscious experience, 
and any ‘truth of the subject’ depends, therefore, on the truth of the subject’s experience of 
something, as opposed to ideological assumptions or expression of what, e.g., something 
is. This suggests the nature of individual consciousness is indispensable to establishing 
truth about both the object it is conscious of, and the subject itself. While consciousness 
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is not a necessary feature for, say, the heart to pump blood, or knowledge of the arteries 
a necessary feature for the survival of the organism, distinction should be made between 
biological facts pertaining to established scientific truths or frameworks, and the social, 
environmental factors which, in principle, should be accessible to the mediation of all 
individuals.  
 
Accounting for perceptions of the world with language is essential to the ability 
of individuals to determine the truth of their propositions. The conceptualisation of 
these perceptions, however, may itself be reified or ideological, or the product of a false 
consciousness originating from ideological norms of the immediate social environment, 
suggesting an active role of the subject in making propositions aspiring to the status of 
truth. Where the notion of false consciousness raises larger questions pertaining to the 
status of the mind within reality - questions investigated below – the notion of the ‘truth 
of the subject’ can presently be delineated as a question of the extent to which the 
subject reflects simultaneously on its relationship to its subject matter (the object of 
knowledge), and on itself. This also means that the question of the truth of the subject 
can be re-framed as a question of the subject’s experience, where the ‘false consciousness’ 
of something reflects the extent to which the experience of something is, or has been, 
restricted, whether by (ideological) social structures and norms, by individuals 
themselves, or both.  
 
First, for individuals to make any claim to truth at all, and for there to be any 
chance of guaranteeing that what individuals experience as meaningful is grounded in 
verifiable relations with the objective world, they must engage in discourse and gain 
perceptions contrary to their own, without which any claim is worthless. Such inter-
subjective discourse acts correctively – normatively - in revealing shortcomings in 
subjective perceptions of the world, as well as providing new experiences that can be the 
source of evolving truths pertaining to respective individuals. Clearly, conflicting 
perspectives between what the subject-for-itself considers to be legitimate and what the 
social realm holds as being so, not to mention what different social realms hold, are the 
source of constant conflict within which any truth of the subject may be examined. But 
what is a recognisable locus of such conflict? I address this in Chapter 2, where I 
consider the objective determination of ideology in the notion of ‘instrumental’ forms of 
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rationality, alongside introducing some of Adorno’s key concepts in order to establish 
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III. CHAPTER 2: PRIORITISING THE OBJECTIVE 
 
This chapter continues the cross-examination of the concept of ideology, now in 
relation to categories of instrumental and subject-centred forms of reason. To this end, I 
examine contradictions inherent to various kinds of instrumental rationality to suggest 
how modern society is in need of a continuing critique of ideology, and to submit a 
position from which ideology critique itself can be rationally validated. These objectives 
involve a discussion of the problem of ‘rational constraints’. Additionally, the question of 
how experience of modern society can be a source of claims to truth is introduced. Some 
of Adorno’s theoretical responses to the problems of ideology and truth are introduced 
with a view to establishing their validity. The objectives of this chapter are, first, to 
continue discussing ideology in contexts that resurface throughout this thesis, and 
second, to establish basic elements of Adorno’s theory, and to suggest their relevance to 
contemporary problems, and structures of thought associated with them. 
    
2.1  The Object: Modern Society and Instrumental Reason 
 
One way of examining conflicts of perception discussed is the evaluation of 
specific ideas pertaining to the functions of ideology in contemporary society. Certainly, 
understanding how various ideological forms impact individuals helps to account for 
their perceptions of the world. A standard critique of ideology is that it passes for, and is 
sanctioned as, reason in modern societies. This critique suggests modern rationality has no 
court of appeal outside itself, and therefore that the kind of rationality whose objective is 
to subject the objective world to the human will becomes an incontrovertible ideology in 
its own right. In critical theory, the type of rationality resulting from the drive towards 
quantification and control over nature is typically called ‘instrumental reason’.  
 
This reason is ‘instrumental’ in the sense that it becomes self-sustaining while 
evolving into evermore powerful forms, in that it exerts itself upon the social realm to 
the point where it is accepted as naturally ‘given’, and in that it operates predominantly 
according to a logic of means to ends. Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment 
is a classic critique of instrumental reason, in which they argue that scientific theory 
guides what is deemed in the service of knowledge and progress by constructing objects 
of knowledge with a view to manipulating the natural world. Their criticism questions 
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how theories pertaining to these objects are developed, suggesting they are often 
developed in isolation from actual social, historical and natural circumstances in which 
they are elaborated. As opposed to treating nature itself as a true object of knowledge, 
they claim many such theories treat their objects partially in (attempted) isolation from 
nature, and therefore potentially ignore ways in which elements accounted for in these 
theories change in the course of their experience.  
 
In as far as such theories contribute to common understandings of reason, reason 
becomes ‘instrumental’ in the following ways: First, in the sense that theories are imposed 
on the natural world. Second, theories manipulate those elements of the natural world 
best serving the theories themselves, at the expense of inconvenient or contradictory 
evidence. Third, these theories often legitimate themselves independently of recurring 
reference to the natural world as a whole, and specifically to the social experience of these 
theories in the context of society within the natural whole. Further, the threat posed by 
instrumental reason, irrespective of the purely scientific validity underpinning it, is that a 
form of reasoning that has achieved a limited form of scientific success becomes the de 
facto standard of rationality applied throughout society, and across manifold levels of 
social and individual experience.  
 
Habermas, for example, distinguishes between attempts to understand nature and 
natural laws with a view towards manipulating them technically towards pragmatic ends 
as a neutral and necessary form of instrumental reasoning, and the critical questioning of 
how this instrumental rationality can function in socially oppressive ways.22 Such critical 
questioning can amount to reasoning that, conversely, is not ‘instrumental’, but remains 
continuously wedded to the changing social experience itself of instrumental rationalities.    
 
It follows instrumental rationality may result in forms of ‘subject-centred’ reason 
which define rationality in terms of needs that are arguably not real. Consider, e.g., the 
extensive contribution of science to the manufacture and commercial promotion of 
products destined for the marketplace that are not real necessities, and which do little to 
address genuine needs or individual suffering. While this involves questioning subjective 
positions from which one judges ‘genuine’ needs, one predominant feature of modern 
life is the overpowering extent to which commercial products are forced upon individual 
                                                
22 See Habermas 1968. 
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consciousness through the immediacy of advertising, technology and a plethora of 
different, often manipulative, methods.  
 
This exemplifies how a form of instrumental reason – the overwhelming supply 
of products to satisfy objectives of economic growth (itself an ideological measure of 
social health) – can lead to subject-centred reasoning. In this instance, subject-centred 
reasoning is the consumption of products due to their availability and satisfaction they 
induce, but often not due to reflection on their actual necessity. 23  Subject-centred 
reasoning is encouraged, therefore, by a dependence on objectives and a social reality 
predetermined by instrumental forms of reason. This form of subjective reasoning can 
be characterised e.g. as understanding the social realm predominantly as a marketplace 
that exists to satisfy desire, or as a wholesale ideological concurrence with the 
determination of modern society by the objective of economic growth.  
 
This contrasts with objective perspectives of society as, say, the expression of 
untold types of behaviour that cannot simply be classified according to the mechanisms 
of the marketplace. Or, e.g. contrasts with the perspective, as Jackson suggests, that the 
determination of social experience predominantly by objectives of economic growth – 
the default reaction of governments even in the face of grave socio-economic 
mismanagement arising from ideological dependence on this very objective – cannot be 
sustained indefinitely if prosperity and the ecology are to be preserved, due to finite 
resources.24 The sheer social dominance of instrumental forms of rationality increases, 
therefore, likelihood of its subjective acceptance as naturally ‘given’ – ‘the way things are’ 
– where individuals may ‘subjectivize’ this form of reason as their own.  
 
Additionally, instrumental forms of rationality are prevalent in the administration 
of modern society to the extent that innermost individual desires and thoughts may 
become indistinguishable from prevalent social ideas of, e.g., happiness or beauty, to the 
point where these can no longer be dissociated from their representation through the 
lens of instrumental reason. If instrumental reason were all-pervasive, however, it entails 
the only form of reason with which individuals can identify is instrumental, in that they’d 
                                                
23 See Bauman 2001. 
24 Jackson argues the idea of prosperity cannot be limited to GDP, high median incomes or financial 
wellbeing, but is a combination of all factors contributing to material wellbeing, such as psychology, 
social safety or a healthy eco-system. See Jackson 2009. 
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be deprived of both objective responses to the stimuli of the immediate world and the 
critical ability to develop such responses. Is this truly the case?   
 
According to Honneth, ‘…Adorno and Horkheimer presuppose [in DoE], for the 
sake of labour, individuals must forcibly constrict their capacity for sensory experience as 
well as their organic instinctual potential in order to realise the discipline of instrumental 
functions’ (Honneth 1996, p.48). Intensification of the means of domination encroaching 
on ‘sensory experience’ and ‘organic instinctual potential’, legitimated by rational means 
of mechanisation and numerical administration as facts of modern life and work, is in 
fact, according to Adorno, a lack of rationality. This lack of rationality, masquerading as 
reason, compromises possibilities of rational approaches to social and human problems - 
meaning, approaches taking all forms of experience into account.  
 
For Adorno, the potential for ‘non-instrumental’ forms of reasoning in modern 
society does exist, despite how social relations are objectively and ideologically 
determined. This potential, however, has to do with the capacity of reflection itself to 
surpass what is perceived as ‘given’ and realise ‘moments’ of freedom in reflection which 
has not already been circumscribed, either by the individual, or in socially fixed 
identifications of an object of knowledge. To realise such moments, Adorno emphasises 
the necessity of the continuous immanent critique of ideological forms, where one 
objective of such critique is to salvage the ‘speculative moment’ of concepts that gets lost 
or obscured in the social reality determined by instrumental rationality.  
 
Cook provides exemplifications of such concepts. For example, the ‘“self-
evident” truth that all men are created equal’ enshrined in the U.S. Declaration of 
Independence contains ‘an idea of equality which has not yet been realised and which 
can be used as the basis for a critique of existing inequalities’. Another such concept is 
‘[t]he idea of freedom, derived from Enlightenment… whose ideational content 
transcends particular economic interests’ (Cook 1996, p.82). The ‘speculative moment’ in 
these examples refers to the potential for experiencing the freedom in these ideas that 
has not been universally realised, or which is threatened by existing circumstances. 
Extracting the speculative moment in such concepts can be a source of reflection 
liberated from constraints on experience imposed by instrumental reason, and, intimating 
the kind of reason Adorno develops, salvaging such moments is a basis for proceeding 
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with ideology critique. It follows contradictions between socially expressed ideals – e.g., 
democracies as societies based on free speech - and their experience in material reality – 
e.g., how securing one’s livelihood often includes having to circumscribe public 
statements (and potentially, private thoughts) - is the starting point of both ideology 
critique, and for reflection striving to overcome ideology. While our ideology critique 
continues, therefore, it is simultaneously necessary to develop arguments suggesting how 
instrumental rationality comes to exert such power over the social sphere that Adorno 
conceives of the ideological determination of social relations as ‘total’.      
 
One of the philosophical preoccupations of modernity is the problem of ‘rational 
constraints’, which is also a problem lending itself to questions concerning the role 
played by science and technology. The idea of rational constraints is as follows: In order 
for a form of reason to remain rational, as opposed to becoming ‘instrumental’, self-
legitimating and therefore, a form of ideology, it must seek legitimation according to 
criteria external to itself, and must continually justify itself according to claims 
contradicting it. In this way there would be an external, rational ‘constraint’ on that form 
of reasoning which would, by acting as a mode of checks and balances, increase its 
validity and social legitimacy, as opposed to allowing it to develop irrespective of, e.g., 
verifiably harmful social consequences.  
 
For example, technology legitimates itself socially with appeals to the 
inventiveness and playfulness of human spontaneity (e.g., software programming is an 
area where creativity is appreciated professionally). The domination of social experience 
by technology creates its own aporia, however. Technology can also encourage the 
limitation of spontaneous thought and creativity to the purely technical realm – consider, 
e.g., the social and financial premium placed on things like web design or advanced 
programming skills, or how much easier it is for laboratories dedicated to technological 
advances to secure private and public funding for research and development than, say, 
research departments in the humanities.  
 
A relentless ideological emphasis on technical accomplishment as the supreme 
contemporary achievement of human spontaneity, to the neglect of most other areas of 
social activity and reflection to which spontaneity contributes, suggests one key way 
technology itself has become self-legitimating. It also concentrates freedom in one area 
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of potential human activity in society more broadly, promoting ideological judgements in 
the process – e.g., the social value of financial or professional investment in technology 
considered superior to investment in most other areas of social activity - that become 
social norms onto themselves. Additionally, it leads to long-term consequences, such as 
the limitation of individual and social skill sets, and the workforce in general, to 
technological manipulation alone, or behavioural changes as a result of the technological 
mediation of so much human communication.25  
 
One reason for the domination of social experience by technology, then, is 
because of the lack of rational constraints on it. It follows that the creation of technology 
itself or the social consequences of its use are rarely challenged, partly because no other 
area of social thought or activity can compete with technological mediums themselves in 
terms of the immediacy with which they relay their messages. The rationality and logic 
immanent to the development of technology in the first place can become a source of 
social irrationality, therefore, when the extent of its social monopoly is such that it does 
not have to justify, politically or otherwise, its near-total social dominance beyond its 
own rationalising forms, while still clearly impacting on so many other areas of social and 
individual experience. The lack of rational constraints on technology has implications for 
the ideas of freedom and self-determination, and how these come to be conceptualised 
dominantly in the social context. Technology is designated as a central expression of 
democratic freedom, in that its development is a testament to human ingenuity and that 
its use is liberating, democratic and spurs innovation. For example, the fact that a new 
piece of software or the latest in the endless stream of applications and updates allows 
individuals to do previously unimaginable things with their computers may be considered 
progress in the literal sense that the software itself has improved.  
 
The ideological undercurrent of the notion of software or Internet as ‘liberating’, 
however, is the celebration of the increased personal freedom to do previously 
unimagined things, which does not take into account all the ways in which this freedom 
may be abused, may curtail the freedom of others, or may lead to unintended and 
irreversible social consequences. Consider e.g. the phenomenon of ‘cyber-bullying’, 
where bullying amongst children perpetrated anonymously over the Internet can take on 
                                                
25 Examples of this are given throughout the thesis.  
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previously unimaginable proportions merely because it is possible26, not to mention the 
proliferation of practices such as sharing of child pornography, or the effect of 
pornography on children themselves, etc. Or, consider the broader social effects of 
potentially decreasing levels of literacy due partly to overexposure to often false, 
fragmented information and incoherent reading on the Internet27, the strain on attention 
spans due to the social pressure of constant interconnection, or breakdowns in civility 
due to anonymity afforded by web-based communication.  
 
These brief examples demonstrate some contradictions in the identification of 
the concept of freedom with technological progress. The problem with technological 
progress in the context of ideology critique is that individual conceptions of freedom 
come to be identified predominantly with the kinds of freedoms afforded by 
technological development, where the socially dominant form of instrumental rationality 
is adopted as subject-centred reasoning. The lack of rational constraints on this form of 
instrumental rationality, resulting in its near-total social dominance, however, suggests 
there are substantial elements of self-determination, and what can be conceptualised as 
freedom, unaccounted for within the strictures of merely technical progress. Where do 
individuals stand with regards to their self-determination from the influence of 
technology, and do they even have a democratic choice in the matter, if they are to 
survive under conditions of postmodernity?  
 
Furthermore, the social experience of the kind of freedom promoted by 
technological progress as a modus operandi of the increasing ability, e.g., of individuals to 
do as they please online (which has real repercussions for social attitudes offline) suggests 
urgent consideration of rational constraints on that form of subject-centred freedom, 
alongside the technology encouraging it. One problem with subject-centred reason, 
however, based on the perceived freedom to act in accordance with whatever is possible 
and what the individual desires, is that among its governing precepts is that it should not 
submit itself to external critique or socio-political mediation. What, then, can rational 
constraints amount to, if they must issue from the judgement of individuals themselves - 
judgement, moreover, that may be increasingly difficult to separate from the 
technological domination of social experience?    
                                                
26 See Cowie 2012. 
27 See Rich 2008.  
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Conversely, how is the charge sustained that instrumental rationality does not 
submit itself sufficiently to the court of human judgement, when individuals presumably 
make judgements about how responsibly to exercise their creativity and freedom through 
possibilities afforded by technology, and the possible consequences thereof? The 
problem can be considered by reflecting on how the direction of modern society is 
determined without recourse to political accountability for technological progress. This 
suggests the identification of social progress with technology is taken to be another 
natural, self-explanatory given, enabling the forces of production behind the 
technological drive to operate freely without this idea of progress being debated 
politically, or submitted to an informed popular vote. The political process in the West, 
as a whole, operates from within the paradigm of technological progress. It partially stakes 
its claim to being democratic on the extent to which technology facilitates the democratic 
process of making information available to prospective voters through various media.  
 
However, it also operates from an a priori position that, consequently, 
technological progress is sui generis democratic, and therefore doesn’t require submission 
to political discourse or popular plebiscite. Consider, e.g., how public political discourse 
is reduced to media-friendly sound-bites, ostensibly appealing to the shrinking attention 
spans and spare time of potential voters. Partly a consequence of how individuals 
become accustomed to digesting information with the immediacy with which it is 
dispatched, it is also a consequence of the overall technological obsession with speed. 
Political discourse is unquestionably affected. For example, Bauman observes how, in 
their successful 1997 and 2001 campaigns, Blair and the Labour Party  
 
wisely abstained from expounding on… political programmes and philosophies: were they to 
behave differently, they could perhaps alienate some of the voters by opposing their preferences, 
but they would lose many, many more by demanding a mental effort they would neither wish nor 
be able to make, risking boredom and fading interest. Knowing… that the absence of guidelines 
to be trusted is a most vulnerable and painful aspect of life in our increasingly fluid social setting, 
Blair preferred to dwell on the appeal to trust him, leaving sorely under-discussed the policies 
electors were supposed to trust him to promote. The other constant motif of Blair’s electoral 
speeches was that of “modernisation”, a term as vacuous by itself as it is useful in implying a 
gloss of scientific seriousness and expertise on the universal and perpetual desire to make things 
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better. After electoral victory there was of course no reason to abandon the victorious strategy 
(Bauman 2002, p.164).  
 
This example illustrates how political leadership is both absolved of having to go into 
detail to promote its agenda because of the effects of modern technology (the immediacy 
of information manifested in sound-bites, shortening attention spans), and how it uses 
this state of affairs to promote agendas of ‘modernisation’ (technological and scientific 
development, etc.) while generally avoiding serious questions being asked about it. While 
there is no doubt that technology also plays a positive role involving citizens in the 
political process, the fact that the technological determination of social reality itself was, 
until recently, rarely the topic of political debate reflects the extent to which it is 
positively accepted as a natural given of modern life. In other words, the form of 
instrumental rationality ideologically identifying social improvement (and health) with 
technological progress as a given currently has few external, social or political rational 
constraints to which it must submit.  
 
The obvious candidate for such rational constraints is the electorate itself, but the 
fact that electorates are rarely exposed to such discussions in the course of political 
campaigns, or that individuals rarely make a political issue of this aspect of the objective 
determination of their social experience, suggests a social encouragement of the 
potentially undemocratic aspects of this instrumental form of rationality. The rationality 
sustaining the overall technological drive must be held accountable if it is to properly 
legitimate itself as part of the constitution of the democratic order, and if it is not merely 
to be self-legitimating on the pure basis of its possibilities as opposed to, say, 
democratically legitimated - or not - as a consequence of its social experience. Who other 
than the individuals sustaining that rationality themselves can act as rational constraints 
and demand accountability?  
 
The contradiction arising is therefore between an instrumental form of rationality 
determining manifold levels of social and individual experience in potentially 
undemocratic ways because of its ideological influence over individual reasoning, and the 
fact that individuals themselves are the source of this instrumental reasoning, partly in the 
belief that it increases their democratic freedoms. If instrumental forms of rationality 
must be accountable to something other than – something outside – the social conditions 
they objectively determine, and if they are to be subject to rational constraints and not 
Prospects Beyond Ideology: Reason, Freedom and the Truth of the Subject – 
Towards Political Models for the Critical Thought of Theodor W. Adorno 
 
 80 
merely considered to be naturally given, it is far from evident that rational constraints 
exist objectively in the natural world. It follows that rational constraints must issue from 
individuals themselves, and from the mediation occurring between them at the level of 
their social engagement.      
 
The precise problem of instrumental rationality is that it cannot only be 
considered to be rational if it does not submit itself to critiques where it can account for 
the extent of its influence. That it does not do so is a source of contemporary alienation: 
First, the unaccountability of technology and other manifestations of instrumental 
rationality add to sentiments of powerlessness because of the ways they objectively 
determine individual lives. Second, individuals have limited recourse to action because 
their ability to arbitrate the direction of society through the political process is constrained 
both by narrowing scopes of political discourse, and the increasing reliance of that 
discourse on ideological elements sustaining instrumental rationalities. In this state of 
affairs, it may be tempting for individuals to accept their world ‘as is’ and to act in 
accordance with prevailing norms and expectations – perhaps despite themselves or 
critical reservations they may have - increasing the potential for accepting the social state 
of affairs as ‘naturally’ given.  
 
Modern individuals could thus be said to be doubly alienated – first, from aspects 
of their nature and subjectivity that simply don’t identify with the forms of instrumental 
rationality they are compelled to act in accordance with, and second, by having that 
alienation reinforced by the latter’s unaccountability. The technocratic determination of 
society, therefore, can in part be characterised as the domination of elements of external 
nature required for the development of technology itself as a product of scientific 
reasoning, and the repression of elements of (inner) nature as a consequence of the social 
power exerted by this form of rationality. Ensuing alienation, consequently, can be taken 
to be the problem of the extent to which self-determining action is possible under social 
circumstances both determining the immediate experience of individuals, and dominating 
elements of their inner nature. How, moreover, if the ability to understand and do the 
science that eventually - despite itself - results at least partly in a potentially undemocratic 
domination of social experience, is as much a feature of human nature as any other aspect 
of human experience, does it result in the domination of competing aspects of human 
nature and understanding?  
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The ‘disenchantment of nature’ made possible by the rise of modern science is 
central to understanding the experience of alienation in modernity. Scientific theory, 
broadly speaking, offers insight into the natural world while making predictions about its 
structure. One of its central philosophical tenets is the idea that something’s way of being 
‘natural’ is the position it is ascribed in the realm of law, a stance attributed to Kant by 
thinkers like Sellars and McDowell. This means phenomena in natural science become 
intelligible in terms of the position they are attributed according to laws of nature, 
resulting in the ‘disenchantment’ of nature as a historical process in which natural things 
become increasingly intelligible and, therefore, lose the meanings they had in traditional 
cultures.  
 
This ‘loss of meaning’ could partially account for the experience of alienation, 
where tradition ascribed fixed meanings to experiences to which individuals, in previous 
eras, tethered their sense of identity, but this doesn’t suggest the scientific quest to make 
natural things more intelligible is itself irrational or somehow repressive of human nature. 
It does suggest, however, that if the laws of nature natural science seeks to comprehend are 
themselves ‘self-legitimating’, then natural science itself, in its pursuit of the objective 
understanding of natural phenomena, also becomes ‘self-legitimating’ to the degree that it 
attempts to identify phenomena as they are, objectively, in themselves.  
 
Scientific theory, however, relies on concepts – for example, the concept of 
falsifiability, e.g., whereby science over time disproves theories that were previously 
commonly accepted – and these concepts themselves cannot be inscribed into natural law. 
The question of how scientific theory uses concepts, therefore, is a matter of judgement that 
cannot be entirely self-legitimating. Scientific theory, e.g., often attempts to isolate its object 
of knowledge and subjects it to tests yielding data independently of the rest of nature, in 
the effort to comprehend it. Following Adorno, this suggests, first, that judgements are 
made about scientific method that reduce understanding of the phenomena to the concept 
of the method itself – effectively identifying the particular natural phenomenon with the 
concept. Second, it suggests the conceptual method is potentially imposed on the natural 
phenomenon in isolation from social, historical and natural circumstances in which it has 
been developed. Where, then, does this leave the status of reason itself in nature? 
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Sellars and McDowell also suggest, therefore, that conceptual abilities needed to 
reason or make judgements cannot be accounted for by natural science or the laws of 
nature alone. For McDowell, following Sellars, judgement and justification in the search 
for rational validity takes place in what they call the ‘space of reasons’. This space exists 
beyond what is purely nature or law, does not rely on naturalistic causal explanations 
characteristic of modern science, and is therefore not self-legitimating. Thornton 
characterises McDowell’s position in his influential work Mind and World as the 
 
attempt… to reconcile the idea that perception serves to justify our beliefs – it is part of what 
Sellars called the ‘space of reasons’ – and yet it is at the same time a perfectly natural 
phenomenon. The problem is that natural events do not seem to be suited to play a justificatory 
role. Reason and nature seem to be distinct. The solution, McDowell suggests, is a proper 
understanding of experience. (Thornton 2009)28  
 
This means, for McDowell, that reason, or the justification of beliefs in the ‘space of 
reasons,’ is a part of nature – individuals with perceptions and the capacity to 
conceptualise are natural phenomena like anything else in the natural world. Reason, 
however, simultaneously appears to stand ‘outside’ nature, to the degree that nature itself 
doesn’t need justification for its naturally given laws, while human reasoning to 
understand these laws does require (necessarily a form of social) legitimation. This suggests 
a divide between reason and nature that, pace McDowell, can only be bridged by an 
adequate understanding of human experience, a position coinciding with Adorno’s notion 
of experience.  
 
At present, it could simply be asked where the identification of nature with law 
leaves the reasoning within which judgement takes place. A contradiction that could be 
evaluated in the space of reasons, for example, is one arising in the relationship between 
nature and modern society. It could be argued that modern life, with its plethora of 
seemingly spontaneous activity, automatically supplements the notion of natural law with 
the idea that there are no ‘natural’ external constraints on the knowledge arising from this 
activity. What becomes understood as the ‘natural’ element of this activity becomes a ‘law’ 
of existence onto itself, and rational constraints on this activity would therefore be an 
attempt to dominate (human) nature.  
 
                                                
28 See Thornton 2009. 
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Is what critics call instrumental rationality, then, simply a reflection of nature, with 
humans performing natural, spontaneous tasks of survival and improvement at higher 
levels of consciousness than animals? Or, pace Adorno, are self-legitimating, instrumental 
forms of rationality themselves expressions of attempts to dominate nature that can be 
conceived as illegitimate in as far as they seek to dominate both human nature and the 
natural world according to singular conceptions of reason, without submitting to rational 
constraints of their own? Where does this contradiction leave the status of reason, and 
freedom? This thesis is devoted to considering this question.  
 
If the social development of technology - as a wider aspect of scientific progress - 
is assumed to be a natural and necessary component of human activity, subtended by 
ideological assumptions about its contributions to progress and knowledge, then questions 
arise as to how the legitimacy of this process is guaranteed. If it cannot be legitimated other 
than through its perpetuation as part of a ‘natural’ human process, then it must still be an 
ideological process, irrespective of benefits it provides, and the extent to which ideological 
reasoning itself is part of (human) nature.  
 
Marx’s analogy of the camera obscura applies to this instance of social reality that is 
both true and false: true to the extent that the structure of modern reality is perpetuated 
through a broadly consented-to method, but false to the extent that there is a reality outside 
the realm of social and technological power that can increasingly only be viewed through 
prisms created by the encompassing ‘totality’ of that structure. Bauman provides a 
historical example of this camera obscura: 
 
As… Marx discovered, the ideas of the dominant classes tend to be the dominant ideas… For at 
least two hundred years it was the managers of capitalist enterprises who dominated the world – 
that is, set the feasible apart from the implausible, the rational apart from the irrational, the 
sensible apart from the insane, and otherwise determined… the range of alternatives inside which 
human life trajectories were to be confined. It was therefore their vision of the world, in 
conjunction with the world itself, shaped and reshaped in the likeness of that vision, that fed into 
and gave substance to the dominant discourse (Bauman 2000, p.55).  
 
This suggests how, in the age of industrialisation, the power dominant classes held over 
society was itself the source of legitimacy eventually attributed to their ideas, and of how 
these ideas characterised the rest of society - as opposed to legitimacy of the ideas 
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themselves. In terms of the camera obscura analogy, social reality thereby became 
simultaneously true and false. It became true in the sense that the social reality dominant 
classes sought to create was created, and perpetuated by all those not members of these 
classes but whose powerlessness vis-à-vis their capital and influence ensured the creation 
of that social reality by default. This reality was false, however, in the sense that it reflected 
the vision of an interest-driven minority and not the experiences of the social majority, 
who, in the Marxist reading, became further alienated from their own interests, potentials 
and labour. By this example, power becomes the prime determinant of legitimacy, and is an 
instance of particular forms of reasoning - reflecting specific interests - that become 
socially legitimated in reality by virtue of a concentration of power. This stands in contrast 
to rational constraints on this power that could shape concepts of social legitimation by 
taking all kinds of social experience into account, including, e.g., the alienation of the 
majority of individuals from their labour during this period of industrialisation.   
 
Additionally, there is the notion of legitimacy ascribed to the social process by law 
developed in conjunction with social experience. As social conditions change, laws are 
developed in relation to them, concretising them and thereby grounding the kind of 
development in question within the institutional structures of society. Considering the 
extent to which establishing legality is supposed to take place independently of vested 
interests, it may therefore be suggested that the perpetuation of social reality cannot only 
be an ideological matter. However, the extent to which law grants legitimacy to social 
conditions in its need to legislate according to social realities can obscure ways in which 
the perpetuation of such conditions are also assumed to be naturally ‘given’ as a result. 
Consider, e.g. the development of the idea of the modern nation-state in the 19th and 20th 
centuries and its grounding in social reality. In this context, the new tasks of the modern 
state, according to Bauman,  
 
…involved standardisation of law and legal institutions across the state; unification, and often 
direct administration, of the process of popular education; and securing priority of unified legal 
discipline over all other, particularistic loyalties… It is for the same reason that the modern state… 
[demanded] discipline to its own commands solely on formal, legal grounds: that is, referring to 
the fact that the commands have been issued by duly appointed incumbents of offices entitled to 
make rulings related to the given area (Bauman 2000, pp.165-66). 
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It follows the submission of social conditions to legal structures is effectuated with the 
aim of stabilising ideas that lead to those conditions in the first place, as evidenced in the 
period of the legal establishment of nation-states. It may therefore be suggested that the 
legal process itself is not necessarily ideological in the sense that its outcomes are 
controlled by private interests, which they aren’t - or shouldn’t be.  
 
Conversely, the manner in which legal processes contribute to the stabilisation of 
social reality - and therefore to impressions that such social reality is a natural 
development, and not an interest-driven one - is an ideological factor, if it is assumed that 
a social reality always reflects a dominant perspective of the world – dominant, that is, to 
the extent that it excludes competing conceptions to its own. If the technological phase of 
development is also subject to the creation of laws related to it, and these contribute to 
impressions of its legitimacy, then a similar problem arises with relation to distinctions 
between real and perceived legitimacy. For example, legislation in relation to technology 
primarily takes place reactively to the social consequences of the transformation of the 
increasingly, pace Bauman, ‘liquid’ public sphere and relations, often predominantly in 
relation to protection of commercial interests.29 The notion that legislation eventually 
arises in relation to the social effects of technology does not mean the scope of 
technological power itself has been legitimated, although it may help sustain the perception 
that it has. What, then, is ‘real’ legitimacy, in this context?  
 
One way of thinking about legitimacy is to consider Habermas’ principle that 
knowledge should be ‘grounded’ in the interests and needs of human beings. The drive 
behind such a principle is emancipatory, in terms of overcoming social distortions 
inflicted by unaccountable structures of power. The extent to which something might be 
considered legitimate could be considered in terms of how it seeks to further the aim of 
freedom and the manner it answers, or not, to genuine human needs. Such legitimacy 
would be ‘real’, then, in terms of how it is judged according to real needs, something only 
determinable in a social context between agents with contrary perceptions and experiences. 
In this light, if we accept the premise that part of the ideological power of technology 
depends on its perceived legitimacy – in terms of how it comes to be understood as naturally 
given with no further need for justification – then it can be inquired how the social power 
of technology can be justified. It would then have to place its claim to legitimacy in a 
                                                
29 See Chapters 6 and 7. 
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space of reasons extensive enough to incorporate all questions - socio-political, 
philosophical or otherwise, that can be raised about it.  
 
As previously suggested, the technological drive and its social impact is 
increasingly a discussion and policy execution limited to competing experts, and to those 
with access to both development of technology and education necessary to understand it - 
precluding in some measure the properly public sphere from political deliberation 
concerning its impact on the social realm. As Habermas suggests, 
 
The quasiautonomous progress of science and technology… appears as an independent variable 
on which the most important single system variable, namely economic growth, depends. Thus 
arises a perspective in which the development of the social system seems to be determined by the 
logic of scientific-technical progress. The immanent law of this progress seems to produce 
objective exigencies, which must be obeyed by any politics oriented toward functional needs. But 
when this semblance has taken root effectively, then propaganda can refer to the role of 
technology and science in order to explain and legitimate why in modern societies the process of 
democratic decision-making about practical problems loses its function and “must” be replaced by 
plebiscitary decisions about alternative sets of leaders of administrative personnel (Habermas 
1992, p.133). 
 
Habermas here suggests how political representatives are presented to the public and 
elected on the basis of how well they will continue to observe the ‘functional needs’ 
served by science and technology – namely, their contribution to economic growth. These 
‘functional needs’ become paramount concerns according to which democratic 
referendums are held, overshadowing consideration of practical problems arising from 
these ‘functional needs’ and affecting the electorate in manifold ways.  
 
Additionally, the appearance that the social system is determined by the ‘logic of 
scientific-technical progress’ suffices for it to be reinforced politically and through 
propagandistic means, creating the impression it has already been legitimated. This 
process typically takes place under ideological assumptions that ‘functional needs’ 
themselves are the solution to all social problems. Such approaches ignore the 
fundamentally political issue of the considerable effect of technology on the daily lives of 
individuals in a modern polity, again to the extent that they are enjoined to propagate its 
methods professionally and privately. On the receiving end of the social spectrum, the 
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assumption of legitimacy of the process - not to mention lack of interest in the political 
process often accompanying it - suggests how individuals may be discouraged from 
reflecting upon its long-term effects on the spontaneity and self-determination of their 
public and private activities.30 
 
It is not clear whether spontaneous activity in modern life can be dissociated from 
the learned pragmatism induced by instrumental rationality, considering the average 
person’s work day will consist of media and technology-driven interaction. The question 
of what spontaneity is, and its relation to the concept of reason, including instrumental 
rationality, is explored in Chapter 3. What appears clear is that in the space where 
spontaneous activity and instrumental rationality combine, rational constraints may be 
developed from within the technological paradigm - measures improving the functioning 
of the system - but there are no clear rational constraints outside that space, where reason is 
practiced autonomously. Habermas’ account of ‘communicative reason’ addresses this 
problem. For Habermas, subject-centred reason ‘finds its criteria in standards of truth and 
success that govern relationships of knowing and purposively acting subjects to the world 
of possible objects or states of affairs’. This means subject-centred reason is reactive in 
nature - reactive to states of affairs that already exist, and pragmatically accepting of them. 
In the communicative reason he proposes, however,  
 
…rationality is assessed in terms of the capacity of responsible participants in interaction to orient 
themselves in relation to validity claims geared to inter-subjective recognition. Communicative 
reason finds its criteria in the argumentation procedures for directly or indirectly redeeming claims 
to propositional truth, normative rightness, subjective truthfulness and aesthetic harmony’ 
(Habermas 1992, p.314).  
 
From this perspective, individuals submitting claims and themselves to each other for 
verification of the truth and normativity of their propositions are in a position to develop 
reasoning that can provide rational constraints in a continuously evolving space of reasons. 
Such a space is, in principle, never self-enclosed and, as a result of the on-going procedure 
of submitting validity claims for scrutiny by other individuals - other individuals being the 
                                                
30  The immediacy with which technology renders information accessible arguably obscures its 
verification, not to mention how it is divulged with diminished reflection because it was obtained with 
such ease in the first place. The speed with which information dissemination occurs conceivably affects 
the extent to which individuals are able to make informed decisions about political issues and express 
them at the ballot box. For a radical critique of the information society, see Virilio 2000.  
 
Prospects Beyond Ideology: Reason, Freedom and the Truth of the Subject – 
Towards Political Models for the Critical Thought of Theodor W. Adorno 
 
 88 
source of rational constraints – can expose disproportional power and claims rooted in 
ideology, helping to circumvent the ‘instrumentalisation’ of validity claims.     
    
2.2 Introducing Adorno’s Priorities 
 
Such a ‘communicative reason’, however, does not by itself settle the problem of 
instrumental rationality. As I have suggested, the problem arises when the overall social 
system appears to individuals as naturally ‘given’, as opposed to being considered the 
product of specific social agendas perpetrated by powerful interests, increasing potential 
for the critical categories of false consciousness, alienation and subject-centred reasoning. 
Two of the most straightforward types of alienation that can be identified in such a 
complex of social power, then, are a) failure to identify sources of power, and b) failure of 
overwhelmingly identifying with such sources of power. The combination of an 
unaccountable complex of power with enormous social influence and a social realm 
caught between these two types of alienation raises questions concerning the shaping of 
individual identity in modernity, evoking the notion of Bildung, and what it might mean in 
the context of modernity. 
 
 Bildung means, roughly, ‘formation’, in the sense of shaping individual identity. As 
a precept of Enlightenment, Bildung was central to the idea of a rational society, and was 
supposed to be achievable by virtue of the existence of communities within which 
individuals pursue their activities. By engaging in those communities, individuals would be 
in a position to partake in their development, learning from previously established 
resources, contributing to their development in turn. This engagement would provide 
access to reason ‘as such’, as individuals gained increasing understanding of society, 
themselves and the relationship between them, and could consequently contribute to a 
mutually shared conception of reason in turn. A community of individuals thus engaged 
would therefore be responsible for their own Bildung, and for that of the community as a 
whole. How does this Enlightenment conception of reason square with the modern social 
realm, dependent on self-sustaining forms of rationality precluding large segments of 
society from influencing their development, while ideologically determining their social 
experience? This outline of what Bildung was ‘supposed’ to mean is not to suggest a 
reactionary ideal of a ‘superior’ pre-modern society, but to suggest that if Bildung is a 
means by which access to reason is to be possible, it must be re-evaluated under objective 
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modern conditions. Prevalent conditions suggest that the totalising effect of technology 
creates anxiety, not only about always having to ‘catch up’ with the endless stream of 
products and injunctions from the techno-industry, but also about being left out of touch 
with the ‘rest’ of reality.  
 
The ‘rest’ of reality can be a plethora of things, whether access to a reality 
unencumbered by technological immediacy, or the unfulfilled potential of subjective or 
inter-subjective expression as a result of pressures inherent to the frenetic pace of modern 
life. A form of rationality potentially precluding the opportunity to experience other aspects 
of reality due to its influence and practical requirements blocks both experience of 
different aspects of reality and the diversity of new experiences they can give rise to. 
Additionally, the totalising drive is complemented by the dominant cultural ethos of 
economically driven supply – commercial stimulation blurring distinctions between real 
and manufactured needs - in areas often obscuring problems of economic imbalance, 
social injustice or basic needs. The danger that social concerns may be overlooked beyond 
political lip-service also suggests such concerns may come to be seen as the unfortunate, 
but ‘necessary’ price to pay for the standards of advanced societies and ultimately, 
therefore, also comprise a naturally given state of affairs that cannot be remedied - and 
consequently ignored.  
 
Moreover, the way individuals are exposed to social affairs is often a matter less of 
their direct experience of them than of their predetermined mediation through a plethora 
of mediums – consider e.g. how exposure to news outlets, often far from communicating 
the objectivity they claim to aspire to, necessarily involves exposure to predetermined 
social agendas, irrespective of the part of the political spectrum being promoted (not to 
mention the proliferation of often very deliberately subjective punditry). The inevitably 
ideological distortions of social experience, therefore, and the distortions these potentially 
reproduce in the individual mind, redoubles in complexity questions concerning the 
relationship between subjectivity and the objective world, an issue sufficiently complex 
even prior to consideration of elements in modernity that distort perceptions of the world.  
 
The question arising in this context, then, is what kind of Bildung is presupposed in 
the modern conception of reason. If we accept the premise that the modern conception 
of reason is aligned with the ubiquitous paradigm of social progress technology is said to 
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represent, what can aspects of experience – and conceptualisations of rationality that 
follow - that do not find themselves validated within this paradigm appeal to? Can there be 
a corrective mechanism outside the ‘life-world’31 dominated by instrumental rationality? Is 
it possible, under modern conditions, to create the space for an ‘other’ of utilitarian 
reason?  There may be no concrete answer to the purely epistemological problem of 
arbitration between the subjective mind and the objective world raised by imperfect and 
competing forms of rationality. Indeed, any such concretised answer could itself amount, 
pace Adorno, to ideology. One approach to dealing with the question, however, may be to 
reframe it as a socio-political problem. If it is recognised that the unaccountability of 
instrumental forms of rationality contradicts democratic ideas of individual and social 
freedom, then an appeal can be made to submit the forces contributing to the 
predominance of instrumental rationality to a normative process of legitimation, 
dependent on evaluations of its experience across all sectors of society.  
 
A normative relationship between technology, the natural sciences and the 
humanistic sciences, for example, within which they legitimate themselves respectively 
with regards to the aspiration of satisfying human needs, could be made precisely with the 
intention of letting each camp of enquiry act as a rational constraint on the other. This 
entails how technology and natural science should be developed in conjunction with 
serious social and empirical research predicting social effects of their development. For 
example, the notion of the preservation of the ecosystem is an area where the interests of 
both social and scientific research necessarily coincide. Scientific research establishing 
which activities are responsible for threats to the environment, and how, can be combined 
with empirical research of factors helping to explain why individuals develop norms 
resulting in the downgrading of the ecosystem.  
 
This has precisely been the case in recent years on environmental issues: The 
combination of both types of research then helps explain what alternatives might exist to 
such actions in the socio-economic context (green vehicles, etc.), and act as the basis for 
developing such alternatives politically. In the context of the social effects of technology 
itself, a similar process would ideally provide scrutiny to ensure that technologies are 
developed with the additional legitimacy of independent intellectual oversight - not least 
of its possible social effects - that could be submitted to public debate and plebiscitary 
                                                
31 Habermas’ term, developed from Husserl. 
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oversight. This could help ensure a rational process to help safeguard the socio-political 
realm from unaccountable complexes of power, focus social research to develop serious 
findings to compete with scientific claims in the space of reasons, and provide rational 
constraints by submitting research to the social context in which its findings are 
consequential. Such an environment could be legitimated in advance by its public 
accountability, ensuring its democratic legitimation at each stage of its development, at 
least in terms of agreement and compromise on possible impacts on the social realm.            
 
In the absence of such quasi-utopian resolutions, however - short of everyone 
practicing Habermas’ theory of communicative reason, who or what would arbitrate such 
a process without dominant factions emerging? - there is a further, philosophical 
problem. At the level of the supposed separation of reason and nature, disjunction exists 
where reason is employed to understand nature, but innumerable aspects of nature are 
overlooked in the evaluation of specific forms of reason. Adorno and Habermas each 
suggest ways of approaching this problem.  
 
For Habermas, the objective is to move towards the communicative form of 
reason in which ‘rationality is assessed in terms of the capacity of responsible participants 
in interaction to orient themselves in relation to validity claims geared to inter-subjective 
recognition’ (Habermas 1992, p. 314). From this perspective, making validity claims in a 
space of inter-subjective recognition enables evaluations of rationality that take into 
account conflicting conceptualisations of nature, because, as individuals are themselves 
elements of nature, broader nature itself cannot be excluded from the process of inter-
subjective recognition.  
 
For Adorno, however, it is also a matter of retrieving what has been lost or 
damaged in the domination of nature by reason – without sliding into subjectivism - as a 
manner of attempting to establish objective truths about the imbalanced relationship 
between individuals and instrumental rationality, through which individuals would ideally 
enjoy uncorrupted relations with each other. Such relations would be dependent on 
individuals accounting for how they both affect, and are affected by, the objective world, 
emphasising the types of alienation they experience and the factors inducing them - ‘the 
need to let suffering speak is a condition of all truth’, as Adorno maintains, ‘[f]or 
suffering is objectivity that weighs upon the subject’ (Adorno 1973, pp.17-18). 
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Emphasising alienation is therefore crucial because, just as it allows individuals to 
recognise ways in which they have been dominated, or their experience distorted, it also 
allows recognition of ways they reproduce those structures of domination in their own 
thought. In order for individuals to have the possibility of experiencing ‘undistorted’ 
relations with each other, they must be in a position to articulate what has been ‘lost’ or 
repressed in their nature.  
 
For Adorno, instrumental rationality is the culmination of the ‘homogeneous 
flow’ of history that he wants to ‘interrupt’ by unmasking the barbarism behind forms of 
rationality by which social constellations concretise, in the exposure of the suffering - 
past, present and likely future - inflicted on individuals in the name of reason. It follows 
that any claim to rationality that ignores or engenders human suffering is undermined by 
its own irrationality. For Habermas, though, Adorno’s view of a ‘total’ instrumental 
rationality as set forth in the DoE does not allow for a workable praxis of reason and 
demonstrates an ‘uninhibited scepticism regarding reason, instead of weighing grounds 
that cast doubt on this scepticism itself’ (Habermas 1992, p.129). On this reading, 
Adorno undermines his own claim to reason by ‘totalising’ his critique of instrumental 
rationality.  
 
For Adorno, conversely, one surmises that ‘validity claims geared to inter-
subjective recognition’ would be impossible without always first challenging the 
concretion of social reality from which such validity claims arise. Adorno never escaped 
the shadow of his experiences with totalitarianism in Germany and, consequently, the 
adoption of information and propaganda dissemination techniques similar to those 
practiced by the Nazis elsewhere in the Western world, a constellation of circumstances 
that shaped the ‘negativity’ of his thought. Habermas shared these experiences and was 
similarly affected, but has been more concerned with developing his critique of reason 
according to possibilities for practical freedom, as opposed to Adorno’s more severe 
emphasis on its limitations. For Adorno, freedom - and therefore the possibility of non-
instrumental forms of reasoning - is primarily a principle of the possibilities of reflection, 
and specifically reflection attempting to overcome its domination of its object; for 
Habermas, freedom must be feasible in the world through practical reason. The critique of 
instrumental rationality in DoE, then, is a defining point for both thinkers: for Habermas, 
to the extent that he doesn’t fully reject it, but sees it as missing the component of 
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communicative rationality; for Adorno, to the extent he remained broadly faithful to its 
precepts, through his centrepiece of Negative Dialectics and other final writings.32  
 
The dialectic of Enlightenment then, as Bowie explains, is the idea that ‘the 
subject both dominates nature by its separation from it in technological manipulation, 
and is most subjected to nature precisely when it seems to be most separate from it’ 
(Bowie 1997, p.258). This means the more the subject tries to manipulate nature, the 
more it tries to separate itself from nature as something somehow ‘transcending’ nature. 
It follows that, as itself a natural phenomenon, the subject can never, however, 
‘transcend’ nature and subjugate it to its will entirely, and consequently subjects itself to 
nature the more it tries to dominate it. This suggests that while individuals may, in the 
subconscious or unreflective practice of ‘instrumental’ rationality, partake in dominating 
nature, they may fail to recognise the extent to which they are still, or perhaps especially, 
determined by, and subject to, the objective world.  
 
The objective world, however, is not just the various forms of reason prevalent in 
society, but also nature – meaning, reason, like individuals, is a part of nature. Equally, 
concerning the relationship between reason and nature, Adorno suggests ‘[i]nstead of 
either positing rationality or negating it as an absolute, reason must try to determine it as 
a moment within the whole, which has admittedly made itself independent in relation to 
the whole. Reason must become aware of its own naturalistic character (ihres eigenen 
naturhaften Wesens)’ (Adorno 1969, pp.22-23).33 This means Adorno is committed to a 
relationship between reason and nature in which nature is not separated from reason, as 
opposed to how, e.g. material nature and the intelligible are separated in the Kantian 
conception of the relationship.  
 
If the mutual manipulation between instrumental rationality and the individual 
depends on a separation of reason from nature as something other than nature, and of 
nature from reason as something ‘non’-rational by way of its not being humanly 
conceived, then Adorno’s point is that to legitimate itself, reason cannot step outside the 
boundary of nature. Although it has come to operate independently of nature, it is still 
                                                
32 However, the radical thesis of DoE was continually revised and moderated in Adorno’s subsequent 
work, something only fully apparent with the recent publication of his university lectures, which make 
these arguments in a more accessible manner than some of his ‘canonical’ texts. 
33 Quoted in Bowie 1997, pp.267-268.  
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just a ‘moment’ within the whole made up of more than just particular variations of 
rationality, irrespective of how many areas of experience they come to determine. Among 
these areas is the individual’s ‘inner world’, in which spontaneity and the conceptual 
thought it engenders touch on a decidedly broader spectrum of experience than the 
immediate ‘instrumental’ requisites of the social life-world.  
 
The idea of spontaneity and its relation to conceptual development, and thus, the 
capacity to reason, is explored below, not least in relation to Adorno’s critique of 
epistemology. One preliminary outline of what spontaneity is, though, according to Kant, 
is the ‘natural capacity to reflectively control judgement by rational evaluation of sensory 
inputs, existing knowledge and beliefs of the situation at hand’ (Longuenesse 2000). This 
suggests spontaneity giving rise to conceptual development, and thus to sense-making 
properties involved in making judgements, is necessarily affected by boundless 
experiences of the world that cannot only be limited to the influence of the social realm 
and the experience of self-legitimating forms of reason.  
 
Adorno, however, suggests spontaneity can itself become ideological, and thereby 
alienated from its reason-bearing capacities: according to Bowie, ‘Adorno’s critique of the 
idea that truth is generated by the subject’s spontaneity interprets this spontaneity merely 
as the subject’s capacity for domination of the object’ (Bowie 1997, p.258). This means 
that spontaneity engendering conceptual thought making truth-claims possible is 
subjected, under modern conditions, to the same limitations as thought. In instrumental 
rationality, thought is an instrument of domination identifying objects in the world 
predominantly with its own dominant concepts, e.g. with how objects have been 
identified, whether by individuals, or as they already appear to be identified in the 
objective world. Instrumental rationality in thought thereby discards concepts not already 
dominant in the sense of how an object is already identified. For Adorno, instrumental 
rationality is ‘total’ to the extent that even sense-making integral to spontaneous 
experience has no point of reference outside of instrumental rationality, and is therefore 
determined, possibly in its entirety, by pre-existing procedures of identification. This is an 
issue at the heart of this thesis: has spontaneity itself become ideological, and, if so, what 
could be done about it?  
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The problem at the core of this dilemma is the disparity between how reality is 
accounted for in the relationship between subject and the objective world, particularly if 
both the objective world and the mind are sources of ideology. If individuals depend on 
the objective world for their experience of broader reality, this experience depends on: the 
natural world, of which the individual is part, the social world, of which it is also part but 
which is the cluster product of ideological forms of reasoning, and the ways these 
structures coexist with, and influence, subjective responses to the world. Reflection, then, 
is simultaneously the origin of ideological forms of rationality reproduced in the social 
world, and the ‘location’ for reception of spontaneous impulses to experience capable of 
challenging conceptual concretions of experience into ideology. For Adorno, then, the 
possibility that spontaneity itself has become ideological is predicated on conceptualisation 
of social relations being determined by instrumental forms of rationality, where experience 
is forcibly constrained and reproduced within these structures of thought because of the 
immediacy of social experience to the individual. At present, therefore, this 
characterisation, which is not immune to criticism, suggests that the question of the ‘truth 
of the subject’ depends on the extent to which it can challenge the already spontaneous 
conceptual determination of its own thought through its experience. This raises the question 
of what Adorno’s conception of ‘truth’ is.  
 
 Adorno, whose resources are drawn upon to work through the problem of 
accounting for the ‘truth’ of the subject, develops his thought from an array of resources, 
most notably Kant and Hegel, from whom he develops his own specific dialectic of 
experience. Adorno’s ‘immanent’ dialectical problem of experience is what he calls 
‘mediation’ (Vermittlung) between particular and universal. By ‘universal’, Adorno means, 
first, the totality of elements comprising the objective world. More specifically, the 
‘universal’ means how a particular object comes to be identified in universal terms. By 
‘particular’, Adorno means what remains unique to each object, meaning, what is not 
accounted for by how the object has become identified in the universal.  
 
The mediation between particular and universal, then, is, first, how each particular 
object relates to all other objects. Second, it refers to continuous inconsistencies between 
how the particular object has been identified in the universal sense, and what remains 
unaccounted for in the universal classification of the object, and therefore deserving of 
further reflection. Third, it refers to the continuous relationship between the object of 
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knowledge and the reflecting subject: the subject is also an object of knowledge identified 
in universal terms, and in constant danger of losing its particularity. However, as the 
subject reflects on objects of knowledge outside itself, both subject and its object of 
knowledge change in ways unaccounted for by how it has already been identified in, or 
mediated by, the ‘universal’.  
 
The fundamental point to consider is: Any classification of objects in universal 
terms necessarily includes an ideological component. By definition, classification 
potentially restricts further reflection pertaining to objects, making it more likely the 
classification itself becomes ideological. This means an important element of Adorno’s 
conception of truth is that reflection pertaining to any object must be continuous if it is to 
avoid becoming ideological. An outline of Adorno’s analysis, then, is that it focuses on, 
first: How the particular is subsumed under the universal: the particular object is 
universally identified in a certain way, losing its uniqueness. Second, it focuses on 
retrieving what is unique to the particular: the particular object is extracted from its 
ideological designation in the universal, and continually considered in its own right as an 
object of knowledge, without the objective of any definitive re-classification. The mediation 
of the object – the manner in which it comes to be defined culturally so as to gain an 
identity by which it is recognised – is understood by Adorno as a historical process by 
which that ascription of identity, be it to things, persons or institutions, is an ideological 
process. In terms of the ‘immanent dialectical problem of the mediation between the 
particular and universal’, then, Adorno purports to show that mediation of particular and 
universal, and subject and object, is transitory and continually in question, and hence the 
place where the truth or untruth of the object of knowledge – including the truth of the 
subject - is formed.  
 
This mediation occurs, then, both at the level of the object and the subject. If the 
thesis is correct that instrumental rationality engenders a subject-centred reason that 
identifies objects with its own categories and concepts, then the subject is also in danger 
of losing sight of objective social conditions determining those concepts. Without an 
appraisal of objective social conditions, the subject loses a key element in its ability to 
critically evaluate both itself and other objects of knowledge. By this account, the subject 
judging an object without continually invoking the critical appraisal of its own relationship 
to it, itself remains mired in falsehood when that critical element is lost, or ‘sublated’, in 
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the universal. In Hegelian terms, sublation (Aufhebung) refers to changes undergone by a 
concept or entity reaching more sophisticated stages in the course of its development.34 In 
this process, the concept is both cancelled in its original form, and preserved as part of a 
more developed, ‘universal’ form.  
 
In Adorno’s sense, however, sublation does not lead to higher levels of 
development, but potentially to inferior degrees of comprehension: the ‘original’ form of 
the concept was a reaction to concrete social circumstances, which, by being sublated in 
the universal, is no longer critically evaluated in its particularity. Instead, the concept in its 
new ‘universal’ form becomes its dominant form, with diminishing reference to the 
original circumstances in which it originated. Consequently, experience becomes 
‘fragmented’ because one of the critical elements permitting evaluation of the subject’s 
relationship with the object of knowledge is lost. The subject therefore has to contend 
with two potential sources of falsehood – that of its relationship with the object it judges, 
and that of its relationship to itself, where each component reinforces the other.  
 
This leads to Adorno’s ‘universal context of delusion’, in which individuals 
become one with the ‘total’ society of exchange, and exchange critical awareness for the 
safety of representing, and being represented by, the ‘universal’ whole as it appears to 
them in its immediacy, thus ceasing to engage critically with their objects of knowledge, 
and with themselves. The key to Adorno’s dialectic, hence, is that mediation of subject 
and object itself must constantly be challenged in ways simultaneously revealing both the 
true and false in reflection by being juxtaposed with the experience giving rise to it in the 
first place, and through which it is continuously mediated. For Adorno, the context of 
mediation is always assumed to be, a priori, the structure of domination, oppression and 
self-preservation inherent to advanced industrialised societies. It follows that the 
expression of resistance to this on behalf of the particular – the subject – already takes 
place from a position of ‘false’ experience, and that the alternative to it cannot be found in 
a pure form within that context.        
 
 A negative dialectic is the intention, therefore, to search for a dialectical ‘non-
identity’ of the ideological entity that the subject becomes through its social mediation. 
Breaking with the ‘myth of the subject’ – the myth there is a ‘core’ subjective identity 
                                                
34 See Chapter 6. 
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impervious to influence of the objective world – entails breaking with what is always 
already ‘distorted’ by the necessity of self-preservation. The drive to dominate nature in 
instrumental rationality is an expression of that self-preservation, but actual self-
preservation is thereby itself undermined because human nature, and not just external 
nature, becomes dominated as a result of ideological constraints on the scope of possible 
experience. If this is the ‘falsehood’ of the relationship in which the particular is subsumed 
by the universal and of distorted experience resulting of it, what then is ‘true’ experience?  
 
In terms of Adorno’s search for the ‘adequate organon of knowledge’, both a 
truthful approach to historical developments and frankness about the human condition in 
each historical configuration must be considered in light of suffering inflicted on humanity 
by humanity. ‘The need to lend a voice to suffering is a condition of all truth,’ as Adorno 
suggests, as the expression of suffering is also an expression of the objective conditions 
causing it – it is the ‘objectivity that weighs upon the subject… [which] is objectively 
conveyed’ (Adorno 1973, pp.17-18). But if suffering is an inherent component of the truth 
of the subject, so is the untruth of uncritical approaches to the self and reflection:  
 
The thema probandum is just as much the truth and untruth of thinking. It relinquishes its untruth 
insofar as it attempts, through negation, to follow its experience. An adequate philosophical 
thinking is not only critical of the status quo and its reified replica in consciousness but is equally 
critical of itself. It does justice to the experience animating it not through compliant codification, 
but rather by means of objectification. Whoever thinks philosophically hardens intellectual 
experience by the same logical consistency whose antithesis he wields (Adorno 1998, p. 133). 
 
As this passage suggests, reflection itself is the ‘location’ in the objective social conditions 
of modernity containing the potential for freedom. That potential is only realisable by 
thought remaining true to experience, by refusing to consign experience to ideology in the 
sense of allowing its particularity to become subsumed in the ‘universal’, thereby negating 
ideological claims on the experience. By being critical of itself, thought objectifies itself in 
the attempt to follow the essence of the experience that changes it, preventing it from 
sliding into the untruth of what it is ideologically designated to be. The constant attention 
paid to experience itself would negate the ideological ‘codification’ threatening to 
neutralise it into the ‘universal’, or social totality.  
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The fundamental point, then, is to avoid classification of experience into 
something ‘natural’ and hence unremarkable - and to remain true to engagement with the 
reality of experience as far as the critical element in thought can carry it. This suggests, for 
Adorno’s own variation of (anti-)epistemology, the crucial aspect emphasising the social in 
any inquiry into knowledge. It also suggests the primacy of ideology critique in the 
establishment of claims to knowledge. While Adorno certainly does not deny the validity 
of scientific knowledge, epistemological accounts - particularly in philosophy - that pay no 
attention to social circumstances in which they are developed are tantamount to quasi-
ideology relying on subject-centred forms of reasoning merely purporting to be objective.     
  
From this introduction to Adorno’s theory, it becomes clearer how, when 
concepts of reason, freedom and subjectivity are suggested as a ‘given’, intertwined 
whole, as is often the case in ideological formulations of the achievements of the modern 
Western world, it can obstruct speculative moments of freedom suggesting 
contradictions in the social experience of these concepts. It follows the claim to freedom 
becomes ideological when it is assumed to have been ‘achieved’, particularly as a result of 
binding adherence to singular conceptions of reason, rather than consisting of a 
continuous process that does not culminate in ideological formulation. Similarly, where 
freedom and instrumental rationality become mutually complementary ideologies, 
subject-centred reason is perceived as personal freedom, where, from Adorno’s 
perspective, it is quite the opposite.  
 
Thus far, I have considered the concept of ideology and some of its ramifications 
in the context of modernity. I have suggested the concepts of freedom and reason in the 
modern world can both be elements of ideology, and similarly, that individuals 
themselves are the source of ideology. Consequently, the subject’s claim to truth depends 
greatly on active engagement with elements both in the world and in the mind that 
compromise this claim. To that end, the centrality of ideology critique to Adorno’s 
contention that freedom can be realised in reflection has been established. Part of 
making Adorno’s case below involves a continuing evaluation of his assessment that 
instrumental rationality is ‘total’, and his philosophical position will be considered in light 
of its development from the original thought of Kant and Hegel. Additionally, the notion 
of the truth of the subject is further considered in light of continuing assessments of the 
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extent to which freedom and rational self-determination are possible in the modern 
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IV. CHAPTER 3: THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM 
   
The following chapters investigate the question of whether conditions of 
modernity fulfil the democratic promise of freedom and rational self-determination, or 
whether, pace Adorno, these conditions result in predominantly ideological notions of 
freedom, and a form of reason amounting to instrumental rationality. In this chapter, the 
question whether claims to truth are undermined by the interrelationship between 
ideology and instrumental rationality, and the impact of this on consciousness, is further 
considered with reference to the possibility of normative standards in thought and the 
development of social norms. Moreover, the question of the relationship between 
freedom and reason is pursued with the objective of explaining how this relationship 
allows Adorno to conclude instrumental rationality is a perversion of rational thought, and 
therefore a threat to freedom. This question is considered by developing Adorno’s theory 
in conjunction with exploration of ideas related to the concept of ideology, such as 
causality, and the concept of freedom, such as spontaneity. The friction between ideology 
and freedom is re-framed as a question about the relationship between reason and nature. 
Understanding this relationship, in turn, is crucial to comprehending how forms of inquiry 
can become compromised. 
 
3.1 The Idea of Subjective Freedom: An Introduction 
 
It was suggested above how subject-centred reason, the source of domination of 
social structures by instrumental rationality, conflicts with the kind of rational constraints 
that would enable some form of emancipation from instrumental rationality. If Adorno’s 
premise is correct that individuals are unfree to various degrees due to their determination 
by instrumental forms of rationality, what can the freedom of the subject amount to?  
 
The idea that freedom should be central to subjectivity is a modern concern that 
gained importance in the Enlightenment, and via democratic ideals accompanying it. This 
notion broke with pre-modern assumptions that subjectivity was determined by an 
objective order of reason external to the individual, often understood in pre-
Enlightenment times to be a larger reality involving the idea of God. Accordingly, pre-
modern subjectivity can be understood to have been restricted by the randomness of the 
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place it was assigned in the social or natural order, the specific context of which was 
understood to be pre-ordained, and therefore not freely determined.35  
 
From the perspective of Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit, by contrast, the modern 
subject regards itself as a ‘simple-being-for-self’, a being aware of itself primarily as having 
a subjective point of view on the world. This perspective, according to Pinkard, emerged 
from the  
 
dialectic of “Consciousness”, in which the subject went from an understanding of himself as 
simply apprehending objects (pure singularities or perceptual objects), to an understanding of himself 
as knowing objects only by being engaged in conceptualising activity. In taking himself as an 
essentially self-conscious agent, the subject developed a view of knowledge as being primarily an 
elaboration of more practical endeavours – namely, the satisfaction of desire (Pinkard 1996, p.55).  
 
This means consciousness reached a point where it ceased to regard itself as distinct from 
the objective world - as something with a narrow scope for self-determination merely 
shaped by unseen objective forces, and instead recognised the ability to conceptualise the 
world primarily via its own subjectivity. This acknowledgement of an evolving relationship 
between consciousness and the objective world led individuals to recognise they could 
shape the objective world in ways benefiting them, e.g., by increasing their standards of 
living and broadening their possibilities, enabling them to satisfy their desires.  
 
These satisfactions, in turn, enabled people to become individualised, in the sense 
that they were now acting primarily on their own imperatives, and connected them to the 
objective world, in the sense that their endeavours contributed to shaping their wider 
social circumstances. It follows that for individuals to act on their desires, there must be a 
standard of self-determination with which they can plot their satisfaction. This notion of 
freedom, consequently, was eventually institutionalised in modernity as the political ideal 
of democracy, supposed to guarantee the pursuit of subjective desires, and, thereby, 
individual rights.   
 
The Idealist claim regarding freedom, however, was about why the ideal of freedom 
should be considered legitimate in the first place. The argument, following Pippin, was 
that human values such as love, security, living standards and other personal interests 
                                                
35 See Hall 2004 for a discussion of pre-modern conceptions of identity.  
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wouldn’t be worth pursuing if they remained abstractions pre-determined by perceived 
objective conditions, as opposed to being realisable objectives individuals freely choose to 
pursue. Self-determining individuals, by this account, would create conditions in which 
such objectives could be pursued by breaking with the idea of their objective 
determination, thereby legitimising their pursuits by assuming responsibility for the 
consequences of their actions.  
 
The Idealists’ case was for the ‘reality’ of such self-determination that ‘such a 
reflexive self-grounding could be realised systematically and in practical life’ (Pippin 1997, 
p.7), as modern society already depended on the feasibility of such an ideal. This means 
‘reality’ came to refer to something more than just the objective world outside the 
individual; instead, self-determination suggested not only that reality was made up of a 
relationship between individuals and the objective world, but also that social reality was a 
consequence of self-determining actions. According to Hegel, this meant modern society 
had already become rational, because even pre-modern society contained seeds of what 
could later be deemed rational legitimacy.  
 
The pre-modern order of reason was already the consequence of a perception of 
the objective world individuals had attempted to rationalise in ways also attributing a 
structure to social reality. It follows, therefore, that social reality was already being shaped 
by the judgement of individuals, albeit in ways not predominantly emphasising the idea of 
their rational self-determination. Where modern society became rational for Hegel, then, 
was with the recognition that society had the duty to perpetuate itself by appealing to 
‘rational legitimacy and so to the capacities for free agency presupposed in such appeals’ 
(ibid.). This ‘free agency’ is self-determination, and its possibility depends on a self-legislating 
reason, the further implication of which is a practical rationality in which a social collective 
of individuals exercise freedom.  
 
This form of reason was self-legitimating precisely because structures and 
enterprises shaping modern society, such as education or commerce, were already the 
product of the free agency of individuals. This account of rationality depends on a 
speculative and non-empirical conception of human activity as spontaneous, which, Pippin 
suggests, creates the possibility of an account of human thought based on the ‘judgings 
and intendings supposed to be the prior conditions for the possibility of any cognitive 
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claim or intentional deed, a “critical” or a non-metaphysical account of mentality itself’ 
(ibid, p.8).  
 
3.2 A Speculative Moment: Between Causality and Normativity 
A) A Normative Conception of Experience  
 
The notion of such a critical account of reason raises the question of how to 
understand the normative dimensions of human thought. The normative dimensions of 
thought are the ‘standard[s], rule[s], [or] principle[s] used to judge or direct human 
conduct as something to be complied with’ (Honderich 2005, p.662). Norms, therefore, 
are standards by which claims are evaluated, such as standards used to assess the notion of 
an inherently social rationality. If spontaneous activity is taken to be both the source of 
self-determination and of norms used to evaluate judgements arising from self-
determination, however, what provides the necessary normative constraints if spontaneous 
actions are to be thought of as rational, and how does thought account for these 
constraints? How do norms arise, and how do they accommodate normative constraints, 
if they are to be rationally legitimated?  
 
Disregarding empirical observations and metaphysical explanations presently, the 
question of determinacy and its role in explaining why humans do certain things arises, such 
as why humans create rational institutions and modes of thought and being in the first 
place. The appeal in pursuing such a trajectory of thought over purely empiricist and 
rationalist accounts was, Pippin suggests, born with Kant’s ‘transcendental philosophy’ in 
the 1781 Critique of Pure Reason, in which Kant argued that  
 
…prior to attempting to answer any question, philosophical or empirical, about the world, or the 
mind, or the good, the original question on which all others depended must be that concerning the 
“possibility” of the mind’s knowledge of anything. When that question is pursued rigorously, it 
turns out that the possibility of any objective representation must presuppose the active role of the 
subject in establishing its relation to the world (Pippin 1997, p.9). 
 
The priority of empiricist and rationalist traditions was accounting for the mind’s relation 
to the world, the former in its hypothesis that knowledge is derived from sensory 
experience, the latter in its assumption of reason as a natural intuitive faculty. The 
Kantian perspective, however, demanded these traditions ‘inadvertently do more to ask, 
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rather than to resolve, the question of the possibility of an epistemic (and so normative) 
mind-world relation in the first place’ (ibid.).  
 
Kant’s notion of a priori constraints on knowledge, in the sense that the objective 
world or objects cannot be known as they are ‘in-themselves’ independently of cognition, 
entails, then, that neither the empiricist emphasis on experience nor rationalist accounts 
of spontaneity contain the resources, taken by themselves, to answer the question of a 
normative relationship between mind and world. For such a relationship to be truly 
normative, it would have to continually account for standards by which knowledge of 
anything in the world is evaluated, and what constitutes ‘knowledge’ in the first place. 
Moreover, there is the problem of how to ask the question of the possibility of such a 
relationship. The only thing that can initially be assumed, therefore, is that asking such 
questions ‘presuppose[s] the active role of the subject in establishing its relation to the 
world’ (ibid.).  
 
How does the active involvement of individuals contribute to determining their 
normative relationship with the objective world? For Adorno, making the question 
accessible in the first place depends on refusing to resolve it simply through recourse to 
detached empirical observations of the world, accentuating instead the confrontation 
arising in thought itself in its engagement with the world. This suggests empirical 
observations or metaphysical explanations, taken by themselves, do not suffice. Rather, 
to the extent each provides insight into an object of knowledge, they should be thought 
simultaneously together and against each other continuously alongside other competing 
claims, such that the object is not known according to a single dominant methodology. 
In this way, competing claims act as normative constraints on each other. For Adorno, 
freedom is the objective of involvement of the mind in acts of cognition.  
 
First, this means freedom from lines of inquiry with inadequate normative 
constraints, which are in danger of becoming self-legitimating, ‘instrumental’, and 
therefore ideological. Such freedom is what Adorno calls ‘the indefeasible norm of self-
evidence’ (Adorno 1998, p.12). This ‘indefeasible norm’ refers to the concept of 
‘Dabeisein’, and Pickford’s note accompanying the citation ascribes Adorno’s use of it to 
an allusion to a passage from Hegel:  
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The principle of experience contains the infinitely important determination that, for a content to 
be accepted and… held true, man must himself be actively involved with it (dabei sein), more 
precisely, that he must find any such content to be at one and in unity with the certainty of his own 
self. He must himself be involved with it, whether only with his external senses, or with his deeper 
spirit, with his essential consciousness of self as well (Pickford 1998, p.318).  
 
The idea is that individuals cannot be sure of their self-determination unless they are 
actively involved (dabei) with the content of their experiences. It follows thought should 
apply itself to objects with freedom from organised, doctrinal attempts to understand the 
world - albeit without ignoring them - turning the ‘quintessence of the experience 
accumulated in thought’ (ibid. p.13) onto objects themselves, and consequently 
perceiving them in new ways. The necessity of this continuous reflection arises from 
internal contradictions of social reality itself. For example, without reference to 
antagonisms between different social elements, there can be no genuine observation if it 
is not related to how objects of knowledge are changed in light of how social practices 
affect each other in the course of experience.  
 
Consider, e.g., how economics plays a role in how culture is understood, and how 
this simple realisation raises further questions about how an object is evaluated. For 
example, the status of a cultural artefact is often reduced to its exchange-value on the 
marketplace, although the artefact may be a source of spiritual value through what it may 
represent. Additionally, the artefact may have aesthetic value irrespective of its exchange 
value or cultural status. Furthermore, the artefact is likely to have represented different 
things to different people in different economic contexts, not to mention the where’s, 
why’s and how’s of the original historical context in which the artefact was created. The 
dominant prism through which the artefact is evaluated at any given time, however, likely 
reflects the individual’s immediate subjective interests, as opposed to objective 
evaluations attempting to take all these factors into account. The point, therefore, is that 
these realms of understanding both change for themselves over time and experience, and 
change each other as they influence each other in non-linear ways not necessarily 
conforming to the chronology of history and recorded experience. For Adorno, the 
process of searching for the ‘truth-content’ (Wahrheitsgehalt) of the experience of such an 
object of knowledge suggests, therefore, not only are there ongoing antagonisms 
between distinctive realms of evaluation, but also continuous oppositions within them 
that cannot be overcome by prioritising one form of evaluation over another. 
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For Adorno, a critical judgement about the truth of the conception of an object 
depends on evaluations of the object’s own ‘complex internal dynamics and the dynamics 
of the socio-historical totality to which the [object] belongs’ (Zuidervaart 2011). This 
means the truth-content of the object cannot be evaluated according to a dominant 
epistemological principle without also potentially losing access to other aspects of the 
object’s truth-content. This suggests the necessity of the active involvement of 
individuals with their experiences if critical judgements about any kind of truth-content 
are to be possible.  
 
In turn, the ability to make such critical judgements is an integral characteristic of 
self-determination. For Adorno, the objective is not to ground epistemological procedure 
and thereby ‘resolve’ the relationship between subject and object according to a 
dominant methodology, irrespective of how coherent a system of thought may appear. 
The problem is, rather, a question of overcoming restrictions that ‘grounded’ 
epistemological thought – thought systematised according to a predominating 
methodology - can impose on experience, by keeping antagonisms that make up the social 
process, and in which experience is gained, in focus. Adorno’s point is to keep 
conceptual thought open to the effects of experience, as opposed to imposing concepts or 
pre-established ideas of what constitutes knowledge on experience itself. He does not 
thereby deny the need to consult existing methodologies – the ‘quintessence of the 
experience accumulated in thought’ – given what has already been conceptualised is 
incorporated by necessity in engagement with the object of knowledge. Rather, it is a 
question of how continuous experience of the object changes concepts by which it is 
experienced, and therefore potentially ways of identifying it. Adorno’s approach, then, 
involves the activity of thought in its engagement with the world, but more precisely, 
involves the influence, first, of experience upon thought, and second, of the spontaneity 
of new thought arising upon existing thought.  
 
What provides the individual’s ‘indefeasible norm of self-evidence’, then, is 
spontaneous activity of thought upon thought, or reflection: the measure of whether 
standards or normativity involving claims to truth can be achieved is ultimately the extent 
of the individual’s experience of, and reflection upon, the object of knowledge. A 
normative constraint on spontaneous activity itself, therefore, is the extent to which 
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thought remains engaged with its objects of knowledge. Put simply, it is impossible for 
individuals to provide norms by which the truth of the experience is judged if they are 
not themselves actively engaged with the content, gained from continual experience, of 
the conceptual claims pertaining to its object. What, then, can this ‘continual’ experience 
amount to?  
 
Adorno’s conception of experience is that it should strive to be a form of ‘un-
regimented’ or ‘unreduced’ experience (unrestringierte Erfahrung) – experience by default 
involving, but not reduced to, socially dominant norms or pre-existing strictures of 
reasoning in thought itself. It follows thought cannot avoid experience of these forms in 
the modern world or in thought itself, and must by necessity engage with them, but has 
the capacity to overcome them by not allowing itself to become reduced to them. 
According to Adorno, 
 
[t]he concept of experience… has… taken on such an extraordinarily normative significance: on 
one hand, genuine experience, that is, experience of something new which has not existed before, 
is hardly possible in the world in which we live, while, on the other, science, by the system of 
rules it imposes on knowledge, no longer permits such experience. I would not hesitate to define 
the idea of a dialectical theory of society as something like the restoration of, or – to put it more 
modestly – the effort to restore, the experience which is denied us both by the social system and 
by the rules of science… I would reiterate that the kind of experience I [have in mind] is not 
some random exercise of thought, but is guided, and imposed on us, by existing problems… 
Unless one expressly forbids oneself such experience, one cannot really escape it. (Adorno 2002, 
p.51)  
 
By ‘the system of rules [science] imposes on knowledge’, Adorno is not challenging 
science itself, but rather how legitimacy is often bestowed on knowledge socially only to 
the degree that it conforms to scientific findings, thereby prioritising epistemological 
methods sustaining these. Unreduced experience is partly a matter, therefore, of 
overcoming scientism – ‘the belief that knowledge must be identified with science and 
that natural sciences are the only valid mode of knowledge’ (Macey 2000, p.343) – and 
the ways this belief determines social experience such that it can hardly be understood, or 
legitimated, any other way.  
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It is crucial to emphasise, as Adorno underlines, that ‘un-regimented experience’ 
does not amount to random thought merely unempirical for its own sake, or judgemental 
to the extent that it expresses opinions unconcerned with legitimating themselves. 
Rather, it is thought arising from experience of the objective world, or of something in it, 
not constrained to the multifarious ways its conceptualisation has already been 
determined, scientifically or otherwise. How can objective reality be experienced in ways 
occurring to thought in ways thought itself has not already circumscribed, whether by 
individuals or the immediate ways the objective world appears to them?  
 
As Hullot-Kentor suggests, ‘[w]hat Adorno wanted to comprehend was the 
capacity of thought – of identity itself – to cause reality to break in on the mind that 
masters it. This concept of emancipatory reason can calmly be stated as the most 
important idea in Adorno’s philosophy’ (Hullot-Kentor 2006, p.15). The need for 
unrestricted experience, then, is pertinent in light of a social realm determined by 
instrumental forms of rationality relying on an underlying scientism which, taken by 
itself, does not provide an adequately normative conception of experience, and of social 
experience in particular. Moreover, where this scientism contributes to a complex of 
social problems of its own, the ‘unreduced’ experience of these problems forces efforts 
of a better conception of normativity rather than reduction of all problem-solving to 
science and its methods. Adorno’s ‘dialectical theory of society’ is the effort to ‘restore’ 
the kind of experience that has all but been made impossible by how the social system 
has already been structured and the kinds of reasoning sustaining it, and is the practical 
component of his concept of ‘emancipatory reason’.      
 
However, this conception of experience raises the question of how the free 
determination of individuals, conditional on specific desires brought about through 
sensation and contact with their immediate context of the objective world, relates to the 
notion of rational relations. It was Kant’s ‘Copernican revolution’ in metaphysics that 
reversed the theory of cognition by postulating that objects conform to ways of knowing 
them, and not to analyses of how they exist ‘in themselves’. For example, the principle of 
causality – the notion that every event has a cause, which is a leading organisational 
principle of experience - is a central element of the individual’s conceptual apparatus, as 
opposed to something existing objectively in the world, because the world cannot be 
known ‘in itself’ independently of cognition.  
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If Kant’s paradigm shift is followed, according to Pippin, then the issue is how the 
mind takes an active role in its determination within the world, if consciousness is not to 
be merely a product of the mind’s causal arrangement of experiences which itself can be 
assumed to be ‘rational’. In terms of what Kant calls ‘intuitions’, following Pippin, in order 
to explain how rational relations with the world come about, it does not suffice to claim 
such intuitions enact psychological or causal roles in the individual’s judgement. It is not 
enough to assume, therefore, that intuitions automatically become part of the 
psychological or causal chains in thought, and that individuals proceed to reason their way 
through the world based on how these intuitions are embedded in their overall train of 
thought.  
 
Rather, he suggests, there is already a normative relation in the ‘direct presence’ of 
the objective world to the mind in sensation, within what Sellars and others termed the 
‘space of reasons’. The ‘space of reasons’ is a term differentiating between acts of 
reasoning and justification, and the justification of schemas of cause and effect as 
employed in natural scientific inquiry. According to Sellars, the ultimate validity of 
epistemic claims depends on whether they can be proposed normatively – in terms of 
whether value (e.g. ‘right’ or ‘wrong’) can be ascribed to a claim – and this normative 
status is essential for a claim to be a candidate for knowledge. The problem, however, as 
Pippin suggests, is accounting for those normative dimensions of sense-making practices, 
which is crucial to claiming there are rational relations between consciousness and the 
objective world in the first place. In other words,  
 
[n]either the given content of experience nor some sequence of events in nature can be said to be 
responsible for our believing anything or acting in some way. We are responsible for what we take 
experience to constrain, and these constraints are rational, normative, [and] not psychological or 
(in the modern sense of law-governed) natural…What is the nature of normativity itself apart 
from how the mind actually works…? (Pippin 1997, p.11)  
 
The key to this passage relates to the responsibility ‘for what we take experience to 
constrain’: Individuals are capable of determining the extent of their experiences beyond 
how they are causally or psychologically arranged in consciousness. This responsibility to 
delineate parameters of experience, in turn, is part of what enables there to be rational 
relations between subject and object. Part of having rational relations with the world is 
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being responsive to experiences, as opposed to how they appear ‘given’ to us - whether 
causally or otherwise - for what they can reveal, suggesting some form of normativity 
embedded in how the mind develops its understanding of the world.  
 
If thought is considered as an activity – the activity of submitting justifiable norms 
and being submitted to them in turn, engaging other subjectivities with regards to the 
external world normatively – then the claim can be made there can be rational relations 
not purely instrumental in Adorno’s sense. However, this raises the question of how 
rational norms relate to the plethora of beliefs and reasons not subject to seemingly given 
causal laws. Part of normative activity is to try to answer that question, in part, following 
Pippin, by finding the right way to state the insufficiency of causal explanations.  
 
3.3 B) A Causal Turn of Events 
 
For Adorno, one such insufficiency is causal explanations can be reduced to 
themselves, in what he calls their ‘empirical ambiguity’, without considering how experience, 
and social antagonisms comprising it, undermine such explanations. This means causal 
explanations can easily become self-circumscribed, in the sense that causal chains of 
reasoning potentially continue forever in the regressive search for causes of causes, 
without taking into account the impact of new experience upon previous experience every 
time a causal chain is established. For example, an explanation of something [c] being 
traced back to its cause [b], itself assumed to be caused by a third effect, [a], and so on, 
does not account for either the totality of experience bringing about [a] [b] or [c] 
respectively, nor for the experience – the specific socio-historic context - from which 
respective causal explanations are made.  
 
For Kant, however, causality amounts to more than simply cause and effect. 
Causality is when ‘all experience obeys the law of succession according to cause and effect. 
This… is then justified by aligning the irreversibility of causal succession with the 
irreversibility of time. With such arguments Kant attempted to prove that causality was a 
condition of experience and could not be derived from it’ (Caygill 1995, p.108). For Kant, 
then, one condition of relations with the objective world is that individuals arrange 
perception of objects according to how it is gained over time, which Kant maintains is 
one of the main conditions for experience to be possible. Conversely, causal explanations, 
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taken on their own as the impulse Adorno attributes to Kant to ‘trace every condition 
back to “its” cause’, ignore the ‘awareness of all the causal sequences that intersect in 
every phenomenon – instead of its being unequivocally determined by causality in the 
sequence of time’ (Adorno 1973, p.266). This means causality does not occur only 
according to linear conceptions of time, but rather across innumerable boundaries of 
experience. How, then, can Kant’s claim that causality is a necessary condition of 
experience be mediated by Adorno’s claim of the insufficiency of purely causal 
explanations?  
 
In his lectures on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Adorno notes how causality is 
central to Kant’s conception of how individuals gain experience, understanding and 
ultimately knowledge:  
 
In Kant causality is a category that follows from unity of personal consciousness. It is nothing but 
the general conformity to law which compels me to synthesise the different phenomenal aspects 
of the same thing that succeed each other in time. He agrees here with Hume in not ascribing 
causality to things-in-themselves, that is, he does not conceive of causes naturalistically. In contrast 
to Hume, however, he believes that an ordered knowledge, a lawful succession of events, is only 
possible in the context of this form. Thus, whereas Hume would say that causality is merely 
subjective, Kant would reply, indeed, it is merely subjective, but this supposedly subjective element is 
the necessary precondition without which objectivity cannot come into being (Adorno 2001, p.91).  
 
For Kant, like Hume, causality is not something of the phenomenal world in the 
naturalistic sense, but what allows for the subjective ordering of experience over time. 
Unlike Hume, Kant also claims it would be impossible to conceive of the objective world 
without the a priori ordering of experience into the ‘unity of personal consciousness’: 
causality, while not the only way the mind makes sense of the world, is nevertheless 
essential to the mind’s ability to make sense of the world at all.  
 
However, for Adorno this assumption about the causal ordering of experience 
over time is a root cause of ideological thought. If the ‘unity of personal consciousness’ 
depends on causal ordering of experience, then maintaining this unity, as a central element 
in individuals’ desire to identify themselves - both regarding their subjectivity and in wider 
terms of their social orbit - involves projecting causal structures of thought onto other 
elements of experience. Causality is a subjective resource for the ordering of experience, 
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irrespective of the extent to which it can be established to be part of nature outside 
subjectivity. However, when it is assumed what is experienced in nature in itself follows the 
same causal patterns at the root of cognition, and of how individuals organise experience 
and identify themselves, then causal reasoning becomes ideological. It follows for Adorno 
that the very notion of a ‘unity of personal consciousness’ is an ideological construct, in 
the sense that consciousness is ‘unified’ and identity achieved at the expense of what is 
kept from entering them, whether deliberately, subconsciously, unconsciously, or as a 
result of forms of subject-centred reasoning perpetuated by such a ‘unity’.  
 
Moreover, Adorno takes issue with Kant and German Idealism as a whole, on the 
charge that German Idealism is the ‘most developed expression of the self-understanding 
and attempted legitimation of bourgeois society’ (Pippin 2005, p.100). By this reckoning, 
the kind of ‘philosophy of identity’ which, Adorno claims, is buttressed by principles like 
Kant’s ‘unity of personal consciousness’, is how society grounds and legitimates itself, 
while simultaneously legitimising the kind of ideologically procedural thought, such as the 
preponderance of causal reasoning, he charges such a ‘unity’ depends on. It follows for 
Adorno that ‘[p]redominant patterns of thought (herrschende Denkformen)’ such as causality, 
identitarian reasoning and instrumental rationality, ‘have hardened into a system of 
domination – involving all levels of societal practice, and reaching all the way down into 
the constitution of the subject itself’ (Wellmer 2006, p.4). Consequently, ‘[t]he falseness of 
bourgeois society is supposed to be paradigmatically on view in the Idealist defence of its 
[and society’s] most sacred ideal: freedom’ (Pippin 2005, p.100).  
 
We need not remain within Adorno’s mid-20th century paradigm of ‘bourgeois’ 
society to extract the fundamental point, pace Wellmer, about instrumental rationality 
reaching into the constitution of the subject itself, and its implications for the social 
concept of freedom. For Adorno, the point is that the ‘sacred ideal of freedom’ amounts 
to little more than the ‘freedom’ to reproduce causal structures of thought comprising the 
‘unity of personal consciousness.’ The conceptual content of the claim of ‘freedom’ held 
sacrosanct by modern society is thereby exposed, he suggests, as a fraudulent imposition 
of ideology, the notion of freedom in this case being little more than an ideological 
construct ‘legitimated’ by subject-centred reasoning.  
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What Adorno disputes in terms of causal assumptions is therefore projection of 
the mind’s ordering of experience onto the objective world. Methodology relying primarily 
on this projection is in danger of foreclosing spontaneous responses to experience. 
Adorno is thereby concerned with the standard explanation of causality as something 
traceable back to a ‘root cause’ in a linear conception of time, and how this view distorts 
how the root cause is itself dependent on multiple other elements, not a unique social 
constellation consisting of its own innumerable causes and effects. These cannot only be 
understood by referring back to what is assumed to be the root cause. Consequently, the 
danger is purely causal explanations are translated into disinterested methodological 
procedures relying to varying degrees on analyses of cause and effect, obscuring how such 
procedures become factors in sustaining ideological structures.  
 
For example, causal explanations may be attributed to development of social 
structures in terms of attempting to account scientifically for elements contributing, 
among other things, to the degree of power these structures exert over society. The 
scientific realism school of political thought, e.g., advances claims based on the 
assumption that ‘the aim of explanation in the natural and social sciences is essentially the 
same. The study of social power is analogous to the study of causal powers in the natural 
world. Its purpose is to explain political outcomes in terms of the causal powers of agents’ 
(Hayward 2000, p.23). Such explanations do not suffice to account, however, for specific 
intentions, perceptions or activities of individuals comprising such structures, and a purely 
causal account of power exerted by them in society can ideologically obscure the 
contingent historical experience of individuals determining their actions in ways 
irreducible to purely causal processes.36  
 
Adorno postulates that while the natural sciences ‘are content to handle causality 
with operational definitions that are inherent in their modes of proceeding’ (Adorno 2001, 
p.91), philosophy pays insufficient attention to how causal explanations are central to the 
seeming determinacy of social conditions as they appear (at the risk, he says, of 
undermining the supposed independence of philosophy from the sciences). Not 
adequately analysing how ‘[e]very state of things is horizontally and vertically tied to all 
others, touches upon all others, is touched by all others’ (ibid., p.267) is tantamount, for 
Adorno, to subject-centred reasoning ‘instrumentally’ encouraging the totality of its 
                                                
36 See Joseph 2004. 
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influence over the development of social conditions. It follows critical thought must 
engage with causal explanations precisely because these are intimately connected to the 
idea of a dominated nature – connected, that is, to aspects of experience suppressed in 
efforts to establish coherent views of the world, in which causal reasoning plays a 
predominating role.  
 
Recognising, therefore, that experience is partly dependent on causality, Adorno 
suggests attention should instead be focused on the projection of causal structures on the 
objective world: 
 
Objectively and subjectively, causality is the spell of dominated nature. It has its fundamentum in re 
in identity, which as a mental principle simply mirrors the real control of nature. In reflecting upon 
causality, reason – which finds causality in nature wherever it controls nature – also grows aware 
of its own natural origin as the spellbinding principle… Causality… is nothing but man’s natural 
origin, which he continues as control of nature (ibid. p.269).   
 
Adorno emphasises how causality is connected to the imposition of identity on objects of 
knowledge as a reflection of man’s attempt to control nature. Maintaining a ‘cognitively 
critical sense of causality’ reveals how the identity by which objects come to be known by 
way of their causal explanation is imposed at the expense of experience not reduced to 
this attempt. By this account, causal reasoning is projected by individuals onto nature. 
When causal explanations thereby become socially legitimated as a ‘given’ or ‘natural’ form 
– or a socially accepted norm – of perceiving the world, individuals may lose sight that 
what they perceive as causal structures in the world are at least partly their own 
projections.  
 
For Adorno, these causal structures thereby also become a source of ideological 
distortion grounded in the imperative to control nature. This imperative, however, is 
ineluctable: the subject’s attempt to control nature – its natural origin - is in the name of 
self-preservation. It is due to self-preservation that individuals identify nature and themselves 
with causal chains of reasoning with which they organise their thought. This self-
preservation is made ineluctable by the powerlessness experienced vis-à-vis the objective 
world. Adorno, therefore, does not deny this imperative of self-preservation, expressed in 
identity and as identification of the objective world. Rather, he is interested in elements of 
experience this drive to identification as the dominant organisational principle of 
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subjectivity misses. It also follows causal explanations potentially contain speculative 
moments of freedom, considering their examination can reveal things those explanations 
fail to account for. Paying insufficient attention to causal explanations, therefore, whether 
disputing them without adequately analysing them, or assuming them to be given forms 
correlative with natural laws, can amount to acting in concert with instrumental rationality.  
 
As outlined, speculative moments of freedom for Adorno occur in engagement 
with a claim pertaining to an object of knowledge, to see what that claim was originally 
made in relation to, where and how the claim may have changed over time, the unfulfilled 
potential in its content, and therefore how it may have been distorted over time, including 
in its present form. The reason for doing this is locating interstices at which claims are 
formed and modified provides opportunities to, first, free conceptual content of the claim 
from dominant methodological procedures that may have distorted it – without 
overlooking the accumulation of experience contained in these. Second, it provides 
opportunities to reassess potential of the original claim in a contemporary light, taking 
into consideration both this accumulation of experience and the conceptual content of the 
claim as distinct from subsequent experience, keeping mediation of the object of 
knowledge alive and possibly effecting changes in how it can be known.  
 
Searching for speculative moments of freedom in thought, then, is a thoroughly 
normative procedure for Adorno, in the sense that norms by which claims are made are 
themselves continuously reassessed and submitted for justification. With regard to causal 
explanations, that speculative moment could occur when it is apprehended how man’s 
attempt to dominate nature could be at the origin of causal reasoning, and how causal 
reasoning in turn reinforces attempts to dominate nature. Consequently, it could be 
understood how this form of circular reasoning dominates other claims pertaining to 
nature or other objects, thus liberating individuals to consider such claims in contexts not 
relying solely on causal reasoning, or which aren’t non-consciously underpinned by the 
impulse to dominate nature.  
 
It follows that, in acting as normative constraints on each other as far as causal 
reasoning in a given context can be justified, individuals help each other recognise 
instances in which they are non-consciously projecting such reasoning onto the objective 
world, as opposed to reflecting on experience in ways not reducing it to causal reasoning 
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alone. At first glance, it appears modern society offers ample examples, from the 
harvesting of natural resources to the implications of man-made climate change, of man’s 
drive to dominate nature, and that such a claim is therefore an obvious observation 
pertaining to the nature of modern society. However, what may not be as obvious is how 
Adorno suggests this drive is replicated in the smallest of individual gestures, particularly 
in the context of functioning within strictures of modern society, where the principle of 
self-preservation cannot be anything other than fully conscious.  
 
For example, individuals are often required to repress features of their subjectivity 
– and therefore, elements of nature - as the necessary sacrifice in order to belong to the 
larger social whole, particularly in as far as qualifying for socially acceptable identities is 
concerned – ‘acceptable’, that is, within parameters of necessarily limited experience. For 
Adorno, this kind of ‘false’ socialisation is virtually total while producing equally false 
norms regulating social activity, in the sense that socialisation involves domination of both 
nature and the subjectivity that is part of it, and therefore that norms determining 
socialisation are to some extent complicit in suppressing elements both in subjectivity and 
in objective nature. The question arises, therefore, whether a different kind of normativity 
is even possible, not least from Adorno’s own perspective.  
 
For Adorno, however, causality amounts to more than the simple claim of its 
subjective projection. For example, he claims the ‘integration’ of modern society has to 
some extent made searching for causal relations futile, because causality has become 
indistinguishable from social structures in which it is reproduced, leaving him with the 
conclusion that ‘[o]nly… society itself remains the cause’ (Adorno 1973, p.267). 
Accordingly, causality ‘disappears’, in what he calls the ‘crisis of causality’, because it 
becomes increasingly impossible to trace a condition ‘with evidentiality to another single 
condition’ (ibid.).  
 
It follows social structures are permeated by causal reasoning to the degree that 
experience of society is unavoidably affected – and structured – predominantly by the 
causality inherent to these structures (‘networks of causality’), to the point that it becomes 
difficult to distinguish experience itself from how it has been ‘caused’, or structured, by 
society. This also means particular causal social structures become increasingly difficult to 
trace, not least historically, because of how they practically become indistinguishable from 
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the experience of society as a whole. This implies opportunities to mediate social relations 
in ways not depending mainly on causal reasoning in social modus operandi such as ‘means 
and ends’ are diminished, and therefore that the ability to experience social reality beyond 
its causal determination is confined, simultaneously restricting the ability to reconsider 
social experience differently from how it already appears ‘given’.  
 
It also follows, then, that instrumental rationality relies on causal structures to such 
an extent that most individuals come to re-enact these structures as part of the thoughts 
and activities they take to be constitutive of the ‘unity’ of their identities and, 
consequently, their possibilities for self-determination. The preservation of social identity, 
on this reading, depends on the conceptual unity individuals ascribe to themselves, a unity 
depending disproportionately on causal structures, whereas for Adorno this kind of unity 
undermines independence, and specifically the individuality of experience, as opposed to 
strengthening it. This notion extends to the idea that pursuing freedom in democratic 
society amounts to little more than the liberty to reproduce causal chains of thought and 
action already given to individuals merely by virtue of immediate experience, and is at the 
heart of Adorno’s conception of how the experience of modern democracies is 
ideologically determined.  
 
This conception also suggests, not only that there may be nothing outside causal 
structures in modern society to which a non-instrumental form of reason can appeal, but 
also that the more an ideology of causal thinking girds the fabric of social relations, 
particularly under the guise of ‘freedom’, the less perceptible it becomes. The crux of this 
argument for Adorno is that, as awareness of causal pressure is a vital component of 
individuals’ ability to reflect on experience, the ‘disappearance’ of causality therefore 
entails the disappearance of the possibility that ‘causality points to the idea of freedom as 
the possibility of non-identity’ (ibid. p.269). In this instance, ‘non-identity’ would be all 
those forms of experience that cannot be identified purely in causal terms, or the 
conceptual content remaining in an object of knowledge undermining identifications made 
through causal reasoning.  
 
Specifically, if that object of knowledge is the idea of freedom, then the non-
identity of this notion of freedom would be that resisting its determination by causal 
reasoning, such as other aspects of inner and outer nature unaccounted for by the latter. If 
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there is to be a possibility of experience emancipated from ideological thought, it is 
imperative for Adorno that individuals attempt to comprehend nature in ways that cannot 
be reduced to the ‘unity of personal consciousness’, the causal structures inherent to this 
unity, or identitarian conceptions of the world resulting from it. The potential loss of the 
possibility of non-identitarian, non-ideological thought is at the heart of Adorno’s 
concerns for possibilities of social change, and thereby for the very possibility of truly 
democratic claims to autonomy and self-realisation at individual and social levels.           
 
3.4 Between Spontaneity and Determinacy:  
A) A Fork in the Road: Adorno contra  Kant 
 
There are strong objections to Adorno’s notion of the interrelationship between 
causality and instrumental rationality through his prism of preserving ‘non-identity’, 
particularly at the level of the content of experience. Pippin rejects Adorno’s prioritisation 
of non-identity of the conceptual articulation of an object of knowledge on grounds that 
this prioritisation of the objective world over immediate experience undermines the 
possibility of self-determination and the free adoption of norms.37 This criticism suggests 
prioritising hitherto unknown ‘otherness’ over actual experience undermines experience in 
favour of what individuals simply do not know, weakening their autonomy and ability to 
generate self-determining norms, in which causality, e.g., plays a crucial role. Further, as 
Pippin suggests, if Adorno’s claims of the ‘falseness’ of modern experience in are to stand, 
then the issue of truth would have to be ‘a function of the content of the claim, not with the 
attempted identification itself’ (Pippin 2005, p.102). While claims can be true or false, 
therefore, attempts to know something is what generates claims in the first place. This 
attempt to identify is what could be undermined in the prioritisation of non-identity, 
following Adorno’s already dubious distinction, according to Pippin, between ‘true’ and 
‘false’ experience.  
 
What, however, of normative relations Adorno suggests are already available in 
experience, before conceptualisation takes place? If individuals are determined by an array 
of external and internal factors besides spontaneity, then awareness of their determination 
by these factors, and judgements made in response, still result at least partly from their 
spontaneity. The fact that individuals react to ways they are determined at all suggests that 
                                                
37 See Pippin 2005.  
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spontaneity – their freedom to reject or embrace how they perceive their determination – 
is at least in part the source of their normative relations with the objective world.   
 
The notion of the ‘space of reasons’ is crucial to any account of normativity. If the 
claim that any position must be understood from within this space is correct, then 
adoption of a position must be continuous with ‘the self-reflection about such normativity 
constitutive of how we inescapably and interminably’ (Pippin 1997, p.15.) continue our 
activities. Following Pippin, an account of normativity avoiding trappings of metaphysics 
or psychologism leads to Hegel’s theory of historical rationality and sociality ‘and the kind 
of historical justification of norms that requires’ (ibid.). To remain within the space of 
reasons, hence, requires a development from within the Kantian position that objects 
conform to ways of knowing them, and not to how they exist ‘in themselves’.  
 
For Hegel, it was Kant’s characterisation of the subject as ‘spontaneously 
apperceptive’ that ‘convinced him that Kant… had begun a new kind of “philosophy of 
subjectivity”’ (ibid. p.32). Central to such a philosophy are ‘a priori restrictions set by such 
an apperceiving subject for what could count as an object of knowledge’ (ibid.). Hegel, 
known for rejecting the Kantian hope for a ‘transcendental’ account of human 
subjectivity, turned towards the problem of accounting for historical change with 
attention to relations between intellectual and social practices - ‘shapes of spirit’ – over 
predominating realist or empiricist approaches. Adorno shares this imperative: his analyses 
of social phenomena are made from the perspective of possibilities for social 
transformation.  
 
Critiques of the ‘Culture Industry’ and the wider paradigm of instrumental 
rationality, for example, are undertaken to understand how they impede social 
amelioration. Adorno views social change through the prism of possibilities for freedom; 
it follows that social practice in the ‘Culture Industry’ is connected to analyses of the kinds 
of rationality supporting that practice, and to how their practical application encumbers 
freedom. Hegel’s and Adorno’s approaches could thus be said to appeal to political 
thought acknowledging need for ‘“pre-deliberative involvement,” considering the notion 
of “wholly self-defining individuals” as impossible and yet which doesn’t rely on 
“traditionalism”’. It follows for Hegel, ‘basic elements of modern ethical life could be 
shown to be “rational” [and] not merely “our community’s way of going on”’ (ibid. p.18.). 
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In Hegel’s Idealist version of modernity, pace Pippin, the agenda is of prioritising 
spontaneity that can be realised as a rational, universal norm containing some determinate 
content.  
 
This is a controversial position, as Pippin concedes, not least because it is difficult 
to both keep Kant’s Idealist premises of spontaneity and autonomy and resolve the 
problem of determinacy. For example, the ability to autonomously self-legislate is 
constrained by what is ‘always already’ there – what has already been determined - in the 
specific social context into which individuals are thrown. It follows individuals inevitably 
self-legislate in relation to social structures they have not contributed to and over which 
they have no influence, and yet which might have considerable influence over their 
autonomy (or their understanding of it). How do individuals exercise spontaneity in 
meaningful ways that both rationally take account of the influence of those social 
structures, and create rational space for individual autonomy in relation to them, without 
ignoring ways they have already been determined?     
 
The problem of determinacy and its conflict with the premise of free spontaneity 
is essential to understanding Adorno’s thought. If autonomy begotten through 
spontaneity is always subject to pre-existing determinacy, what can the claim of self-
determining freedom amount to? Moreover, if the possibility of self-determination is 
always contingent on specific, predetermined sets of natural and socio-historical 
circumstances, what can Adorno’s claims about instrumental rationality and its self-
legitimation amount to? How would these be separated from the causality both present in 
pre-determined structures of the natural and social world and a predominant element of 
human conceptualisation?  
 
First, the claim of ‘instrumental rationality’ depends on the claim that there is a 
non-instrumental form of reason, meaning reasoning that cannot be reduced to laws of cause 
and effect and predominating social modus operandi of means and ends. This depends on a 
spontaneous element of reason not determined by reified causal structures of the social 
world. That reason must be available somewhere in conceptualisation effectuated by the 
mind due to spontaneous engagement with the objective world. Second, following 
Adorno, the question becomes whether the element of spontaneity itself has been 
compromised by the conditions of modernity. If that is claimed, then questions arise as to 
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what in modernity had the power to ‘co-opt’ spontaneity not present in previous historical 
epochs.  
 
The rise of modern science distinguishes modernity from previous eras. However, 
regarding the normative space of reasons in which reasoning and judgement coexist with 
purely scientific inquiry, the claim would have to be that spontaneity has been affected by 
the ideology of scientism and its vast practical application, in the sense of the predominant 
role it plays in the cultural rationalisation of modern society, as opposed to being affected 
by natural science itself. Conversely, if it is held external limitations on spontaneity are no 
different in modernity from any other time, would the question be one of how the causal 
organisation of experience assumes a ‘natural’ predominance over spontaneous intuitions 
and conceptualisation in the working of the mind? What, then, in the context of the 
necessity of self-preservation being at the root of causal reasoning and identity thinking, 
does this reveal about modernity, where, as Adorno claims, causality is increasingly 
impossible to trace because it is everywhere at once?  
 
Could it be claimed, therefore, that the scope of social power of instrumental 
rationality, as part of specifically contingent conditions of modernity, is both a 
consequence of this ‘natural’ predominance of causality over spontaneity and, in turn, an 
element reinforcing this imbalance? Would this amount to claiming instrumental 
rationality is ‘natural’? Or rather, that the imperative of self-preservation is more 
accentuated than ever in modern society? As I suggest in Chapter 4, Adorno addresses 
these questions with reference to his idea of ‘nature-history’. These remain significant 
questions, however, with consequences for both the theory of instrumental rationality and 
for Adorno’s contention that ‘the whole is untrue’ as a result.  
 
The problem of the determinacy of social conditions as an expression of causal 
structures of reasoning in thought lends itself to the question of the function of 
spontaneity. How does spontaneity contribute to relations to the objective world, and to 
itself as a normative constraint? Kant’s philosophy of subjectivity addresses the question 
of how cognitive claims are possible in the account of a spontaneous apperception in 
which reality would be determinable by the subject. According to Pippin, Kant’s 
designation of thought itself as spontaneity suggests it is logically necessary that thinking 
involved in knowledge is a kind of spontaneity. It follows that individuals doing the 
Prospects Beyond Ideology: Reason, Freedom and the Truth of the Subject – 
Towards Political Models for the Critical Thought of Theodor W. Adorno 
 
 123 
thinking cannot be causal systems in themselves, because ‘formal conditions of knowledge 
require that the content of cognition be actively conceptualised in a way that is finally… 
causally independent of the causally produced reception of that material, and of any initial 
causal-series processing of that information’ (Pippin 1997, p.30).  
 
The active process of conceptualisation, hence, is the contribution of spontaneity 
to knowledge formation. Even where conceptualisation contributes to further causal lines 
of reasoning and the overall causal structure of the unity of individual identity, and where 
it partially derives its original receptivity from causal structures assumed to be present in 
the objective world, there is a non-causal freedom in the capacity of spontaneity to create 
concepts. The introduction of spontaneity into epistemology, and the idea of the ‘subject’ 
as spontaneous activity,  
 
was what would enable the ‘political language of freedom, self-determination, even “autonomy”. 
The Kantian principle of modernity is not Cartesian certainty, but “the autonomy of reason,” the 
demand that reason determine for itself what it shall accept as evidence about the nature of things, 
and that it determine for itself the rule under which it shall evaluate actions’ (ibid, p.162).  
 
This suggests, in this ‘autonomy of reason’, spontaneity not only generates concepts, but 
also engenders the capacity to reflect on them in turn. This ability to reflect on conceptual 
content of the ‘evidence of the nature of things’ is how spontaneity sets its own 
constraints, creating rules or norms along the way ‘under which it shall evaluate actions’. 
As spontaneity tests these evaluations over time and subjects them to evidence provided 
by experience, it creates norms as to how it evaluates, which, combined over the course of 
experience, become constitutive of the individual’s ability to reason. Individuals thereby 
exercise an ‘autonomy of reason’, where they become self-determining because of their 
ability to provide norms and, in turn, normative constraints on their spontaneity through 
reflection. The arbitration between the two is thereby the source of their ability to reason.  
 
The Kantian paradigm of a free subject establishing its relation to the world 
spontaneously does not, however, pace Pippin, lead to some ‘measureless field’ devoid of 
laws or normativity. On the contrary, normative relations with the objective world only 
become possible through spontaneity, and these are delimited by the extent to which 
individuals engage spontaneously with objects of knowledge. Kant’s account of 
spontaneity, therefore, is made up of two central elements: freedom from external 
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determination, and freedom to self-legislate. In the ‘Transcendental Logic’, Kant’s two 
sources of knowledge originating from spontaneity are 1) the receptivity for impressions, 
described as sensibility, and 2) the power of knowing an object through conceptual 
representations of these impressions (the spontaneity of concepts), described as 
understanding, where the combination of the two results in claims to knowledge.  
 
The achievement of understanding, through conceptual determination of 
representations derived from sensibility, means spontaneity gives itself normative 
constraints that must be conceived of as law- or norm-governed, requiring of spontaneity that ‘it 
give itself its laws or rules of synthesis’ (Caygill 1995, p.375). This self-legislation, however, 
requires the supplement of the a priori universals of space and time in order to generate 
knowledge, and for reason to produce laws that, apart from being logical rules, provide 
grounds for individuals to legislate themselves through these a priori determinations of space 
and time. Such grounds reveal ‘a spontaneity through which our reality would be 
determinable, independently of the conditions of empirical intuition’ (Kant, CPR B 430), 
in which spontaneity is self-legislative.  
 
Kant’s ‘transcendental subject’ thereby ‘transcends’ the a priori universals of time 
and space - which cannot be known independently of cognition - by situating the 
spontaneous unification of reason and nature within the subject, consequently 
‘establishing’ the freedom from external determination and the freedom to self-legislate by 
grounding it in the subject. For Adorno, however, the problem with this conception is if 
spontaneity gives itself its rules of synthesis based on how it a priori conceives natural laws 
and universals of space and time, then how can spontaneity be something merely dependent 
on these a priori universals, and not something which both actively acts upon itself and those 
universals, and is acted upon by them? As Adorno suggests in ‘The Concept of the 
Transcendental (part IV)’, 
 
If the transcendental, or rather the transcendental subject, that is to say, the most general point of 
reference supposed to guarantee the possibility of a universally valid and necessary knowledge, is 
really no more than a logical unity, we could not imagine how spontaneity or activity could be 
ascribed to it. How something that is not in any way individuated in time and space, that is 
essentially no more than a factor that unifies different things – and is thus no more than a logical 
abstraction – is able to generate representations, remains completely obscure (Adorno 2001, 
p.213). 
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Adorno points out if the apriority of time and space are necessary conditions of cognition, 
and if subjectivity is simultaneously ‘unified’ in its ‘transcendental’, independent status from 
time and space in its self-determination and self-legislation by the same logic with which it 
conceives of natural laws, then it is not clear how this logical unification of sensibility and 
the understanding amounts to ‘spontaneity’. How is spontaneity ascribed to a ‘logical 
unity’ that gives itself representations of the world and is able to conceptually determine 
reality independently of the conditions – time and space – of empirical intuition?  
 
The problem with Kant’s conception of a priori access to natural laws and the 
universals of space and time through sensibility, and their spontaneous cognition through 
the understanding, is that it conflates a conception of natural laws with the causality 
projected onto the world by the subject. As Adorno suggested, ‘[i]n Kant causality is a 
category that follows from unity of personal consciousness. It is nothing but general 
conformity to law which compels me to synthesise the different phenomenal aspects of the 
same thing that succeed each other in time’ (ibid., p.91). By this account, conformity to 
what is perceived a priori to be natural law creates the ‘logical unity’ of personal 
consciousness, from which causality follows. It follows, however, that subjective 
projection of causal reasoning as natural law, and onto universals of space and time 
themselves, is the identification of these with the subject, as opposed to spontaneous 
reorientation of the understanding towards the object – e.g. the objective world, space and 
time, nature and natural laws, etc.  
 
This suggests if normative constraints on spontaneity are to be found anywhere, 
then it is not in the a priori dependence on the spontaneity of the subject, but in the active 
mediation between spontaneity and the prioritisation, pace Adorno, of the objective world to 
which it reacts. Consequently, Kant’s ‘transcendental subject’ is still rooted in the 
subjective principle of self-preservation resulting in the domination of nature, and 
identifies both nature and itself in terms of its own causal structures of reasoning. It 
follows freedom of self-legislation in spontaneity must necessarily be a matter precisely of 
not ascribing to subjectivity a transcendental status ‘beyond’ time and space – beyond, that 
is, the objective, if spontaneity is to be a source of reason.   
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Adorno’s conception of reason is thereby one of the principal dependence of the 
mind on nature, where we begin to delineate the objective itself as the normative property of 
spontaneous experience. What does this mean when society appears as part of the 
individual’s immediate objective context? I raised the question of whether conditions of 
modernity can affect spontaneity at either the level of receptivity of impressions or the 
spontaneity of conceptual development. If so, what does it mean for the possibility of 
normative relations between subject and the objective world, and between individuals 
themselves? Can spontaneity be ‘unnatural’ in the sense that it is distorted by existing 
forms of instrumental rationality present in the objective social world, and therefore not 
as it might be under conditions in which these forms of instrumental rationality were not 
predominant?  
 
For Kant, the notion that spontaneity could be thus affected is impossible, as 
spontaneity gives itself its laws of synthesis operating independently of how experience of 
specific conditions in the world may subsequently be conceptualised. Given necessary 
conditions of cognition of space and time, this does not, however, mean, contra Kant, 
space and time do not exist independently of cognition. The identification of space and 
time, then, can only remain a subjective identification, which, however, cannot itself 
circumscribe space and time. As Adorno suggests in part II of ND, 
 
[t]hat the definitions which make the object concrete are merely imposed on it – this rule applies 
only where the faith in the primacy of subjectivity remains unshaken. But the forms of subjectivity 
are not cognitive ultimates, as Kant taught; as its experience progresses, cognition can break 
through them. If philosophy, fatally split off from natural sciences, may refer to physics at all 
without causing a short circuit, it may do so in this context. With theoretical stringency, the 
evolution of physics since Einstein burst the visual prison as well as the subjective apriority of 
time, space and causality. In teaching the possibility of such a prison break, experience – 
subjective, according to the Newtonian principle of observation – argues for the primacy of the 
object, and against its own omnipotence (Adorno 1973, pp.187-188). 
 
Beyond referring to how discoveries about the physical world contradict the ‘subjective 
apriority of time, space and causality’, this passage suggests the following: because 
subjectivity cannot take itself as a cognitive ‘absolute’, the subject’s experience of the 
objective world must prioritise the objective world itself as part of any normative 
conception of experience. As Adorno writes, ‘as experience progresses… cognition can 
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break through [forms of subjectivity]’, suggesting, rather than being found in the subject’s 
spontaneity alone, normative, and therefore rational, constraints on spontaneity exist in the 
experience of mediation of the objective world and the objects within it – including society.  
 
Adorno’s ‘dialectical theory of society’ is the effort to understand normative 
dimensions of experience available to cognition without reducing them to the subject or 
spontaneity alone. Instead, he insists normative dimensions of experience of the objective 
world depend on the content of this experience, which cannot be determined by the subject 
or its spontaneity independently of its dependence on the objective world. Irrespective of the 
extent to which a social force as pervasive as instrumental rationality may affect 
spontaneity and conceptualisation, this suggests experience still contains normative 
constraints on the causal elements of this form of rationality. Such normative constraints 
are supposed to be revealed, paradigmatically, through experience of social contradiction. 
 
 For example, spontaneous experience of social phenomena developed as a result 
of a succession of events throughout history may be experienced in multitudes of ways 
not accounted for, and perhaps contradictory to, purely causal explanation of the 
phenomena. Assuming, then, pace Adorno, that if instrumental rationality is indeed ‘total’ 
at the social level, it is still a social element grounded in causal reasoning and, consequently, 
a form of subject-centred reason, as opposed to being an a priori given, ‘universal’ 
component for the organisation of experience. The social experience of instrumental 
rationality, however, cannot be reduced to either the mind’s causal arrangement, or the 
reproduction of causal reasoning in the creation of social structures.     
 
 What, then, does the normative component of spontaneous experience suggest in 
the concrete context of Adorno’s designation of the ‘totalisation’ of experience in modern 
society by instrumental rationality? As Pippin describes Adorno’s perspective, ‘[t]he 
criticism is that concrete and particular sensuous impulses are not allowed any standing in 
anyone’s motivational economy except as permitted, “incorporated into a maxim” by a 
self-authorising practical reason’ (Pippin 2005, p.103). This means the totalisation of 
experience occurs to the extent that sensuous impulses that do not conform to the 
demands of instrumental rationality are barred from entering consciousness altogether, by 
virtue of possible experiences corresponding to such impulses simply no longer existing in 
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modern society, having been stamped out from ‘acceptable’ parameters of experience 
altogether.  
 
Without necessarily adhering to Adorno’s ‘extreme’ position, it could be suggested 
that sensibility is ‘affected’ if the predominant experience of individuals is social, ergo that 
the spontaneous ability to conceptualise is limited by individuals’ immediate social 
experience, thereby predominating over any other form of experience. It would follow the 
sway held over society by instrumental rationality is explained by its ‘appropriation’ of 
reflective spontaneity by virtue of monopolising possible experience. However, the 
objection then arises that even if it can be suggested that spontaneity can be dominated in 
this way, this does not explain the persistence of the kinds of sensuous impulses Adorno 
claims have all but disappeared. Developments in categories of e.g., music, literature and 
philosophy have not ceased just because a degree of validity can be attributed to the claim 
of ‘totalising’ forms of rationality in modern society.  
 
It may be that exposure to such categories is constrained because instrumental 
rationality foremost promotes the easily accessible, e.g. unsubstantial popular music or 
crime novels, but this is not the same as proposing reflection on experience has been 
compromised altogether. I maintain there is validity to the claim that reflection is 
constrained to some extent by instrumental rationality, but by referencing the idea that 
Adorno’s overall concept of ‘totalisation’ can help to illuminate some of the specific 
contexts in which that claim can be made. This means making such a claim is contingent on 
specific analyses of particular social phenomena, and does not amount to a wholesale 
endorsement of the projection of the concept of totalisation onto society, or spontaneity.        
 
 I have introduced how normative constraints supposed to be available in Adorno’s 
conception of unrestricted experience may still be accessible in Adorno’s own context of 
the totalised society, despite itself. What does this suggest, then, about the determinacy of 
social conditions and the possibility of individual, rational self-determination? On one 
hand, constitutive features of instrumental rationality - of causal and subject-centred 
reasoning - must be the product of spontaneity in the first place, considering this form of 
reasoning is grounded in the self-preservation of individuals vis-à-vis the objective world, 
and is a response to real needs and wants at some stage before it can be considered to 
have become socially ‘instrumentalised’.  
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Where reason becomes ‘instrumental’, then, it is also a matter of searching for 
pragmatic solutions, not only in the name of self-preservation, but also the collective 
preservation of society. There is little doubt, for instance, that mass production of malaria 
vaccine is a pragmatic solution to a pressing universal problem, even though it is still a 
product of instrumental rationality. The question, then, becomes one of the distinction 
between how instrumental forms of rationality are legitimated to the extent they answer 
real needs rooted in imperatives of self-preservation, and where these become self-
legitimating to the degree they no longer answer concrete needs, but rather, manufacture 
needs in turn and consequently, potentially threaten self-preservation. This manipulation of 
needs – consider the ‘capitalisation’ of human emotion in the manner human frailty 
becomes the targeted revenue of a nation’s broadsheets, or the proliferation of ‘reality’ 
shows designed to humiliate unsuspecting individuals – creates an additional imperative of 
self-preservation vis-à-vis society itself.  
 
That is to suggest, self-preservation is no longer solely the original impulse of 
individuals sheltering themselves from an objective world over which they exercise a 
limited form of control, but also becomes an imperative of survival from the very 
structures of rationality supposed to guarantee this ‘shelter’. Adorno refers to this 
dialectical reversal as the ‘second nature’ of self-preservation, which he accounts for with 
his idea of ‘nature-history’, examined below. This ‘second nature’ of self-preservation 
concretely results, among other things and in the grand, self-replicating scheme of capital 
as a whole, in entire industries, pharmaceutical and otherwise, dedicated to what one 
might call ‘mental adjustment’ to social norms that themselves have not been normatively 
legitimated at the socio-political level by any stretch of the imagination - beyond their 
conformity to the logic of capital.  
 
The consequent identification of individuals with these norms – consider how 
media humiliation of its victims often leads to the ‘voluntary’, wholesale embrace by the 
latter of the very norms depriving them of self-determination in the first place in the 
desperate effort, perhaps, to survive – underscores that rational self-determination of 
individuals cannot simply be equated with ‘instrumental’ determinacy of social conditions. 
Daily interaction between individuals and their technological accessories, and the extent to 
which this interaction influences other areas of their lives – e.g., how individuals relate to 
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each other in real life - raises questions as to whether the spontaneous understanding of 
‘others’ as objects of knowledge is affected by the ways individuals become accustomed to 
interacting through technology.  
 
As Turkle suggests, ‘[f]ace-to-face conversation unfolds slowly. It teaches patience. 
When we communicate on our digital devices, we learn different habits. As we ramp up 
the volume and velocity of online connections, we start to expect faster answers. To get 
these, we ask one another simpler questions; we dumb down our communications, even 
on the most important matters’.38 If empirical studies determine over time that inter-
subjective communication is impoverished the more social media dominates interaction, 
would that be an example of the spontaneous understanding being rendered ‘unnatural’ 
per se? Moreover, if it could be determined that spontaneity is affected by environmental 
circumstances, and if Adorno’s conception of overpowering forms of instrumental 
rationality is acknowledged, where does this leave the idea of free will?  
 
3.5 B) Causa Sui  and the ‘Free’ Adoption of Social Norms 
 
The notion of free will is indispensable to any understanding of democracy, law, 
individual rights and self-determination, not least because individuals could not be held 
responsible for their actions if they could not be said to possess the element of free will. 
Nietzsche nevertheless takes issue with this idea, in the sense that something possessing a 
wholly free will would have to be entirely causa sui, its own cause, if its will is to be 
unencumbered by other elements in the world. As nothing can be entirely its own cause, 
there can be no such thing as a truly free will: all will is determined to some extent by 
objective circumstances, and is therefore not ‘free’ in the way so imagined. There is 
consequently a contradiction at the level of individuals assuming ‘full’ responsibility for 
their actions, be it in a democratic, moral or religious sense, because doing so implies that 
one is causa sui:  
 
The causa sui is the best self-contradiction hitherto imagined, a kind of logical rape and 
unnaturalness: but mankind’s extravagant pride has managed to get itself frightfully entangled with 
precisely this piece of nonsense. For the desire for ‘freedom of will’ in that metaphysical 
superlative sense… the desire to bear the whole and sole responsibility for one’s actions and to 
                                                
38 See Turkle 2011. 
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absolve God, world, ancestors, chance, society from responsibility for them, is nothing less than 
the desire to be precisely that causa sui and, with more than Münchhausen temerity, to pull oneself 
into existence out of the swamp of nothingness by one’s own hair (Nietzsche 1990, pp.50-51). 
 
Nietzsche’s attack is directed at the idea of using causality as the explanation for 
everything in the material world – the ‘desire to bear the whole and sole responsibility for 
one’s actions’ resting on the assumption that one can be one’s own cause, and therefore 
rooted in the hypothesis of the causal arrangement of all experience. Rather, causality 
should be regarded as an inadequate subjective conception seeking to explain everything 
from observable phenomena to psychology.  
 
From Nietzsche’s perspective, the problem with this conjecture is it suggests 
something tangible must have been the original cause of everything else and itself, when 
causal reasoning itself, first, hasn’t been able to provide an adequate characterisation of 
what the original cause must be, and second, logically assumes this still intangible 
‘tangible’ element must have been its own cause as well. It follows the notion of a wholly 
free will unwittingly legitimises causal explanations by setting into motion its own chain of 
cause and effect, without considering how it is a subjective concept which, taken alone, 
inadequately explains all intersecting objective phenomena impacting the individual will, 
and grounds it in the ‘logical unity’ of the subject as its own causa sui.  
 
Consequently, believing in this – a notion subtended by the cultural experience of 
modernity as an appendage to the idea that living in a democracy guarantees such a form 
of ‘absolute’ freedom - reinforces causal structures of thought at the socially objective level. 
This also suggests how causal reasoning becomes reified at the objective social level. 
Because instrumental forms of rationality determine vast elements of experience, they may 
be assumed to exist ‘objectively’ even though they may be self-legitimating as causa sui, 
consequently avoiding normative constraints that individuals should provide.  
  
Conversely, the danger of considering instrumental rationality purely in the 
context of causal reasoning is that it leaves no space for evaluating the role spontaneity 
plays in bringing about instrumental rationality, and no consideration of the degree to 
which spontaneity is affected by it in turn. Simply ascribing instrumental rationality to a 
process of cause and effect, without considering how both can be evaluated as outgrowths 
of the impulse of self-preservation, would be equivalent to having limited spontaneous 
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reaction to the concept of instrumental rationality itself, suggesting a lack of self-
determination. Rather, the question becomes understanding how modern consciousness 
becomes inextricable from instrumental rationality, and investigating how spontaneity 
both conforms to these conditions and is capable of resisting them.  
 
How is spontaneity generated independently of something as objectively pervasive 
as instrumental rationality and the source of normative constraints on that rationality? 
Adorno’s dialectical theory of society is partially the attempt to answer this question. I 
explain below how the theory of negative dialectics is an attempt to salvage spontaneity 
from its social determination by instrumental rationality by re-orientating it from the 
subject and towards experience of the objective world itself. For now, the assumption that 
spontaneity can operate independently of instrumental rationality leads to the idea that as 
part of nature, spontaneity is still connected to the rest of nature in ways not mediated by 
pre-determined systems of thought and correlative subject-centred reasoning.  
 
Different ways of observing nature lead to differing conceptions of nature and 
reason that need not be mutually exclusive or accounted for by singular meta-narratives, 
scientific, philosophical or otherwise. According to Adorno’s critique of modern 
conditions, if elements of nature can only ever be partially identified, but are only identified 
with what natural science attempts to make comprehensible, they are in danger of being 
perceived as identical to what has been made comprehensible. The point that whereas 
reason ascribes laws to nature, natural events themselves do not seem suited to provide any 
justificatory role bears repeating here, in the sense of how this suggests how individuals 
are then primarily justifying and identifying themselves through the parts of nature they 
manage to identify – and control.  
 
Additionally, Adorno suggests the ability to identify characteristics of nature and 
master them mimetically recreates itself within the nature of individuals themselves. For 
example, the excursus on Homer’s Odyssey in DoE shows how, in order to vanquish 
Polyphemus, the ability to control nature results in Ulysses’ understanding of himself only 
through this power over ‘nature’. Consequently, Ulysses loses what is particular to himself 
– he gains control over nature at the expense of his own self: 
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Ulysses emerges from the struggle a self-identical, invariable, force of nature as the power of self-
preservation, a second immanence, that does to itself and first nature, by self-control, what it once 
feared from first nature: it destroys particularity… External mimicry of the natural force of the 
Cyclops becomes internal self-identical mimesis… which is itself a structure of the self-sacrifice of 
particularity to universality. Thus, in its conscious control of nature, the self has triumphed by 
becoming opaque to its self-reproduction as second nature (Hullot-Kentor 2006, p. 237).     
 
Where individuals understand nature by isolating parts of it and gaining mastery over 
them, control is gained, but at the expense of their understanding of the rest of nature, and, 
consequently, of their understanding of themselves and how they now act in the interests 
of that control itself. The ‘particularity’ of individuals, consequently, as that part of nature 
immanent to them, is sacrificed for their ‘universality’ – identification that binds 
individuals to others and consequently becomes their ‘second nature’. I treat the notion of 
‘external mimicry [becoming] internal self-identical mimesis’ in Chapter 4. Presently, the 
parable of Ulysses demonstrates how identification of outer nature, and consequently of 
inner nature with this identification itself comes at the expense of the particularity and self-
determination of the individual, resulting in this process of identification becoming its 
own ‘universalising’ causa sui. 
 
The central question, then, is: how can what is held to be true be legitimated in 
ways not relying purely on scientific explanation? The reduction of epistemological 
questions to, broadly speaking, questions about cognitive science from a naturalistic 
impetus, has, following Bowie, made this a contemporary concern, primarily because ‘the 
reduction of epistemological questions to natural science does not answer important 
metaphysical questions about subjectivity and its relationship with the rest of nature’ 
(Bowie 1996, p.7). The question resonates in Kant’s contrast between the realm of 
freedom and the realm of nature and, following Bowie, points towards distinctions 
between how a ‘space of reasons’ might be organised internally as a ‘moment’ of reason 
within nature, and how nature might be organised on conceptions assumed by natural 
science.  
 
This question reiterates the problem of ideology: if the internal organisation of the 
space of reasons is subsumed within how nature is conceived by natural science, then the 
exercise of reason within such a space can become ideological. As science depends on 
disinterested methodological procedures controlling given environments in order to prove 
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theories pertaining specifically to those environments, it clearly cannot take all 
characteristics of nature into account when testing for the particularity of just one of 
them. Moreover, science has developed such methodological procedures over time, based 
on obtaining the types of results being searched for in the first place.  
 
This means science tests hypotheses with pre-conceived ideas of what tests may 
show, by virtue of how methodologies are designed. By that token, however, if questions 
about normativity within the space of reasons were judged uniquely according to 
dominant methodological procedures, these procedures would clearly limit the spontaneity 
playing a part in developing norms in the first place, reducing experience of the objective 
world to themselves. Furthermore, such methodology isolates the epistemological 
conception of the relationship between mind and objective world to areas methodology 
has hitherto succeeded in controlling. As epistemology seeks to answer questions which 
include, but are not limited to, natural science, it follows disinterested scientific procedure 
cannot simply be transplanted to questions concerning the provision of norms precisely 
because it is itself unlikely to remain disinterested, and is therefore in danger of becoming 
ideological.  
 
In Adorno’s terms, then, scientific method enables access to understanding only of 
those aspects of nature it can control, ‘[f]or our knowledge of nature is really so 
performed by the demand that we dominate nature (exemplified by the chief method of 
finding out about nature, namely the scientific experiment) that we end up understanding 
only those aspects of nature that we can control’ (Adorno 2001, p.176). The space of 
reasons is, therefore, in danger of becoming ideological because it often takes place from 
contexts already defined by the control of nature. An example of how the conception of 
nature by science affects how reasons are made can be found in the way scientific inquiry, 
however disinterested and earnest it seeks to be, is quasi-instrumentally employed to 
buttress policy implementation deeply impacting the social realm.  
 
The problem arising, then, is when, as a result of the influence of such policy, the 
conception of nature understood through the prism of scientific method becomes socially 
legitimated as a given way of thinking about both nature and society as a dominant social 
norm onto itself. The point in finding places outside of ideology in which to submit claims 
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to a space of reasons is to suggest, as Wellmer does39, there is ‘space’ within nature that 
cannot be understood by scientific method alone, therefore requiring other aspects of 
understanding. How, then, should normative dimensions of thought, and the ‘rules or 
normative constraints characteristic of free activity’ be understood in this context?  
 
This remains a necessary question in the context of modernity, and from a 
philosophical perspective is crucial to pursue if the problem of scientism is to be 
confronted. If individuals are to stake autonomous claims vis-à-vis the objective 
determination of social experience, then the question of determinacy and its role in 
explaining why humans construct modes of thoughts and being, culminating in social 
structures, and consequently social norms accepted as given, must be considered. We have 
seen how the impulse of self-preservation must be one central source of such 
determinacy. In this light, human activity should be considered, not necessarily from 
either extreme of empirical or metaphysical philosophy, but from an account of 
normativity accounting for cognitive claims and rational constraints normativity could 
provide in light of individuals’ social activities and their relation to the notion of self-
preservation. This does not mean normativity should only contribute to social conceptions 
of reason eventually shared by everyone, such as basic democratic standards of free 
speech or inter-subjective respect for the value of life inscribed into social law, in order to 
guarantee their preservation.  
 
Rather, Adorno’s idea that normativity depends on experience of the objective 
world suggests aspects of normativity that become socially concretised need to be 
continually mediated in light of the experience itself of these norms. Certainly, while a 
number of norms are agreed upon socially because they enable standards of life, it does 
not follow all norms are equal for everyone. Where it can be assumed that the 
development of self-determining norms remains rational - in the sense e.g. these norms 
don’t infringe on the quality of life of others - individuals still develop norms specific to 
their own subjectivity, needs, desires and social context, which cannot be accounted for by 
a singular conception of reason. This suggests another ‘indefeasible norm of self-evidence’ 
must be the free adoption of norms in general: there could be no conception of an 
independent ‘will’ at all if individuals were unable to develop norms suited specifically to 
                                                
39 See Wellmer 2009. 
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themselves, nor could there be an overall conception of ‘reason’ had these norms not 
developed in relation to specifically individual needs.     
 
However, if norms constituting a given understanding of reason are determined 
through spontaneous conceptualisation, this raises the question of how this 
conceptualisation results in Adorno’s quandary of reason and freedom as mutually 
compatible, governing ideologies. If it can be claimed that the concept of freedom is 
employed towards ideological ends in modernity, such that it is routinely equated with the 
means and ends of instrumental rationality, to which extent can it be claimed that self-
determination is undermined?  
 
We may consider the oft-invoked ideological complement of the notion of 
‘freedom’ with consumerism in Western society. The precept of consumerism is that the 
free choice of consumers determines the economic structure of society. Conversely, the 
logic of consumerism, with its ubiquitous promotion of goods and services and deliberate 
linkage of these with arbitrary notions of social status and identification, creates, in 
practice, desires – as opposed to needs - that cannot properly be considered to be the 
result of self-determining reason. This means while individuals are free to consume 
whatever they want within means, it doesn’t follow that what they want is necessarily the 
product of spontaneous reactions to objective circumstances, but is often reflected by 
what they are enjoined to desire according to dominant conceptualisations of social 
identification promoted by instrumental rationality.  
 
This raises the question of how the economic structure of society is determined by 
free choice, and how it may be claimed that free choice is determined by the economic 
and ideological injunctions of society. From Adorno’s perspective, the danger in this 
instance is that normative constraints supposedly available in individuals’ experience, 
particularly in their conceptualisation of freedom, are replaced by social norms 
circumscribing this concept of freedom, which in this case is the freedom to consume. 
This social norm of the concept of freedom has the further consequence of promoting 
identity-formation through consumerism itself, such that it can be argued that the ‘unity 
of personal consciousness’ in modernity comes to depend to some extent on how people 
identify themselves through what they consume.  
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It follows at least some of norms individuals develop, particularly in relation to the 
spontaneous conceptualisation of freedom, depend on the direct causal pressure of the 
social norm of ‘freedom’, to how individuals are able to conceptualise it. While Adorno’s 
claim that this process is near-total may be exaggerated, the truth of its content relates to 
how it helps illuminate ways in which spontaneity is impacted upon by instrumental 
rationality. It also helps expose how norms can be social constructs seemingly ‘freely’ 
adopted, but likely adopted as a consequence of the predetermination of parameters of 
social experience by instrumental rationality. Such forms of rationality may effectively be 
considered causa sui, in the sense they are no longer consciously mediated by individuals, as 
opposed to their content being reflected upon so as to constitute, despite themselves, a 
possible resource of self-determination.  
 
One example of a contemporary social norm becoming causa sui and potentially 
displacing self-determination is the technologically-determined phenomenon of 
individuals sharing compromising pictures on cell-phones and the Internet, an occurrence 
known as ‘sexting’. The prospect of potentially being compromised professionally – or 
worse40 – because of the eternal availability of such pictures or video, once shared, is 
apparently often met with insouciance. While the impulse to do this may be ascribed to 
youth, curiosity and inexperience, and while the act of doing so is ostensibly an individual 
choice, to what extent could it be claimed that the all-encompassing determination of 
people’s experience by technology is a major factor in influencing and encouraging this 
type of behaviour - specifically, the public broadcasting of what would ordinarily be 
considered to belong to the intimate private sphere?  
 
Moreover, to what extent are individuals enjoined to participate in the 
phenomenon of ‘sexting’ or suchlike because they perceive it as a social norm, and 
therefore that the social – and causal - pressure to conform to this type of behaviour can 
be considered ‘legitimate’ by the increasing numbers of people involved in it (likely a 
determining factor among younger people, particularly those with no experience of social 
relations sans Internet or cell phones)? From this perspective, it may be clarified the 
problem Adorno has with the conception of a ‘free’ adoption of norms is, on one level, 
that subjectivity can all too easily become heteronomous as opposed to autonomous – 
                                                
40 See Meyer 2009.  
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that the supposedly free adoption of norms is in fact an act of submission to socially 
dominant norms which are merely given, and therefore appear previously ‘legitimated’.  
 
On another level, it is that social norms, taken by themselves, express an 
accumulation of experience that doesn’t necessarily require the individual’s spontaneous 
involvement with it – not requiring individual reflection for the norms to be adopted, and 
therefore not subjected to rational constraints of its own. One example of this would be 
the kind of nationalism historically precipitating one country’s declaration of war on 
another, where the social norm of the first country’s superiority over the other within that 
country, as a part of the justification for war, is often freely adopted at face value as a causa 
sui by the majority of individuals without further reflection. The free adoption of norms at 
face value can thus be conceived as little more than a free adoption of ideology lacking 
rational constraints.  
 
 Thus far, Adorno’s conception of spontaneity has been suggested as depending 
on an ‘unreduced’ experience of the objective world, a prioritisation of the objective 
world itself to experience, and on (inner and outer) nature in the subjective effort to 
exercise forms of normativity that can capture ‘truth-effects’, in as far as it does not 
reduce experience to itself. In the following chapter, Adorno’s conception of un-
regimented experience as a source of rational constraints is explored by introducing 
further theoretical elements, including the assertion – ‘against epistemology’ - central to 
his philosophy that epistemological approaches seeking to ‘ground’ knowledge in the 
subject are in danger of missing dimensions of experience vital to pursuing questions of 
truth. Furthermore, Adorno’s emphasis on ‘mimetic’ aspects of experience is considered, 
and how this notion suggests a dialectical approach to experience opening up the 
possibility of a spontaneous component of reason in his context of a ‘total’ instrumental 
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V. CHAPTER 4: THE LIMITATIONS OF EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
In this chapter, I develop Adorno’s notion of experience as spontaneity of 
thought anchoring itself neither in apriority of the subject or objectively given structures 
of rationality. Instead, it is a continuous process of the mediation of experience – whether 
of society, the natural world or particular objects of knowledge therein - and the 
immediate ways this experience is given to the subject. This mediation attempts to 
account dialectically for how both object and subject are changed in the course of this 
experience, in the effort to express its truth.  
 
First, the thesis of DoE is outlined to introduce how conceptual reflection can 
reveal needs forgotten or repressed when thought is restricted to reification of the 
impulse of self-preservation. For Adorno, it follows attempts to ‘ground’ thought, 
whether, philosophically, in the subject, or as an effect of the scientific objectification of 
nature, rely on misconceptions of a prima philosophia, a philosophy of ‘absolute 
beginnings’. This prima philosophia buttresses certain epistemological conceptions of the 
relationship between reason and nature, but fails to account for ‘contradictory senses of 
nature’ irreducible to it. It follows such misconceptions, sometimes expressed as the 
‘myth of the given’ in philosophy, can play a part in reinforcing the immediacy with 
which ideological structures of thought are received as truth. Elements of this immediacy 
are challenged with aspects of Adorno’s ‘meta-critique’ of epistemology.  
 
Second, I introduce Adorno’s contention that society and its ‘unreduced’ 
experience must be a constitutive element of epistemology, and demonstrate how 
epistemology, taken as an absolute end onto itself without consideration of its socio-
historical mediation, is liable to become ideological. Third, it follows the mediated 
character of knowledge lends itself to a dialectical understanding of experience, a 
contention examined in this chapter with reference to Adorno’s central idea of the 
dialectical relationship between nature and history. Fourth, the notion of mimesis is 
expanded to suggest how elements of experience that may be regressive when restricted 
to the self-preserving compulsion to identify, could, as spontaneous elements of 
experience, contain progressive elements of non-identity that can be a source of 
normative constraints on instrumental forms of rationality. The purpose of this chapter 
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is to illuminate why Adorno addresses the deficiency of methods of thought ignoring the 
concept of the social, and to introduce how his theory redresses such shortcomings.   
 
4.1 Myth and Enlightenment 
 
The previous chapter concluded with the contradiction between the free 
adoption of norms as a necessary prerequisite of self-determination, and how this self-
determination can be illusory. Self-determination may be undermined where reflection 
on the conceptual content of given norms is restricted, and therefore where individuals 
are heteronomously determined by these norms, as opposed to engaging with them 
autonomously. It was thereby shown what may be suggested by the notion of ‘false 
consciousness.’  
 
Lack of reflection on adopted norms, whether individuals are unconcerned with 
evidence contravening prejudices or assume ‘guarantees’ of self-determination in norms 
immediately given to them, suggests how consciousness may be ‘false’ in the sense that it 
does not mediate the conceptual content of its adopted norms. Self-determination must 
therefore entail engagement with conceptual content of claims regarding norms and 
other objects of knowledge in the world. What if, however, spontaneity becomes ‘co-
opted’ towards ideological ends, to the degree that spontaneity conforms, by necessity, to 
pragmatic demands determined by instrumental forms of rationality? What distinguishes 
spontaneous engagement with the conceptual content of social norms from spontaneity 
geared towards practical forms of rationality?  
 
Adorno’s approach to this problem relies on the ‘priority of the objective’ - that 
individuals depend for cognition on the objective world and nature, in the sense they 
cannot think about themselves without these. Individuals depend, in the immediate 
sense, on the precedence of the social world in relation to them, but individuals and 
society both depend on the priority of nature ‘in relation to all subjectivity it establishes 
outside itself’, meaning, the ultimate priority of nature – including elements of human 
nature - over all limited attempts to conceptualise it. Consequently, the conceptual 
content of what is given to experience is an essential factor in mediating the objective 
world.  
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This includes the extent to which spontaneous involvement of thought does not 
amount only to reacting to immediate experience, but also penetrates conceptual claims 
sustaining that immediacy. For Adorno, any theory not addressing specific socio-
historical experience in which the theory itself arises becomes instrumental, in the sense 
it both vitiates insights immanent to this socio-historical experience relevant to the 
theory, and insulates itself from accounts undermining it at the expense of aspects of its 
own truth. Adorno’s conception of experience is dialectical and therefore not restricted 
to empiricist conceptions of experience – albeit dialectical thought also mediates between 
empirical claims. This dialectical theory of experience contrasts with the given-ness of 
the immediacy of sense perception empiricist accounts rely on, which cannot by 
themselves account for all experience of the objective world and the totality of truth 
claims. Adorno does not thereby deny the validity of empirical thought, but suggests, 
taken by itself and lacking acknowledgement of its own mediated character, that 
empiricism fails to conceptualise truth claims according to its own epistemological 
standards.             
 
The Kantian conception of self-determining reason was based on the intention to 
end the pre-modern reliance on the ascription of nature and the objective world to the 
idea of ‘God’, and re-situating that determination, and obligations drawn from it, in the 
human will itself. Moral laws, for example, are elaborated from engagement with 
conceptual claims pertaining to social experience, and therefore framed with reference to 
specific elements of experience, and not the overall a priori rational framework enabling 
sensibility. This suggests the human will can operate independently of how individuals are 
determined by nature. It also follows for Kant, however, that if human action is to be 
rational, it would have to be universalised without contradiction: ‘[a] will operating on this 
principle would be free from any ground of determination (Bestimmungsgrund) in nature 
and hence truly free. A moral subject is thus autonomous in a radical sense. [It] obeys 
only the dictates of [its] own will. Reason, as rational will, is now the criterion, but in a 
third sense, one opposed to nature’ (Taylor 1979, p. 75). A part of reason is therefore 
assumed to be self-determination from the presumed causality of nature. However, if this 
reason is freedom from nature, how is it possible to separate reason from nature without 
it still remaining a part of nature, ‘a moment within the whole’?  
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The central problem with Kant’s conception of ‘universal’ reason is that it 
remains formal: it cannot actually be grounded without ‘borrowing’ from nature what it 
seeks to exclude nature from. It also has implications for polities, in which, following 
Kant, objectives derived from human will would have to be unconditionally legitimate 
for all individuals in order to be universal. However, this raises the question of how 
rational action can be universalised without contradiction, if legitimacy of individual 
objectives is judged foremost by self-determining individuals, and not according to pre-
existing ‘universal’ rationality. Kant’s radical notion of autonomy implies all individuals 
seek their own ends and use their own means. However, Kant’s conception of reason as 
universal simultaneously restricts pursuit of means and ends to make individuals coexist 
under universal laws – therefore also restricting self-determination. How, then, if 
freedom is essentially negative – here in the sense that the freedom to act is restricted by 
social necessity - could a ‘universal’ conception of reason be unconditionally legitimate 
for all individuals?  
 
Moreover, if reason were only immanent, derived purely from the will and self-
determination of individuals, then it must be something imposed on nature. If this 
reason truly aspired to universality, it would have to address the rest of nature without 
simply reducing nature to itself, as individuals cannot simply ‘transcend’, nature, as if they 
were something apart from it. It would have to do this while accounting for its own place 
within nature in a way not only relying on its ability to dominate nature for its own ends, 
but also takes into consideration its dependence on nature.  
 
The socio-historical quandary between the universalisation of reason as one central 
objective of Enlightenment thinking, and practical constraints on autonomy it involves at 
social levels of its implementation, resonates in the concept of the ‘dialectic’ of 
Enlightenment. The central thesis of DoE is twofold: ‘Myth is already enlightenment; and 
enlightenment reverts to mythology’ (Horkheimer & Adorno 2002, p. xviii).  This means, 
first, Enlightenment, as a project of rational and scientific disenchantment, has as its 
objective freedom of thought from mythologies and irrational beliefs buttressing pre-
modern views of the world. Rational development of cognitive techniques to identify and 
master nature was, consequently, central to this conception of freedom from the 
determination of individuals by external and arbitrary forces, resulting as this did in 
mythologies, superstition, religious dogma and, consequently, repressive social structures.  
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The universalisation of these cognitive techniques in the framework of natural 
science, and the universalisation of their truth claims as those principally deserving social 
legitimation, cementing their centrality to the administrative determination of society was, 
however, consequently reflected in the appropriation of nature as an object of boundless 
human control. This control is uninhibited, and, at some point, unqualified, in as far as the 
extent to which it extends doesn’t necessarily answer human needs, or manipulates or 
represses them instead. The meaning of nature is consequently restricted to how 
individuals identify it. For Adorno, it follows that enlightenment procured through 
scientific control and identification of nature is equally susceptible to generating repressive 
social structures. It follows that it can become a mythological framework for ‘objectivity’ or 
an objective ‘certainty’ promoting itself to be intellectually unassailable, while de-
legitimising conceptions of nature – including human nature - that cannot be accounted 
for by its methodologies and predetermination of cognitive parameters for the 
understanding.  
 
This potential undermining of reflection equally part of nature itself, hence, 
undercuts the project of Enlightenment, including possibilities of truth claims that cannot be 
accounted for by the framework of the scientific control of nature. Where reason 
becomes ‘instrumental’ to the extent that it reduces experience to its own universalising, 
yet, to some degree, foreclosed framework for reflection, it also ideologically forecloses 
recognition of socio-political contradictions it creates, mythologizing its own claim to 
universality. Furthermore, attempts to ground knowledge of the objective world primarily 
on the basis of identifying naturally given laws potentially reinforces mythological 
frameworks for the understanding itself, if these are taken to circumscribe possibilities of 
experience. Long-standing human assumptions about particular natural laws may in time 
themselves be revealed to be mythological frameworks, as has historically occurred. The 
seminal event of Copernicus’ displacement of the idea of the earth as the centre of the 
universe, for example, provides a paradigmatic example of the revelation of a form of 
subject-centred reasoning – in this case, the reductive idea of an earth-centred conception 
of the universe which had subsisted for thousands of years – as myth.  
 
While the imperative of identification does not undermine the truth-seeking 
endeavour of natural science itself, based as it is on theories of its own falsifiability, it does 
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suggest how it inadvertently produces its own potentially ‘mythological’ frameworks for 
the understanding in its quest to ‘ground’ conceptions of truth, particularly in perfection 
of its own methodologies. The assumed ‘given-ness’ resulting from the attempted 
identification of natural laws can itself turn out to be ‘myth’ which is nevertheless 
methodically employed to shape structures of social experience. This given-ness reinforces 
itself in social structures determining experience through the power of the immediacy with 
which that given-ness is ideologically reinforced, among other things by technology. It 
follows that subjective particularity – that which may be specific to individuals by virtue of 
being variegated manifestations of nature - is thereby sublated into a mythical universality 
of a social totality grounded in this ‘given-ness’, including what remains particular to them 
and therefore contradictory to this ‘universality’. The potentially ideological element of the 
concept of universality itself, thereby, is one source of Adorno’s claim that ‘the whole is 
untrue’.  
 
One reason for this compulsion towards universalising frameworks for the 
understanding, following Adorno, remains the thoroughgoing fear of the unknown - or 
nature - itself. He deems this fear a form of irrationality, where logic identifies all nature 
with itself and its immediate practical purposes, undermining the Enlightenment 
imperative of reason itself to critically engage what is immediately given to experience. 
This reversion of Enlightenment to myth, however, has its own dialectical contradiction in 
the sense of how myth can act as a function of Enlightenment, something overlooked in the 
indiscriminate Enlightenment drive to overcome all myth – including previous historical 
assumptions deemed to be fallacies because of their lack of scientific grounding - and to 
ground truth in its own positive identification of the objective world. It follows this drive 
to identification can obscure how ideas subsequently deemed to be myths – whether 
allegorically, in parables, religious or other socio-historical accounts - contain conceptual 
elements which themselves were attempts at enlightenment. These ideas are not, however, 
exhausted by the establishment of a framework of logical facticity as the conceptual, self-
determining engine of the ‘truth’ of experience, not least in terms of what they can reveal 
about socio-historical constellations in which they arose, and mediation of concepts upon 
which both logic and these accounts rely.  
 
It follows conceptions of Enlightenment determined predominantly by the 
impulse to identify nature in any absolute sense create potentially mythical frameworks of 
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their own. Additionally, Enlightenment, in its attempt to ground its legitimacy in the 
increasing success – ‘progress’ – with which it manages to control nature, succumbs to an 
additional ‘foundational’ myth Adorno broadly terms prima philosophia. Prima philosophia, is 
the idea that the subject-based, rational control of nature enables individuals to ground 
identity and subjectivity themselves in this domination and thereby ‘transcend’ nature, 
obscuring how they remain susceptible to and part of it. It follows from this attempt to 
ground knowledge and experience, an extension of the imperatives of subjectivity and its 
preservation – and the concretion of its desired-for identification - arise comprehensive 
systems of thought striving to achieve certainty by reducing objectivity and nature to 
cognitive processes. Instead, the ever-intensifying degree to which inner and outer nature 
are dominated by scientific rationality, and the complementary instrumental and 
technological control of social relations, are a reflection of repeated attempts – and 
inability - to overcome nature. Consequently, this compulsion irrationally leads to 
subjective and psychological regression due to damaged experience afflicting the subject in 
the cultural realm, limitations on spontaneity, and the subsequent impoverishment of 
reflection. Adorno does not deny the necessity of the self-preserving imperative manifest 
in the control of nature, but his dialectical approach suggests this control cannot be the 
only prism through which nature is understood.  
 
This core outline of DoE, then, introduces a conception of experience as dialectical. 
How epistemological conceptions grounding themselves in isolation from social 
circumstances in which they are formulated – and the socio-historical mediation of this 
experience - can become ideologically corrupted, is suggested below. Following Bowie, 
Adorno’s conception of experience suggests there are ‘contradictory senses of “nature”, as 
that which is objectified in scientific theories and their applications, and as that which we 
are motivated to respond to in expressive forms which cannot be encompassed by 
objectifying theories, [and] which cannot arise without each other’ (Bowie 2010, p.31).  
 
4.2 The Meta-critique of Epistemology 
 
The Kantian notion of a separation of reason and nature, a continuing imperative 
in analytical traditions of philosophy, entails there is a ‘gap’ to be bridged by an account 
of nature developed from self-determining reason. The space of reasons, e.g., is brought 
about as a result of the necessity of accounting for experience of the objective world, 
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where spontaneity contributes to reason through conceptualisation within the space of 
reasons. However, maintaining this gap between reason and nature as if they were two 
sides that could be conclusively separated, to the extent that reason would be self-
determining irrespective of nature, is a potentially ideological endeavour risking constraint 
of epistemological questions, however inadvertently, in the order of causality. It follows 
attempts to fill this gap can occur at the expense of spontaneity itself, if filling it means 
subsuming aspects of nature entirely to given forms of reasoning in order to understand 
them.  
 
For example, if understanding nature is restricted to aspects of nature that can be 
controlled, e.g. through scientific method, then forms of reasoning thereby arising 
become inadequate to explain aspects of nature that cannot be controlled through that 
method. Consequently, forms of reasoning emphasising their separation from nature 
potentially legitimate themselves without justifying themselves normatively, to the point 
of understanding themselves as being objectively ‘given’. The contradiction between 
autonomy and universality can therefore be re-framed as a question about the 
epistemological relationship between reason and nature.  
 
A self-determining rationality considering itself to be ‘universal’ independently of 
nature, or theories seeking to explain parts of nature without corresponding with the rest 
of nature, can only be universal in the ideological sense. For Adorno, however, it follows 
such concepts, including broader concepts of reason in toto,  
 
are intelligible only with reference to other concepts. For instance, universality could hardly be 
intelligible without particularity since it is both a definitionally contrasting concept and also, in 
reality, one which if effective is supposed to apply to particulars (e.g. every particular human 
being is mortal). To elevate the universal can therefore be exposed as a philosophical strategy 
deliberately excluding key mediating concepts (O’Connor 2000, p. 112).  
 
This means elevation of the ‘universal’ to an absolute concept is none other than a 
philosophical strategy for excluding particulars that are necessarily elements of the 
mediation of this universality, without which there would be no conception of the 
universal, and yet which may conceptually contradict its logical unity, thus undermining 
how it makes its claim to universal truth.  
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In modern philosophy, it follows, there is a foundationalist tendency - what 
Adorno terms prima philosophia, the ‘first philosophy’ – prioritising certain concepts over 
others in the quest for this ‘logical unity’, yet whose conceptual development remains 
dependent on the mediation of concepts, but excludes mediation itself from its 
identification. This suggests concepts may be developed in isolation from social 
circumstances in which they arise and through which mediation necessarily takes place, 
overlooking crucial elements of the experience (socio-historical, individual, etc.) in which 
they are being formulated. According to Brandom, philosophical foundationalism is the 
claim there is a structure of particular beliefs such that, ‘firstly, each one is non-
inferentially arrived at, secondly, that these beliefs presuppose no other belief, either 
particular or general, and thirdly, these non-inferentially acquired beliefs constitute the 
ultimate court of appeal for all factual claims’ (Brandom 1997, p.152). But how are such 
beliefs justified in the first place, if the foundationalist emphasis is on grounding beliefs, 
as opposed to justifying them normatively?  
 
The foundational claim of the philosophy of Logical Positivism, for example, 
rejects statements lacking verificational, empirical basis, asserting ‘only statements which 
can be verified can be truth-determinate’ (Bowie 1997, pp. 253-254). This, as Bowie 
suggests, is itself a presupposition that cannot be verified, depending on a given notion 
of verification ignoring clusters of interpretations of how verification should take place, 
each of which would have to be continuously verified against other interpretations (e.g., 
normatively), in order for truth claims to be made. For Adorno, however, potentially 
false foundational claims contain, despite themselves, measures of truth content. The 
truth of such positions is they can potentially break out of self-imposed constraints and 
reveal central theoretical problems of the present social constellation leading to those 
positions in the first place. According to Bowie, e.g., the problem Adorno diagnosed 
with Logical Positivism was its post-WWII academic institutionalisation, in which the 
‘goal was the philosophical legitimation of the natural sciences’ (ibid.). Consequently, 
Logical Positivism became an ideological endeavour – a means to justify ends, as opposed 
to a mediation between means and ends - and lost the critical function it had played in de-
mystifying philosophy at that time.  
 
For Adorno, foundational categories philosophy attempts to establish are both 
‘never… finally distinguishable from each other, but are also never fully identical’ (ibid. 
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p.255). This suggests because there is social linkage between foundational claims that 
maintain logical independence of one another, the fact that this linkage exists means that 
such claims are specific to their socio-historical context, and can help to illuminate 
aspects of that particular constellation. For example, in some traditional forms of inquiry 
attempting to bridge the epistemological gap between reason and nature, reliance on the 
given means knowledge is assumed to be available merely by virtue of being in a state of 
consciousness prior to its conceptualisation. In philosophical empiricism, e.g., it is 
claimed sensory perception provides evidence qualifying as knowledge without our first 
having to actively conceptualise intuitions gained from nature. Such a claim implies 
reliance, however, on necessarily objective, and therefore social elements that are ‘always 
already’ assumed to be constituted, and which are therefore sources of the objective 
determination of experience, but which themselves have necessarily already been socially 
mediated.  
 
Such approaches insufficiently acknowledge the extent to which they are 
indebted to the social realm, to the degree, e.g., that social relations of some kind are 
required to communicate what is revealed by sense experience in the first place, therefore 
presupposing a socio-historical constellation of experience from which such claims are 
made. Claims derived purely from assumptions about the given-ness of sense experience 
are therefore possible sources of ideology, where such claims ignore other elements, such 
as constellations of experience actually constitutive of such claims. However, illumination 
of the socio-historical constellation in which such claims become ideological, and why they 
do so, can suggest the conceptual content within them that is potentially true, or worth 
retaining for continuing mediation.     
 
This is why all epistemological inquiry should depend on acknowledgement of 
‘the concept of society as a constitutive concept of epistemology’ (Adorno 2001, p.145). 
It follows the ‘given’ much traditional epistemology relies on too easily inscribes 
spontaneity into the order of causality by ignoring the concept of the social. The broader 
point in the context of the relationship between reason and nature is one way to avoid 
succumbing to the imperative to fill the epistemological gap is to emphasise, as Adorno’s 
dialectical theory urges, that spontaneity should be examined both in relation to socio-
historical context as well as to nature. Such dual examination could have the twin effect 
of identifying where inquiry itself is in danger of becoming ideological, and avoiding the 
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danger of assuming both knowledge and social structures are merely given. This is why 
attempts to formulate coherent forms of reason can only be ‘moments within the whole’: 
they cannot exist in self-contained ways outside of nature, and are just one element in 
everything nature consists of. They also cannot exist without the prerequisite of some 
form of social relations in which claims become articulated and mediated in the first 
place.  
 
As Adorno - following Hegel - suggests in his meta-critique of epistemology, 
‘[t]he first and immediate is always, as a concept, mediated and thus not the first. 
Nothing immediate or factical, in which the philosophical thought seeks to escape 
mediation through itself, is allotted to thinking reflection in any other way than through 
thoughts’ (Adorno 2000b, p.117). Those claims grounding themselves in the given-ness 
or immediacy of sense-perception, then, make of the sentient subject the foundational 
concept for experience to be possible, ignoring the degree to which the sentient subject 
is already conceptually dependent on what appears objectively given to its experience – 
but therefore also what has already been socially mediated. The notion of the dependence 
of experience to some degree on mimetic gestures, for example, suggests the necessarily 
social character of this experience – ‘how else,’ as Bowie inquires,  ‘does a child learn to 
understand the point, or even the meaning of communication before it grasps norms for 
communication’ (Bowie 2010, p.14) than through mimesis?41 Where claims are grounded 
in their own ‘given-ness’ and ‘absolutized’ as a form of reason or claim to knowledge, 
then, they ignore all the ways what appears to be immediate has already been mediated 
socio-historically.  
 
Mediation, then, makes reflection dependent on its objective context, and 
underscores the implausibility of a ‘first’, ‘unified’ concept, whether grounded in apriority 
of the subject or in reduction of the subject to (necessarily human conceptualisations of) 
nature (as occurs, for example, in physicalist approaches to knowledge), if reflection is 
not to rely on infinite regresses of causes. As Adorno suggests,   
 
[t]he most enlightened epistemology still participates in the myth of the first in the figure of a 
contract which is never fulfilled and therefore in itself endless, self-repeating without respite. Its 
metacritique presents it with its promissory note and forces from it the external insight, gained 
                                                
41 See Chapter 6. 
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from society, that… [t]he real life process of society is not something sociologically smuggled 
into philosophy through associates. It is rather the core of the contents of logic itself (Adorno 
2000b, p.132).  
 
Adorno’s ‘meta-critique’ of epistemology, then, instead suggests a dialectical relationship 
between conceptualisations of nature occurring historically, and conceptualisation of 
historical experience appearing from perspectives of the human element of nature. It 
follows this dialectic between reason and nature provides the element of experience to 
knowledge that attempts to conceptualise knowledge by logically referring to first 
grounds routinely miss.  
 
The same point extends to Adorno’s accentuation of social contexts in how 
theories of knowledge purporting to be rational are constructed: reasoning ignoring 
social contexts in which it is developed cannot legitimately aspire to provide guiding 
principles for future social contexts. If rationality subtending development of certain 
kinds of technology, for example, is impervious to the way it impacts the social sphere, 
and it can be shown there are harmful consequences in the way it affects the social 
sphere, then what legitimacy does that rationality have in continuing to shape it?  
 
Moreover, the fact it may be logically or scientifically legitimate, in as far as 
something instrumental reasoning contributes to works according to natural laws – e.g. 
any form of modern technology - depends to some degree on exclusion of other 
concepts and experience to which it relates, particularly where it assumes a 
predominating position in social experience. For example, effects communications 
technologies have on inter-subjective communication suggests how these relations are 
increasingly determined by forms of immediacy encouraged by technology itself.42 This 
consequently suggests the need for further conceptualisation of this objective 
determination – including appraisals allowing insight into possibilities of self-
determination, or lack thereof, in the context of this increasingly dominant social norm. 
If conceptualisation concerning communications technology is to be at all spontaneous, 
then, it cannot simply be accounted for by the factual knowledge or logic enabling 
functionality of the technology itself.               
 
                                                
42 See Chapter 7. 
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4.3 Society as a Constitutive Element of Epistemology  
 
In order to comprehend Adorno’s emphasis on mediation, therefore, it is 
necessary to show why reflection ignoring the social context in which it occurs cannot 
properly be considered to be self-determining. Where e.g. empirical reasoning assumes 
an epistemological gap between individuals and nature - between access to theoretical 
entities postulated by a given ontology and the ‘ontology’ of nature itself - then because 
empirical knowledge itself is acquired as a result of experience, it must still belong to the 
space of reasons.  
 
One way empirical reasoning attempts to ground knowledge, however – 
paradigmatic of empiricism as a whole – has been to ‘reduce the structure of the space of 
reasons [itself] to something that is already unproblematically natural on the relevant 
conception… ideas whose primary home is the space of reasons are depicted as, after all, 
serving to place things in nature in the relevant sense’ (McDowell 1994, p.73). Such a 
claim suggests ‘spontaneous’ conceptual determinations are naturally constrained in the 
‘natural’ order of causation, meaning while spontaneity enables justification of claims, 
their truth still depends on how they correspond with a ‘natural’ order of causality, which 
then acts as the natural constraint on these claims.  
 
Accordingly, this ‘natural’ constraint would become intelligible once causal laws 
governing language and consciousness are discovered. However, as Bowie inquires, ‘how 
can we know that this has been achieved unless the answer is presupposed that everything 
is explicable in causal terms’ (Bowie 1996, p.5)? The presupposition that there are 
epistemological ‘guarantees’ in the first place is something that has been termed the 
‘Myth of the Given’, and is essential to consider in order to grasp Adorno’s challenge to 
traditional epistemology. The Myth of the Given, according to Brandom, is  
 
the idea that there can be a kind of awareness that has two properties. First, it is or entails having a 
certain sort of knowledge – perhaps not of other things, but at least that one is in that state, or a 
state of that kind – knowledge that the one whose state it is possesses simply in virtue of being in 
that state. Second, it entails that the capacity to have that sort of awareness… does not 
presuppose the acquisition of any concepts – that one can be aware in that sense independently of, 
and antecedently to, grasping or mastering the use of any concepts (paradigmatically through 
language learning) (Brandom 2003. p.122). 
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The premise of ‘given’ forms of inquiry, then, is that simply being conscious makes some 
form of knowledge immediately available and, moreover, this access to knowledge can 
bypass conceptual determination altogether. The challenge to this ‘Myth’ by Sellars in his 
Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, however, undercuts many foundationalist motives 
often present in analytical philosophy, challenging the solidity of claims to epistemology. 
This challenge is made on the basis that the characteristic of ‘having knowledge purely by 
being in a given state’ and the claim this does not require conceptual acquisition, are 
mutually incompatible.  
 
The Myth of the Given is problematic because it obscures the distinction 
between sensing and knowing, or between the ‘given’ of merely being conscious, and 
actually being aware in a sense involving knowledge, such as in the process of social 
interaction. The problem is it presupposes that knowledge exists independently of the 
conceptual possession, which itself is a social acquisition: without conceptual acquisition, 
however, there would be no possibility to understand or relate what appears given in the 
first place. It follows the attempt to establish a foundationalist ‘given’ or absolute source 
of identification for claims aspiring to the status of knowledge to conform to, whose own 
‘natural’ law merely awaits discovery, leads to its own paradox because it excludes the 
mediation through which such a law would conceivably be discovered.     
 
Consequently, claims pertaining to consciousness cannot be derived purely from 
the immediacy of the objective world to sense perception, as they already possess a 
degree of conceptual content. In order for claims to attain conceptual content, they 
must, according to Brandom, be ‘inferentially related to other claims… one would not 
have one concept unless one had many others to which it is inferentially related’ 
(Brandom 2003, p.147). This counters the empiricist claim that ‘fundamental concepts 
pertaining to observable fact have… logical independence of one another’ (ibid.). 
Following Brandom, conceptual claims about the logical independence of facts are 
themselves mediated. For Adorno, it follows that  
 
[t]hought capitulates into empiricism too early and with too little resistance. By humbly deferring 
to sheer existence, thought fails to come to grips with it and thus abandons the moment of 
freedom and spontaneity… Logically consistent critical and self-reflective thought grasps, in the 
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very jurisdiction of immanence, incomparably more about essence – viz. about the life process of 
society – than a procedure that resigns itself to registering facts (Adorno 2000b, p. 130).  
 
The deferring of thought to ‘sheer existence’ – the immediacy of the objective world to 
sense perception characteristic of empiricism – does not go far enough in its attempt to 
establish truth claims, as it relinquishes the ‘moment of freedom and spontaneity’ of its 
social mediation. Facts are thereby established at the expense of what remains 
conceptually ‘non-identical’ in their mediation as objects of knowledge.  
 
It also follows that any concept pertaining to the objective world is mediated 
throughout its history in the world, often such that it no longer applies to what it initially 
arose as a consequence of. Adorno calls this ‘historical sedimentation’, where the history 
contained in an object of knowledge ‘can only be delivered by a knowledge mindful of 
the historic positional value of the object in its relation to other objects’ (Adorno 1973, 
p.163). This means any object is mediated continuously throughout its history, where the 
totality of this mediation yields its ‘defining’ characteristics as it becomes known in its 
immediate social context, giving the object its historically ‘sedimented’ identity.  
 
In order, however, to reflect on conceptual content of claims related to it, the 
‘positional value of the object in relation to other objects’ at successive points in history 
must be consulted to establish factors contributing to the object’s conceptual 
determination. For example, the Enlightenment concept of liberalism, based on the 
equality of rights developed in reaction to foundational assumptions of the pre-modern 
era – e.g., religious assumptions about man’s place on earth in relation to God, or the 
divine right of monarchies as a guiding principle of social organisation - has come to 
mean, in modernity, distinctly different things to different individuals. To some, 
(classical) liberalism means “unconstrained free enterprise”; for others it means 
“commitment to social democratic initiatives” e.g., government intervention to guarantee 
personal rights through general welfare. In either case, conflicting interpretations depend 
to different degrees on the original premise of individual rights, although their 
understanding changes from the original context in which they arose – not least because 
rights themselves come to be experienced and understood differently - and have been 
mediated continuously in subsequent contexts.  
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For Adorno, it therefore follows that to make claims aspiring to truth, their 
conceptual content must also be freed from how objects of knowledge are identified in 
the immediate sense in a given socio-historical context (their historically sedimented 
identity). Understanding why they are identified as they are also requires access to social 
contexts in which claims were originally made. Adorno’s point is: irrespective of how 
claims are consequently mediated, and how their conceptual content becomes practically 
employed, they are in danger of becoming ideological if the historical, contingent social 
conditions they arose in relation to are forgotten or suppressed. It follows these 
conditions are crucial to revealing the historically contingent needs forming the conceptual 
content from which claims arose, and, consequently, can reveal contradictions between 
the extent to which those needs were satisfied by their conceptualisation and 
institutionalisation in the administration of society, and the degree to which this 
administration may have resulted in the suppression of these needs. This is essentially the 
content of Adorno’s concept that ‘all reification is forgetting’: A conceptual claim cannot, 
by Adorno’s account, be entirely true if not considered in the specific context it was 
formulated, and consequently, the concrete human needs it was formulated in relation to.  
 
If the thesis that an ideology of scientism undergirds dominant forms of 
instrumental rationality in contemporary society is correct, then, it becomes clearer how 
the hegemony of self-legitimating forms of inquiry potentially leads to negligence of 
essential aspects of the truth of concepts inextricable from social needs from which they 
arose. Instrumental forms of rationality are thereby also strengthened as socially 
determining factors, in the sense of determining how individuals relate to themselves and 
their wider social context, and thereby, the kinds of self-determining judgements they 
make. In the 1957 Constituens & Constitutum lecture on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 
Adorno objects that  
 
[p]eople who wish to criticise our dialectical attempts to operate with the concept of society as a 
constitutive concept of epistemology really never have more than one argument. This is that our 
efforts are illegitimate because philosophy has absolute priority over all social considerations and, 
on the contrary, such social questions have first to be grounded in the theory of knowledge. 
Consequently, so the argument goes, philosophy would relapse into pre-philosophical scepticism if 
it were to start talking about society (Adorno 2001, pp.145-146). 
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This suggests how epistemological inquiry becomes ideological in the sense it has first to 
be grounded in theories of knowledge, tainting inquiry with the underlying ideological 
form a given theory is susceptible to. Instead, theories should be constructed with 
recurring dialectical reference to social contexts in which they are formulated, retaining 
emphasis on the process of conceptualisation, therefore, on the influence of elements in 
specific contexts of their formulation.  
 
This emphasis also helps ensure construction of theories of knowledge does not 
ignore the subjective element of mediation: As Adorno suggests, ‘[t]here is nothing that is 
not mediated, and yet, as Hegel emphasised, mediation must always refer to some 
mediated thing, without which there would be no mediation’ (Adorno 1973, p.171). This 
means there cannot be any concept or claim which simply ‘is’ or exists in the given sense; 
all such claims pertaining to experience relates to other claims and concepts, meaning any 
theory of knowledge ignoring the subjective aspect of mediation itself ‘grounds’ itself at the 
expense of forsaking the crucial factor – the experience of the subject - making claims 
possible in the first place. It follows any such theory can also overlook how conceptual 
determinations sustain and ‘legitimate’ themselves socially as forms of instrumental 
rationality, irrespective of their origin or subsequent mediation.  
 
The mediated nature of experience itself, however, means knowledge also cannot be 
grounded in the subject in any definitive sense. According to O’Connor, ‘by virtue of the 
significance of the object in the social totality its meanings necessarily transcend individual 
subjects. As individual subjects confront the object the latter contains an irreducible 
independence which, in the orders of experience and explanation, grant it, the status of 
epistemological priority’ (O’Connor 2004a, p. 2). This suggests no subject can claim 
definitive knowledge of an object because meanings attributed to it are continuously 
mediated in the social totality. It also means the object always contains irreducible 
conceptual independence vis-à-vis the subject because the subject depends on it for 
experience, and on the social totality to which it belongs, for explanation. The object 
therefore attains the status of epistemological priority over the subject’s intuition, over 
ways knowledge is given to the subject in immediate relation to the objective world, but 
also over the subject’s active conceptualisation of the object, considering the object always 
retains its independence from its experience.  
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For Adorno, it follows the irreducible independence of the object means it always 
retains ‘non-conceptual’ elements that cannot be reduced to the accumulation of 
experience in its attempted identification. Beyond how the object eventually becomes 
identified in the social totality and gains its historically sedimented identity, it always 
retains non-conceptualised aspects. This is because the activity of conceptualisation always 
depends on specific social constellations, which are therefore independent ‘moments’ of 
reality or the ‘whole’ – but yet remain socially connected to all other such moments. It 
follows because conceptualisation takes place from within any such independent moment, 
the historical moment itself always restricts possible experience according to what is 
specific to the experience of that historical moment. According to Adorno’s opening 
statements in Negative Dialectics (henceforth ND), then, 
 
[i]n truth, all concepts, even the philosophical ones, refer to nonconceptualities, because concepts 
on their part are moments of the reality that requires their formation, primarily for the control of 
nature. What conceptualisation appears to be from within, to one engaged in it – the 
predominance of its sphere, without which nothing is known – must not be mistaken for what it is 
in itself. Such a semblance of being-in-itself is conferred upon it by the motion that exempts it 
from reality, to which it is harnessed in turn (Adorno 1973, p.11). 
 
This means there is a permanent distinction between active conceptualisation occurring 
from within a socio-historical context, where the objective constellation necessarily 
determines conceptualising activity in order for it to be possible in the first place, and the 
remaining ‘non-conceptualised’ elements of the object. 
 
For Adorno, therefore, the fundamental epistemological error occurs when the 
being-in-itself of the object - its ‘non-conceptuality’ - is transplanted to the activity of 
conceptualisation, thereby grounding the object in the extent of the subjective capacity to 
know it, and, furthermore, creating the illusion that conceptualisation occurs for-itself, 
independently of its social determination. It follows it is in this notion of 
conceptualisation as being-in-itself – as reason separated from nature - that ideological 
structures of thought arise and dominate the social reality in which conceptualisation 
occurs, perpetuating and strengthening control of the ideological form over society. This 
suggests conceptualising activity is condemned to remain part of the forms of rationality 
whose drive is to control nature and therefore, by extension, to perpetuate conditions of 
social and subjective domination - if the crucial distinction between conceptualising 
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activity and the non-conceptual properties of the object is not upheld, and the object is 
dominated by its conceptualisation. By contrast, the emancipatory potential in the activity of 
conceptualisation – and thereby, of reason – depends on the prioritisation of the object 
and respect for its non-conceptual independence, the experience of which re-orientates 
the subject towards the object, as opposed to reducing the object to the subject’s limited 
capacity to conceptualise it. 
 
 One consequence of conceptualisation as being-for-itself, of reason separated 
from nature, therefore, is it results in identitarian thinking reducing knowledge of objects to 
the conceptual identity rational thought imposes on them. This stands in contrast to 
Adorno’s encouragement of ways of knowing objects that do not conform to how they 
are ‘supposed’ to be known in ways previously identified. As any identification is by 
definition limited, then, Adorno’s point is to privilege the ‘non-identical’ in the object 
from the identity that reason determines in relation to it. He wants to understand, 
therefore, ‘what it is about the object that undermines its identity with the “subjective” 
concept’ (O’Connor 2004a, p.4). However, as all objects are connected to specific socio-
historical contexts, it follows non-identity also applies to the ‘identity’ attributed to any 
given socio-historical context itself. If such an historical identity depends on 
‘reconciliation’ of social contradictions existing within such a context (the ‘synthesis’ 
between opposing social forces), then the non-identity of that context keeps those social 
antagonisms and contradictions alive in order to reveal what was repressed in the 
configuration of social identity. It follows investigating experience sacrificed to 
identification can reveal ways of conceptualising objects unaccounted for in the identity 
with which subsequent socio-historic constellations are configured, effectively re-inserting 
those lost elements of experience into the space of reasons.  
 
For Adorno, then, the notion of conceptualisation as ‘being-in-itself’ has become a 
‘totalised’ process in modern society, to the extent that modern society has no other way 
of knowing itself than through the dictates of instrumental rationality. The purpose of 
Adorno’s negative dialectics, hence, is ‘[t]o change this direction of conceptuality, to give it 
a turn to non-identity, [which] is the hinge of negative dialectics’ (Adorno 1973, p.12). 
Adorno’s point is that simultaneous emphasis on both the limits of conceptualisation – 
the non-conceptuality of the object resisting identification - and how conceptual 
development is wedded to social circumstances, could, taken together, change how facts 
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are postulated, potentially overcoming epistemological limitations. In other words, rather 
than re-inscribing categories of thought into the causal order, they should remain part of 
spontaneous activity. These categories should be differentiated in terms of what 
spontaneity at the root of conceptualisation is a reaction to in social terms, and the 
socialising forms of identity conceptualisation assumes at the expense of access to what 
remains non-identical to the concept. According to Bowie, ‘for a theory concerned with 
unmasking the ideological functions of cultural forms in a commodified world, things 
which appear negative and in need of criticism should not just be rejected, but “salvaged”, 
there always being ways in which re-contextualising something can render it meaningful’ 
(Bowie 1997, p.246).  
 
The non-identity of ideological forms, therefore, is how they may be 
conceptualised, not constrained ideologically by identity, but spontaneously re-thought to 
allow reinsertion into the space of reasons. This also suggests all experience should be 
considered valid to some degree, as experience always reveals new ways of comprehending 
objects - a notion with concrete and profound implications for Adorno’s conception of a 
new categorical imperative after Auschwitz. 
 
4.4 The Idea of Nature-History and the Recovery of Spontaneity 
 
For Adorno, therefore, the truth of subjective experience cannot be ‘grounded’, 
either in the apriority of this experience of the subject (as it might be in subject-centred 
forms of reasoning) or in objectifying, yet mediated structures of thought ‘given’ to the 
subject’s immediate experience (as through dominant forms of instrumental rationality). 
Rather than ‘grounding’ experience at all in the search for objective truth, then, the claim 
of the potential truth of experience depends on how experience itself is accounted for in 
its continuous dialectical mediation between subject and object of knowledge. In Adorno’s 
challenge to the Hegelian dialectical ‘resolution’ of nature and reason into the ‘identity of 
identity and non-identity’, in which ‘all [oppositions] become intelligible as aspects of a 
self-related and self-grounding totality’ (ibid. p.255), however, this mediation also tries to 
account for how the subject changes through its experience.  
 
Against Hegel’s resolution of the dialectic between nature and reason into a self-
grounding ‘totality’, for Adorno there is no ‘resolution’ to this process of mediation, 
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where instead his ‘negative’ dialectic emphasises what remains non-identical in the 
mediation between nature and reason.43 For example, reason, as an expression of its 
historical development, cannot be accounted for only by the historical nature of the 
subject – how human nature may have been conceptualised as a matter of a particular 
historical contingency – and nature cannot be accounted for solely by the subject’s 
historical ability to rationally control it. Instead, the conception of a continuous, 
unresolved mediation between nature and history, first expressed by Adorno in his lecture 
the ‘Idea of Nature-History’ in 1932, which informs his work through DoE and including 
ND, is to  
 
comprehend an object as natural where it appears most historical, and as historical where it 
appears most natural. The idea of natural-history, then… [is] [t]he history of nature [where] nature 
[is] grasped as historical; [and] natural history is the historical grasped as natural’ (Hullot-Kentor 
2006, p.239).  
 
The idea of ‘nature-history’ is the attempt to dialectically conceptualise an object of 
knowledge, simultaneously in ways it has been possible to identify it rationally (‘historical 
where it appears most natural’) and in how this identification has failed in ways the object 
retains non-conceptual independence from its conceptual determination (‘natural where is 
appears most historical). Adorno’s anti-foundationalist approach leads him to deconstruct 
‘the supposedly a priori differences between the idea that “history” is the realm in which 
“the qualitatively new appears” and the idea that “nature” is the realm of “pre-given 
being”’ (Bowie 1997, p.254). This means, first, nature cannot be accounted for only in a 
‘given’ sense, as if nature itself were ‘ready-made’, but should also be considered as 
transient as the history it is bound up in, and therefore should not be definitively 
grounded in any historical or epistemological sense.  
 
Conversely, history as the record of human activity and development of reason 
cannot be ‘grounded’ as a foundational concept in which the ‘qualitatively new appears’ 
without reference to the equally transient nature of which it is a part, without which 
nothing ‘qualitatively new’ could appear in the first place. Adorno’s deconstruction 
collapses the attempted a priori distinction between nature and reason into a dialectical 
mediation between them which, rather than grounding itself conceptually either in nature (as 
                                                
43 See Chapter 6, dedicated to how Adorno’s dialectic differs from Hegel’s. 
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object) or history (as subject), or in conceptual ‘reconciliation’ between them (Hegel), is a 
continuous effort to generate new insights into how nature and history change each other. 
This mediation occurs both where history is viewed as the object of knowledge from the 
subjective perspective of human nature, and where nature is viewed as the object of 
knowledge from the objectivising perspective of human history, and between them.     
 
The idea of nature-history suggests, second, how Adorno considers the history of 
human activity through the prism of the increasingly rational control of nature - where 
both natural science and broader, purpose-oriented conceptualising activity may be 
considered aspects of this control – as a form of ‘second nature’. This ‘second nature’ is 
the self-preserving imperative to identify and control nature, dominating both the 
‘primitive’ nature of the subject itself, and spurring the attempted domination of the 
objective world through its reduction to the subject’s ability to conceptualise it. The 
problem with the conceptualisation of historical experience remaining solely within this 
prism of ‘second’ nature – the subject’s rational control of the object – given its 
outgrowth from the imperative of self-preservation in what Adorno considers the 
irrational fear of the unknown, is it doesn’t account for ways in which the primitive, ‘first’ 
nature of the subject – including its spontaneity - is repressed in potentially irrational ways. 
Nor does it account for contradictory senses of nature arising from experience that cannot 
be encompassed by objectifying theories.  
 
As Bowie (2010) suggests, individuals may be motivated to respond to nature in 
expressive forms which cannot be reduced to the ‘second’ nature of rational control, but 
which are spontaneous responses to the natural world arising in works of art, or in the 
role mimesis plays in learning norms of communication. It follows individuals may be 
motivated to such expressive forms by memory of elements of their inner nature that have 
been repressed or forgotten, but which nonetheless remain a (non-conceptual) part of that 
nature. Additionally, as Bowie claims, the sense of (‘second’) nature accounted for by 
objectifying theories and the sense of nature responded to in expressive forms cannot, as 
he says, ‘arise without each other’ (Bowie 2010, p.31). This suggests the need for their 
continuous mediation: objectifying theories couldn’t arise without themselves initially 
being some form of spontaneous expression of experience of the natural world. 
Conversely, expressive forms relating to the objective world, and intuitions about inner 
and outer nature, cannot take place without reference to how the rational control of 
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nature affects mediation of objects of knowledge, including the subject itself as the object 
of knowledge and how it is determined by these circumstances.  
 
This means the dialectic between nature and history is the attempt to 
conceptualise the object that also take place between these conceptions of first and second 
nature. The object is conceptualised immanently to the historical, rational control of 
nature (‘second nature’), but is also mediated by the subject’s spontaneity from non-
conceptual perspectives from nature (the subject’s ‘primordial nature’). Simultaneously, it 
means where the object is conceptualised as natural, as in the objective of natural sciences, 
this conceptualisation should not take place solely from the isolated scientific 
objectification of nature, but also with reference to the historical process of 
conceptualisation (‘historical where it appears most natural’) – and to the social effects of 
this objectification of nature. The concept of these dual characteristics of experience is 
developed in the next chapter. The idea of nature-history, then, is the continuous – 
‘negative’ - dialectic between the non-identity of the object as it has been identified 
historically – its non-identity in nature – and non-identity of the object as it has been 
identified ‘naturally’, or in nature – its historical and social non-identity, in the sense of 
how identification of nature fails to grasp elements of spontaneity in the social mediation 
making it possible.    
 
The notion of mimesis provides the paradigmatic example of Adorno’s distinction 
between ‘primordial’ and ‘second’ nature, as well as the idea central to his aesthetic theory 
that the mimetic element in works of art suggests the possibility of a non-repressive form 
of reason. According to Miller,  
 
Adorno argues that mimesis was the means by which humanity first individuated itself from a 
nature constantly threatening to engulf it, nature conceived as the site of unnamed, terrifying 
forces. Mimesis was the basis of the mythologization of nature, the “name’s breaking into the 
chaos of the unnamed” (in Rosenzweig’s phrase): the first appearance of human rationality, at the 
heart of the mythic world (Miller 1994, p. 46).  
 
The primordial act of reason, it follows, is the subject’s spontaneous act of self-
identification vis-à-vis nature in its ‘mythologization’ of the part of nature that it is in itself, 
in the act of giving itself its name – its identity.  
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Simultaneously, the individual mimetically imitates the nature external to it in order 
to understand and preserve itself from it. As we saw, the excursus devoted to Homer’s 
Odyssey in DoE interprets Ulysses’ voyage in the Odyssey as the development of reason ‘in 
which history becomes second nature, unconscious of itself as nature as a result of the 
repression of mimesis in its metamorphosis into the ratio’ (Hullot-Kentor 2006, p. 245). 
Where Ulysses initially mimics obstacles confronting him in nature to develop the 
understanding to overcome them, this ratio of control as ‘second’ nature overtakes his 
identity – and thereby that of history as a whole – in which the mimetic impulse, as the 
primordial and natural element of spontaneity, becomes repressed.  
 
In other words, the price of knowledge, reason, and identification – is the 
spontaneity of the subject’s (‘first’) nature required for thought itself to arise. As Hullot-
Kentor inquires, the question for Adorno is ‘if mimesis as a process of identification with 
the aggressor results in the repression of mimesis that knowledge to be knowledge 
requires, how is it possible to recuperate mimesis without simply re-enacting the dialectic 
of enlightenment’ (ibid.)? If history as Enlightenment is not permanently to revert to the 
‘myth’ of its own enlightenment allotting diminishing role to the spontaneity indispensable 
to establishing knowledge, facts or identity in the first place, the question for Adorno is 
how mimesis, as an element of this spontaneity, occurs in ways not reduced to the 
identification of nature with the imperative of self-preservation.  
 
How, then, can mimesis be recovered in a way corresponding with its ‘natural’ 
spontaneity – or, its hitherto non-conceptuality, from a place in nature – restoring the 
rational element of mimesis that the domination of nature, or the conceptual domination 
of the object of knowledge, attempt to sublate? According to Hullot-Kentor,  
 
the recovery of mimesis is… thought that follows its objects to the point that “the inherent 
consequence of the object is transformed into its own criticism” – to the point, that is, that the 
object destroys its own illusion. By immanent critique the object names itself. This is rational 
mimesis, the recovery of the name from the course of domination (ibid. p. 247).   
 
Paradigmatically of the objective of critical thought as a whole, and originating as 
Adorno’s friend Benjamin’s idea, this means ‘rational mimesis’ amounts to spontaneous 
reflection critically overcoming conceptual identification of the object of knowledge. This 
critical transcendence simultaneously liberates the object to be re-contextualised in ways 
Prospects Beyond Ideology: Reason, Freedom and the Truth of the Subject – 
Towards Political Models for the Critical Thought of Theodor W. Adorno 
 
 163 
providing new meaning, and emancipates the subject to experience it in ways not confined 
to its own self-preserving imperative to identify.  
 
The ‘recovery of the name from the course of domination’, then, is recovery both 
of the object from how it has been dominated conceptually (its non-conceptuality), and of 
the identity of the subject in its recovery of spontaneity from the singular imperative of 
self-preservation, and socio-historical structures of domination that follow. Adorno’s 
effort to recuperate mimesis can also be considered, therefore, as the intention to reinsert 
spontaneity into any attempted normativity in the space of reasons, where spontaneity, via 
recuperation of rational, non-dominant mimesis, effectively acts as a rational constraint on 
dominating forms of instrumental rationality.  
 
Adorno’s theory thereby leaves one potential way to suggest a continuing 
relevance for philosophy in an age when its necessity is disputed. The difference between 
philosophy and the natural sciences, as Adorno suggests, is that ‘the idea of science is 
research, that of philosophy interpretation (Deutung)… philosophy must always interpret 
with the claim to truth, without ever having an assured key for the interpretation’ (Adorno 
1966, p.334).44 The idea of nature-history, and Adorno’s wider, non-systemic ‘method’ of 
negative dialectics, therefore, is an attempt at interpretation simultaneously not regarding 
itself as such an ‘assured key’ that it incorporates the possibility and necessity of its own 
‘failure’. 
 
 Bowie suggests the figure to which Adorno immediately refers in the experience 
of Western society is the commodity form, which ‘establishes a world of identities that are 
constituted by… chains of conditions, and it creates the realm of illusion which historical 
materialist philosophy wishes to unmask’ (Bowie 1997, p.252). Consequently, one aspect 
of Adorno’s philosophy consists of locating problems bound up in analyses of the 
commodity form, as that constituting the immediacy of experience in the modern world, 
in a constellation providing and revealing the ‘historical truth-content’ of social problems 
at hand. Adorno, Bowie continues, wants to  
 
change the very nature of theoretical arguments, in order to escape the structures of regress and 
the false totalisations entailed in attempts finally to ground theoretical claims. He… suggests that 
                                                
44 Translation Bowie 1997.  
Prospects Beyond Ideology: Reason, Freedom and the Truth of the Subject – 
Towards Political Models for the Critical Thought of Theodor W. Adorno 
 
 164 
by contextualising [such arguments] in a particular manner, the apparently supra-temporal 
philosophical problem can be revealed as the mystification of a soluble social problem (ibid, 
p.253).         
 
The success of such a model, as Adorno expands upon in his essay, ‘The Actuality of 
Philosophy’, depends on its capacity to reveal theoretical dilemmas immanent to real 
historical problems. Natural sciences are necessarily bound up with the socio-historical 
contexts giving rise to the scientific structures within which they operate, ‘but they are not 
merely reducible to such structures, because truth claims of any kind rely on 
transcendence of context’ (ibid. p.263).  
 
In the context of natural science and a social realm dominated by instrumental 
forms of rationality, then, Adorno’s question should be asked from the context of how 
science relates to the rest of culture - and this is clearly not to be undertaken from 
objectifying theories proposed by science. It follows that the question may be raised that if 
scientific method has the means, at least theoretically, at its disposal to address problems 
such as economic imbalance, damage to the environment, or manifold forms of human 
suffering, why then is the bulk of scientific research directed either at supplementary detail 
for a vacuous mass culture, or sustaining that culture through overwhelmingly militaristic 
means? How can scientific and technological progress and their determination of 
historical experience be justified in this context? Rather than science itself, as we saw, it is 
the ideological supplement of scientism as the unequivocal carrier of the supreme good for 
mankind that, according to Adorno, Bauman and others, should be viewed in light of the 
concentration camps of WWII. When considering the degree to which instrumental 
rationality is inherent to such a humanitarian catastrophe, and evaluating the extent to 
which democratic governments and social structures continue to rely on countless 
ideological variations of instrumental rationality, it becomes clearer why Adorno is so 
sceptical of ‘truth claims… wholly indifferent to the forms in which they are articulated’ 
(ibid.).       
 
  It is thus reasonable to expect that normative justification in the space of reasons 
should play an essential role in making truth claims. It is equally reasonable to expect this 
justification to contain spontaneity not reduced to the causality ascribed to the natural 
world, causal chains inherent in social structures, and ways causality determines individual 
autonomy. What, then, of Adorno’s central objection, namely that the process of 
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justification takes place in an ‘unnatural’ (alienated, reified) world, reinforcing causal 
reasoning at the expense of spontaneity because of the stringency of its ideological 
demands? If Pippin’s assertion is now reconsidered: 
     
[i]f formal conditions of knowledge require that the content of cognition be actively 
conceptualised in a way that is finally, at some stage, causally independent of the causally produced 
reception of that material, and of any initial causal-series processing of that information, then a 
thinker cannot really be a causal system, whatever the system is made of (Pippin 1997, p.31),    
 
we are impelled to consider that, irrespective of causal structures, there must be 
spontaneity at the root of conceptualisation not naturally ‘co-opted’ into the determinacy 
of nature, subjective causality, or prevalent social forms of instrumental rationality. It 
follows Adorno’s objections to modern rationality can be considered from the context of 
the urgency of the social conditions he perceives, and from which his method arises. The 
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VI. CHAPTER 5: DUAL CHARACTERISTICS OF EXPERIENCE  
 
Negative Dialectics was the philosophical culmination of Adorno’s reactions to 
catastrophic events in the 20th century - the Holocaust, totalitarianism and devastation 
wrought by modern warfare among them – and to the perpetuation of forms of 
rationalisation sustaining these phenomena to varying degrees in the social fabric of 
modern societies. It was also a reaction to Hegel’s philosophical system, with its 
emphasis on the experience of consciousness and rational necessity of self-knowing 
subjectivity as conduits of reason and freedom. The following two chapters continue 
discussion of why emancipation from ideological structures of thought is pertinent at a 
time when they are increasingly difficult to avoid, yet increasingly difficult to distinguish. 
 
These two chapters are related in tackling the problem - central to criticisms of 
Adorno - of locating the critical perspective in the contemporary context from which to 
tackle Adorno’s concerns, without resorting to a critique that doesn’t account for its own 
place in the social space it criticises. This chapter pursues the task of locating that critical 
perspective, while the next specifically demonstrates why and how Adorno’s dialectic is 
‘negative’ in relation to Hegel’s philosophy. In this chapter, first, possibilities for locating 
Adorno’s thought in the contemporary context are introduced. Second, the Holocaust is 
discussed as the decisive real-world event influencing Adorno’s critique of instrumental 
rationality. Third, expanding upon the idea of nature-history, immanent and transcendent 
components of Adorno’s critique are examined, amounting to an introduction of 
negative dialectics in praxis. The remainder of the thesis is integrated to the extent that it 
follows a ‘movement’ of Adorno’s thought, now from his own objective social context, 
through explanation of his philosophy, and back to the contemporary social 
constellation.  
 
5.1 Reflective Distance: Adorno’s Shadow  
 
In the 2005 Miliband lecture, Bauman makes the case for returning to Adorno in 
the context of uncertainties wrought by globalisation, in what, in a series of publications 
exploring its themes and effects, Bauman terms ‘liquid modernity’.45 Bauman shares 
Adorno’s concerns that emancipatory possibilities, grounded in improving social 
                                                
45 See Bauman 2000-2011.  
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conditions, have diminishing political relevance beyond their immediate ideological 
appeal. While immediate social ills, such as crime, economic downturns or problems 
relating to immigration find their way to the top of political and media agendas, the 
scope of questions related to social freedom is constrained by somewhat doctrinaire, yet 
often arbitrary, determinations of its meaning.  
 
For Bauman, as for Adorno, claims of freedom that don’t take their conceptual 
content into account in a persistently reflective manner, yet upheld according to local 
standards of ‘community’s way of going on’, do not suffice. The notion such claims 
result in norms perceived to have been legitimated provides a powerful incentive to try 
harder to realise the possibilities of freedom. As Adorno suggests in ‘The Concept of 
Contradiction’ (1965),  
 
If… I think of ‘freedom’, this concept is not simply the unity of the characteristics of all 
individuals defined as free on the basis of a formal freedom within a given constitution. Rather, 
in a situation in which people are guaranteed the freedom to exercise a profession or to enjoy 
their basic rights, the concept of freedom contains a pointer to something that goes well beyond 
those specific freedoms, without our necessarily realising what this additional element amounts to 
(Adorno 2008, p.7). 
 
This means the concept of freedom cannot be reduced to whatever is defined as 
‘freedom’ within formal constraints of law in a given constitutional democracy.  Rather, 
the concept of freedom, by definition, must be something not easily categorised in a set 
of socio-behavioural prescriptions. Furthermore, reflection pertaining to freedom cannot 
itself be truly free if circumscribed by socially objective determinations of its meaning. If 
such determinations include endorsements of behaviour ultimately inflicting suffering on 
individuals, then the concept of freedom is something individuals themselves must 
engage if their freedom also depends on that of others, and if they are not merely to be 
accessories to overriding forms of rationality in which their role is negligible.   
 
Bauman agrees with Adorno that ‘charges raised by Marx against a world 
unforgivably inimical to humanity have not lost any of their topicality, and no competent 
jury has found any proof of the unreality of the original emancipating ambitions… there 
is therefore no sufficient reason [Adorno insisted] to take emancipation off the agenda’ 
(Bauman 2006, pp. 169-170). For Bauman, Adorno’s philosophy also remains topical, 
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beyond the boundaries of the specific socio-historical constellation to which he was 
responding - and beyond the constraints of being considered through the prism of purely 
‘Marxist’ thought.  
 
How does Adorno’s thought apply to contemporary circumstances so often 
demanding pragmatic solutions as opposed to philosophical ones, and where theoretical 
approaches to social problems are often spurned as at best overly ambitious and often 
irrelevant, where Adorno himself rarely suggests ‘practical’ solutions? For Adorno, such 
total faith in practical solutions already betrays instrumental attitudes induced by the 
perceived inevitability of social conditions, in the sense such pragmatism refers to 
immediately given sets of circumstances, and not to sustained analyses of how or why 
those circumstances come about. This suggests while practical responses often provide 
short-term solutions to immediate problems, they may not address core questions of 
how such circumstances come about – questions which could contribute answers and 
further questions to help improve circumstances in the longer run. This doesn’t mean 
Adorno didn’t offer practical solutions of his own – for example, a series of radio 
interviews he gave entitled ‘Education to Maturity’ (Erziehung zur Mündigkeit)46 suggest a 
concise politics of education in which he stressed the importance of autonomy in the 
context of institutional education. His practical suggestions nevertheless always retained 
at their core a theoretical element devoted to overcoming unreflecting submission to 
instrumental forms of rationalising and their practical, social application, and, 
concurrently, to reintegrating the component of social experience into theory.      
 
The value of theory, consequently, is that it is not limited by what is immediately 
given. Theory ‘speaks for what is not narrow minded’ (Adorno 1998, p.133), providing 
gateways to the kind of emancipatory reflection that may be achieved by looking beyond 
practical responses, where indeed forms of immediacy themselves are often the problem 
demanding a theoretical response. This is why, e.g., so much of Adorno’s critique 
appears focused on the ‘Culture Industry’: far from being reducible to perceptions about 
Adorno’s cultural ‘elitism,’47 Adorno’s targeting of the culture industry predominantly 
addresses forms of experience within which individuals are compelled to make self-
determining judgements. The culture industry is, thereby, raised in terms of the 
                                                
46 See Adorno 1971. 
47 See Wiggershaus 1995.  
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possibilities - or lack thereof - for social transformation it contains, just as society itself 
should be judged in terms of the extent to which it tries to - and does - alleviate 
suffering. It is also a point of departure for the analysis of other forms of immediacy. As 
Bauman suggests,     
 
[i]f “emancipation”, the supreme objective of social critique, aims at “the development of the 
autonomous, independent individuals who judge and decide consciously for themselves,” it is up 
against the awesome resistance of the “culture industry”; but also against the pressure of that 
multitude whose cravings that industry promises to gratify (and, genuinely or deceitfully, does) 
(Bauman 2006, pp. 171-172). 
 
In light of the persistence of the instrumental rationality Adorno recognised over seventy 
years ago, in conjunction and development of Weber’s original diagnosis48, Adorno’s 
concerns also have not lost their topicality. The confinement of modern life within 
immediate structures of social and cultural experience often leaves individuals isolated 
from reflection that does not conform to predominating forms of rationality, 
compromising resources with which to respond to real pressures of modern life.  
 
This state of affairs demands a serious response that would not be an immediate 
practical resolution, but reflective in nature. The central issue is the concept of freedom, 
in the sense that without reflective freedom to consider claims to knowledge or truth, 
their relation to subjectivity and contexts in which they are made, individuals aren’t in a 
position to distinguish between spontaneous reflection and the objective determination 
of their collective experience by instrumental forms of rationality which do not require, 
nor solicit, their engagement.  
 
How, then, can Adorno’s theory be translated into praxis, or the kind of practice 
that enriches experience without undermining it, in the sense that it often appears 
forbiddingly complex and suggests a fair amount of distance from everyday life? A first 
step, proper to Adorno’s pronouncements, is to consider the validity of all experience, 
including Adorno’s – and perhaps especially, the experience of those whose voices have 
never been heard, or experience that dares not speak its name. Adorno’s dialectical 
theory is the attempt to restore unreduced experience of the object of knowledge, 
including all the ways its conceptualisation contradicts itself. Where the object is 
                                                
48 See Weber’s accounts of purposive and instrumental rationality, Weber 2007.  
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necessarily social in nature, it follows the individual’s experience and sensibility is also 
continually shaped accordingly by what is experienced, but also, conversely, by what is 
not. Individuals are also influenced by default, and in ways beyond their control, because 
they are not exposed to elements of social experience, often because of standards of 
experience considered the norm in a locality, a form of employment or a set of personal 
circumstances. But how can the relevance of this, and of Adorno’s theory in toto, be 
translated to the modern world, where it is increasingly assumed that freedom of 
communication and the wider political tenet of free speech a priori guarantee the validity 
of most forms of experience?  
 
Furthermore, where political procedures tailored in response to immediate 
pressures of a globalising world contrast with Adorno’s emphasis on reflective distance, 
Adorno’s thought often appears intentionally to do its utmost to distance itself from 
modern ideas of practicality. I suggest below how some modern forms of rationality and 
the kind of reflective distance from these structures Adorno advocates are not mutually 
exclusive, despite appearing so. As Bauman suggests, the reflective distance and 
consequent quasi-seclusion that may be interpreted as being intrinsic to a rigorous 
enactment of Adorno’s theory is not, in Adorno’s own view,  
 
an act of treachery – neither a sign of withdrawal, nor a gesture of condescension, nor both 
(“condescension and thinking oneself no better, are the same”, as he himself points out). 
Keeping a distance, paradoxically, is an act of engagement – in the only form which engagement 
on the side of unfulfilled or betrayed hopes may sensibly take: “The detached observer is as 
much entangled as the active participant; the only advantage of the former is insight into his 
entanglement, and the infinitesimal freedom that lies in knowledge as such” (Bauman 2006, pp. 
172-173). 
 
The conception of reflective distance as ‘an act of treachery’ is a reference to perceptions 
among leftist critics, among them students of Adorno’s in the late 1960’s, that his theory, 
and critical theory at large, ultimately entailed some form of active revolt. This 
misinterpretation (to put it mildly – nowhere in Adorno’s work does he intimate violence 
of any form, always maintaining thought itself is the only genuine form of resistance) led 
to staged actions against him at the University of Frankfurt shortly before his death in 
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1969, on the basis that the ‘inaction’ of reflective distance was a ‘reactionary’ betrayal of 
the ‘spirit’ of critical theory.49  
 
On the contrary, those who agitated against Adorno appear to have missed the 
point of his theory entirely. As Bauman points out, reflective distance is itself a valid act 
of engagement, and arguably the only such act leaving no collateral damage, other than to 
the fixed identity of concepts. Adorno himself rebutted critics on the issue of praxis e.g. 
in an article entitled ‘Resignation’, where he maintains ‘[b]eyond all specialised and 
particular content, thinking is actually and above all the force of resistance, alienated 
from resistance only with great effort’ (Adorno 2001, p.202).50 Furthermore, Adorno’s 
philosophy is such that it cannot be claimed for any ideological position – of any 
variation – irrespective of the tradition in which one locates it, a claim this thesis strives 
to demonstrate.  
 
The quote from Minima Moralia regarding the ‘infinitesimal freedom that lies in 
knowledge as such’ (Adorno 2000b, p.26) is, moreover, Adorno’s summary reference to 
thought whose emancipatory potential rests in its ability to recognise its limitations. This 
freedom is ‘infinitesimal’ because it cannot be ‘given’, even in societies outwardly 
proclaiming their freedom; it is, rather, first, a function of the extent to which individuals 
self-determine by scrutinising the content of desires, norms and values by which they 
navigate their lives. Second, crucially, that freedom is ‘infinitesimal’ because it can only be 
momentary if it is truly to be free. The revelation of ‘knowledge as such’ – claims that 
remain accurate in as far as they succeed in recognising their conceptual limitations - can 
only be experienced as freedom for the duration of reflection, and before that knowledge 
is sublated by dominating ideological structures in individual reflection. The ‘infinitesimal 
freedom’ is possible therefore only in relentless pursuit of thought that meets the 
experience of reality, without dominating that experience.  
 
How, then, do we think together the distance Adorno’s thought travels from the 
everyday world in the attempt to know the particularity of the object, and Adorno’s 
aspiration to ‘un-reified rational relations between individuals’? As such un-reified 
relations presuppose inter-subjectivity, and therefore active engagement with the world, 
                                                
49 See Müller-Doohm 2003, pp.720-729, for the social context and reasons for the spirit of revolt at 
universities in Germany in 1969. 
50 See Adorno, 2001(a). 
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Adorno’s theory must clearly show how ‘detached observation’, as a crucial component of 
experience, creates opportunities for experiencing ‘infinitesimal freedom that lies in 
knowledge as such’. It must also, simultaneously, show how that momentary freedom 
helps create conditions for un-reified rational relations between individuals. It must 
therefore be asked, then, what perceived circumstances lead Adorno to insist with such 
urgency on the necessity of these.  
 
As we saw, one of the most contested aspects of Adorno’s theory, brought to fore 
e.g. in criticisms by Pippin and Habermas51, is his idea of the ‘total context of delusion’, 
which also refers to problems of distinguishing reason from instrumental rationality and 
the relationship between reason and nature. Adorno argues possibilities for rational 
relations are compromised by the ‘total’ reach of instrumental rationality over society. 
However, if Adorno’s idea that ‘the whole is untrue’ itself suggests a totalising critique 
grounded in overwhelming scepticism regarding modern rationality, ‘instead of weighing 
the grounds that cast doubt on this scepticism itself’ (Habermas 2002, p.129), Habermas 
inquires how Adorno is able to provide a critique of ideology leaving in place a rational 
criterion explaining ‘the corruption of all [other] rational criteria’ (ibid. p.127). In order to 
be in a position to suggest Adorno’s insights remain valid for the present social 
constellation, the criterion of the rationality of those claims must also be accounted for in 
the space of reasons. More specifically, they must be accounted for immanently to the 
totality he accuses of being ‘false’. The critique of the ‘false’ social totality is, however, the 
transcendent component of Adorno’s critique, taking its position ‘beyond’ society in order 
to demonstrate the ideological corruptibility of all existing within it, but still spontaneously 
from the element of (human) nature within it.  
 
This transcendent criticism takes place from a perspective of history – society, and 
the instrumental rationalities determining it - where it appears most natural, or from 
apprehension of ways society is objectively determined, but not reduced to them. It 
follows transcendent criticism is necessary because of a social context in which everyone 
is liable to experience reification and undermining of self-determination: ‘Transcendent’ 
criticism, then, takes place ‘externally’ to society, but still from the spontaneous element of 
human nature. This is to recognise how any object within the social totality is identified 
ideologically, and potentially, to change how objects and society are known.  
                                                
51 See Pippin 2005 and Habermas 2002. 
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The claim of the potential corruptibility of all rational criteria by ideology and the 
infection of all consciousness as at least partially false must, however, account for the 
possibility of a form of consciousness immanent to the ‘universal context of delusion’ that 
stands a chance of withstanding ideological corruption. ‘One cannot talk of false 
consciousness,’ Adorno says, ‘unless the possibility of a true consciousness exists’ 
(Adorno 2002, p.11). According to Bowie,  
 
[i]n order to find a location from which critical analysis of the production of (false) consciousness 
and reification is possible one must first find a way of showing that the commodity structure 
does not in fact wholly determine the consciousness of all the members of a society: otherwise 
that location is simply not available. This location must be intelligible to the subjects of real 
societies if reification is not to be assumed to be total (Bowie 1997, p.243). 
 
As Adorno’s critique cannot simply be ‘removed’ from society as the object of his 
criticism - as if he were only criticising it externally - it must demonstrate, first, its own 
rational criterion, and second, its legitimacy in social contexts mediated with his thought. 
The reason it must demonstrate legitimacy beyond its specific historical context is 
because if Adorno’s dialectical theory of society is intended to demonstrate the 
possibility of a ‘true’ consciousness, or indeed the possibility of a truth of subjectivity 
itself, then this possibility must be available across all socio-historical constellations. His 
theory remains valid only insofar as it can be validated in the present and future, as well 
as in its original social context.  
 
Adorno’s transcendent critique is complemented by the immanent critique of 
society, the need for which is amplified as society becomes increasingly integrated and 
reified. Adorno’s immanent critique, by contrast with the transcendent critique, recognises 
ideology as ‘socially necessary appearance’ (Bernstein 1991, p.18), in the sense that 
ideology is a representation of cultural production, which by itself is real and which in 
turn is a ‘product of the interest structure of society and [reveals the] historical genesis’ 
(ibid.) of the ideological form. This means it is not the existence of ideology itself which is 
false, because it is instantiated in cultural forms that exist materially, ‘but rather its 
pretension to correspond to reality’ (Adorno 1983, p. 32) meaning, how ideology falsely 
relates individual experience in the social context.  
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This is why Adorno’s immanent critique mediates the transcendent critique: the 
more society is ‘integrated’ under instrumental forms of rationality, which the 
transcendent critique purports to show, the greater the necessity of pursuing specifically 
how these objectifying forms of rationality dominate society. This is also to determine the 
distance between the ideological determination of these objectifying forms of rationality 
and the way they are experienced by individuals, to find truth in contradictions between 
them. It is not a question of prioritising either the transcendent or immanent critique 
according to the context being evaluated, therefore. Rather, it is a question of pursuing 
both critiques simultaneously – dialectically in relation to each other, following the 
unresolved dialectic of nature-history - continuously in every context, as either critique, 
taken by itself, becomes inadequate in relation to the other. 
 
In the context of Adorno’s transcendent criticism, then, by ‘universal context of 
delusion’ Adorno does not, as critics charge, suggest all modern subjectivity is deluded 
and that every aspect of experience in modernity is a priori false. Rather, the idea should 
be interpreted as suggesting that the sheer scope of experience in the modern world 
determined by instrumental rationality means any conceptual determination pertaining to 
any object potentially suffers from ideological distortion, and consequently, such 
distortion affects any subjective understanding of any object (‘the whole is untrue’). 
Individuals may depend on the objective determination of social circumstances as the 
source of their beliefs to the extent that both object and subject become reified, as 
opposed to self-determining in ways not relying on how the present social constellation 
determines experience. The object is reified to the extent that its understanding can be 
dominated by given, often quantitative forms of rationality, and the concurrent 
domination of those forms over experience. The subject is therefore also reified: not only 
is subjectivity restricted in its ability to experience objects beyond how they appear in 
their reified form, it is also restricted in ways it can know other individuals, and ultimately 
itself, as objects of knowledge.  
 
It can therefore be claimed that partaking in everyday life without awareness of 
the construction of social reality or how social norms influence needs and desires 
effectively amounts to reflective disengagement from the self, other people and society as 
a whole. In turn, such disengagement, by virtue of constraints it imposes on experience, 
contributes to the preponderance of instrumental rationality, leaving its practices 
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unchallenged and its ability to affect ever-more private spheres of life unhindered. This 
suggests, first, a distinction between the interpretation that Adorno merely posits the a 
priori claim that experience in modernity is false, and the interpretation that Adorno 
deliberately makes the claim in extreme fashion in order to achieve the following 
objectives: a) To draw awareness to the urgency of the situation he perceives, and b) To 
show how awareness of reified ways in which objects are known is necessary in order to 
make claims retaining truth content in relation to social reality. Second, it suggests 
reflective distance from immediately given experience is a closer form of engagement 
with conceptual claims arising from experience of social reality, as long as that distance is 
mediated with its immanent experience.  
 
5.2 Critical Dialectics 
 
How, then, can the urgency of Adorno’s claims be established, and how is their 
frequent extremity explained? While levels of satisfaction with life vary according to the 
Western society in question, standards of living and health have increased dramatically 
over the past century due to scientific innovation, and, economic crises notwithstanding, 
modern society is increasingly affluent relative to the past. However, these improvements 
have their own social consequences, and, moreover, obscure what this level of 
satisfaction comes to depend on. According to Bauman, whose Modernity and the Holocaust 
discusses the Holocaust as a consequence of, and not an aberration from, instrumental 
rationality,  
 
[t]oday more than at any other time, available technological means undermine their own 
applications and subordinate the evaluation of the latter to their own criteria of efficiency and 
effectiveness. By the same token, the authority of political and moral evaluation of action has 
been reduced to a minor consideration – if not discredited and rendered irrelevant. Action can 
hardly need any other justification than the recognition that the available technology has made it 
feasible (Bauman 2006, p.115).  
 
By Bauman’s reckoning, social decisions requiring reflective thinking, e.g. political and 
moral evaluation, are overridden by imperatives to act according to what is 
technologically feasible. Bauman’s point is about psychological distance between 
individuals and the bureaucratisation, administration and ‘rational efficiency’ of which 
they are the integral part.  
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It follows instrumental rationality drives a wedge between the individual’s role, 
professionally and otherwise, in facilitating social progress based on technological 
advance, the consequences of that progress, and, especially, between individual 
consciousness and its role in this progress. Individuals’ consciousness is compromised by 
forced proximity to this type of progress, in the sense they have little alternative to 
employing technology or acting according to social norms due to the necessity of 
securing livelihoods and social stations. It also follows individuals don’t, excepting 
spiritual or intellectual guidance provided by mentors in various walks of life, have a clear 
social authority to appeal to should they have ethical or other objections to being part of 
the overall process of rationalisation. There is no social force or body of inquiry 
possessing sufficient social sway to compete with this process. While religion appears 
such a social force in the context of globalisation, the kinds of religion represented at this 
political level are often organised, ideological and, mostly, dogmatic, as opposed to being 
an autonomous search, spiritual or otherwise, for ethical guidelines.52   
 
It is under similar circumstances of the process of rationalisation curtailing 
reflective practices that Bauman regards the Holocaust as a direct consequence of 
modernity, and not an aberration. The gradual institutionalisation of value-free, scientific 
standards was a consequence of the possibilities of instrumental rationality, and ultimately, 
in the case of Nazi Germany, these possibilities brought about the feasibility of genocide. 
What made the Holocaust possible, Bauman suggests, wasn’t racial hatred of the entire 
German people towards Jews, something claimed in certain studies of the Holocaust53, 
but something which, as other historical scholarship54 has indicated, was more specific to 
Nazi leadership than Germans as a whole. 55  Rather, it was the investiture of 
rationalisation at all levels of social organisation that created the possibility of genocide:  
                                                
52 See the thought model in Chapter 7. 
53 See Goldhagen 1996. 
54 See Browning 2007. Browning investigates how ordinary Germans with no apparent zeal for the 
Nazi project nonetheless acquiesced to implementation of the ‘Final Solution’ in order, largely, to 
preserve themselves.    
55 Bauman’s study investigates German attitudes towards Jews in pre-Hitler years dating back to the 
19th century, highlighting their changing nature, for better and worse, as Jews became integrated in the 
social fabric of German society. Undeniably, Bauman finds evidence of ingrained anti-Semitism 
among Germans, particularly among those resentful of encroaching conditions of modernity 
threatening to destroy traditional understandings of the hierarchical ordering of society and of the 
separation between classes and social and religious groups. Nevertheless, there is a distinction between 
acknowledging the existence of anti-Semitism among Germans prior to Nazi rule, and maintaining all 
Germans shared the detestation of Jews exhibited by Nazi leadership; on the contrary, where ordinary 
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First, this possibility arose at the level of the hierarchical bureaucratic structure 
permeating every aspect of social life, operating on the basis of a form of rationality 
simply accepted as inevitable. Second, it arose at the individual level, where reflective 
challenges to the nature of that rationalisation and its consequences, and to their own 
position within that process, could result in death or sanctions and exclusion. 
Consequently, average individuals became complicit in crimes of the Nazi regime, but at a 
distance – meaning, through alienation in terms of individuals’ relation to their labour and 
understanding of how that labour contributed to the greater whole of what the Nazi 
regime came to represent. Despite being part of the overall process of rationalisation in 
terms of belonging to the administrative network governing every aspect of social life - 
not least employment - individuals were made to feel they were not personally responsible, 
either for the social direction of the rational process (e.g., mass industrialisation as a 
means to war), or its ultimate consequences.  
 
Bauman suggests one reason the Nazis proved so successful in implementing 
their aims – which became increasingly ambitious as technological means improved – 
was because of the unreflective, psychological distance between labouring individuals and 
the social consequences of their labour. The success in implementing that distance, or 
the combination of the reification of the subject with its alienation from the object (e.g., 
the consequences of social ‘progress’), and other individuals, accounts for the success of 
the process of rationalisation and the implementation of Nazi objectives more than belief 
in actual Nazi ideology itself. Ultimately, according to Bauman, the ideological role of 
scientism proved more overpowering than political claims embodied in Nazi ideology, 
and did as much as anything to create conditions for genocide:   
 
Indirectly (though centrally to its general social function), science cleared the way to genocide 
through sapping the authority, and questioning the binding force, of all normative thinking, 
particularly that of religion and ethics… In as far as religion and ethics could not rationally 
legitimise demands they made on human behaviour, they stood condemned and found their 
authority denied. As values and norms had been proclaimed immanently and irreparably 
subjective, instrumentality was left as the only field where the search for excellence was feasible. 
Science wanted to be value-free and took pride in being such (ibid. p.108).   
                                                                                                                                      
Germans were accomplices of the Nazis in the sense that they by and large did not try to prevent the 
Holocaust, Bauman provides evidence they did not embrace it, or their leaders’ beliefs, either. The 
reasons for the Holocaust are other than the presumed accumulated hatred of an entire people for 
another. See Bauman 2006.      
Prospects Beyond Ideology: Reason, Freedom and the Truth of the Subject – 




It was belief in science and dislodging of other forms of inquiry as ‘subjective’ - and 
therefore flawed - which ensured the legitimation of value-free rationalisation was 
accepted socially as a natural given. With that belief established, normative thinking that 
could challenge the supremacy of the rationalisation process and the objectives toward 
which it laboured was sacrificed to what was perceived, at the immediate level, as being the 
greater social good.  
 
The suppression of non-scientific norms, and their disqualification as ‘irrational’ 
and ‘irreparably subjective’, made impossible any substantive political challenge to the 
ideological fusion of belief in the supremacy of instrumental techniques with specific 
tenets of the Nazi political programme. Further, the suppression of non-scientific norms 
enabled the alienation of ‘ordinary’ citizens from the victims of this kind of scientism, 
primarily by first alienating them from themselves. Bauman’s broader point about the 
Holocaust being a product of those aspects of civilization depending on rationalisation is 
that the ideology of scientism and the instrumental drive contributing to the reification 
of the subject are well and alive in contemporary society, and not specific to Nazi 
Germany.  
 
The presence of instrumental rationalising in almost all elements of the modern 
social order – from public to private, professional to leisure, from war to building peace 
– suggests the kind of normative thinking pure science cannot account for is as necessary 
as ever if, pace Bauman, the political and moral evaluation of social action are to have any 
authority at all. How, then, if a historical event such as the Holocaust contains valuable 
lessons about the destructive potential of an unchecked rationality, can it be that 
equivalent forms of instrumental reasoning continue their domination of modern society 
unabated? Part of the conundrum is while ethical thinking with normative objectives is 
tolerated, it can be rendered irrelevant, in the sense that it has little social authority. It is in 
the context of what would almost certainly happen to individuals defying the Nazi 
regime, alongside those targeted by virtue of identity, that questions arise as to what 
could happen were ethical reflection ever perceived to be a material threat to the 
hegemony of the interests sustaining dominant forms of instrumental rationality, or to 
those individuals mostly or completely under their sway.  
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From Adorno’s experience as a political and ethnic refugee from Nazi Germany, 
he witnessed what he perceived as the perseverance of essentially similar forms of 
rationalisation in American society during his time there as émigré, and subsequently 
upon his return to Germany, in the emerging ‘organised’ phase of capitalism. This 
‘organised’ capitalism was grounded in the logic of consumerism, ‘a system whereby 
conscious and unconscious inculcating of dispositions to spend and invest has become 
the central driving force of the economy’ (Hammer 2006, p.82). This meant the structure 
of the economy was changing to induce mass consumerism through mass production, 
with consumerism in turn guaranteeing the economic determination of society was 
driven by continual technological improvement - irrespective of political or ethical 
evaluation - while simultaneously integrating society under this form of instrumental 
rationality. Adorno drew parallels between the rationality characterising capitalist 
consumerism with the instrumental rationality that produced fascism in the sense that 
‘the culture industry’s effective integration of society mark[ed] an equivalent triumph of 
repressive unification in liberal democratic states to that which was achieved politically 
under fascism’ (Bernstein 1991, p.4).  
 
Adorno was not thereby comparing the two societies on the basis that they both 
result in political fascism, but on the basis that cultural unification through repression 
that occurred in Germany as a combination of rational efficiency and the pointed barrel 
of a gun occurs, in Western capitalism, through submission of normative thought to 
rational efficiency alone. The extremity of Adorno’s claims concerning the ‘totalisation’ 
of society is thus brought into relief and affords some insight into why he conceived of 
the transcendent component of his critique with such urgency, and why it is impossible 
to dissociate from his philosophy. In the context of this urgency of responding to a 
social constellation still determined by forms of rationality proven capable of leading to 
genocide, Adorno issues what could only be considered a practical demand. In one of the 
most well-known passages from ND, Adorno writes: ‘[a] new categorical imperative has 
been imposed by Hitler upon unfree mankind: to arrange their thoughts and actions so 
that Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so that nothing similar will happen’ (Adorno 1973, 
p. 365).  
 
This demand may appear obvious, and may therefore appear redundant as a 
cornerstone for an entire philosophy. What is not always obvious, however, is the 
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connection between forms of rationalisation that placed such a high premium on 
efficiency and value-free scientism that they eventually culminated in the Holocaust, and 
the prevalence of equivalent forms of rationalisation in many aspects of everyday activity 
in the current socio-historical constellation. Thought, for Adorno, must explicitly address 
the ways catastrophes such as the Holocaust can come about, and have the specific 
objective of preventing them. As he relates in his sociology lectures,   
 
It may be that the murder of six million innocent people for a delusory reason is an 
epiphenomenon when measured by the standard of a theory of society, something secondary not 
the key to understanding. However, I would think merely the dimension of horror attached to 
such an event gives it an importance which justifies the pragmatic demand that in this case 
knowledge should be prioritised… with the aim of preventing such events’ (Adorno 2002, p.18). 
 
It also follows from Bauman’s argument, then, that one predominant purpose of 
knowledge must be to prevent suffering. While genocide in the 20th century is certainly 
not limited to the Holocaust, nor to predominating forms of rationality experienced in 
Western societies, the urgency of Adorno’s thought also relates to the – specifically 
modern - danger of individuals rendered irrelevant to the functioning of the social whole, 
consequently leading to untold forms of suffering. As Adorno suggests,  
 
[f]ear used to be tied to the principium individuationis of self-preservation, and that principle, by its 
own consistency, abolishes itself. What the sadists in the camps foretold their victims, 
“Tomorrow you’ll be wiggling skyward as smoke from this chimney,” bespeaks the indifference 
of each individual life that is the direction of history. Even in his formal freedom, the individual 
is as fungible and replaceable as he will be under the liquidators’ boots (Adorno 1973, p.362).         
 
By the principle of the principium individuationis of self-preservation which, ‘by its own 
consistency, abolishes itself’, Adorno not only suggests that the impulse of self-
preservation as the supreme social instinct results in the kind of reflective disconnection 
that enabled the massacre of an entire ethnic group. It also ultimately leads to ordinary 
citizens applying the devaluation of life to themselves.  
 
The historical example of self-preservation through tacit consent in Nazi 
Germany, at the cost of the attempted, systematic elimination of an entire identity, 
suggests how self-preservation can amount to consenting to the kind of norm in which 
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any individual can become dispensable at any time. It follows the repressive unification 
of culture through forms of rationality trivialising the role of the individual, and therefore 
also inter-subjective responsibility, institutes an environment in which self-preservation 
becomes the only viable alternative. That this kind of norm extends beyond the specific 
experience of Nazi Germany – ‘the indifference of each individual life that is the 
direction of history’ – is a function of the norm of subordinating all criteria by which 
society judges itself in the name of self-preservation, and by extension, to the overriding 
demands of rationalisation and efficiency.  
 
This perspective that submission to the administrative demands of modern 
technology is equivalent to submission to the kinds of norms which led to the Holocaust 
will need to be qualified, however, as it is not clear that such a direct parallel can be 
drawn. Genocide has not occurred in Western society since the Holocaust (though the 
extent to which it is said to have happened as a result of Western actions elsewhere in the 
world is a topic of perpetual debate; as Adorno suggests, ‘Auschwitz is a prototype of 
something which has been repeated incessantly in the world since then’ (Adorno 2002, 
p.18)). Modern political discourse centres on issues like human rights, social equality and 
conflict prevention to the degree that respecting these values is itself a norm. This 
initially suggests that value-driven or ethical thought has not been eradicated, nor 
subordinated to the imperatives of instrumental rationality to the degree Adorno appears 
to suggest. Moreover, Adorno’s transcendent account of instrumental rationality initially 
appears to fail to take into account some ways in which science, technology and rational 
efficiency are used to alleviate personal suffering and, e.g. prevent humanitarian crises, 
suggesting self-correcting mechanisms.  
 
The lack of emphasis on positive aspects of rationalisation, however, is a 
function of the critical element of Adorno’s account of ‘repressive unification’. Adorno 
doesn’t deny forces of production are brought to bear on improving the human 
condition: as he makes clear in the ‘Theory and Practice’ lecture (1965),  
 
…and if we fail to follow up this idea that the forces of production could satisfy human beings 
and enable mankind to enter into a condition worthy of human beings – if we fail to give voice 
to this thought, then we certainly will be in danger of giving ideology a helping hand.  Such an 
outcome is prevented only by relations of production and by the extension of the forces of 
production into the machinery of physical and intellectual power. I believe, then, that we have to 
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begin by saying this, and that a possible starting-point for a correct practice is to rethink how to 
put a society on the right path when, on one hand, it threatens to stagnate owing to the ossified 
relations of production and the attitudes resulting from that situation, while, on the other, it 
ceaselessly produces the forces that initially promote destruction but that tomorrow or the day 
after, if I may put it crassly, could actually make possible a paradise on earth’ (Adorno 2008, 
p.48).      
 
Adorno finds problematic not forces of production themselves, which contain almost 
infinite potential and resources for the improvement of social conditions, but relations of 
production subordinating individuals to their practical demands. It follows diluting his 
critique with provisions pertaining to the obviously positive aspects of rationalisation 
obscure the urgency of the critique, which wouldn’t be of assistance in ameliorating 
social circumstances. While Adorno’s sense of urgency is firmly based in his experience 
of his own social constellation, however, differences between the particular cultural 
experiences of Adorno’s constellation and those of subsequent generations must be 
emphasised. This is not least to be in a position to ascribe validity to the claim that a 
similar ideological process of rationalisation that brought about fascism and its 
consequences survives in the present social constellation. 
 
 Adorno’s false generalisations and often unaccounted-for drawing of parallels for 
effect can undermine his philosophy, particularly on first-time readings remaining 
singular. It is also unhelpful, to some extent, that a rather intimate acquaintance with his 
work is necessary in order to understand what his central points are and why he makes 
them how he does. While his fragmented style is a consequence of his philosophy, and 
while making claims in sometimes extreme fashion is in order to force their engagement, 
the effect is often, unfortunately, to foreclose his thought, leading many scholars to 
dismiss him. For example, how Adorno often equates the manner in which perception is 
formed as a result of advertising in the – formally free - culture industry with fascist 
propaganda in a totalitarian society does not allow for sufficient degrees of 
differentiation between either the two cultures or the (sometimes unsubtle) differences 
between advertising and ideological propaganda. Comments like ‘’[a]dvertising becomes 
simply the art with which Goebbels presciently equated it, l’art pour l’art, advertising for 
advertising’s sake, the pure representation of social power’ (Adorno 2002b, p.132), while 
captivating, tend to undermine Adorno’s philosophical intentions in the way they 
reductively collapse differences between modern culture and Nazi Germany for effect, 
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particularly if readings do not extend beyond DoE (which does not mean such totalising 
statements, while false in their generalisation, do not contain some truth-content).  
 
Further, as Hammer suggests, ‘[t]he equivocation between accounting for the 
commercialisation of everyday life, on one hand, and analysing mechanisms of 
authoritarian consensus formation in totalitarian states, on the other, makes it difficult to 
locate [Adorno’s] claims within a sufficiently specific mode of cultural transmission’ 
(Hammer 2006, p.74). Despite Bauman’s argument for the survival of the forms of 
rationalisation leading to the Holocaust in the present social constellation potentially 
validating Adorno’s transcendent criticism, it is much harder to make the case for the 
cultural transmission of ‘authoritarian consensus formation’, as it is known in 
dictatorships, to the commercialisation of everyday life in formally free societies.  
 
While the urgency of Adorno’s claims regarding instrumental rationality can 
reasonably be understood from the context of his own socio-historical ‘location’ with 
experiences of fascism, world war and the Holocaust, therefore, those insisting his claims 
retain at least some degree of validity today must demonstrate the location from which 
they are made if they are not to be dismissed as (counter-) ideology. If Adorno’s thought 
proved unable to provide such a location beyond his own historical context, according to 
his own rational criterion of society as a constitutive element of epistemology, his theory 
would be open to the simple charge that instrumental rationality does not foreclose 
reflective practice to the degree that he suggests it does. This is especially important in 
the Western social context which guarantees free speech as human right by law, where 
the most obvious challenge to critics of instrumental rationality in particular is that they 
are perfectly free to think and say whatever they want, thereby undermining their claims. 
Furthermore, by the speculative logic that instrumental rationality creates a self-enclosed 
totality where even spontaneity conforms to ideological prerequisites of that reason, the 
claim that instrumental rationality is ‘totalising’ is itself in danger of becoming ideological. 
Such a claim can be construed and manipulated, e.g. as an excuse to disavow 
responsibility for one’s actions, or, conversely, for wholeheartedly and uncritically 
embracing instrumental rationality, irrespective of its social consequences, because it is 
assumed to be inevitable.  
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Part of the necessity of first appreciating the transcendent context from which 
Adorno expresses the urgency of his claims, however, is not only that it illuminates 
potentially disastrous consequences of ideological thought while making practical 
demands about the value of each individual life and experience. Adorno’s philosophy is 
intended to improve social circumstances, though he harbours no illusions about the 
impact of his thought on society at large. It is, rather, in the context of responding to the 
conundrum of preventing social attitudes that either actively or passively enabled the 
Holocaust. In his essay, ‘Education after Auschwitz’, Adorno makes the practical 
demand that individuals ‘must labour against… lack of reflection, must dissuade [other] 
people from striking outward without reflecting upon themselves. The only education 
that has any sense at all is an education toward self-reflection’ (Adorno 2005, p.193). In 
his lectures on moral philosophy, he insists philosophy ‘consists in reflection on 
knowledge and not in the immediate transmission of information, and anyone seriously 
involved with philosophy… has to be prepared to submit to the process of reflection, 
and to reflection, moreover, conceived as free’ (Adorno 2001b, p.23). These are practical 
suggestions that sound like common sense: indeed, to the extent that such ideas have 
been integrated as social norms and cornerstones of much modern education, it appears 
modern society has succeeded in heeding some of the lessons of the Holocaust and even 
some of Adorno’s more straightforward proposals. However, Adorno’s emphasis would 
be on how such reasonable suggestions themselves easily become ideological by virtue of 
their ‘common sense’.  
 
We now turn to the immanent component of Adorno’s cultural criticism. Having 
criticised society as a whole from a ‘bird’s-eye’ perspective in his transcendent critique 
from the spontaneous element of human nature, it becomes imperative to demonstrate 
specifically how everything becomes ideologically corrupted by reflecting on the precise 
‘movement’ of particular cultural forms, and ascertaining why and how these become 
repressively integrated into the social totality. This reflection takes place immanently to the 
experience of society itself.  
 
When, e.g., pedagogical injunctions such as ‘self-reflection’ or ‘inter-subjective 
respect’ become concretised as social norms – while obviously a welcome development – 
they easily become catchphrases for a society proclaiming its freedom or social 
achievements, as opposed to reflective engagement with such principles on a continuous 
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basis. Beyond attempting to establish distance between the ideological concretisation of a 
norm and its social practice, Adorno’s immanent criticism reaches into contradictions 
both within the ideological concretisation of the norm and between this and its social 
practice. Adorno does not deny the rational basis for self-preservation, or how self-
interest must naturally be a central subjective imperative. He is, though, concerned with 
demonstrating how that rational basis itself results in social contradictions. The rational 
impulse of self-preservation also contributes irrationally to social conditions, in the sense 
that it isolates individuals, pits them against each other, and overlooks how e.g. inter-
subjective respect – or, prioritising objectivity outside oneself - may ultimately be a more 
rational way to ensure that self-preservation.  
 
This kind of mutually enabling alienation contributes to ideology-formation and 
identitarian social relations further fragmenting inter-subjective relations, simultaneously 
with the repressive integration of society under dominant forms of instrumental 
rationality. This suggests where, e.g. Western societies identify themselves by postulating 
they govern themselves according to such positive norms, these may be invoked 
primarily as a result of the forced integration of society, and not necessarily as a result of 
its socio-historical memory, the real experience of its members, or their present social 
needs.  Moreover, contradictions between experiencing norms and their ideological 
manifestation often occur within individuals. The principle that all people are created 
equal, e.g., as one condition of inter-subjective respect, is often accompanied by the 
ideological notion that ‘all experience is equal’ often buried within socio-political arguments 
concerning otherwise well-meaning aspirations to overcome race, class, gender or status 
barriers. The conflation of the principle that all people are created equal with the idea 
that all opinions hold equal value relativizes experience in the name of inter-subjective 
respect and does not follow from the (socially and legally mandated) right to hold 
opinions.  
 
Suggesting A’s opinion on, say, stem-cell research is just as valid as B’s opinion, 
even though B has significantly more experience with, that particular subject matter, both 
undermines B’s experience and erroneously ‘legitimates’ A’s opinion on the basis that she 
couldn’t learn more about stem cell research than she currently knows. Conversely, the 
concretion of the notion of experience as an arbiter of truth contains its own 
contradiction, namely that insight can still validate opinion which nonetheless contains 
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less hard intellectual experience of the subject matter: one can have more experience of a 
subject matter and still be wrong. Adorno, for example, formulates one sense between 
experience and spontaneity in that ‘…knowledge comes to us through a network of 
prejudices, opinions, innervations, self-corrections, presuppositions and exaggerations, in 
short through the dense, firmly-founded but by no means uniformly transparent medium 
of experience’ (Adorno 2000, p.80).  
 
This means conceptualisation of experience leading to knowledge is not only 
always subject to mediation, but also always finite in relation to experience itself. The 
immanent component of Adorno’s criticism, therefore, is reflection following the 
particular and precise ‘movement’ of individual cultural forms, revealing non-identity 
between them at each stage of their conceptualisation and at every level of their social 
experience. While principles like self-reflection or inter-subjective respect shape 
educational principles in contemporary society, therefore, it is far from clear how they 
translate to the culture of everyday experience, not least in the ‘virtual’ context of the 
online community where people mostly spend their time, and where minimal civility is 
often lacking. It could be argued, e.g., that the Internet, as a form of technology enabling 
and promoting, anonymity online (notwithstanding the ease with which online activities 
are retrieved by third parties), reveals and encourages repressed human drives that 
become apparent in various forms of online aggression.56 This is an example of a form of 
instrumental rationality provoking the irrational drive of unguarded (and often 
unprovoked) aggression as an acceptable behavioural and social norm incompatible with 
the socio-ideological notion of inter-subjective respect. 
 
The objective of immanent criticism, then, is to reveal contradictions between 
the particular experience of the subject matter and the way it has been concretised into 
an ideological form consistent with its social determination by instrumental rationality. It 
follows reflective engagement with the subject matter reveals limitations of how it has 
come to be defined in a fixed purview. However, the fixed purview is not a definitive 
indication of experience, either in the sense of what it suggests in terms of its historical 
configuration, or the accrued experience of the subject matter through which it is 
assumed a fixed identity can be ascribed to it. According to Adorno, 
 
                                                
56 See Chapter 7 thought model. 
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By gauging its subject matter and it alone, thinking becomes aware of what within the matter 
extends beyond what was previously thought and thereby breaks open the fixed purview of the 
subject matter. For its part the subject matter can also be extremely abstract and mediated: its 
nature should not be prejudged by a surreptitiously introduced concept of concretion. The cliché 
that thinking is a purely logical and rigorous development from a single proposition warrants 
every reservation… Thoughts that are true must incessantly renew themselves in the experience 
of the subject matter, which nonetheless first determines itself in those thoughts. The strength to 
do that, and not the measuring-out and marking-off of conclusions, is the essence of 
philosophical rigour. Truth is a constantly evolving constellation, not something running 
continuously and automatically in which the subject’s role would be rendered not only easier but, 
indeed, dispensable (Adorno 1998, p.131).   
 
Only the continual, unreduced experience of the subject matter can yield more adequate 
concepts, but these will always be inadequate for as long as they are concretised in ways 
dominating experience of the subject matter. Because the subject matter itself may have 
been thoroughly mediated and open to a diversification of historical interpretation, 
attempts to concretise it in terms of a single logical process or method both obscures its 
nature as a multifaceted, complex phenomenon, and wrongly ‘identifies’ its place in 
nature according to a specific socio-historical interpretation.  
 
This prejudging of its nature in turn simultaneously impedes continued historical 
mediation on the subject matter and new experience it can give rise to. Adorno challenges 
thought based on ‘a logical and rigorous development from a single proposition’ because 
of its potential limitation of new experience. It follows the direction of Adorno’s 
negative dialectic is experience that ‘passes into that which lies concealed beneath the 
façade of immediacy, of the supposed facts, and which makes the facts what they are’ 
(Adorno 1973, p. 166). Reflective disengagement occurs when it is assumed reflection 
conclusively identifies the subject matter. Immanent criticism, by contrast, is one part of 
the ‘constantly-evolving constellation’ of truth requiring continuous engagement of the 
subject. 
 
It is not necessarily with respect to the objective determination of society that 
perspectives come to be concretised within fixed purviews. For example, when reflecting 
upon historical events such as the Holocaust, there are manifold ways to approach the 
event in order to locate it within a framework for the understanding in the effort to make 
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sense of it. Following Bauman, one such way would suggest regarding it as a unique 
event in Jewish history, the culmination of centuries of anti-Semitism made possible by 
technological advancement at a unique point in history. Or, the Holocaust could be 
understood as an aberration from the trajectory of history - one in a long line of 
aberrations – but one serving to demonstrate specific social and psychological conditions 
in which the civilizational drive was suspended.57 However, framing a context within 
which the understanding attempts to make sense of an object of knowledge can have the 
adverse effect of remaining the fixed purview of understanding in reflection, resulting in 
the prioritisation of the subjective perspective over the object of knowledge. While 
contextualisation is a necessary function of the understanding, therefore, Adorno’s 
imperative is that the subject matter is not ultimately concretised with finality. Any 
attempt to understand the truth of an event such as the Holocaust, therefore, would have 
to incorporate continuous reflection upon all such narrative contexts, and would - 
crucially - take into account how these contexts thought dialectically influence and 
change each other.  
 
Irrespective of whether the subject matter relates directly to contemporary 
society, immanent critique cannot remain purely immanent: it must still revert to 
mediating its objective social conditions – the socio-economic reality in which reflection 
occurs, as far as it can be determined. It follows while immanent criticism immerses itself 
in the particularity of the object of knowledge, reflection isolated from its objective 
context doesn’t relate the particularity of the subject matter back to society, idealising the 
subject matter at the expense of its objective context, and cancelling the objective 
context from the process of reflection. A dialectical conceptualisation of truth, then, 
depends on both the object, the particularity of which is mediated through immanent 
criticism, and on the objective social context in which the criticism is made, 
conceptualised in transcendent criticism. Because individuals depend on society for their 
immediate experience, society itself is an object of knowledge without which it would be 
impossible to pursue objectivity in the mediation of particulars. Society is, nevertheless, a 
compromised object: where society is objectively determined by instrumental rationality, 
individuals cannot make legitimate claims without themselves being immanently engaged 
with them. This is why immanent and transcendent criticism must continuously be 
mediated dialectically without being sublated in the consciousness of the subject: 
                                                
57 See Bauman 2001 for these arguments in the context of sociological research methods.  
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Immanent criticism can lose sight of socio-economic reality, while transcendent criticism 
lacking the component of immanent criticism merely affirms the domination of society 
by instrumental rationality without challenging it. Prioritising or neglecting either 
perspective therefore leads to elimination of either the objective context or the 
elimination of the subject, in the sense that reflection becomes irrelevant to socio-economic 
reality. 
 
The threat posed by instrumental rationality, then, is when individuals become 
dispensable precisely when their mediation is no longer needed, a threat concretely 
demonstrated by the Holocaust. Less perceptible is how many aspects of experience 
become irrelevant to cultural forms and the overall rationalisation objectively 
determining consciousness in modern society. Individuals may remain ‘relevant’ in as far 
as they remain economic consumers of products relating to cultural technological forms, 
or in as far as they contribute to their further development, but as Bauman suggests, their 
imperatives are limited by what is tolerated according to ‘the criteria of efficiency and 
effectiveness’. Conversely, individuals imposing the same methodological procedure 
indefinitely on objects of knowledge irrespective of the socio-historical conditions of 
both individuals and methodological development miss important elements both in the 
accrued truth about the object of knowledge and the truth of the subject’s relationship to 
it. There is, then, no simple resolution of mediation between transcendent and immanent 
criticism, or of contradictions arising within the specific subject matter mediated in 
immanent criticism, and between conceptual contradictions arising between this 
mediation and the subject’s immediate experience of the social world.  
 
Adorno’s dialectical criticism moves between its transcendent and immanent 
forms continually without a priori looking for or finding sublation into a non-ideological, 
‘absolute’ conceptual truth of an object of knowledge, as such would be ideological by 
definition, ignoring what remains non-conceptual to that identification and non-identical 
in how it may be experienced. Adorno’s ‘location’ for the critical analysis of reification, 
then, is not properly a location at all, but a continuous evolution of reflection preventing 
itself from becoming ideological. ‘Philosophy,’ as he says, ‘is thought in a perpetual state 
of motion’ (Adorno 2008, p.5). Concretised at a fixed juncture, the critical analysis of 
reification would also be turned into a subjective concept dominating its subject matter 
by constraining it within its own fixed identification of how such analyses should 
Prospects Beyond Ideology: Reason, Freedom and the Truth of the Subject – 
Towards Political Models for the Critical Thought of Theodor W. Adorno 
 
 190 
proceed. This is a significant element of Adorno’s philosophy of negative dialectics, and 
this chapter has foreshadowed some reasons why Adorno’s dialectic is ‘negative’: the 
following chapter explains this ‘negative’ dialectic in detail with reference to its 
philosophical genesis in Hegel’s dialectic of self-determining reason.  
 
As Hammer suggests, ‘[f]or Adorno, dialectical criticism responds to a specific 
social and historical configuration. If this configuration were to change, then the critic 
would also have to change’ (Hammer 2006, p.92). Interpreting Adorno, therefore, must 
also take place in relation to the current socio-historical constellation, and must take into 
account the ways this experience contradicts Adorno’s socio-historical context. There are 
significant structural differences between the industrial capitalism of Adorno’s time and 
the contemporary post-industrial, postmodern form of capitalism, for example. The 
invasion of private life by the public sphere of production in the former has arguably 
been replaced by the determination of the public sphere of consumerism, social 
interaction and politics by the most powerful elements of the private sphere in the latter. 
Such distinctions are investigated in the following two chapters. It follows, then, that 
Adorno’s philosophy cannot simply be ‘imposed’ on the contemporary socio-historical 
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VII. CHAPTER 6: NEGATIVE DIALECTICS 
 
The following chapter explains the ‘negative’ turn of Adorno’s dialectic, here 
illustrated with reference to Hegel’s dialectic of the rational self-determination of 
thought. Adorno’s dialectical turn is ‘negative’ because it seeks to give voice to forms of 
experience he claims both Hegel’s dialectic and other subject-centred forms of rationality 
neglect. Such experience may be expressed as forms of suffering overlooked by the 
normative aspects of Hegel’s account of reason, or to which such a ‘universalising’ 
account may inadvertently contribute. The ‘negative’ dialectic, therefore, may be 
illustrated through the distinction between Hegel’s rational reconciliation of conceptual 
reflection with the objective world, and Adorno’s prioritisation of the ‘non-identity’ 
always remaining between them, or, for Adorno, ways in which Hegel’s dialectical 
‘reconciliation’ falls short in its claims to truth. It follows demonstrating how 
reconciliation of the objective world to reflection fails can reveal dimensions of 
experience remaining unexplored or unaccounted for, disclose where accounts become 
ideological, and point towards new ways in which to conceptualise experience.  
 
The chapter proceeds as follows: First, I provide an outline of Hegel’s dialectic of 
‘determinate negation’ and an account of the rationality and normativity of conceptual 
practices according to this dialectic, with some examples of self-correcting mechanisms 
of society’s institutional structures. Second, the central objection to this account – that 
experience cannot only be understood through such a ‘totalising’ account of rationality – 
is explained via Adorno’s reorientation of reflection towards experience remaining 
unexhausted by - and ‘non-identical’ to - attempts to conceptualise it. Third, the 
‘negative’ dialectic is illustrated by way of this turn towards the ‘non-conceptuality’ in 
experience, and what this prioritisation could amount to at the level of social rationality 
and normative practices. Finally, examples are provided of ways in which negative 
dialectics apply in the contemporary social constellation, foreshadowing the thought 
model in the following chapter demonstrating how Adorno’s critical approach remains 
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6.1. The Concept of Dialectic 
 
The Hegelian dialectic is, at its core, an evolution from the meaning Kant had 
attributed to ‘dialectic’ in the Critique of Pure Reason. As we saw in Chapter 3, Kant 
thought it impossible for thought to ‘transcend’ the phenomenal world of sensation and 
empirical knowledge to the ‘noumenal’ world of pure reason, or the world (“thing”) as it 
is ‘in itself’. Instead, as thought strives towards this realm of ‘pure understanding’, it 
remains mired in what Kant took to be the falsehoods of self-contradiction – the 
‘antinomies of pure reason’ governing empirical experience and the phenomenal world – 
and these are what, expanding on Plato’s notion of the term, he called ‘dialectics’.  
 
For Kant, limits of the human understanding (‘reason’) and limits of truth are the 
same thing.  Hegel, however, took the contradictions of ‘dialectics’ to mean Kant’s 
antinomies themselves provided a logical starting point from which contradictions could 
be resolved, and thus that inroads could be made into the realm of pure reason instead by 
virtue of resolving them – therefore also leading to increasingly perfect conceptions of 
truth. The existence of contradiction, it followed, demonstrated the limitations of the 
understanding. Overcoming these contradictions would enable the progress of reason in 
comprehending the noumenal – in Hegel’s terms, the ‘absolute truth’ - and thus 
simultaneously demonstrate progress of the understanding in the phenomenal world. 
 
Contradiction, then, is the starting point of Hegel’s dialectical process. A concept 
about the world is posited as a potential description of reality. Logically, the concept 
already contains its own negation (the description may be shown to be false), and the 
struggle between the concept and the ways it is shown to be false result in a new concept, 
which in the Hegelian process is the ascent, or “sublation” [Aufhebung], to a ‘higher’ stage 
of comprehension, itself resulting in a new concept. This new concept generates its own 
negation, and as such the dialectical process continuously lays bare the truth of reality 
through ever more sophisticated concepts. Each successive dialectical stage is a ‘moment’ 
that is itself overcome, or “sublated”, into a new concept.  
 
Hegel thus claims that the rational compulsion of experience is one of negation – 
the negation of inadequate judgments as consciousness of an object develops.  Hegel 
refers to the rationality of experience as ‘determinate negation’. The negation is 
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‘determinate’ because the ability to show what is lacking in an explanation is the 
condition of the possibility of a better explanation: the negation, as Bowie explains, is 
therefore ‘not of the form of “false”, but of the form of “false’, but the necessary 
condition of “true”’.58 Experience of the phenomenal world is therefore rational to the 
degree that it already possesses the element of self-correction.  
 
But this dialectic presupposes, then, the a priori concept of the subject who makes 
the judgment.  Hegel calls this a priori condition Being, the necessary condition for 
anything about the world to be ‘known’. Dialectical logic proceeds from ‘Being’ and 
ceaselessly advances towards a conclusion that Hegel calls the ‘absolute Idea’, or truth 
itself. This ‘absolute Idea’ is both thought and reality simultaneously – concepts of 
objects in the phenomenal world reconciled with reality as truth.  However, if ‘Being’ is 
always in the process of becoming something, how can there be an ‘absolute’ concept of 
truth? Scruton explains the basis of Hegel’s thought thus:  
 
Imagine a kind of impersonal dialectical ‘thought’, or thinker, attempting to understand the 
world. It has nothing available to it but thought and so must put forward, as its sole instrument 
of knowledge, the “concept” which enlightens it. Of necessity it begins from the single most 
indeterminate concept – that which is contained in all concepts and yet which is logically 
precedent to them, the concept of being. But what is being, considered as “unmediated” by 
reflection, and as free from extraneous determinations? It is surely, nothing… Hence, the 
concept of being contains within itself its own negation - nothing – and the dialectical opposition 
between these two concepts is resolved only in the passage to a new concept. This concept is 
‘becoming’, which captures the truth contained in that previous opposition, the truth of the 
passage of being into nothing and nothing into being. To our impersonal thinker, the world now 
appears as becoming rather than as being, and this perception is ‘truer’ than the preceding one, 
although as yet far short of that absolute truth in which all such oppositions will be resolved” 
(Scruton 2001, p. 174). 
 
‘Becoming’ is therefore a ‘truer’ form of the concept of ‘Being’ because it is a 
reconciliation of ‘Being’ and its opposite, ‘Nothing’. The truth of ‘Being’ is determined by 
‘becoming’, or the passage of nothing into something – an identity - but simultaneously is 
further determined, in the objective world, by what that identity is not (its non-identity). 
From the rational necessity of correcting this lack, further oppositions arise and the 
                                                
58 Quoted from correspondence. 
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process of conceptualising reality continues. For Hegel, the ‘totality’ of these stages are 
passage to the ‘absolute Idea’ itself, which is simultaneously both the whole of reality and 
the attempt to know it, in all its historical forms. The metaphysics towards which Hegel’s 
dialectic strives is therefore the Idealist attempt to abolish the distinction between 
thought and reality altogether.   
 
Contradiction is therefore the ‘moment’ of becoming. Existence, taken by itself, 
presupposes an immediacy with which things can be known – such as in Kant’s 
Transcendental Unity of Apperception – but the moment where things become known is 
their active mediation by the subject. Even the apparent immediacy of the consciousness 
of the “pure” subject and the ‘sense-data’ available to it must be mediated, as Bowie 
suggests, “because it cannot be made intelligible unless it is informed by concepts (hence 
the unboundedness of the conceptual)” (Bowie 2013, p.45). However, the subject does 
not merely mediate the object of knowledge and thus ‘reduce’ it to the subject itself – the 
object continues resisting the concept attributed to it by the subject, and thus continues 
engendering the becoming of the subject. As such the objective world always stands 
opposed to the subject.  
 
We already saw in Chapter 3 how Adorno is intent on sustaining Kant’s 
unresolved contradictions as part of his own organon of knowledge. How does this 
square with Hegel’s dialectical resolutions? And how can Hegel’s procedure plausibly 
expect to ‘abolish’ the distinction between thought and reality? 
 
6.2.  Dialectic as Normativity 
 
The priority Adorno ascribes to the mediated character of knowledge, and the 
dependence of knowledge on recognising the interconnected nature of social experience 
– alongside his problematic reference to society as the ‘totality’ – is philosophically 
indebted to Hegel’s metaphysical concept of the ‘absolute Idea’, or what Hegel calls Geist. 
It is also a rejection of this notion in its strictly Hegelian form. Conversely, an increasing 
focus of Hegelian scholarship since the 1970’s has emphasised a more ‘non-metaphysical’ 
Hegel, in which the Hegelian ‘Idea’ can be interpreted as a process of social 
normativity.59 This strand of argument is outlined in the following:  
                                                
59 See e.g. Taylor 1979, Pinkard 1996, Pippin 1997 and Bowie 2013. 
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Hegel expresses Geist as the idea of a ‘world-spirit’ made up of the ‘totality’ of 
mediation occurring in the course of socio-historical experience. This world-spirit is 
therefore the historical account of the self-determination of human thought, in which ‘the 
question of why we have come to think of things the way we have, to categorise our 
experience and activity’ can be ‘shown to be presupposed in any attempt to discover or 
justify… because of prior attempts at such categorisation’ (Pippin 1997, p.165). This 
means historical accounts are always required to explain why rules, norms or conceptual 
practices come to be regarded as legitimate. The continual transformation of the ‘sense-
making patterns and rules’ determining social experience, and by which objects are 
categorised, is the historical form of the self-determination of thought.   
 
The objective of self-determining thought is its continuing attempt to overcome 
alienating forms of consciousness between subject and the objective world, between 
communities, and between, and within, individuals. This historical process of the ‘whole’, 
with its successes and failures, is the legitimate, truthful reconciliation between experience 
and reflection, also reflected in the increasingly rational conceptual practices and 
institutional structures of society. According to Pippin,  
 
[Geist can] be understood as a kind of collective human achievement… that achievement being 
the establishment of normatively successful, mutually bound communities… Geist… [is] the 
achievement of… rule-following, reflectively re-assessing communities, and that process must 
somehow be understood (at its most basic level) as a kind of continual negotiation about 
normative authority (Pippin 2005, p.95).  
 
Geist, on this reading, is the formation of communities normatively bound by the rules and 
sense-making patterns individuals give themselves historically, through inter-subjective 
mediation and negotiation. Simultaneously, Geist is the gradual fulfilment of needs and 
desires of individuals contributing to these rules as the expression of an increasing 
subjective freedom arising from rational possibilities of self-determining thought. The 
‘absolute Idea’, therefore, is, following Pinkard, ‘that conception of our having the world 
in view through our conceptual and intuitive practices, which themselves are possible 
only because of the normative, inferential “whole” of which they are moments’ (Pinkard 
2002, p.261). Conceptual practices are both a consequence of the objective ‘whole’ 
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through which individuals intuit the world and upon which they depend, and what makes 
the ‘whole’ normative to begin with.  
 
The ‘dialectical history of self-consciousness’ to which Hegel’s Phenomenology of the 
Spirit refers is therefore concerned with ‘showing how “succeeding social spaces” 
[already] contained resources within themselves… able to explain and justify themselves 
over and against earlier alternative accounts and to demonstrate and affirm for 
themselves that their own accounts of themselves were satisfactory’ (Pinkard 1996, p.12). 
These ‘social spaces’ include development of social institutions, such as legal and 
educational structures and the state, whose legitimation towards the communities they 
serve is provided in the political mediation and improvement of social and legal norms 
they develop, and legislate in the name of the communities they represent.   
 
The same normativity extends to identity ascribed to objects in the continuous 
process of amending categorisation and attempting to identify what remains objectively 
non-identical to reflection. This attempt to unite thought with the objective world 
continues as long as justifications of claims can be recognised as inadequate, 
simultaneously amounting to the normative process of justifying and legitimating the 
conceptual practices of society. It follows Hegel’s ‘absolute Idea’ is, essentially, an 
‘identity of identity and non-identity’, which is effectively the ‘practice of giving and 
asking for reasons’ (ibid. p.200).60 This process is understanding how things and norms 
that appear ‘given’ to experience always already rest on other conceptual premises that 
have been, and continue being, socially mediated.  
 
For Hegel, it follows knowledge is ‘only intelligible in terms of the way our 
concepts gain their determinacy via their relation to other objects, not by “immediate” 
grasping of irreducible fact (Bowie 2012, p.5). Concepts only gain their determinacy, then, 
not by how the world appears ‘given’ or accounted for as fact, but as a result of how they 
have been and continue being mediated, and thereby determined. This mediation 
eventually determines the position and legitimacy an accumulation of conceptual 
reflection may eventually acquire within the social ‘whole’, as it becomes the basis of 
established conceptual practices determining social experience.  
 
                                                
60 Pinkard notes Hegel’s Idea is „more or less the same“ as Sellars’ space of reasons. 
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The central objective of Hegel’s philosophical system, therefore (and the task of 
the Phenomenology), according to Bowie, is to unite conceptual reflection and the objective 
world in such a way that emphasises that any truth to such a unity cannot only be derived 
from what is immediately given to experience. This is ‘because any judgments about the 
unity divide – “mediate” – what is supposed to be immediate… It is only by carrying out 
the mediation of what is initially immediate that the truth of that unity can be shown’ 
(Bowie 2003, p.83).  
 
This distinction between i) what is immediately ‘given’ to reflection from 
experience of a specific objective context, and ii) the mediation of socio-historical 
process of reflection resulting in ideas, received facts or practices that may consequently 
become given, is also necessary to ascertain whether the concept in its given form 
corresponds truthfully with the accumulation of experience it claims to represent. If 
judgments concerning worldly objects are ‘located within a pattern of reasoning that is 
not itself determined by the object but by the way in which spirit, Geist, has socially and 
historically come to determine itself as necessarily taking the object’ (Pinkard 2002, 
p.258), then Geist is the social achievement normatively enabling judgements to be 
continuously self-correcting vis-à-vis both the objective world and its own development 
of social norms. This is how Geist can be understood as the ‘space of reasons’ within 
which individuals comprehend themselves. According to Pippin, 
 
[o]ur own social practices – Geist – are best understood as the result of… continuous historical 
transformation. Our sanctions and ideals are not just contingent results, however, merely our way 
of going about things, but can be shown to be superior resolutions of internal insufficiencies in 
the status of norms in prior epochs of Geist (Pippin 1997, p.393).  
 
There are therefore also always contradictions between how social practices are justified 
according to a specific historical epoch, and the changes to social experience continually 
instigated by historical progress (including how a given epoch, and history itself, may be 
understood from new vantage points of future historical points of reference). The 
‘superior resolutions of internal insufficiencies… in prior epochs” force re-evaluation of 
judgments on social practices and consequently, engender a continual transformation of 
‘sense-making patterns and rules’. The ‘Idea’ for which Hegel intends Geist as the vehicle, 
then, is reconciliation between reflection and the objective world in the successful and 
truthful identity between them. This categorisation is the basis for knowledge increasing 
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the scope for personal self-determination, the fulfilment of subjective needs, and thus, 
the objective freedom of society.  
 
The increasing realisation of social freedom is thereby incorporated in the form 
of society’s self-improvement and self-determination, e.g. from the contingency of 
nature. For example, social experience in pre-modern periods prior to the rise of modern 
science was to some extent determined by a contingency of the relative unpredictability 
of nature (relative to contemporary experience). Increasingly accurate reflection 
pertaining to the objective world in the natural sciences through a continuous process of 
categorisation and its scientific falsification – in other words, the mediation by which 
good science falsifies inferior methods of understanding, say, natural events, by 
continually proposing superior ones - has provided continually enhanced resources with 
which to predict and respond to natural events, and protect society from them, 
supplementing an increasing social self-determinacy from the contingency of natural 
events. 
 
6.3 Moving beyond Hegel 
 
As we saw in preceding chapters, Adorno shares Hegel’s notion that mediation 
lays bare conflicts between conceptual reflection in its manifold historical manifestations, 
and the objective world as it appears ‘given’ to experience, and this is the aspect of 
Hegel’s thought he retains in his ‘negative’ dialectic. Hegel’s ‘determinate’ negation of 
thought does not mean, however, that dialectics is a priori negative: it does not mean, as 
Adorno says, that ‘thought itself – and thought is tied to subjectivity – is negativity, and 
to that extent that negativity, and especially dialectical thinking, is negative dialectics from 
the outset’ (Adorno 2008, p.11). What, then, is ‘negative’ dialectics?  
 
First, the ‘negativity’ of Adorno’s thought is the attempt to comprehend – and 
liberate - the spontaneity within thought itself – as we saw, ‘the capacity of thought – of 
identity itself – to cause reality to break in on the mind that masters it’ (Hullot-Kentor 
2006, p.15). If thought is to challenge the identity it ascribes to the objective world, there 
can clearly be no ‘positive’ conceptual resolution or final identity in its reflection of the 
object. Rather, what Adorno calls the ‘non-identity’ of the object determines its 
experience such that its mediation does not come to an end, and no concept as such 
Prospects Beyond Ideology: Reason, Freedom and the Truth of the Subject – 
Towards Political Models for the Critical Thought of Theodor W. Adorno 
 
 199 
circumscribes its identity with finality. ‘Spontaneous’ experience of the object, rather, 
points towards ways it has not been known or identified, leading to new concepts 
pertaining both to the object, and the subjectivity experiencing it.   
 
This experience never exhausts the object itself. ‘[W]hen I speak… of negative 
dialectics,’ Adorno says, ‘what I mean by it is… the very fibre of thought, its inner 
structure, the way in which… the concept moves towards its opposite, the non-
conceptual’ (Adorno 2008, p. 6). This ‘fibre’ or ‘inner structure’ of thought is where 
spontaneity overcomes the identity imposed upon it within thought itself.  As spontaneity 
can only ever partially overcome the conceptual limitations of identity, however, it results 
in further contradictions. And as these necessarily fall on the side of consciousness, the 
latter continually stands opposed to the ‘non-identity’ of the object it attempts to 
comprehend. However, the subject’s mediation of the object also changes the subject and 
also, as we see below, gives rise to elements of experience which are ‘non-conceptual’ in 
their articulation or content, in as far as they cannot be circumscribed by attempts to 
identify them.  
  
In its most elementary form, negative dialectics is mediation between subject and 
object attempting to think together ‘the presence of subjectivity in the object (the idealist 
insight into the subject’s active participation in the perception of the object) and the 
presence of objectivity within the subject (the materialist insight that the schemata of 
perception are co-constituted by society)’ (Pickford 2002, p. 325). The object is invested 
with subjectivity in order to be known, and the subject is invested with objectivity in order 
to know, suggesting, pace Adorno, how the dialectic between subject and object cannot be 
resolved with any finality on the subjective side. Instead, Adorno’s dialectic explores 
unresolved contradictions between subjective conceptualisation of the object and the ways 
the conceptualising consciousness is determined by objective social circumstances.   
 
The Idealist side of Adorno’s negative dialectic shares, nevertheless, Hegel’s 
emphasis of conceptual ‘sublation’ into more developed states of consciousness: 
‘thoughts that are true’, as he states in the passage quoted in 5.2 above, ‘must incessantly 
renew themselves in the experience of the subject matter, which nonetheless first 
determines itself in those thoughts’ (Adorno 1998, p.131). The fundamental exception 
Adorno takes to Hegel’s dialectic, however, relates to how the object is determined in 
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conceptual reflection. Adorno’s central criticism is that Hegel seeks to ‘wholly dissolve 
the real into what can be articulated in concepts’ (Bowie 2012, p.2). This means, first, 
Hegel ‘puts all the determinacy on the side of the mediating forms of the subject’ (ibid.): 
Hegel’s dialectic ‘sublates’ all experience into the self-determining ‘Absolute’ in the 
historical process of the subject’s active mediation, which in turn for Hegel comes to 
account for the totality of experience.   
 
For Adorno, this dialectical ‘sublation’ remains ‘positive’, because it conveniently 
overlooks experience where, i.) the subject is not, or cannot be, self-determining, where 
its consciousness remains dependent on the objective world or nature beyond it; where 
ii.) mediation of the subject’s particular, contingent experience does not occur 
consciously, or the subject is incapable of significantly conceptualising its experience in 
sufficiently ‘normative’ terms; or where iii.) the subject’s particular experience fails to be 
incorporated in the normatively legitimated conceptual practices of society, but may be 
no less ‘true’ as a reflection of social circumstances for that matter. Put another way: 
Hegel’s determinate negation prioritises the self-determination of thought by directing it 
towards the identity conceptual reflection ascribes to the object. For Adorno, this 
prioritisation is a symptom, as well as a cause, of Hegel’s premise of the ‘whole’: 
 
In Hegel, the positive nature of dialectics – in other words, the fact that the whole, the 
quintessence of all negations is the positive, the meaning, reason, indeed the godhead and the 
Absolute – is the premise that actually sets the dialectic in motion. By the same token, it is also 
the result that is supposed to emerge, and emerge, inexorably, from this dialectic (Adorno 2008, 
p.27).  
 
Adorno’s objection to the premise of the ‘whole’ is that it tries to be both what he refers 
to as the ‘analytical’ premise of how conceptual reflection relates to the object (the 
identity, or lack thereof, between them), and the ‘synthetic’ premise of the reconciliation 
between thought and the object, simultaneously. This means the ‘analytical’ premise of the 
problem of relating conceptual reflection to the object and reconciling them in Hegel is 
ultimately the same as the ‘synthetic’ premise that reflection (the concept) captures ‘that 
which is not mind [the object], and identif[ies] with it [italics mine]’ (ibid., p.28). 
 
The first significant part of Adorno’s objection to Hegel, then, is how the 
dialectical contradictions of experience, and eventually conceptual practices normatively 
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determining experience of the social whole, are ‘sublated’ in consciousness itself. As 
Pippin notes, the common criticism of this ‘sublation’ in the ‘whole’ is that it relies on a 
‘philosophy of consciousness.’ The criticism of such a philosophy, supposed to provide 
the normative standards by which society’s self-determination becomes possible, is that it 
is an account 
 
[o]f how the opposition between subjective certainty and self-satisfaction, on the one hand, and 
objectivity and sociality, on the other, is finally “sublated” within some single “macrosubject”… 
by means, that is, of some theoretical denial of all “otherness” and so the “totalisation” of a self-
conscious subject as “the whole” (Pippin 1997, p.159).    
 
This criticism suggests how sublation of conceptual reflection into a self-grounding 
‘whole’ determined by the (theoretically, increasingly sophisticated) consciousness of the 
subject may, despite the rational compulsion of determinate negation, also ultimately 
reduce the object to conceptual reflection and normative practices arising thereof. It also 
suggests how experience of the object may become predetermined by normative 
practices already determining social experience, to the degree that aspects of the object 
or objective world become foreclosed to the consciousness of the subject.  
 
Hegel’s prioritisation of identity that thought can ascribe the object, then, has the 
effect of ‘totalising’ the concept, and therefore subjectivity itself. We have seen how 
Adorno wants to retain the element undergirding Hegel’s dialectic of the subject’s active 
participation in the mediation of the object. Simultaneously, he wants to re-orientate 
reflection towards experience as it may be determined by the object, meaning experience 
of the objective world that precisely cannot be reduced to, or ‘totalised’ in, 
conceptualisation. If, as we saw, the material basis of experience is that ‘schemata of 
perception are co-constituted by society’, however, then Adorno also wants to retain the 
unsettled Kantian distinction between the object in itself, and the unresolved 
contradictions (dialectics) of the phenomenal world. Quoting his lectures on Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason, Bowie explains what Adorno wants to retain from the Kantian 
philosophy:   
 
Adorno sees the form of the subject/object relationship as ‘a relationship of tension between the 
moment […] that something is thought, and the something which is thought’; this is ‘the 
relationship of tension in which the movement of philosophy, the movement of thought is 
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played out at all’ [Adorno 1959-1960, p.4892]. Clearly ‘these two moments in Kantian philosophy 
are in continual friction with each other’, and Adorno’s interest lies in ‘How they are in friction 
with each other’, what constellations they enter into with each other, what difficulties result from 
this’ [Adorno 1995, p.10] (Bowie 2013, p.38). 
 
In Kant, there is the unresolved dialectic, not only in contradictions of the phenomenal 
world, but also between these and the ‘thing’, or object, in itself. To clarify: ‘that 
something is thought’, for Kant, is possible because of the transcendental unity of 
apperception. The something which is thought, however, depends on the contingent historical 
moment in which it is thought. The latter, as we have seen, is accommodated in Hegel’s 
dialectical mediation, but the reflective tension for Adorno remains between how 
thought may be determined or ‘given’ at a specific historical moment, and the 
spontaneity of thought (‘that something is thought’) of the transcendental subject, in 
itself. This reflective tension can only be expressed, following Hegel, by necessity via 
reference to a given socio-historical ‘constellation’ of subject and object, but, following 
Kant, cannot reduce the object of knowledge to this constellation, as the object always 
retains elements distinct from any particular historical attempt to conceptualise it, thus 
retaining elements of ‘non-identity’.   
 
Simultaneously, however, pace his critique of Kant, Adorno also retains a ‘non-
identity’ of the concept. Kant resolves his categorical imperative, for example, in the face 
of contradictions of the phenomenal world with the deontological argument that moral 
law is necessary in its own right and does not rely on hypothetical premises, because 
these are dependent on subjective imperatives. Moral law, therefore, would be legitimised 
by individuals acting only insofar as their autonomously chosen moral actions should 
become universal laws – as he states in the categorical imperative: ‘Act only according to 
the maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become universal law’ 
(Kant 1993, p.30). Moral autonomy would thus be possible by acting in concert with 
universal law. Kant had thereby attempted to overcome contradictory ethical demands 
between individuals with a universalising injunction derived from ‘pure reason’ that 
would simultaneously guarantee autonomy, in the sense of mankind’s own unique 
position and duty in the world, and which required no further theoretical elaboration.  
 
For Adorno, however, the point is not that such a concept of morality needs 
further theoretical elaboration, but that it is not clear how it corresponds to a world 
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‘where it is very undecided how far such a right life would touch the objectively 
entangled and enmeshed nature of existence today’ [Adorno 1993, p.147] (Bowie 2013, 
p.112) and where even the finest theoretical resolution of a problem may not illuminate 
what ‘right action’ may be under a particular circumstance. Additionally, the autonomous 
choice involved in resolving, say, a dilemma according to one moral maxim or another 
obscures a chain of other (probably contradictory) factors contributing to circumstances 
that may yet be decisive to the situation, factors which, moreover, may by themselves 
impose severe constraints on autonomy.  
 
In this way, concepts - as we also saw in Chapter 2 concerning claims whose 
residual truth-content resides in contradictions between what they aspire to but which 
has not been achieved socially – also always retain a non-identity, namely in 
contradictions between conceptual claims themselves and their relation to the experience 
of social reality. Additionally, however, such concepts may yet be emancipatory precisely 
in their failure to correspond truthfully to reality, in the sense that they keep experiences 
and ideas, and the circumstances they were a reaction to, alive in ways which may be 
repressed by the existing norms of a given society. The non-identity of the concept, 
alongside the non-identity of the object outlined above, are simultaneously targeted in 
Adorno’s ‘negative’ dialectic.    
   
Following Bowie, then, ‘Adorno’s concern is therefore with the “tension between 
the interest in the objectivity of truth, on the one hand, and reflection on the knowing 
subject as that which constitutes truth, on the other”’ [Adorno 1959-1960, p. 4930] (ibid. 
p.43). ‘Truth’ cannot only be an epistemological matter of resolving issues of knowledge 
positively, as truth only gains its objectivity through reflection of the subject, the latter of 
which is historically contingent. Simultaneously, truth must be objective in a sense that 
cannot be reduced to the subject and its contingent experience, which is the kind of 
objectivity investigated by natural science (recall Adorno never disputes science itself, 
only, as Bowie says, ‘what the exclusive concentration on [science] may produce’ (ibid. 
p.46) in social terms).  
 
Yet, natural science, for its objectivity, is still by necessity a reduction of 
objectivity to subjective categories, and Adorno is here interested in the ‘objective’ 
meaning that is lost when the objective world is ‘controlled’ by these subjective 
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categories. The ‘negative’ dialectical turn is therefore towards the ‘truth-content’ in the 
unresolved, ‘non-identical’ tension between the loss of objective meaning, on one hand, 
and the subjective interest in freedom and self-determination, on the other, within a 
specific historical constellation of the object under consideration demanding the attempt 
of its articulation. However, such articulation will also depend on the acknowledgement 
we investigated in Chapter 4 that, for Adorno, the objectivity sought in epistemology or 
science cannot be the sole standard for philosophy, because our ways of relating to the 
world are not only or primarily cognitive, but also affective. 
 
At this point, two steps must be taken to concretise what this theory can mean in 
practice: first, we look at how Adorno’s ‘constellations’ can be used to illustrate 
difficulties arising from tensions in contradictions between experience and its objective 
determination. Second, we examine the notion of subject as object, via which ‘non-
conceptuality’ can be examined. It follows if there is also objectivity within the subject in 
order for the subject to know anything in the first place, then there must also be an 
objectivity with which the subject can be known which is not cognitive in the scientific or 
epistemological sense, but to which the subject’s self-determination is nevertheless 
concretely bound. I expand on this point in section 6.4 below.  
 
Excursus: Preliminary Constellations 
 
Adorno’s targeting of instrumental forms of rationality in the historical 
‘constellation’ of Modernity that, despite degrees of their political consent is intended to 
reveal tensions between the subject’s self-determination and the objective, contingent 
determination of experience. These tensions also show how the normativity of 
contemporary practices objectively determining much of what is conceptualised in a 
specific historical constellation can fail to grasp significant elements of subjective 
experience. Moreover, the gap between such elements and the normative game of ‘giving 
and asking for reasons’ reveals aspects of the ‘truth-content’ in claims made about social 
experience – but which cannot be exhausted in the claims themselves.   
 
Regarding the constellation of Modernity, we may recall how Adorno ‘insists on 
the pervasive and constitutive character of capitalist production [and simultaneously] 
calls attention to the role of corporeal instincts and needs, and of their repression, in the 
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formation of self and civilization’ (Zuidervaart 2011). For example, capitalist relations of 
technological production and economic consumerism, where normatively ‘successful’, 
obviously shape the identities and ideologies of individuals, just as immanent systemic 
failures causing human suffering61 equally determine, in very real ways, how people think 
and relate to their environment. But, as we have also seen, subjective identity itself is 
already determined at the cost of repressing elements of inner or outer nature, the 
manipulation and distortion of needs 62 , and the necessary institutional and legal 
limitations on the scope of subjective choice.  
 
Adorno is here interested in experience consisting simultaneously of i.) all the ways 
the subject is objectively determined, where reflection cannot, or only, be self-determining 
and ii.) the self-determining conceptual activity occurring on the subjective side which, 
however, cannot subsume the object or objective world to itself.  The latter occurs on at 
least two levels: first, on the objective or natural level, where, e.g., individuals may be 
genetically predisposed to think or act in certain predetermined ways, or, second, in the 
sense that individuals may be constrained by social and ideological strictures, such as 
nationality, class, education, finances, and so forth.63 
 
The initial contemporary constellation that may be suggested is the gap between 
the objective determination of social experience by technology as the primary 
determinant of capitalist economic production, and the subjective ability to conceptualise 
its experience in a way that captures its ‘truth-content’ - or fails to.  Adorno’s ‘negative’ 
turn from Hegel’s dialectic in this context can be illustrated, initially, as follows: The 
determination of contemporary experience by economic imperatives of technological 
progress can clearly be thought of in Hegelian terms as a reconciliation of a form of 
conceptual reflection (e.g., technical savoir-faire developed from scientifically objective 
knowledge) with conceptual practices predetermining the experience of society (the 
compulsory quotidian use of technology). This reconciliation is ‘sublated’ in the 
consciousness of the subject (the dependence of individuals on technology to, e.g., 
secure their livelihoods, and their contribution to technology in turn).  
 
                                                
61 See chapters 2, 3 and 5.  
62 See chapters 1 and 2. 
63 See chapter 1. 
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However, this objective determination of experience and the development of, 
e.g., socio-economic norms by technological applications in contemporary society, not 
least due to the ideological prioritisation of speed and immediacy, affects communication 
and the mediation of social norms in increasingly uncertain ways, including in terms of 
how individuals perceive time and are able to determine their use of it.64 The commercial, 
ideological element of this speed-driven technology is the empowerment of individuals 
and clear appeal to their increasing opportunities for self-determination. How self-
determination is possible with regard to technology itself, however, is a significant 
element of the truth-content of such claims: on one hand, individuals experience hitherto 
unimagined possibilities of freedom, economic and otherwise, because of what 
technology makes possible; conversely, self-determination vis-à-vis technology becomes 
increasingly difficult if we consider, e.g., its appropriation of time itself, where previous 
distinctions between ‘private’ and ‘public’ time are collapsed in a 24 hour cycle of 
consumerist ethos.       
 
Additionally, the broader commercial claim that technology makes modern life 
‘universally’ easier is a key element in its facile political legislation, but the claim is 
undermined by the ways it may leave behind large segments of the population and 
exclude key demographics, such as the elder, the unemployed, etc., whose possibilities to 
adapt may be compromised, from participation in the legislative process to other 
normative activities. Social norms may be adjusted over time to address such concerns, 
but, e.g. as Rosa suggests (2013), the ‘social acceleration’ 65 itself can result in the 
alienation of vast numbers of people from understanding of, and the ability to effectively 
engage, socio-economic mechanisms most determining their everyday experience. This, 
moreover, can also (or especially) extend to managers, experts or those charged with 
implementing the economic instruments which, in conjunction with technology, 
determine much social experience, a vivid recent example of which was the financial 
crisis of 2008 and its aftermath, which occurred despite the forecasts and predictive 
models of top economic experts, even as the crisis became increasingly apparent.66     
 
That this global crisis originated in the U.S. sub-prime mortgage crisis, predicated 
on financial instruments such as so-called ‘credit default swaps’ that kept the institutions 
                                                
64 See chapters 3 and 5. See also Rosa 2013. 
65 Ibid. 
66 See Greenspan 2013. 
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and traders perpetrating them largely unaccountable while affecting swathes of people 
globally who had nothing to do with the U.S. housing market but who, among other 
things, were caught up in complex international financial mechanisms threatened by the 
crisis and targeted by severe austerity measures imposed by governments in its aftermath, 
underlines two things: First, this kind of objective determination of social experience 
both severely limits the self-determination, economic and otherwise, of individuals, 
rendering them incapable of responding directly in ‘normative’ fashion other than 
through limited mechanisms of the political ballot (which, for many, provides insufficient 
degrees of choice between economic policy). Second, the experience of suffering caused 
by the crisis – beyond the immediate level of foreclosures, lost jobs, life-savings and 
homes, etc. – suggests a truth-content of the social experience of this historical 
constellation that finds little or no expression in the, e.g. cognitive mechanisms of the 
systemic socio-economic adjustment to the crisis.    
 
The Adornian turn toward the ‘non-identical’ in such a historical constellation of 
experience is not merely a political, intellectual or ideological opposition to the tangible 
injustice wrought by such events that may, or may not, provide a normative corrective to, 
in this instance, out-of-control financial mechanisms, however. Rather, he is here 
interested in elements of that particular experience that remain unexpressed, as part of the 
truth-content of its experience. It is possible e.g., that the crisis may be understood in the 
future in terms of economic instruments developed to address it, or lessons learned from 
the reactive measures of governments, or a combination of these and other factors, etc. 
However, cognitive ways of understanding this particular socio-historical constellation of 
events are not the only way to understand its experience, and as we see below, its 
affective dimensions may provide resources that suggest ways of self-determination in a 
constellation in which ‘normative’ responses may fail to satisfy it on many levels.     
 
Another way of examining Adorno’s emphasis on unresolved tensions in the 
constellation of Modernity is to consider the undisputed benefits of modern medicine as 
the obvious way in which increasingly accurate cognitive concepts relating to the human 
body contribute to an objective form of freedom and personal self-determination, in 
their contribution to longevity of life and prevention of human suffering. Conversely, 
such advances can also result in socially repressive phenomena, such as the meaningless 
prolongation of life in terminally ill people who desire peaceful death but where it may 
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be illegal by law to administer it, the sometimes wrongful prescription of medicines 
which may have been developed to satisfy commercial interests of pharmaceutical 
entities, or, more superficially, artificially created ‘needs’ for non-essential plastic surgery, 
as part of the Culture Industry’s standardisation of norms of beauty (itself a source of 
widespread suffering). Such tensions between, first, a Hegelian view of the indisputable 
historical progress of a specific form of scientific rationality and second, an Adornian 
view that historical contradictions continue revealing how the problem of freedom 
cannot only be subsumed into, e.g. only explanatory laws of science and the freedoms 
they provide, invites consideration of Adorno’s emphasis on affective elements of 
experience, to which we now turn. 
  
6.4. Moving Beyond Identity: Towards the Non-Conceptual 
 
What does Adorno’s dialectical turn towards ‘non-identity’ amount to? We saw 
how his ‘prioritisation’ of the objective is to re-orientate experience away from the 
subjective control of nature. Where this control, inherent in conceptual forms of 
comprehending and categorising the world, is necessary to understand it in the first 
place, it is simultaneously the source of violence done to the object, whether to the world 
as such (e.g., in man’s ability to lay waste to the environment in exploitation of its 
resources), or other subjectivity (domination of the other as a strategy of self-
preservation as the systemic capitalist norm), and therefore also a source of suffering. 
Adorno’s point is therefore to try to comprehend experience in ways not uniquely 
subsumed under the conceptual control of the object, or nature, considering the real-
world, historical effects it can have. How will this be possible, if identification and 
control of the object is the only way to make sense of the world in the first place? 
 
The ‘priority of the objective’ (unfortunately named, because the term suggests a 
decentred subjectivity altogether, which is not Adorno’s point) is simultaneously more 
differentiated and targeted than a ‘blind spot of objectivity’ that e.g. realists such as Nagel 
also suggest can never fully be attained.67  If this objective is what is non-identical to the 
concept, then concurrently the only way to grasp it is through the concept – through 
                                                
67 [T]here will not even be a limiting point beyond which it is impossible to go. This is because each 
step to a new objective vantage point, while it brings more of the self under observation, also adds to 
the dimensions of the observer something further which is not itself immediately observed. And this 
becomes possible material for observation and assessment from a still later objective standpoint. The 
mind’s work is never done’ (Nagel 1989, pp.128-129). 
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identity, or the attempt to conceptualise it. Simultaneously, as Bowie explains, ‘if the 
relation of thought to its object did not involve an aspect of non-identity in the object, 
thought would be empty, because it would not be directed at something beyond itself’ 
(Bowie 2013, p.67). This means thought must already be determined by what it is not – 
and it is this ‘spontaneity’ of thought determined by what it is not, as opposed to the 
reduction of the object only to subjective categorisation, that Adorno wants to salvage by 
using ‘the strength of the subject to break through the fallacy of constitutive subjectivity’ 
(Adorno 1973, p. xx).  
 
The ‘fallacy of constitutive subjectivity’ is how identity circumscribes the object 
to itself, whether conceptually, or in ways individuals ideologically exclude, dominate or 
persecute otherness – the other as object external to subjectivity - to safeguard (self-
preserve) their sense of identity. As we saw, it is also the source of ‘false’ consciousness 
and other forms of reification, which Adorno says only ‘the strength of the subject’ can 
overcome. But identity also points towards what is conceptually lacking in it, and thus a 
concept always contains more than it can express. ‘The primacy of the object’, Adorno 
writes, also means ‘that subject for its part is object in a qualitatively different, more 
radical sense than object, because object cannot be known through consciousness, hence 
is also subject’ (Adorno 1998, p.249). This means the subject is more ‘radically’ object 
than an (inanimate) object in the world, in that it possesses consciousness, and thus a 
potential self-determination to overcome the identity imposed both on subjectivity by its 
objective determination, and by subjectivity, through ‘subject-centred’ forms of 
reasoning, on the object. 
 
More concretely, this also means the subject itself is an object of knowledge that 
cannot only be understood by, say, objectifying methods, irrespective of how accurate 
these are.  We need not only take the ‘absolute’ example of the horror of Auschwitz or 
other atrocities perpetrated in the name of identity in order to grasp what Adorno means 
by subject being more ‘radically’ object. For example, the ability of modern medicine to 
mitigate suffering does not eliminate how the subject has experienced that pain, which can 
be expressed in manifold ways and relative to a number of circumstances that cannot 
only be accounted for diagnostically. Simultaneously, however, the ability to accurately 
diagnose and treat malady unquestionably also opens up new ways of understanding its 
experience. Adorno’s point here would be that as objectifying methods improve in their 
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accuracy to solve human problems, the more this conceptual refinement also points to 
what it is not – or elements of experience, and experience of its objectifying methods, that 
it has missed – or which are forgotten. The ‘non-identical’ in this sense are elements of 
experience that may have objective truth-content, but are obscured by dominating ways 
of determining objectivity – and which have a truth-content to contribute to the search 
for objectivity in turn.     
 
On another, social, level, benefits of technology in making information available 
to individuals they may not otherwise have had undoubtedly liberates their conceptual 
powers and, in one sense, their ‘ideological’ identities (at least according to earlier 
historical notions of ideology). Conversely, the increasing demands technology places on 
individuals creates other ways of relating to it, and each other, which can also result in 
(unwelcome) constraints on subjectivity and the suffering of forms of unfreedom. The 
pressure to comprehend a range of issues beyond a personal profession or field of 
expertise, e.g. the technological injunction to integrate all personal information online 
which puts identity itself at risk, or in another sense, ‘objectifies’ identity in ways the 
subject can no longer control, can create immense degrees of suffering. More simply, it 
may be considered how online economic interactions for elderly people who may make 
disproportionate financial errors because of a lack of understanding of the technology 
that has replaced in-person contact, can place an undue burden of suffering (inadequacy, 
loss of basic identity/means or traditional senses of belonging, etc.) on individuals, which 
may not yet have been adequately understood, politically, ‘cognitively’ or in otherwise 
normative terms.68 The objective determination of experience, hence, as an object of 
knowledge in its own right, means there are dimensions of experience that are also 
objective, e.g. that possess an objective truth-content in a sense that cannot only be 
encompassed by socially pragmatic achievements, or the objective standards employed to 
their ends.   
 
In the introduction to ND, Adorno writes: ‘[t]he need to lend a voice to suffering 
is the condition of all truth. For suffering is objectivity which weighs on the subject; what 
it experiences as most subjective to it, its expression, is objectively mediated’ (Adorno 
1973, pp.17-18). This means, first, truth cannot be ‘separated’ (in the epistemological 
sense informing cognitive stances) from the contingent socio-historical constellation 
                                                
68 See Turkle 2011. 
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experienced, because the conceptual identity ascribed to something at a specific point in 
time is objectively determined. Second, because the cognitive identification of the 
objective world comes to determine so much of social experience, it means truth cannot 
be a matter only of that identification, however successful, but must also be about what it 
misses (what is non-identical), e.g. elements of social experience not explicable only 
through its normative success.  This includes above all ‘the need to lend a voice to 
suffering’, because suffering cannot only be measured or understood by cognitive means, 
and yet is the standard by which people judge their happiness, or lack thereof. Third, 
suffering and its expression do not have to be justified according to normative modes of 
rationality in order to be true. Fourth, however, the subjective attempt to express 
suffering, or other forms of affective experience, can be an objective form of truth missed 
by social norms or objectifying forms of rationality. 
 
The claim to objectivity in this sense also depends on the argument, developed 
by Honneth,69 that the notion of ‘Acknowledgement’ (Anerkennung) must be a preceding 
relationship of the subject to the objective world than the historically developed 
cognitive methodologies employed to grasp it. We saw in Chapter 4 how Adorno 
developed the notion throughout his work that the subject’s attempt to ‘control’ the 
world was a consequence of the imperative of self-preservation, and how Adorno’s 
‘negative’ turn from this reasoning was towards an ‘affective’ or ‘mimetic’ dimension of 
understanding the world not only depending on its control, but also on how self-
preservation must mean mutual understanding. The argument as recently developed by 
Honneth illustrates how consequent ways of understanding the world in cognitive terms, 
irrespective of their success, also means these advances would not have been possible in 
the first place had it not been due to mutual agreement or concern, in a particular socio-
historical constellation, that these advances were necessary to pursue in the first place.  
 
What this means for Adorno’s argument at the immediate level is there cannot be 
a notion of truth without acknowledgement of the elements of experience, such as the 
suffering or inter-subjective comprehension constituting socio-historical reality on one 
hand, and the notion that the (philosophical or other) attempt to ‘rationalise’ suffering in 
terms of the advances of modern reason, is a failure of the understanding  - and an insult 
to the dignity of those suffering, by attempting to give this objective ‘meaning’ - on the 
                                                
69 See Honneth 1996. 
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other. But additionally, and crucially for Adorno’s theory, is that it is a ‘negative’ turn 
away from the self-resolution of ‘dialectics’ as the pursuit of truth and the – still equally 
dialectical - turn towards ‘mimetic’ dimensions of the understanding. Mimesis, at its most 
basic in the Greek means ‘imitation’, which has been ascribed a large degree of variegated 
philosophical meaning and is the source of contentious debate70, can for Adorno’s 
purposes initially here be understood as the affective, non-repressive and non-violent 
reflection of human activity in its imitation.  
 
In this view, mimesis as an attempted description of reality, is present in all forms 
of everyday communication. From the need to observe others to adapt to, say, pragmatic 
demands of a workplace, to the adoption of a particular accent within a given 
environment, to how couples may adopt each other’s mannerisms, mimesis is a 
subjective way of understanding and coping with the objective world in ways that doesn’t 
immediately demand its control or its reduction to the subjective self. Consider e.g. a 
young child’s imitation of its parents or peers as it enters what Lacan calls the ‘symbolic’ 
realm of communication71, before it is even capable of articulating thoughts clearly in 
linguistic terms. As such, we may consider how the attempt to describe the reality that is 
experienced in the first place in cognitive terms or more advanced concepts has to be a 
function of the mimetic element in human communication, without which 
communication itself, considering the development of shared languages, would not be 
possible in the first place. The ‘non-identical’ turn toward the mimetic in Adorno is 
firstly, then, the attempt to salvage the moment of experience that is not dominated by 
the need for self-preservation. This is, first, in the attempt to ward off suffering, but 
second, in the desire to salvage aspects of experience from their determination by 
‘instrumental’ forms of rationality, and return them to a truth-content of the objectivity, 
or nature, beyond these.  
 
Adorno’s companion work to ND, the difficult Aesthetic Theory (AT), is his 
testament to mimesis as a central philosophical category in its interpretation of how art 
can embody a non-repressive form of reason. While this work is unfortunately outside 
the scope of this thesis due to the former’s sheer magnitude, and the concentration of 
                                                
70 See e.g. Adorno’s influence on Lukács, The History of Class Consciousness and The Theory of the 
Novel for an influential account of a mimetic view of history and literature, and Rorty 1980 for an 
epistemological challenge to uses of mimesis.  
71 For an elaboration on this, see Conclusion.  
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this thesis on predominantly socio-political dimensions of Adorno’s thought, we may 
briefly look at what he intends with it in the context of a ‘negative dialectic’. One 
imperative of AT, for example, is to show how tensions within works of art express 
contradictions in the socio-historical context within which they are created. Working 
through the contradictions within a work of art and its interpretation, it follows, reveals 
tensions in social experience itself that remain un-reconciled. At the same time, he says,  
 
Art is… able to speak in itself. This is the realisation through mimesis. Art’s expression is the 
antithesis of ‘expressing something’. Mimesis is the ideal of art, not some practical method or 
subjective attitude aimed at expressive values. What the artist contributes to expression is his 
ability to mimic, which sets him free in the expressed substance (Adorno 2002, p.164).  
 
First, most basically, this means art contains resources of expression not ‘codified’ in the 
same sense aspects of social behaviour and communication may be determined by 
dominant ideological, linguistic or other expressive norms. Art ‘speaks for itself’, but 
Adorno’s nuance is what it expresses is non-identity between how expression may 
‘objectively’ be determined – e.g. ‘practical method’, and the subjective (or ideological) 
inclination of an individual’s mode of expression - their ‘subjective attitude aimed at 
expressive values’ - and simultaneously, between these and the mimetic, ‘pre-subjective’ 
ideal towards which expression strives. Second, this means the ‘non-conceptuality’ 
between subjective expression and the mimetic ideal can simultaneously reveal what the 
subject wanted to express beyond what it did express, but failed to – and this ‘ability to 
mimic’: the process of trying to grasp the non-identical between the subject’s expression 
and what it wants to express – what it wants to mimic – is what sets the subject free in 
attempting to express it.  
 
Music, e.g., while expressed conceptually on many intersecting and contradictory 
levels, contains the mimetic dimension of its composer’s experience. It contains not only 
the subjective, determinative content – what its composer ‘wants’ to say – but also the 
objective determination of the exact historical moment in which they say it. The 
accumulation of experience at a particular moment of composition results in a mimesis of 
that moment in what is expressed, while offering a way beyond conceptual boundaries 
within which it is expressed. It is simultaneously an expression of a constellation of non-
identity between, first, the composer’s self-determination and the objective determination 
of their experience, and second, the way the non-conceptuality in the expression suggests 
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truth-content beyond the experience that accumulated it. In this sense, also, the music (in 
this instance) becomes the object to the listening subject, but the dialectic between them 
can be non-dominating and non-repressive – how else to describe the joy and (for lack of 
a better word), freedom, when the mind is moved by something in music that is 
understood, but cannot be encompassed by the subject’s own conceptualisation itself? It 
is in such a sense that art can be said to ‘speak for itself’.     
 
The vast expanse of possible expression in the arts and elsewhere, then, 
underlines the irreducibility of the affective dimension of the understanding. Where one 
does not expect a composer, writer or painter to justify their art normatively in terms of 
cognitive or propositional truth, what may be expressed, and the residual non-
conceptuality in that expression, is still partly a matter of the objective determination of 
experience in a contingent historical constellation, and therefore contains truth content 
about the objective world. Additionally, the immediate conceptual content in a work of 
art – its ‘identity’ – also points towards what is non-conceptual in it: the identification of 
a work according to a dominant understanding of its historical context, or what else may 
be known about it, can also reveal elements of the historical experience that may have 
been suppressed, rejected or forgotten in that particular identification.      
 
A negative dialectic, then, is the attempt to think together the ways social 
experience is determined, normatively or otherwise, and the ways experience remains 
non-identical, contradictory and objective to, the objective determination of society. The 
‘negative’ dialectic, hence – the ‘non-identity of identity and non-identity’ – is, the turn, 
then, first: to a non-identity between how the subject may be objectively determined, 
where reflection cannot, or only, be self-determining, and the self-determining conceptual 
activity occurring on the subjective side which, however, cannot subsume the objective 
world to itself. Second, simultaneously, it is the non-identity between truths that can be 
established by objective means, and the contents of experience these forms cannot 
account for or express, but which may be available to the understanding because of other 
elements of experience, such as the affective or mimetic dimensions of the 
understanding.  
 
I have now outlined what a negative dialectics can mean at the theoretical level. 
This chapter has explained how Adorno retains the idealist element of Hegel’s dialectic 
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of the subject’s self-determination through its active participation in the perception of 
the object, while giving it a materialist turn by supplementing it with the objective 
determination of consciousness. Where for Hegel rationality is a truthful reconciliation 
between experience and the objective world, for Adorno, the truth of the subject 
depends on a critical rationality that any reconciliation between experience and the 
objective world is an insufficient measure of truth. In the next and final chapter, I 
consider what this critical rationality can mean in a concrete political sense, in a thought 
model targeting a contemporary historical constellation. This thought model is an 
attempt to suggest how political models might be extracted from Adorno’s overall body of 
work in future research, but does not claim an absolute essence of such a model – only 
how Adorno’s central arguments may, despite his own reservations, add up to one made 
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VIII. CHAPTER 7: THOUGHT MODEL – NEGATIVE DIALECTICS OF 
POSTMODERNITY 
 
The following chapter is a thought model demonstrating a ‘negative’ dialectic in a 
contemporary constellation of historical experience. The model investigates objectively 
determined currents of social experience through a transcendent dialectical critique 
considering the ‘Global War on Terror’ (henceforth GWOT), and an immanent 
dialectical critique considering perspectives of the integration of technology into 
postmodern identity. The model investigates non-identities between the ideological 
concretion of conceptual practices and their social experience, in the attempt to express a 
truth of subjectivity in this ‘postmodern’ historical constellation. The chapter also 
considers some differences between the historical context Adorno addressed and 
elements of the contemporary one, suggesting how his theory remains relevant, and 
resources that may be drawn from it.  
 
First, I introduce the thought model in terms of Fukuyama’s argument of the 
‘End of History’. This is to show that while this argument fails in the immediate context 
of the GWOT, it retains a truth-content that can be salvaged in a demonstration of the 
objective determination of social experience immanent to contemporary Western 
societies. Second, I undertake the ideology critique of the transcendent socio-historical 
context of the GWOT to emphasise one sense of how identity politics continues to 
permeate attitudes and political discourse in the context of globalisation. This sets up the 
immanent ideology critique of the Western postmodern ‘identity’, where third, I 
investigate dual dialectical perspectives of the objective determination of social 
experience in the context of the loss of personal privacy through technology on one 
hand, and look at some critical aspects of the incorporation of technology into behaviour 
and what it suggests for self-determination in the ‘information society’, on the other. 
These excursuses are bridged by a discussion of the ‘crisis of experience’ in Modernity, 
and how Adorno’s theory remains a resource for a recurrent (but differentiated) 
discussion of this ‘crisis’ in Postmodernity. Finally, in the negative turn of this dialectic 
between ‘transcendent’ and ‘immanent’ ideology critiques, I consider a political 
conceptualisation of the Western Postmodern identity arising from a non-conceptuality 
which this negative dialectical thought model has attempted to express.  
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7.1 Introduction: The End of History, Revisited 
 
In the historical context of the end of the Cold War, political scientist Francis 
Fukuyama made the case in his work, The End of History and the Last Man’72, that world 
history had culminated in a concretising, integrating direction toward liberal 
parliamentary government, market freedom, and technologically driven growth. Most 
remaining systems of government ideologically resistant to Western liberalism, the 
argument followed, were incorporating by necessity, however gradually, nominally 
democratic principles of liberal economic activity through limited market and social 
reforms. Most notably, China had already instituted limited economic reforms in the late 
1980’s73, and Russia, lacking democratic infrastructure, had been opened to unfettered 
capitalism virtually overnight following the dissolution of the U.S.S.R.74  
 
For Fukuyama (at the time), developments of this early 1990’s constellation 
appeared to confirm the Hegelian notion of an ‘end of history’. Fukuyama’s argument 
adopted the Hegelian premise of a conclusively ‘truthful’ reconciliation of the objective 
world with the concept, in this case, of liberal democracy, in the sense that following 
various failed social experiments of preceding centuries, no remaining ideology could 
credibly compete with a market system capable of integrating any idea. Liberal 
democracy was therefore destined to spread globally in a version of  ‘historical 
reconciliation’ of the democratic system of governance with the truth of human 
aspirations and needs, in a ‘sublation’ by the free market of the expressions of these 
needs in previous historical configurations.  
 
At face value, this premise of the ‘end’ of history was widely criticised following 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and onset of the era of the GWOT, with its 
concurrent factors of hostility to the effects of globalisation and towards specifically 
Western values, and the resurgence of religion as an ideological battleground for hearts 
and minds. Fukuyama, nonetheless, had also questioned what such an ‘end’ of history 
could actually look like. Among other things, he challenged the discontents of a liberal 
society so integrated that human passions and ingenuity would amount to little more 
                                                
72 See Fukuyama 1993. 
73 See Coase 2013.  
74 See Dzarasov 2013.  
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than the preservation of health and the material accumulation of wealth as the last great 
equalising, democratising factors.75  
 
Would the removal of ‘ideological’ competition altogether, Fukuyama asked, and 
lack of the possibility of metaphysical satisfaction of human interests in the face of the 
benefits and truths of modern science and freedoms afforded by market mechanisms, 
paradoxically result in a populace so disenchanted or pacified that democracy itself could 
be ‘devalued’, as a function of its own normative success?  The revolt against 
globalisation and real-world effects of economic injustice, terrorism and war laid 
Fukuyama’s argument to rest relatively quickly in ensuing years. These may not have 
completely invalidated the Hegelian thrust of Fukuyama’s argument from a perspective 
immanent to Western society, however, where he may have articulated vital elements of 
modern consciousness with this adoption of the Hegelian idea.  
 
For the purposes of this thought model, I therefore identify a constellation of 
contemporary Western socio-historical experience between a transcendent perspective 
of the GWOT, as one defining element of ‘universal’ (global) contemporary political 
discourse, and then - more specifically - from the immanent perspective of some 
developments pertaining to civic identity within Western societies. The model therefore 
simultaneously outlines a negative dialectic immanent to Western society, highlights how 
some of Adorno’s critical concerns remain relevant to the present historical constellation, 
and suggests new ways of conceptualising the truth-content of its experience, 
highlighting its contradictions and pointing towards ways of overcoming its ideological 
concretion.   
 
7.2 The Transcendent Critique: The Global War on Terror 
 
I therefore consider the initial inception of the GWOT as a transcendent critique 
of contemporary social experience.76 Beyond its wars, strategic imperatives and degrees 
of practical success, the GWOT has indelibly marked experience of the current era, not 
least in terms of its reinforcement of identity politics and concurrent alienation of the 
                                                
75 Fukuyama takes issue with this notion in subsequent writings. See Fukuyama 2014.  
76 I am constrained by initial events marking this historical period and cannot go into more recent 
events related to it, such as the Arab Spring or the plethora of other developments, for reasons of space. 
I maintain, however, these initial events have defined the current age on manifold political and 
ideological levels, and therefore serve as an adequate ‘constellation’ for this thought model.  
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‘Other’. Whether domestically in Western societies, where problems related to 
immigration often play out in the shadow of security concerns related to the GWOT, or 
internationally, where reinvigorated religious ideologies overshadow more subtle 
economic undertones of globalisation and continue to culminate, on the immediate level, 
in terrorism and counter-terrorist measures, the GWOT is another no less critical side of 
the experience of globalisation driven by boundless free market expansion, in a world 
where global events have immediate local repercussions.  
 
One initial prism through which this conflict was viewed was the supposed 
‘Clash of Civilizations’ suggested in an influential paper77 by political scientist Samuel 
Huntington, an argument which seemed prescient on September 11, 2001. The argument 
proposed that with the end of the great 20th Century ideological struggles, individuals 
would increasingly define themselves through ethnicity and religion, culminating in a 
‘clash’ between the West and other civilizations rejecting ideals of democracy, human 
rights, secularism, etc. Huntington claimed the ‘central and most dangerous dimension 
of… emerging politics would be conflicts between groups from differing civilizations’ 
(Huntington 1998, p.13). Conceptually, however, this argument belied the historical 
complexity of the development of radical Islam78 and reinforced its own dominant 
narrative – most evidently at the immediate political level - at the expense of factors 
related, but decidedly non-identical, to this interpretation.  
 
For example, friction between the West and ‘the rest’ may have reached its 
flashpoint of antipathy in the September 11th terrorist attacks and subsequent actions, but 
radical splinter groups around the Muslim world urging fundamentalist views of Islam far 
predated this event and historically targeted, more frequently, fellow Muslims of differing 
religious denominations in local territories, which is not to overlook the more nationalist 
ambitions of radical groups in, say, Central Asian, former Soviet-controlled territories.79 
Such events coincided with the succession of attacks on Western interests between 1993 
and 2001, in conjunction with mounting apprehension immanent to Western societies 
between cultural identities due partly to paradoxes between integration and a cultural 
homogenisation of social experience. The designation of a multifaceted complex of 
global power-relations in the causality of ‘globalising’ cultural experience as an ideological 
                                                
77 See Huntington 2002.  
78 See Burke 2004. 
79 See Lieven 1999.  
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constellation of warring civilizations, as Huntington suggests, or an outright GWOT, as 
became Western policy, are therefore, pace Adorno, inadequate constellations for this 
particular dialectic of globalisation. 
 
The GWOT is better characterised, initially, as an ideological confrontation 
between factions espousing absolutist conceptions of respective identities on multiple 
sides of a globally politicised divide. In this light, non-identity can be suggested both at 
the immediate conceptual level of the GWOT, and at the level of its experience. The 
declaration of a ‘War on Terror’ concretised a conceptual framework in which the notion 
of ‘terror’ came to be understood more synonymously with ‘Islamic terrorism’, and where 
the furtive characterisation of ‘war’ could be interpreted as being between the 
predominant conceptual self-identification of the West (and its socioeconomic practices) 
as rational, free, and the ‘other’ of terror - and the conceptual identification of terrorism 
more specifically with the Islamic world and pre-modern, religious forms of belief.  
 
One problem with this identification of the GWOT, however, is, as Burke points 
out, that terrorism is a tactic and the ‘term [war on ‘terrorism’]… is therefore nonsensical’ 
(Burke 2004, p.24). It is questionable, first in the sense that the term ‘GWOT’ 
hypostatises a tactic while failing to adequately identify not only who the perpetrators of 
terror are - though it is understood implicitly - but also what this war’s objective is. The 
reason is purportedly the sheer multiplicity of terrorist groups globally whose objectives 
cannot simply be accounted for by Al-Qaeda as the specific terror cell responsible for 
September 11, but perceived to be potential threats to Western interests - also beyond 
the responsibility of national governments to protect their citizens. This notion of a ‘war 
on a tactic’ therefore suggests its open-endedness and potential for ideological 
perpetuation beyond any specifically stated objective. That the designation of ‘war’ left 
the status of long-standing nationalist terrorist groups such as ETA, NLF or IRA in the 
scheme of the GWOT untouched, e.g., moreover reinforces the notion that the terrorism 
targeted is Muslim-related, characterised as motivated primarily by anti-Western 
sentiment and identified specifically with Islamic code. The unspecified nature of the 
term, moreover, was presumably also in order to cloud distinctions between terrorist 
networks and nation-states that could be accused, justly or not, of harbouring them. 
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Second, ‘terrorism’ is an expansive designation dependent on subjective concepts 
e.g. the identity of the perpetrators, the ideological nature of their cause, the nature of the 
act itself, and its experience by its victims. A ‘war’ on ‘terrorism’, therefore, is a 
simultaneously vague and fixed ideological identification of the objective of dealing with 
the actual problem of terrorism, not least because the conceptual concretion with which it 
is immediately identified and its connotations obscure deeper understanding of 
motivations behind it. Additionally, ensuing characterisation by senior political figures 
and the media of the GWOT, and by extension, antagonisms with the West’s broader 
enemies, in terms of a wider metaphysical struggle between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ led to a 
strengthening of the religious undercurrents of this war, further reifying an already deeply 
ideological confrontation to virtually ‘cosmic’ status. These constellations of meaning for 
confronting terrorism, Islamic or otherwise, are inadequate frameworks leading both to 
discursive distortion and obscuring adequate assessments of the problem and causes of 
terror itself, not least in terms of dealing effectively with its threat. This antagonism 
exists, moreover, in a reified purview of globalised social experience, and this reification 
of its contradictions sublates experience of terrorism and its causes within a framework 
arguably contributing to its perpetuation.  
 
The causes of specifically Islamic terrorism are manifold, but at least two are 
impossible to ignore at the immediate political level: sentiments of impotence in the face 
of social conditions in large parts of the Muslim world, and perceptions such conditions 
are objectively determined by Western global economic and political power. These two 
factors are simultaneously causally related and non-identical. They are related in the sense 
that the West could be held partially responsible, both directly and indirectly, for 
perpetuation of social conditions in the Muslim world due to its global influence and 
historically self-interested policy in predominantly Muslim countries.80 One reason for 
this has been a general lack of historical consciousness of Muslim countries on behalf of 
Western policymakers in addressing contemporary geopolitics (I consider the relation of 
historical consciousness to reflective non-identity below). That such a perspective, in its 
ideological form, can result in underplaying the socially immanent responsibility of 
Muslims themselves for social conditions and the real contribution of some of their own 
traditions to the nature of these, however, suggests distinctions, pace Adorno, between 
the direct causation of identifiable phenomena and non-identical ways such causes can 
                                                
80 See Wright 2007. 
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interrelate. The ideological concretion of a confluence of causes in the identification of 
Western influence as the prime source of grievance in the radical Islamic mind serves, 
nevertheless, in conjunction with appeals to Islam itself, as the basis for the purposive 
‘rationality’ of terrorism.  
 
Moreover, Islam is, from its inception, a political project of identification, beyond 
its specifically religious tenets.81 The specific response of terrorism to Muslim grievances, 
real and imagined, is couched in religious injunctions of Islam as grounds for mutual 
identification between individuals and justification for the extreme nature of terrorist 
acts. It nonetheless remains thoroughly political; as Burke suggests, because a grievance 
‘is explained by an individual through reference to a religion, [it] does not make it a 
religious grievance. It remains a political grievance articulated with reference to a 
particular religious worldview’ (ibid. p.25). Islam, consequently, provides a belief system, 
behavioural proscriptions, identity, and vocabulary to resist Western power, but it 
follows the specific act of terrorism is political, and, moreover, ‘legitimated’ in its religious 
appeal to Islam. A large part of this ‘legitimation’ rests on interpretations of Western 
influence, rationality and culture perceived as lacking in tradition, values, and 
diametrically at odds with Islamic codes of behaviour. Islam, thereby, provides not only 
assumed legitimacy for the Muslim identity, but also, for terrorists, ‘legitimation’ for the 
political act of terrorism.   
Contrary to some immediate reactions to the unaccustomed realisation of 
‘globalised’ terrorism in 2001, the conflict shouldn’t, then, be viewed so much through 
the prism of ‘religious war’ between e.g. Islam and Judeo-Christianity, as through the 
ideological lens of political actors invoking religion to legitimate their cause. What, then, 
are these grievances used to ‘legitimate’ radical acts of violence in the name of religion, 
and what conditions ‘justify’ interpretations of Western culture as in turns oppressive and 
trivialising? One way to suggest why the West is characterised as lacking ethical 
foundations, and consequently why religion is held forth as the response, is the often 
sheer impudence of Western cultural and economic power. According to Habermas,  
[t]he furious fundamentalist recourse to a set of beliefs, from which modernity has elicited 
neither any self-reflexive learning process nor any differentiation between religion, secular 
knowledge, and politics, gains a certain plausibility from the fact that it feeds on a substance that 
                                                
81 See Scruton 2003. 
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apparently disappeared from the West. A materialist West encounters other cultures … only 
through the provocative and trivialising irresistibility of a levelling consumerist culture… the 
West presents itself in a form deprived of any normative kernel as long as its concern for human 
rights only concerns the attempt at opening new free markets… (Borradori 2002, p.33)  
The immediate encounter with Western power is, by this account, experienced as the 
manifestation of a culture grounding itself in materialism. By virtue of its technological 
mastery and economic demands resulting in the objective determination of increasingly 
global spatio-temporal experience, Western rationality is perceived to sublate all culture 
and experience it encounters into this materialism. The regression to religion as a ‘pre-
modern’ form of rationality on the broader global level, on this reading, is an effect both 
of the perception of Western rationality as normatively lacking ethical foundations of its 
own, and the attempt to resist sublation of traditional identity into a predatory 
consumerist culture. 
This also suggests while political terrorism is correctly identified with Islam, there 
is also non-identity between the ‘return to religion’ as a matter of seeking conceptual 
resources for a normative conception of experience not sublated into materialism, and 
the use of Islam - or any other belief - to ‘legitimate’ political terrorism. The extremist 
conception of Islam, beyond identifying itself with reference to an ‘external’ object – a 
variation on the concept of ‘God’ (which, paradoxically, cannot be anything other than a 
subjective concept), is an ideological resource for a mode of action – terrorism – tailored 
to political ends. It is therefore also a subject-centred form of reasoning reducing 
experience of the material world to its own dominant conceptualisation of it. 
Concurrently, terrorism is a political means to ‘ground’ the ideological aspect of identity 
simultaneously in radical Islam and in the globalisation of social experience - irrespective 
of justifications it gives itself about Western ‘imperialism’.  
Conversely, Habermas’ characterisation of a modernity which ‘has elicited [no] 
self-reflexive learning process’ from the ‘furious fundamentalist recourse to a set of 
beliefs’ in the wake of its global dominance can be reflected in the Western response to 
terrorism. Beyond the warranted reaction of outrage at attacks aimed squarely at the 
Western identity itself – the initial targets being the symbolic seats of political, financial 
and military power in the U.S. and the broader Western world, prior to subsequent 
attacks elsewhere – the immediate reaction was instantaneous reaffirmation of the 
Western identity. Beyond justified prerogatives of governments to protect their citizens, 
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however, this reaffirmation also amounted conceptually to the political perpetuation of the 
hegemony of its ‘universalising’ forms of rationality, in terms of protection and 
expansion of economic interests globally. This reaffirmation of identity also included the 
attempted revalidation of the ideological concept of freedom central to the Western 
identity, in the identification of freedom with the universalising, globalising drive of its 
own instrumental modes of rationality, as became evident in intonations of Western 
notions of democracy and freedom for subsequent occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq.  
However, as Greenway suggests, ‘[n]eoconservative theorists, who knew nothing 
about Iraq, believed the transformational power of democracy could change the Middle 
East – make Arabs more like Americans. But what happened was Iraq became more like 
the Middle East…’ The occupation of Iraq, e.g., beyond the immediately political 
identification of Hussein’s Iraq with decidedly non-identical elements of Al-Qaeda and 
the broader GWOT, was partially predicated on identification of the non-identical 
concept of an Iraqi nation with the identity of the broader constellation of the Western 
concept of universalising democratic freedom. This particular ‘identity of identity and 
non-identity’ turned out to be a costly judgement not only creating demonstrable fissures 
in the conceptual continuity of the Western identity itself – the radicalisation and 
polarisation of public discourse on all sides, or the crisis of democratic legitimation in the 
West more broadly in the context of American unilateralism – but also reinforcing the 
Iraqi struggle to identify itself as non-identical to the Western identity by reaffirming tribal 
identities, as the ensuing 2005-2007 Sunni-Shi’a civil war demonstrated.  
More significantly, the identitarian nature of the immediate and, politically 
speaking, probably inevitable response of the GWOT was self-contradictory to the extent 
that beyond revalidating the Western identity, it also concretised and ‘validated’ the 
conceptual framework for conflict and the antagonism against itself. The avowal of the 
GWOT recognises terrorism on its own terms, sublating the radicalised experience of a 
non-identical ‘other’ into the Western form of universalising rationality and ‘legitimating’ 
it, to the extent that the Western identity now positively acknowledged terror as a ‘side-
effect’ of its own globalising forms of socio-economic rationality. The lack of a reflexive 
rationality in the establishment of this ideological constellation was subsequently 
underlined, not only in the immediate sense by a general disavowal of responsibility or 
historical reflection by Western governments, but also by the longer term prosecution of 
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the ‘war’, which, while successfully disposing of agents of terror, lags in addressing the 
success of its ideological appeal. 
Habermas, for example, suggests affirmation of the GWOT was ‘a serious 
mistake, both normatively and pragmatically. Normatively, [President Bush was] 
elevating these criminals to the status of war enemies, and pragmatically, one cannot lead 
a war against a “network” if the term “war” is to retain any definite meaning’ (Borradori 
2002, p.34). This suggests terrorists, specifically those like Al-Qaeda operating beyond 
the realm of jurisdictional or internationally binding law, were validated within Western 
and international legal frameworks by their elevation to the status of ‘war enemies’, 
entitling them - in theory - to legal representation and protections that are the right of 
soldiers in a military court of law (as one element of the legal self-legitimation of the 
Western identity). This led, e.g., to contradictions in practical terms in determining the 
legal status and fate of detainees apprehended in subsequent theatres, resulting in the 
creation of extra-legal military tribunals for the prosecution of terrorists and the 
institution of the practice of extraordinary rendition to interrogate terrorists beyond legal 
protections afforded them by domestic laws.  
Additionally, the abrogation of civil liberties, e.g., in legislation of the ‘Patriot 
Act’ in the U.S. which authorised, or loosened restrictions on, wiretapping, the issue of 
search warrants without court orders and the withholding of basic rights under the U.S. 
constitution, were politically and legally justified on the pretext of fighting terrorism and 
the necessary price to pay, paradoxically, for preservation of the Western identity and its 
concept of freedom. The conflation of the GWOT with broader ideological interests 
threw into dispute definitions by which the war itself was waged, including normative 
and legal conceptions by which the prosecution of war could be legitimated. It may be 
suggested, therefore, that an even more serious consequence of the September 11 
attacks, beyond aggregate loss of life, was the arguably successful assault on democratic 
institutions themselves, and therefore on the very Western identity, brought about 
paradoxically in part by the Western effort to preserve this identity. Just as unfortunately, 
these arguably ‘successful’ consequences of the logic of terrorism doubtless reinforced its 
legitimacy in the eyes of its perpetrators, or of those who would emulate them.     
This can by necessity only be a generalised outline of the initial contours of the 
GWOT. The conflict between respective conceptions of identity at its kernel, and 
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competing but concurrently absolutizing forms of reasoning espoused by its factions, 
amounts to a socio-historical constellation of experience ‘uniting’ the Western identity 
with one form of its non-identity in a destructive form of globalising normativity which, 
it might be suggested, is anything but rational. The need for a ‘negative’ dialectical turn 
from this kind of normativity seems clear. Additionally, one element underlying 
experience through the prism of globalisation may be identified as increasingly anxious 
attempts to ‘ground’ identity itself under increasingly uncertain ‘postmodern’ conditions. 
Desired regressions to ‘absolute’ mythical origins implicit in the drive to identification is 
not strictly an Islamic phenomenon, however, and in the remainder of this model I 
investigate corresponding imperatives in postmodern culture and the Western identity. 
We will see how attempts to ‘ground’ identity in ideological ways to ‘guarantee’ 
subjectivity continue permeating rationalising structures at the individual and social 
levels, and I will show how performative contradictions arising thereof also, pace Adorno, 
point towards forms of non-identity that cannot be concretised within such efforts. In 
turning to the immanent critique of the Western identity, then, I ask what freedom, 
rationality and self-determination amount to within some recognisable forms of 
contemporary experience.    
7.3 The Immanent Critique: The Postmodern Identity 
Habermas’ characterisation of the ‘provocative and trivialising irresistibility of a 
levelling consumerist culture’ presenting the West as ‘deprived of any normative kernel’ 
elsewhere in the world demands investigation of certain social conditions immanent to 
Western society.  How e.g. do emerging social norms with relation to technology 
correspond with democratic standards of freedom and self-determination? To explore 
these questions dialectically I deploy two excursuses: The first highlights experience of 
the notion of privacy in postmodern society and the objective social determination of 
some norms relevant to it, and the second looks at some critical aspects of the 
incorporation of technology into behaviour, and what it may suggest for notions of self-
determination. Some ‘non-conceptual’ tensions between these objective and subjective 
levels of two aspects of contemporary social experience suggested at the end point 
towards resources for conceptualising this experience in political terms. 
This thesis has examined Western society’s intensive integration under capitalist 
imperatives of technocratic rationalisation. It has also already explored how – in broader 
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terms of the struggle for alternative socio-political ideologies characterising the 20th 
century, and the relative contemporary lack thereof – political consensus exists less as a 
matter of consensus-seeking than from a position of consensus already reached, as 
pertaining to the predominance of liberal economics, and freedom as expressed through 
the commodity market. To recap these arguments: social relations, class distinctions and 
behavioural norms appear to be objectively determined predominantly according to 
consensus grounded in imperatives of finance, consumerism and technology, and of 
technological and financial access in turn.  Political differences are often restricted to 
disagreement over the social content of capitalism, while the political right to self-
determination characterising the struggles of Modernity may, in post-industrial society, to 
some degree have been overshadowed by the right to choose between competing 
products and ‘life-style’ choices. Many of these conform to integration of the collective 
social whole on determining premises of consumerism and financial freedom as 
conceptual standard-bearers for the idea of freedom itself.     
No such generalisations should obscure the multitude of historically conflicting 
models for capitalist practices, and the styles practiced in countries throughout the West 
are by no means homogeneous in strictly economic terms. In light of national differences 
in economic theory and practice, therefore, it is impossible to speak of capitalism as a 
single, monolithic ‘whole’. One characterisation of the role of capital in post-industrial 
society that does seem irrefutable, nevertheless, is, as Žižek suggests, that ‘the fate of 
whole strata of the population and sometimes of whole countries can be decided by the 
“solipsistic” speculative dance of capital, which pursues its goal of profitability in blessed 
indifference to how its movement will affect social reality’ (Žižek 2008, p.11). As 
opposed to being determined by an ‘organised’ form of capitalism with politically defined 
socio-economic objectives (irrespective of how such models hold sway in e.g. 
Scandinavia), a large share of social experience globally is determined by random and 
contradictory investment of capital into whatever is perceived to have the highest 
immediate rate of profitability, with national and local politics often compelled to follow 
suit.82  
Two dominant elements combine, therefore, in the present determination of 
social experience: the pursuit of profitability ignoring its effects on social reality, and its 
combination with a totalising, technocratic form of rationality, evidenced by its presence 
                                                
82 See Hutton 2002.  
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in simplest daily necessities or interaction. The latter may also prioritise its pragmatic and 
efficient adoption over socially or individually detrimental elements of its experience 
(most immediately the loss of privacy, as suggested below), even as it consequently 
corrects perceived transgressions in normative fashion (not least to preserve profit 
margins) (consider, e.g. struggles between multinationals like Google and the European 
Union, with the latter’s efforts to take regulatory steps to safeguard data-protection).  
This suggests, then, a frame for how society is ‘organised’: Vertically, by the 
haphazard and random investment of capital, while simultaneously determined 
horizontally by its unceasing integration with a technocratic form of rationality tolerating 
few challenges to its social power. It is in the ‘positive’ dialectical resolution between 
capital and technocratic rationality determining contemporary historical experience that 
we may first reconsider the notion of the ‘End of History’: It is obviously not that 
‘history’ has come to a positive ‘resolution’, but rather that a form of historical 
determinism is present in the way social experience is indomitably determined by capital 
and technocratic rationality, even as, paradoxically, social reality becomes increasingly 
uncertain because of it. This frame also suggests while many elements of contemporary 
experience share degrees of similarity with those targeted by Adorno’s cultural critiques, 
there has also been a marked change in the organisational structure of society between 
socio-historical constellations.  
First, as Bauman suggests, we should note the shift from a ‘society of producers’ 
to a ‘society of consumers’, where consumerism is an integrated aspect of social and 
cultural production, and where distinctions between public and private are increasingly 
blurred. The ‘society of producers’ typifying Modernity and the constellation of historical 
experience in the latter part of Adorno’s career was characterised by the incursion of the 
public sphere of production into the private lives of individuals, in the sense that 
production in the public sphere was destined to shape consumption in the ‘private’ 
setting of individuals’ lives, and thus, partially, their identities as private citizens. 
Individuals laboured in a public realm of industrial production, with their activity as 
consumers a matter of how they chose to manage their private lives, where some 
normative demarcation still existed between conceptions of the public sphere of 
production, and private consumerist activities.  
Prospects Beyond Ideology: Reason, Freedom and the Truth of the Subject – 
Towards Political Models for the Critical Thought of Theodor W. Adorno 
 
 229 
By contrast, post-industrial consumer society can be conceived of as being 
determined equally in the democratic sense by individual needs and desires, as by quasi-
oligarchical, entrenched private interests supplying the utilities, gadgets and applications 
dominating the marketplace and its behaviour in the first place, and who use their share 
of market power to determine financial and social value. Additionally, consumerism has 
become a fully integrated aspect of the public role of individuals, in the sense not only of 
‘life-style’ choices marketed by individuals themselves for a share of market or cultural 
value, but also because of the hypostatisation, online and elsewhere, of values, norms and 
beliefs held by them, which becomes an essential part of the cultural production and 
marketability of their own identities, both professionally and privately (and thus, in one 
sense, reflects a reification of identity itself).  
It may therefore be suggested that individuals find themselves in supporting roles 
for the integration of the market with all aspects of human experience, where private life 
itself has become one of the most valuable and scarce commodities. Consider, e.g., the 
trade-off between privacy and access online – how, on the most basic level, access to the 
most popular interactive applications (Google, Facebook, etc.) often requires consent, 
tacit or otherwise, from users that the platform in question is entitled to compile 
information – sometimes including information about the user’s online history not limited 
to the platform itself - ostensibly to deliver more targeted advertisements and ‘facilitate’ 
the user’s life, but over which users effectively relinquish their intellectual property 
control.83  
The degree to which information about individuals is gathered online and stored 
by third parties, and the extent to which individuals consent, and contribute, to this as a 
social norm in its own right, suggests a fundamental shift in attitudes over traditional 
values like privacy, not least considering the amount of information individuals 
themselves volunteer about their private lines online. The paradox between the outrage 
over revelations of surveillance by the NSA ostensibly in the fight against terror, and the 
relatively muted response to essentially similar activities by private companies, 
emphasises the extent to which exchanging privacy for access has become a social norm.   
                                                
83 Top tech corporations e.g. Microsoft, Google, Facebook, etc. have gradually been compelled to 
provide increasing privacy features to applications and assure confidentiality vis-à-vis unsolicited third 
parties, though these often remain intransparent and largely inaccessible, while these corporations 
continually develop new ways of harvesting information unbeknownst to users.  
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Excursus 1: The Object: Privacy and the Postmodern: A “Public” Determination of Private Experience  
 
The social explosion in data harvesting pertaining to everything - and everyone - 
also suggests it is not only that private life is becoming illusory (or at least, an increasingly 
valuable commodity, considering its increasing scarcity), but also that the ability of both 
individuals and governments to maintain confidentiality is being compromised. 
Combined, these developments incontrovertibly change society and social norms, without 
it being understood exactly what this will result in. Pace Adorno, it also suggests the 
pursuit of apparently spontaneous activities and interests can also collectively result in 
oppressive forms of social conformity, reflected in this instance in a freely adopted 
normativity (the exchange of privacy for freedoms afforded by technology) culminating in 
potential forms of social oppression directed at the individual (the threat against 
confidentiality and the public appropriation of the individual’s private thoughts). How, in 
this instance, does the public sphere determine private experience?    
 
First, in the private sphere: revelations concerning the systematic breadth and 
depth of data collection pertaining to citizens worldwide by, among others, U.S. 
intelligence agencies are arguably surprising only to the degree that it has been possible to 
ignore the extent to which ‘big data’ is not only collected in commercial contexts. Almost 
everything individuals do leaves electronic traces, which are collected and analysed so as to 
create evermore perfected profiles – and therefore also evermore precise ‘identities’ - of 
who they ‘are’. Every time a mobile phone, credit card, GPS or computer is used, it is 
registered, not just as an inbuilt function of technology itself, but because information 
about who individuals are and what they do potentially creates revenue. It may therefore 
just as easily be sold, to third parties wishing to target advertising, and to others wishing to 
know personal details about individuals – including governments.   
 
Second, in light of the explosion of social networks, individuals themselves supply 
a broad range of access to information about themselves online, which, realistically, is 
accessible to anyone wishing to obtain it. The snapshot of an intimate moment is only a 
click away from ownership by the public sphere, and where individuals are constantly 
equipped with recording devices registering the smallest or most consequential 
experiences, the ‘willingness’ to share these is in some measure already objectively 
determined, both by pressure stemming from communicative norms to do so, and by how 
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individuals relinquish control the moment something is shared, however innocuously, 
with another individual. Recordings of individual moments can be spread around the 
world and interpreted in contexts never dreamt of the moment recordings were made. In 
this light, it appears even more consequential that governments also compete with private 
enterprise to develop methods to further systematise, analyse and refine the collection of 
vast reams of information pertaining to individuals’ innermost thoughts and doings.  
 
Third, knowledge collected by information-services of nation-states can no longer 
be kept confidential to nation-states themselves. It is not solely social media, privately owned 
service providers or governments collecting information that have access to it: everything 
gathered simultaneously becomes accessible to those who understand how to hack into 
aforementioned entities and spread data they find. Any information is, essentially, a click 
away from its availability to someone else, the only real limitation being the degree to 
which accessible information can be absorbed. The world’s most powerful governments, 
for example, experience a growing inability to keep their own secrets: revelations by 
WikiLeaks and others of large reams of highly sensitive data is seemingly only the 
beginning of a tsunami of spectacular, sensationalised leaks. The observation that the 
private sphere simply no longer ‘exists’ in the way individuals traditionally understood it is 
accompanied by the notion that confidentiality as a norm is potentially also disappearing, 
whatever existence it still has predicated on the (ever-diminishing) limitations of 
technology.  
 
Irrespective, then, of the motives of saboteurs and political dispositions from 
which one considers unauthorised publicists, the fundamental normative question for 
democracies is whether there should simply be information the public has no business 
knowing about, whether at the highest diplomatic levels, or by average people concerning 
other average people. While the undermining of the ability of governments to function by 
traditional means may be applauded in some quarters, most people presumably still value 
their information kept confidential by public institutions, or value the confidentiality of 
the ballot box, or, for that matter, confidentiality of correspondence and the possibility of 
private communication.  The guarantee of a free press as an institutional pillar of 
democracy, for example, depends on its duty to protect its sources, something 
undermined when communications are wiretapped or hacked into, and lives are put at 
risk. 
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These examples suggest ways in which democratic norms are upended by 
technocratic forms of rationality, and of where the democratic process itself struggles to 
catch up to how its ‘normativity’ is in fact objectively determined. We thereby have some 
concrete contemporary examples of why Adorno prioritises the ‘non-identical’ in social 
experience to its objective ideological determination, on at least three levels in this 
example of privacy in our specific socio-historical constellation:  
 
First, on the immediate level, reduction of someone’s experience to the identity 
attributed to them from information about them harvested online can clearly result in a 
state of deep subjective (- and social) un-freedom, particularly considering how someone’s 
experience or reflection is far more expansive and contradictory, if unexpressed in equally 
immediately powerful terms, than pristine profiles that can be created from online 
behaviour. The loss of freedom in this instance can clearly be highlighted by how people 
can lose jobs, livelihoods or their self-determination from something as simple as 
decontextualized snippets of information they may not even have posted themselves.84  
 
Second, the myriad ways in which social experience is non-identical to 
technocratic designations of freedom and self-determination in their ideological rationale 
of access, consumer and financial possibility, etc., demonstrates political contradictions 
immanent to democracies formally devoted to the former, but lacking political answers to 
new and compounding social problems emerging from this objective determination of 
experience, including confronting new meanings and deficits of the notion of democracy 
itself within existing institutional structures of government and public life (this much 
should be evident in governments’ own lack of control over information they gather).  
 
Third, the ‘non-conceptuality’ of this emerging social state of affairs – the 
experiences it both objectively engenders and the gamut of subjective effects and 
responses remaining un-conceptualised by, or non-identical to, the distinct pragmatic 
forms both ‘neutral’ technocratic rationality grounded in successful science and the more 
targeted rage for financial exploitation or political or other control misses – is a necessary 
political resource, if indeed democracy itself is not to become, as Fukuyama feared, 
devalued as a function of its own normative success.         
                                                
84 See e.g. Love 2011.  
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Interlude: Historical Consciousness and A Crisis of Experience? 
 
The passage from the ‘society of producers’ to the ‘society of consumers’ has also 
been marked, then, by a shift from the gradual integration of public and private spheres of 
life and dialectics between them in the former, to a conception of social experience 
subtended by a premise of public unification between them. This ‘unification’ of social 
experience, however, is also to a large extent objectively determined by competition 
between the relative strengths of private interests, which in turn come to determine public 
norms to various degrees. Bauman characterises this socio-historical transformation as 
 
[r]ather than being a step towards the ultimate emancipation of the individual from multiple 
external coercions, that passage may be shown to be the conquest, annexation and colonisation of 
life by the commodity market – the most profound (even though repressed and concealed) 
meaning of that conquest and colonisation being the elevation of the written and unwritten laws 
of the market to the rank of life-precepts; the kind of precepts that can be ignored only at the rule-
breaker’s peril, tending to be punished by their exclusion (Bauman 2007 p.62).    
 
Bauman suggests that as the marketplace itself becomes the arbitrator of social 
normativity, the ‘elevation of the written and unwritten laws of the market to the rank of 
life-precepts’ ensures an ineluctable identity between how the market determines values, 
needs and interests, and the possibilities of self-determining subjectivity - to the degree 
that self-determination is effectively equated with freedoms afforded by the marketplace. 
Equally significantly, such a perspective of the identification of autonomy, self-
determination and rationality predominantly with market imperatives suggests how 
Adorno’s demand for non-reified relations between individuals takes on a contemporary 
dimension:     
 
The near-‘total’ determination of social experience by the free market and the 
relative paucity of political representation of concerns not subsumable to market interests 
or mechanisms suggest one context in which the ‘negativity’ of Adorno’s dialectical 
reflection remains essential. If Adorno was concerned with what Jay calls a ‘crisis of 
experience’ in the historical constellation of the industrial era (keeping in mind, as Jay also 
underlines, that Adorno is deeply critical of attempts to ‘re-enchant’ the world in ways that 
‘seek to recover an alleged ur-experience… somehow deeper than the mediations of 
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culture and society’ [Jay 2004, p.131] - a stance Adorno famously attributes to Heidegger 
in the Jargon of Authenticity), then the question of whether  
 
[t]here is, in short, an implied sense of loss of something that once existed and has been seriously 
damaged, if not entirely destroyed, in the present. Variously attributed to the traumas of world 
war, modern technologies of information, and the “atemporal, technified process of the 
production of material goods”… the decay of something called experience is for Adorno an index 
of the general crisis of modern life” (ibid).  
 
remains equally central to contemporary experience. What this ‘loss’ of experience actually 
amounts, to, though, must relate to ways of experiencing the world eschewing its 
domination by rationalities by which modern wars are waged, how information 
technologies mediate knowledge, or the determination of experience by its relation to an 
overabundance of material goods.  
 
There are sufficient parallels in the contemporary historical constellation with 
Adorno’s critical perspectives over 50 years ago to suggest concerns with the ‘crisis of 
experience’ continue into the post-industrial era, where in some cases similarities are 
pronounced by the even more extreme degree to which some of these forms of 
instrumental rationality Adorno criticised determine experience, firstly, as we have seen, 
on the immediate basis upon which the line between private and public life has been 
eviscerated. Additionally, experience of the present historical constellation itself points 
both to what needs to be expressed politically with relation to it, and to what its 
experience both gains and misses in relation to other historical configurations.   
 
Adorno suggests one notion of experience in his 1959 essay ‘Theory of Pseudo-
Culture’ as ‘the continuity of consciousness in which everything not present survives, in 
which practice and association establish tradition in the individual’ (Adorno 1993, p.33).85  
By tradition established by ‘practice and association’ he means not only manifold kinds of 
Bildung whose experience may be threatened by the objective social overemphasis on 
‘production’ (or in our sense, the dominant emphasis on technology in culture and 
education), or the ways this form of cultural production arrogates infinitely variegated 
kinds of experience to its own dominant form of rationality. Adorno also means resources 
                                                
85 See Jay 2004, p.130.  
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of inter-subjective experience – practice and association resulting in establishing ‘tradition’ 
– that may offer means for responding in self-determining ways to the objective 
determination of culture. This tradition, then, a matter of a ‘continuity of consciousness in 
which not everything present survives’, also refers to historical consciousness as what points 
towards non-identity between how the present socio-historical constellation is 
immediately given, and all the kinds of experience its forms fail to account for.  
 
Historical consciousness and inter-subjective experience are thus two sides of the 
mediation of any contemporary experience, such that it ‘survives’ the objective 
determination of consciousness in the present, without being resolved in any ideological 
sense on the subjective side. If the ‘continuity of consciousness’ of historical experience 
cannot be reduced to the dominant rationality determining the immediate present, 
however, then the subjectivity upon which that continuity depends also depends on how 
historical experience remains contradictory within both any given constellation and between 
them, or e.g. between past, present and future. On the other side, ‘[e]xperience,’ says Jay, 
‘…comes only with an encounter with otherness in which the self no longer remains the 
same. Adorno would add that to be undamaged, experience must treat the other in a non-
dominating, non-subsumptive, non-homogenising manner’ (Jay 2004, pp.140-141). The 
‘crisis’ of experience, then, can be understood to be how historical experience is ‘lost’ 
when i) the past is reduced to dominant ways in which the present is understood, ii) the 
experience of individuals is homogenised by the objective determination of experience of 
the present, and iii) experience loses objective points of reference by identifying 
differentiated historical developments, or history in toto itself, according to dominating 
‘meta’-narratives of the present.  
 
Historical consciousness is not only a matter of preserving the past for the 
present, moreover; it is also a matter of being able to understand the present in terms of 
its relation to the past. Adorno suggests in ‘The Meaning of Working through the Past’ 
(Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit) that ‘[t]he past will have been worked through only when 
the causes of what happened then have been eliminated. Only because the causes continue 
to exist does the captivating spell of the past remain to this day unbroken’ (Adorno 1998, 
p.103). The concrete historical context he refers to is the post-WWII reconstruction of 
Germany which, in the attempt to democratise as hastily as possible and overcome the 
stigma of fascism, did so in part by retaining some of the instrumental forms of rationality 
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that had subtended the latter (e.g. capitalist-industrialised modes of production, the 
continuation of propaganda dissemination techniques in popular culture, etc.), and in 
some cases rehabilitating people who had been complicit with the previous regime.  
 
What Adorno refers to here is, however, not only an appeal to rectify past errors, 
e.g. in social terms of the discrimination that causes humanitarian calamities (colonialism, 
the Holocaust, genocide in Rwanda, etc.). At face value, identifying such phenomena in 
terms of an ideological ‘root cause’ to be eliminated from human behaviour would appear 
hopelessly idealistic, yet imperative to pursue in terms of organising society such that 
potential for similar events is minimised. It is also an appeal to understanding how causal 
forms of reasoning, where objectively true as demonstrated by their normative success, 
but therefore often considered ‘irreproachable’ and beyond the mediation of culture and 
society, also depend for their truth on their critical mediation. And because they do, they 
cannot only be considered in terms of success in explaining positive socio-cultural 
developments, but must also be considered in terms of their contribution to socio-
historical normative failures. As such, the past can never be worked through ‘entirely’ 
without becoming an ideological prioritisation of one interpretative apparatus over the 
other, but simultaneously, the determination of a present sublating all historical experience 
into its own ‘normative’ successes potentially obscures sources of suffering in the past - 
therefore also enabling causes of suffering in the present.  
 
Conversely, it is also not simply a matter of looking to history for resources to, 
e.g., correct perceived injustices of the present, because mediation of the past by the 
present involves how specific experience of the present subsumes understandings of 
history to its own dominant forms of reasoning, by necessity missing elements of specific 
experiences of the past. As Thomson suggests, [b]ecause our idea of history is deeply 
bound to that of culture (we think of cultures as having histories; we understand history in 
terms of the progression and development of culture; our idea of what ‘objective’ history 
is must be influenced by the cultural context of our thought), we cannot simply look for a 
historical remedy to this situation…’ (Thomson 2006, p.75). A ‘continuity of 
consciousness’, then, is also a matter, not only of ‘remembering’ history, but of continuing 
mediation of the experience constituting it that is not ‘resolved’ in dominant identification 
of it by cultures of the present (or, for that matter, that cultures of the present are 
conceptualised via some ‘purified’, ideological ideal of a specific narrative of the past). 
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Rather, the non-identity between how the past is understood in cultures of the present 
and how understanding of the present to some extent depends on repressing experiences 
of the past points towards the ‘continuity of consciousness’ of what is missed by dominant 
historical interpretations. The ways such interpretations ‘lose’ experience, then, 
contributes to the ‘crisis of experience’ in modernity. 
 
Adorno is acutely aware, however, of difficulties involved in maintaining a 
‘continuity of consciousness’ in the immediate sense of experiencing the modern world. 
He proceeds to suggest in the ‘Theory of Pseudo-Culture’ how the continuity of 
consciousness is ‘replaced by the selective, disconnected, interchangeable and ephemeral 
state of being informed which, as one can already observe, will promptly be cancelled by 
other information’ (Adorno 1993, p.33). This statement is significant: cascading volumes 
of random pieces of information given to individuals at the immediate level are likely to 
interrupt continuing mediation of a specific aspect of experience, or encourage acceptance 
of a ‘given’, dominant ideological form of its conceptual understanding. It is especially 
important with regards to the specific constellation of the Internet and mass media, where 
the most apparent continuity is the act of exchanging information itself.  
 
Here, one aspect of information exchange can clearly be considered in the same 
context as commodity exchange, where we saw above how identity and personal 
experience are ‘commodified’ online. But the freedom and openness of information more 
generally can also be considered in the context of its ideological appeal to the individual, 
and individuals’ conformity to information in terms of their status as consumers, which in 
turn is determined by socio-economic status, education, and so forth. One central point 
Adorno makes is that information becomes judged relative predominantly to its perceived 
relevance to the immediate present, obscuring historical consciousness of how the 
information itself has, first, been ‘objectively’ determined, and second, how it is being 
mediated by the subject – including how information is ‘cancelled out’ in consciousness by 
other information, and forgotten.  This resonates in the contemporary immanent 
experience of modern technology, where information becomes ‘fragmented’ in the sense 
that its sheer volume and exchange challenges the ability to determine its continuity in 
reflection. In the second excursus, we now consider this aspect of the immanent 
experience of information exchange as the subjective component of this negative 
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dialectical outline, which, taken together with its objectively determined components 
above, may suggest one way to frame a ‘crisis of experience’ in Postmodern society.     
 
Excursus 2: Free Information Exists Because What It Promises Does Not? The Fragmentation of 
Experience 
 
How can Adorno’s claim that information exchange ‘cancels out’ other 
information, and therefore potentially continuity of consciousness of a subject matter, 
itself be mediated in the present social constellation of contemporary media and political 
culture? Such a claim, as Adorno would point out, is itself impossible to totalise and 
requires, among others, empirical studies of interrelations between social and individual 
norms for processing, retaining and recalling information, and, e.g. of degrees to which 
thought processes may be influenced by immediacy and exchange on the Internet, or 
indeed by an audio-visual culture so dominant that social experience has virtually become 
unthinkable without it.  
 
The explosion of the ‘virtual’ sphere of experience over the last 20 years, however 
– an unprecedented revolution in social circumstances within a short period of time in 
relative historical terms, and its virtually overnight appropriation and determination of 
social experience, means such research is in its infancy. It is also likely to remain 
inconclusive as experience of social reality, technological developments and scientific 
research all evolve. Considering the velocity of information exchange, however, a central 
socio-political question relates to the truth of the relationship of individuals to social 
reality in this context. Information exchange in postmodernity, even within familiar 
contours of work, interests or the inclination to critically mediate information, is one 
historical constellation in which to frame the question of what this incorporation of 
technology into behaviour to unprecedented levels suggests for notions of self-
determination.    
 
We may recall Adorno and Horkheimer’s contention in DoE that “all reification is 
forgetting”. By this they suggest experience becomes objectified when it is forgotten. This 
means while experience is conceptualised any number of ways, when individuals ‘forget’ 
(or repress, or otherwise ignore) its contradictory contents, the (necessarily) imperfect 
ways these have been conceptualised become concretised into ideological perspectives. 
Prospects Beyond Ideology: Reason, Freedom and the Truth of the Subject – 
Towards Political Models for the Critical Thought of Theodor W. Adorno 
 
 239 
This objectification is likely, in turn, to be concurrent with dominant social norms of 
understanding, rather than faithful to experiences themselves, such that ‘continuity of 
consciousness’ of contradictory elements comprising these experiences is broken. There 
are two senses in which we may consider this idea in our postmodern constellation of 
information exchange:  
 
First, on the immediate level, information pertaining to actual experience is 
objectified in the sense that much of it becomes eternally universally available on the 
Internet, which, on one hand, has the pragmatic function of a research tool making 
information available for reference at any future (historical) point in time. Conversely, this 
very eternal availability of information online suggests how individuals may not internalise 
or consciously mediate information available to them, in the knowledge they can always 
return to it later (which, when it comes to things like news analyses, can become 
overwhelming with the avalanche of hourly material). On the surface, this may seem no 
different than the ‘opportunity cost’ involved in dividing one’s time between different 
tasks. 
 
The constant flow of information by itself, however, necessarily entails there is an 
opportunity cost to the resources expended by consciousness – equally suggesting much 
of the information consumed may also promptly be forgotten, as new demands on 
attention spans are made. In this sense, it can be speculated how continuity of 
consciousness of a subject matter beyond the objective reification of its experience is 
further undermined by the inability of memory to retain all it has consciously registered, 
particularly due to constant new demands made on it by accelerating information flows, 
and considering the increasingly scarce resource of time. Conversely, it can also be 
suggested that the proliferation of information objectifies memory itself, in the sense that 
technology increasingly makes the retrieval of information easier online. Does this external 
‘hard drive’ of memory, in this case, substantially affect how individuals mediate 
information?  
 
Second, there is the question of how ideological variations of information relating 
to individual or collective experience can ‘crowd out’ other interpretations, which, e.g., 
often occurs at crossroads between newsgathering and the interests of competing news 
organisations. The immediacy and speed of information exchange in this sense encourages 
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adoption of dominant ideological views of social experience, which in turn may encourage 
their status as simply given objective truth. Additionally, the ways social media and other 
services (e.g. Facebook, Google) use algorithms to promote or crowd out information 
based on user profiles compiled from arbitrary information gathering can ensure 
individuals are most often exposed to recurring types of information, or what they are 
already ideologically inclined to subscribe to, thus creating a ‘filter bubble’ in which 
experience of material is constrained.86 It can be suggested then, pace Adorno, how critical 
reflection may be imperilled by some of the already inherently normative mechanisms of 
the information society.        
 
There are ways, therefore, that ‘freedom of information’ does not necessarily entail 
the freedom or self-determination of the subject, if individuals are both subject to 
necessary constraints and in some ways precluded from experiencing or reflecting upon 
subject matter by systemic mechanisms or information flows prioritising some 
interpretations over others, and thus do not partake in their own historical mediation of it. 
This also suggests elements of the present historical consciousness of a subject matter itself 
are potentially undermined, before they are mediated in any significant sense. Additionally, 
a subject matter or its experiential content is at risk of eventually becoming inaccessible to 
social experience in toto, and to individual mediation in particular, if it is crowded out of 
the information exchange in dominant mediums individuals are exposed to. 
 
In some ways, nevertheless, the modern context of 24-hour instantaneous 
connectivity and media may seem to undermine Adornian notions of a crisis of 
experience. Considering how much of this activity relies on spontaneous choices between 
individuals, outlets, broadcasters or providers, and how the Internet is a forum, not just 
for dissemination of information, but also for free and creative expression, there are 
seemingly few constraints on, e.g. expression of the dissatisfactions of experience, 
opinions, or perceptions of experiences gone unnoticed, or indeed anything else anyone 
may feel (consider i.e. comments sections of online newspapers, where expression reigns 
freely – but also where individuals often forego traditional constraints of in-person 
communication and express repressed antagonisms or other negative and even violent 
emotions, because of the relative anonymity afforded by ‘usernames’). 
 
                                                
86 See Pariser 2011  
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If, however, freedom of information is in many ways judged predominantly on the 
basis of its immediate use to the present, meaning, its exchange happens at such velocity 
that it encourages acceptance of a conceptual concretion of a subject matter in its 
immediately given form, and therefore in some ways discourages further mediation, then 
information itself and the ways it is comprehended can easily become ideological. On the 
subjective side, individuals often have use of information to the degree that it conforms to 
immediate reflections, and appropriate information - as object – accordingly (e.g., reduce 
it to their own ‘constitutive’ subjectivity), while reifying it into both an ‘objective’ 
identification, and their own identities. Combined, this can have the effect of increasing 
the irrelevance, or ‘disposability’, of both the object of knowledge (the subject matter 
information pertains to), and its mediation, e.g. the subject. From an Adornian perspective, 
the objective determination of the information-as-object as ‘commodity form’, as opposed 
to its mediation, prioritises the freedom of information over the self-determination of the 
subject, as ideology.     
 
In turn, information itself may become de-contextualised from even its immediate 
context, ‘fragmented’, as it were, into a ‘floating signifier’, a term defined by Levi-Strauss 
as ‘represent[ing] an undetermined quantity of signification, in itself void of meaning and 
thus apt to receive any meaning’ (Levi-Strauss 1987, pp.63-64). It follows individuals 
become ‘empowered’ by its fragmentation to ascribe any meaning they want to 
information, without necessarily referencing the objective historical context either of 
available information, or of themselves beyond the immediately given, subjective context of 
exposure to the medium. As Eriksen suggests,      
 
Instead of ordering knowledge in tidy rows, information society offers cascades of de-
contextualized signs more or less randomly connected to each other… Put differently: when 
growing amounts of information are distributed at growing speed, it becomes increasingly difficult 
to create narratives, orders, developmental sequences. The fragments threaten to become 
hegemonic. This has consequences for the ways we relate to knowledge, work and lifestyle in a 
wide sense (Eriksen 2001, pp. 109, 113)87  
 
As suggested in the Introduction, proponents of the supposed ‘de-hegemonization’ 
afforded by postmodern social conditions celebrate the end of the function of the 
narrative in terms of its historical contextualisation. This is taken to be liberation from 
                                                
87 Quoted in Bauman 2007, p.46. 
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what they consider to be the repressive unification of subjectivity under dominant 
Enlightenment narratives supposedly de-emphasising individual experience. What, then, as 
Eriksen suggests, of the ‘fragments [that] threaten to become hegemonic’ themselves’, and 
what does this mean for experience?  
 
First, that it becomes ‘increasingly difficult to create narratives, orders, 
developmental sequences’, also suggests contradictions between the types of causality 
making the science subtending technology possible in the first place, and its social 
experience, in terms of how it becomes increasingly difficult to establish continuity 
between random pieces of information that may all relate to one subject matter in 
different ways. These arguably become increasingly difficult to locate and contextualise in 
any causal, ‘historical’ sense in terms of the immediate volume of competing narratives of 
a given idea, and the sheer difficulty of ordering information and its often random 
exposure, even on a singular topic of personal interest.  
 
That this, following Eriksen, has ‘consequences for the ways we relate to 
knowledge, work and lifestyle in a wide sense’ may be underlined by additional 
contradictions between random decontextualized information and, recalling Kant, how 
consciousness orders experience causally in its ‘unity of apperception’ (in terms of 
memory, succession of events, etc.) to make subjective sense of it. The global, 24-hour reach 
of free information, while in one sense objectively reflecting spontaneous human 
productivity which does not conform to individual timelines or perceptions determined by 
local social realities, is simultaneously an objective determination of experience that can 
conflict with the self-preserving necessity of imposing causal ordering on the information 
flow. On one hand, there is objective meaning to information which has nothing to do 
with the subjectivity mediating it. On the other, how else does subjectivity mediate 
information that has no or little relation to immediate local experience? One way, pace 
Adorno, is prioritising the objectivity in information itself and letting it guide the subject’s 
experience of it. The other, however, is the temptation to reduce it to the subject’s own 
causal ordering (e.g. ideologically) in ways not reflecting objective truths of the 
information itself, but in which the subject ascribes the meaning it wants to it.   
 
Second, assuming fragmentation allows individuals to ascribe any meaning they 
want to information, it suggests how the object the fragment relates to is sublated in 
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consciousness in toto in its fragmented form, steering experience away from the object of 
knowledge and back towards both the identity of the subject and the fragmented identity 
ascribed to the object. Lacking reference to the broader objective socio-historical context 
in the social determination of what fragments become ‘valid’ suggests how fragments 
themselves become hegemonic, considering the prioritisation of fragments over others by 
virtue primarily of the consensus of the largest group of individuals at any one given time 
(we may consider, e.g. how the notion of ‘consensus’ in the context of market 
consumerism is inextricably related to the determination and attribution of market value 
by private interests, the perception of which is subsequently reinforced in its promotion by 
technology).  
 
In turn, this fragmentary reduction of the object to consciousness reinforces both 
ideological understandings of the object, and the ideological identity of the subject. This 
may be observed in online political discourse where, in addition to the combative nature 
of targeted political attacks and their frequent reduction of opponents to ideological 
caricature, the additional technological speed with which misinformation or wilfully 
fabricated myth based on fragmentary information is disseminated contributes to the 
adoption of myths to suit ideological predispositions. Experienced across the political 
spectrum, a simple example of this was concretion of the social myth on the Internet that 
U.S. President Obama is a Muslim.88 That particular myth was promoted as a fragmentary 
piece of information hypostatised from the politician’s background, compounded by his 
ethnic heritage, and promoted ceaselessly online to validate ideological opposition to his 
policies, to the point where the myth became accepted as truth for many right-of-centre-
right Americans.    
 
Additionally, where the myth, and so many others like it, originated as politically 
motivated insinuation on the Internet, that did not prevent political and media 
organisations, best considered to be private establishments in themselves and in terms of 
their overall accountability to the public, from propagating the myth to their own 
commercial and ideological benefit. 89  The public, for its part, was thereby further 
encouraged to believe whatever it was already ideologically predisposed to believe. 
                                                
88 ‘A growing number of Americans say that Barack Obama is a Muslim, while the proportion saying 
he is a Christian has declined… A new national survey by Pew Research Center finds… nearly one-in-
five Americans (18%) now say Obama is a Muslim, up from 11% in March 2009.’ See Pew 2010. 
89 See Uwimana 2010. 
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Assuming such myth-making occurs across an innumerable range of topics online, one 
element of the experience of postmodernity, from this perspective, appears to be rooted 
in an exchange of the historical ‘macro-ideologies’ of the past for a series of ‘micro-
ideologies’ of the present. Indeed, one way to describe the historical shift from the ‘society 
of producers’ to the ‘society of consumers’, or from the relatively organised capitalism of 
Adorno’s period to the hyper-capitalism of the present day, is describing it as a shift from 
the historical constellation of submission to political meta-ideologies to a mass, voluntary 
contribution to micro-ideology.     
	  
Third, if information is fragmented as a by-effect of its dissemination at speeds 
and frequencies to which consciousness struggles to adapt, then consciousness is forced 
to adapt to the fragmentation itself, as the default position from which it accesses the 
objective world, at least on the virtual level. For example, as Carr relates,   
 
In a Science article published in early 2009, prominent developmental psychologist Patricia 
Greenfield reviewed more than 40 studies of the effects of various types of media on intelligence 
and learning ability. She concluded that “every medium develops some cognitive skills at the 
expense of others.” Our growing use of the Net and other screen-based technologies, she wrote, 
has led to the “widespread and sophisticated development of visual-spatial skills.” But those gains 
go hand in hand with a weakening of our capacity for the kind of “deep processing” that 
underpins “mindful knowledge acquisition, inductive analysis, critical thinking, imagination, and 
reflection” (Carr 2010). 
 
Consciousness itself may by habit become fragmented into ‘cascades of de-contextualised 
signs more or less randomly connected to each other’ (Eriksen 2001), where identity is 
what ‘binds’ (however loosely) these fragments together, and where the natural, ‘self-
preserving’ response may be to reduce these fragmented cascades of information to the 
existing identity and ideological predispositions of the subject – in other words, identifying 
information or the object of knowledge with subjectivity, in the postmodern variation of 
subject-centred reason.  
 
Such a ‘constitutive’ form of subjectivity, then, is at least partly dependent, first, 
on the assumption of an objectively ‘meaningful’ course of its determination by the 
imperatives of technocratic efficiency and hyper-capitalist consumerism by which it lives. 
For example, if it has become an objectively determined norm to consider free 
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information in the context of its conceptual fragmentation and immediate exchange, then 
historical forces (technocratic, etc.) determining this constellation of experience are also 
broadly ‘legitimated’ socially. Second, experience of the objective world has come to 
depend on a near-absolute reconciliation of experience with conceptual practices 
determined by technology.  Conceptualisation takes place from a possibility of experience 
predominantly within an immediate present of constant information fragmentation. The 
reconciliation of conceptualisation with the objective world occurs by pragmatic necessity 
with respect to this immediacy, and therefore often at the expense of reflection and 
experience that cannot be reductively collapsed into the fragmentation itself. Third, the 
fragmentation of information simultaneously ensures an instantaneous ‘identification’ of 
experience itself, which may further obscure what remains conceptually non-identical to 
the experience being related.      
 
Fourth, the notion of the information society of one in which information ‘cancels 
out other information’, while certainly not the only way to explain experience of the 
virtual world, and which doesn’t account for vast conceptual resources that open 
information makes possible, is nevertheless one way to suggest i.) an objective 
determination of thought that by necessity concretises concepts ideologically while 
potentially stymying their mediation beyond their immediate given-ness, and ii.) a 
reduction of and by subjective identity to exchanging increasingly decontextualized and 
‘randomly connected’ fragments in ways both conforming to the pre-existing identity of 
individuals, and challenging their ability to be self-determining vis-à-vis the cascades of 
information they contend with, insofar as self-determination in this context would involve 
possibilities of mediating the immediacy with which so much information is received 
itself.  
 
If freedom is a function of self-determination, it may thereby be considered at this 
historical constellation of the information society that freedom of information doesn’t 
necessarily equate to self-determination, if freedom involves experience that isn’t only 
objectively determined. Simultaneously, the self-determination inherent in the freedom to 
mediate an object of knowledge must also depend on how thought is determined by the 
object if its mediation is not to become reduced, ideologically, to subjective control. In the 
sense discussed above, technology in one sense ‘mediates’ the object of knowledge in 
terms of fragmenting it before consciousness apprehends it in its seeming immediacy; in 
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another sense, the subject is inclined to dominate the object of knowledge – to identify it 
– with the ways it itself manipulates technology (and is manipulated in turn).  
 
In these two excursuses I have considered an objective determination of 
experience, in terms of how the cost of online freedom appears to be the loss of privacy, 
and a subjective, immanent element of experience in the information society, in which 
self-determination may be undermined if restricted to a consumerist ethos in mediating 
information and a subjective reductionism of objects of knowledge, the understanding of 
which is simultaneously objectively determined by the technological fragmentation of 
experience. I also showed how some of Adorno’s more accessible observations remain 
relevant to the present historical constellation. What, then, from a negative dialectical 
perspective in the historical constellation of the GWOT and the information society, could 
a notion of the truth of its experience amount to? 
 
7.4 The End of History and the Crisis of Experience: A Negative Dialectic of 
Postmodernity 
 
A truth-content of the misleading notion of an ‘End of History’ can be salvaged in 
our historical constellation of Postmodernity. The notion can refer, first, to the objective 
determination of experience immanent to Western societies by twin engines of capital and 
technocratic rationality. Conceptual practices promoted by these determine social reality 
to ever-increasing degrees, reflecting lack of political alternatives to their integration. By 
the same token, the intensifying incertitude of this social reality underscores how such an 
‘absolute’ integration and reconciliation between often contradictory conceptual practices 
(the ‘free’ market, democracy, technological immediacy) in a form of ‘positive’ historical 
determinism cannot only result in a reconciliation of experience with the objective world 
as truth, in a Hegelian sense. One aspect of the truth-content of Fukuyama’s claim, 
therefore, is that contradictions between human needs, freedoms, and self-determination, 
and how these are challenged by the ways experience is objectively determined, suggest 
how a normative, ‘positive’ reconciliation of contradictory practices with the objective 
world can, in itself, become the source of a gamut of emerging social problems. 
 
This is illustrated by how the reinforcement of ideologies immanent to Western 
social experience (as a focus of this model) at the level of its conceptual practices also 
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reinforces ‘meta’-ideologies with which the West conducts, for example, its foreign policy 
at the ‘transcendent’ globalising level of social experience. History, self-evidently, 
continues to be made from present social experience, although the truth of this experience 
- and of history itself - is a matter of its mediation, and of the degree of critical reflection 
possible immanently to this mediation. As submitted, one contradiction immanent to 
Western experience is how historical consciousness is undermined by objective 
mechanisms determining social experience while the very contribution of individuals 
themselves to this exchange remains a central element of their scope for self-
determination. Such a contradiction emphasises Adorno’s point that on one hand, the 
objective determination individuals conform to in potentially oppressive ways is also a 
product of the free pursuit of their own interests, and conversely, that this freedom may 
paradoxically obstruct critical mediation of experience that would contribute to pursuing a 
truthful form of self-determination.   
 
One way to substantiate the notion of a ‘crisis of experience’ in postmodernity, 
then, is to consider, dialectically, how individuals freely contribute to potentially repressive 
ways their social experience becomes objectively determined. Free information given to 
individuals may be reduced to immediate identification of its subject matter, pace Adorno, 
in the imperative of self-preservation and the subject-centred conception of ‘freely’ 
attributing meaning, as opposed to encouraging critical mediation of both subject matter 
and, by extension, subjectivity itself. The fragmentation of free information through 
mechanisms of its objective determination, however, can also make the continuity of 
consciousness of a specific historical object increasingly difficult to maintain in causal 
terms. While, therefore, individuals may seek to critically mediate objects of knowledge, 
they might also find it increasingly difficult to causally relate fragmentary information 
truthfully. Conversely, the immediacy of this fragmentation may encourage reduction of 
mediation to what is itself immediately given and therefore, to ideologies of subjective 
identification. Political perspectives and ideologies may thereby be reinforced as opposed 
to challenged, where mediation may be encouraged to remain within objectively 
determined prisms of experience. Historical consciousness of contradictory ways between 
how information may be immediately ‘given’ as a function of individuals’ free expression 
in technological mediums, and its mediation by individuals through their concrete 
experience, which to some extent is objectively determined (e.g., through filter bubbles 
Prospects Beyond Ideology: Reason, Freedom and the Truth of the Subject – 
Towards Political Models for the Critical Thought of Theodor W. Adorno 
 
 248 
online), may be lost between a subjective domination of the subject matter, and the 
objective determination of social experience in which its mediation takes place. 
  
The ‘non-conceptuality’ of this experience comprised of both repressive and 
emancipatory phenomena simultaneously, then, can be lost in favour of its ideological 
concretion, e.g. the political invocation of democratic freedoms as absolute principles, 
though these also normatively perpetuate repressive anti-democratic mechanisms and 
practices. Such a loss remains a significant element of a ‘crisis of experience’ in 
postmodernity. For example, the excursuses in this chapter outlined, first, the loss of 
privacy and confidentiality as one objective determination of experience by technocratic 
rationality. Second, it suggested a fragmentation of consciousness in the consumption of 
free but technologically mediated information by individuals. One way these phenomena 
contend with each other is, on one hand, increasing volumes of information allow 
individuals to mediate any object in competing ways that can always spontaneously 
suggest non-identity with which knowledge or awareness is identified in the immediate 
sense. Conversely, the intensifying immediacy of the identification of individuals themselves 
by others that the loss of privacy and confidentiality contribute to, is also fortified by the 
‘fragmentation’ of consciousness, in the sense that it encourages the immediate given-ness 
of the profiled and compiled ‘identity’ of individuals, therefore also suggesting how 
ideological conceptions of identity are reinforced at political levels.     
 
It follows, e.g. that the loss of privacy creates identifications of individuals 
compiled in ways that quite deliberately manipulate them, curtailing their freedoms and 
impeding their avenues for self-determination. This identification, however – especially 
where it potentially has dire personal or political consequences – cannot possibly account 
for the entirety of an individual’s experience (even with regards to the specific matter at 
hand), or intentions. Information available concerning individuals, therefore, cannot only 
be truthful identification, considering how much experience a particular identification fails 
to take into account. Simultaneously, however, the immediacy of information exchange 
reduces this accumulation of experience to identification normatively facilitated by the 
access afforded by technology, where what this categorisation misses neglects substantial 
elements of truth pertaining to the experience of individuals. In this sense, there is an 
institutional prioritisation of the objective determination of identity which falls short of the 
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subjective component of experience, and the ability to prioritise this experience as an 
object to be mediated. 
 
Conversely, if the bulk of information by which individuals mediate experience is 
fragmented, and individuals are compelled to identify objects of knowledge – and others – 
according to this fragmentation, where does that leave the truth of their own identities, and 
expression thereof? Put differently, if the objective determination of experience by 
technology animates individuals to mediate information in ways encouraging its reduction 
to identity, simultaneously with how - or in more powerful ways than - objects of 
knowledge may spontaneously determine their experience, then an important element of 
the truth of modern experience is, pace Adorno, all the ways identification obscures the 
truths of its mediation. This has consequences in concrete political contexts, which, as we 
saw in the context of the GWOT, is partly dependent conceptually on identity profiling on 
respective sides of its divide. The question from a contemporary perspective becomes, 
however, do aforementioned normative mechanisms immanent to Western society, and 
especially in the decade hence, play a role in reinforcing this profiling, and if so, what then 
of contradictions arising between this systemic reinforcement of identity profiling and the 
prosecution of the GWOT?  
 
At the immediate level, it seems clear that technological immediacy reinforces 
prisms of conflagration themselves. Consider, for instance, how the recent slew of 
beheadings of Westerners by the terrorist group ISIS and its global video broadcasting 
immediately determined Western policy towards a more proactive interventionism in the 
relevant geographical theatre than had (recently) been U.S. and Western policy, in part 
because of how the graphic detail of the videos influenced public perception of Western 
governments domestically. One intention behind this broadcasting was demonstrating the 
power of ISIS to influence Western policy, where Western technology itself was the 
medium by which the group gained its “oxygen of publicity.” This, however, 
demonstrated contradictions not only between how the globalisation of practices 
immanent to Western instrumental rationality can undermine the very instruments of 
Western power, but also how Western policy, and more broadly, Western rationality itself, 
find themselves objectively determined, and in some ways, detrimentally so, by both the 
possibilities and dangers they have created.    
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Events like this, then, serve to reinforce ideological oppositions at the conceptual 
level of the GWOT. First, they are a deliberate tactic on behalf of groups like ISIS to 
‘legitimate’ their cause, particularly the more they can involve Western retribution. Second, 
ideological oppositions are reinforced immanently in the West at the immediate level of 
the identification of Islam or the perceived Muslim mind-set with the acts of ISIS or other 
radical groups (considering that when Muslims are related to news items, it is often in 
contexts such as this). While free and accurate information abounds as to the radical 
imperatives of this group in its specific geographic and geopolitical context, setting it apart 
from so many other Muslim denominations and areas of experience, the reinforced 
identification of Islam with terrorism, both deliberately by e.g. ISIS, and by Westerners it 
provokes, immediately crowds out comprehension of its non-identity (much like 9/11 had 
done over a decade earlier). Consider, e.g., how the visual impact of the beheading footage 
crowds out potential competing narratives regarding traditional differences immanent to 
the Muslim world, the historical consciousness of conflicting traditions and their 
interpretations in different world regions, or, on a more immediate level, the (partially) 
democratising imperatives of the Arab spring just few years earlier.     
 
One question arising in this context, then, is what wars fought ideologically by 
proxy through technological mediums as much as on battlefields will mean for future 
generations of policymakers, assuming the immediacy of events globally continue to shape 
ideological perspectives locally. The notion of an ‘End’ of History in the constellation of 
postmodernity can refer in a second sense, then, to an undermining of historical consciousness, 
consequently perpetuating ideology. Loss of awareness, or a reified ‘forgetting’, of 
contradictions between how experience and consciousness are objectively determined and 
the ways subject-centred self-determination also contributes to subjective and objective 
repression, is part of the crisis of experience subtending the perpetuation of ideology, and 
therefore conflict. In the context of the GWOT, the question arises not only of a 
concurrent radicalisation of the Western mind in some quarters due to the reduction of a 
complex web of global causes and effects to the immediate given-ness of (technologically 
mediated) events to identity, but also of how future ideological perspectives might use 
technological advances to perpetuate both conflict, and themselves. That terrorism should 
be combated and preferably defeated is incontrovertible; the political question is the 
means by which the issue is – and can – be mediated, which is not ineluctable, but may 
often appear so. Pace Adorno, the larger question additionally remains if science and 
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technology are poised to create ideal or vastly improved social conditions, and indeed 
often promote themselves ideologically as such, why then do many of their social 
consequences continue to prove themselves so harmful to universal interests?     
 
I have here sought to demonstrate, then, the continuing relevance of Ideology 
critique and philosophy to a world that, where myth can serve the function of 
enlightenment and enlightenment often reverts to myth, often seems inimical to both. A 
negative dialectics, as outlined in this thought model, is the attempt to demonstrate the 
truth and untruth of experience simultaneously, both immanently to the objective 
determination of experience, and critically towards the prisms in which such experience 
takes place. Non-identity of the conceptual representation of experience and the 
prioritisation of the object of knowledge itself in the attempt to express non-conceptual 
elements of its experience are therefore, I maintain pace Adorno, crucial elements of 
potentially truthful mediation. In the context of this thought model, therefore, I have 
explored non-identities between freedom and self-determination, and between these and 
modern forms of rationality. I have demonstrated a negative dialectical turn from one way 
experience is objectively determined in postmodernity by the GWOT, while attempting to 
remain truthful to multiple elements immanent to Western experience itself. In the 
Conclusion that follows, I suggest a theoretical continuation of negative dialectics, and 
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IX. CONCLUSION  
 
I conclude this thesis by recapping some of its central arguments and suggesting 
what the ‘truth of the subject’ can amount to. I conclude, first, that negative dialectics 
remains a germane approach to exploring issues of truth in the contemporary 
constellation of socio-historical experience. Second, I maintain ideology critique remains 
a crucial resource for investigating both the truth and untruth of social normativity. 
Third, I reaffirm that freedom must be a matter of the possibilities of self-determination 
in the mediation of the objective world. Finally, in 8.2, I suggest a resource for a 
theoretical direction for the continuation of Adorno’s thought via Žižek’s proposal that 
negative dialectics can be thought together with Lacan’s psychoanalytical notion of the 
‘Impossible Real’.  
 
8.1 Concluding Remarks: The Truth of the Subject 
 
The introductory question of this thesis was twofold: Does Adorno’s theory of 
negative dialectics remain a relevant approach to exploring issues of truth and meaning 
beyond the critical purview of the specific historical constellation he addressed, and does 
this theory remain a workable alternative to those theories suggesting, broadly speaking, a 
‘demise’ of self-determining subjectivity in the classic Enlightenment sense? The question 
was asked within a wider framework of the uses of philosophy in an age of social 
experience determined predominantly by science and technocratic rationality, and 
whether ‘classic’ Enlightenment conceptions of reason, freedom and self-determination 
particular to the German tradition can still contribute resources to a historical 
constellation determined by decidedly transformed social conceptions of subjectivity and 
freedom from those these notions originally addressed.  
 
I have answered both parts of the question in the affirmative. The need for 
Adorno’s conception of an objective dialectical truth of social experience and subjectivity 
not only explained through the objectifying processes of science and technology, nor 
reduced to immediate imperatives of subject-centred reasoning, is not vitiated at a 
historical juncture that, from a critical standpoint, continues exemplifying forms of 
domination across all layers of social experience. Repressive phenomena remain 
observable, not only in the sense characterising traditional politics or international 
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relations in the age of information, economic globalisation and terrorism, but also occur 
immanently to democratic and open societies whose normative and institutional 
instruments also contain repressive mechanisms that may not be as instantly apparent as 
the immediacy of their contributions to the normative determination of social 
experience. 
 
To this end, this thesis has argued that ideology critique remains an essential tool 
of inquiry into objective social circumstances, and potentially across multiple disciplines 
of inquiry, also beyond the immediately political. Ideology critique is necessary to 
evaluate the normative practices of society, and to investigate, among other concerns, 
democratic standards of freedom and postmodern conceptions of rationality to 
determine where, and how, these potentially fall short of the truths of social experience. 
In so doing, notions such as alienation and ‘false consciousness’ remain critical categories 
that can reveal forms of experience deserving of inquiry and which, conversely, need not 
be reduced to ideological iterations of these notions themselves. On the contrary, I hope 
to have shown that Adorno’s philosophy offers resources to overcome ways such ideas 
become ideological in their own right, through to a truth-content of such postulates that 
attempts to remain faithful to the experience itself of specific socio-historical 
constellations.             
 
As such, this thesis has emphasised Adorno’s notion of experience with the view 
towards examining possibilities of self-determining subjectivity as central to any rational 
conception of the truth thereof. The ‘strength of the subject’ Adorno wants to use to 
break through the ideological trapping of constitutive subjectivity is at once the attempt 
to apprehend the truth of the subject’s experience, and simultaneously the injunction to 
critically mediate the forms of rationality by which it conceptualises and expresses this 
experience. The question was raised, pace Adorno’s sociocultural critiques, whether 
conditions of Modernity have culminated in forms of predominantly ‘instrumental’ 
rationality which, through their very normativity - or lack of adequate constraints – foster 
ideological notions of freedom and self-determination, or, pace Adorno, ‘subject-centred 
reasoning’. I have shown what allows Adorno to make such claims about modern 
experience is his objection to the inevitable projection of subjective structures of 
ordering the world - such as the causal ordering of experience - onto the objective world 
as the predominating ways of understanding its experience, in the sense that the objective 
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world and nature cannot only be reduced to ways its experience may be conceptualised 
historically or subjectively.  
 
Such a claim has required an account of how spontaneity must be available in 
conceptualisation as a result of the mind’s engagement with the objective world, which 
cannot be reduced to, e.g., causal laws the mind gives itself. This is the freedom inherent in 
conceptualisation, which cannot be reduced to conceptualisation itself as its own ground, 
dependent as this remains on the objective world. Normativity only becomes possible 
through this spontaneity, and the extent to which normativity determines issues of truth 
can only adequately be measured by the extent of spontaneous engagement with the 
object of knowledge – meaning, ways of experiencing it that keep in perspective 
contradictory ways in which the truth of its experience is identified. If normative 
constraints on spontaneity itself are to exist, conversely, it is not in their a priori 
dependence on spontaneity, but in active mediation between spontaneity and its 
prioritisation of the objective world to which it reacts.   
 
I therefore showed that the reason for this ‘priority of the objective’ is that what 
Adorno calls prima philosophia – or, the ‘myth of the given’ in philosophy grounding 
knowledge in consciousness - fails to account for the contradictory senses of nature 
Adorno claims cannot be grounded either in consciousness or the (scientific) 
objectification of nature. Attempts to ground experience or knowledge in any absolute 
sense lead to comprehensive methodologies striving to achieve certainty by reducing all 
objectivity to the cognitive processes of the subject. I suggested how e.g., empiricism, 
taken by itself as the immediacy of sense perception, can become ideological where it 
lacks acknowledgement of its own mediated character. Following Adorno, the immediacy 
of the objective world characteristic of empiricism doesn’t go far enough in its attempt to 
establish truth-claims, as it relinquishes the ‘moment of freedom and spontaneity’ of its 
social mediation.  
 
What has this meant for my discussion of truth? Facts regarding objects of 
knowledge may be established – ‘identified’ - at the expense of what, pace Adorno, 
remains non-identical in the mediation of their experience. This means an element of their 
truth must always pertain to what remains ‘non-conceptual’ in the positing of facts. 
‘Instrumental’ forms of rationality therefore potentially posit facts as truth in ideological 
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ways. It also means reason cannot be ‘grounded’ in consciousness without remaining 
something forced on the objective world. Where Enlightenment rationality attempts to 
ground its legitimacy in the increasing success with which it controls nature, Adorno 
suggests it too succumbs to the foundational myth of prima philosophia. The rational 
control of nature enables individuals to ground their identities in this same control. If 
reason is to be universalised, however, it must address the objective world without 
reducing nature to itself, as subjectivity cannot simply transcend the nature of which it is 
part.  
 
Such a ‘gap’ between reason and nature, to the extent that reasoning could be 
self-determining irrespective of nature, is therefore also a potentially ideological 
endeavour. Filling this gap can occur at the expense of spontaneity itself, if it means 
subsuming aspects of nature entirely to given forms of reasoning in order to understand 
them. Reason, therefore, must also be a matter of its dependence on nature. Adorno’s 
‘negative’ turn is therefore, partially, that experience should be examined in relation to 
both its socio-historical context and to nature. Conceptualisation pertaining to the 
natural world, or claims to knowledge of an object therein, cannot simply exist in a given 
sense, as claims pertaining to all kinds of experience always involve other socially 
mediated concepts. This also means reflection that doesn’t take its social context into 
account cannot properly be considered to be self-determining. Conceptual claims must 
be considered in the specific socio-historical context they are formulated in, and concrete 
human needs they are formulated in relation to.  
 
This concretely underscores the socio-political emphasis of this thesis. The truth 
of experience cannot simply be grounded either in the apriority of consciousness or in 
socially objectifying structures of thought given to it. Adorno suggests the socially 
rationalising compulsion to ‘dominate’ nature also irrationally leads to subjective and 
psychological regression due to e.g., damaged experience of the cultural realm and a 
concurrent impoverishment of reflective spontaneity. Revealing such is the purpose of 
ideology critique, and of Adorno’s call to ‘un-reified rational relations between 
individuals’. The perceived circumstances leading Adorno to insist on these - the ‘total 
context of delusion’ - refers to the reach of instrumental rationality over society and its 
potential reification of all social experience. The endeavor of negative dialectics, then, is 
to reclaim spontaneity as the rational criterion that also explains the potential corruption 
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of all other rational criteria in this ‘totality’.  
 
Adorno’s Ideologiekritik purporting to show such corruption consists of dialectics 
between transcendent and immanent criticism. Transcendent criticism is made from 
‘beyond’ the objective determination of a socio-historical constellation to demonstrate 
the ideological corruptibility of experience immanent to it. Immanent criticism, 
conversely, recognises ideology as ‘socially necessary appearance’, in the sense that it is a 
representation of real cultural production, is a reflection of the interest structures of 
society, and reveals the historical genesis of the ideological form. The existence of 
ideology, therefore, is not ‘false’, because it is instantiated in material cultural forms, but 
the target of critical theory is the pretension of ideology to correspond to the truth of 
experience. Immanent critique mediates transcendent critique: the more society is 
integrated, e.g. through capitalist and technocratic rationalities, the greater the necessity 
of pursuing how such forms of rationality dominate experience. This is to determine 
distance between the ideological determination of these objectifying forms of rationality 
and the ways they are experienced by individuals, to find elements of truth in 
contradictions emerging between them. 
In this light, I considered Adorno’s difficult claim that the cultural unification 
occurring in Nazi Germany as a combination of physical repression and scientism 
subtending rational efficiency can occur in capitalist democracies in submission of 
normative practices to instrumental forms of rationality alone. The practical component 
of this criticism - Adorno’s demand of a new categorical imperative to arrange thought 
and action so nothing similar to Auschwitz will happen - is predicated on the notion of 
Auschwitz as a historical ‘prototype’. Because alongside its benefits, technical progress 
also makes genocide and other horrors possible, it is not so much forces of production 
as the relations of production – e.g. the organisation of social experience – that 
subordinate individuals, and which require addressing by critical theory. This is the 
urgent demand relevant to the contemporary historical constellation continuously 
requiring rethinking of what comes to count as rational, but which reveals itself as 
irrational in as far as it becomes a source of human (or other) suffering. Among other 
examples, I dedicated the thought model in this thesis to demonstrating how the 
technocratic normativity immanent to Western societies plays a role in irrationally 
bolstering ideologies at the globalising level that perpetuate suffering across cultural 
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divides.    
The critical analysis of reification, therefore, is reflective evolution preventing 
itself from becoming ideological by resting at a fixed purview. Concretised, such analysis 
would itself become a ‘grounded’ concept dominating its subject matter by constraining 
it within a fixed identification of how such analyses should proceed. This paradox is 
addressed by negative dialectics. Adorno’s dialectical turn is ‘negative’ because its notion 
of rationality seeks to give voice to forms of experience subject-centred forms of 
rationality neglect. Such experience may be expressed as forms of suffering or aesthetic 
forms of expression obscured by normative accounts of reason, or to which such 
accounts inadvertently contribute. Demonstrating how successful normative practices fail 
to account for other dimensions of their experience discloses where accounts of these 
practices become ideological and points towards news ways of conceptualising their 
experience.      
If thought is to challenge the identity which it itself ascribes to the objective 
world, then, there can be no positive conceptual resolution in its reflection of the object. 
Adorno’s notion of ‘non-identity’ means the object determines its experience such that 
no concept can circumscribe its identity. Spontaneous experience of the object therefore 
points towards ways it has not been identified, leading to new concepts pertaining both 
to the object and the subjectivity experiencing it.  Spontaneity only ever partially 
overcomes the conceptual limitations of identity, resulting in further contradictions. As 
these necessarily fall on the side of consciousness, the latter continually stands opposed 
in non-identity with the object it attempts to comprehend. However, mediation of the 
object also changes the subject, giving rise to hitherto non-conceptual elements of 
experience in their attempted articulation or content, in as far as they are never fully 
circumscribed by these attempts to identify them.  
Negative dialectics therefore explores unresolved contradictions between 
conceptualisation and how consciousness is determined by objective social 
circumstances. At the theoretical level of this thesis, therefore, I showed that Adorno’s 
central objection to Hegel is how dialectical contradictions of experience, and conceptual 
practices normatively determining experience of the social whole, are ‘sublated’ in 
consciousness. Retaining the element undergirding Hegel’s dialectic of the subject’s 
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active participation in mediation of the object, Adorno re-orientates reflection towards 
experience as it is determined by the object, meaning experience that, precisely, cannot 
be reduced to the conceptualising consciousness. Adorno simultaneously retains the 
Kantian distinction between the object itself and the unresolved contradictions of the 
phenomenal world. Reflection for Kant is possible because of the transcendental unity of 
apperception. What is thought, however, depends on the contingent historical moment 
in which it is thought. Contradictory tensions in subjective truth, then, are between how 
thought is objectively determined at a specific historical moment, and the spontaneity of 
the transcendental subject itself. This reflective tension can only be expressed, following 
Hegel, via reference to a particular socio-historical constellation of subject and object, 
but, following Kant, cannot reduce the object of knowledge to this constellation, as both 
object and subject retain elements distinct from any particular historical attempt at 
conceptualisation.  
Truth, therefore, cannot only be an epistemological matter of ‘resolving’ issues of 
knowledge, as truth only gains objectivity through reflection, which is historically 
contingent. Simultaneously, truth must be objective in a sense that cannot be reduced to 
the subject and its contingent experience. Adorno’s chief contribution to the discussion 
of truth in this thesis is therefore in objective meaning that is lost when the objective 
world is dominated by subjective categories, and in elements of the experience of a 
particular socio-historical constellation that remain unexpressed - as part of the truth-
content of its experience. The negative dialectical ‘turn’ is therefore towards truth-
content in unresolved tensions between the loss of objective meaning, and the subjective 
interest in freedom and self-determination. Articulation of this truth-content also 
depends on the claim that the objectivity sought in epistemology or science cannot be 
the sole standard for philosophy, because ways of relating to the world are not only 
cognitive, but also affective. 
That the problem of freedom cannot only be subsumed into, e.g. explanatory 
laws of science and the freedoms they provide therefore invites consideration of affective 
dimensions of experience. Adorno’s prioritisation of the objective re-orientates 
experience away from only the subjective control of nature. Where this control, inherent in 
cognitive forms of categorising the world, is necessary to understand it in the first place, 
it is simultaneously the source of a violence done to the object – and other subjectivity - 
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and therefore also a source of suffering. Adorno’s point is therefore to comprehend 
experience in ways not uniquely subsumed under the conceptual control of the object or 
nature, considering the real-world historical effects this control can have. Where Adorno 
paradigmatically emphasises mimetic dimensions of aesthetic experience as containing 
resources to resist the ‘absolutizing’ imperative to control the objective world, this thesis 
has primarily investigated contemporary political phenomena in light of ways subjectivity 
might overcome its ideological domination of otherness.   
 
At the practical level, therefore, the thesis has also sought to investigate 
contemporary political contexts that demonstrate the continuing necessity of a ‘negative 
dialectical’ mediation of political experience that doesn’t merely reduce its interpretation 
to its existing pragmatic or normative imperatives grounded in subjective control, but 
rather, seeks to overcome this. While the thesis has not succeeded in extracting definitive 
‘political models’ for negative dialectics and Adorno’s theory more broadly (something 
made difficult by Adorno’s own recalcitrance to do so), it has succeeded in 
demonstrating contexts suggesting the continuing validity of his critiques, and has begun 
to point towards how such political models could be constructed. For example, in the 
constellation of the thought model above pertaining to the dual critique of the GWOT 
and the ideological determination of identity and experience of modern society, resources 
may plausibly be extracted to inform future analyses and strategies pertaining to the 
prosecution of simultaneously local and global political imperatives, from which still 
further models may be developed. This will be one of the endeavours of future research.     
 
In concluding, truth, therefore, cannot be separated from the contingent socio-
historical constellation being experienced, because conceptual identity ascribed to 
something at a specific point in time is partly determined by experience. As cognitive 
identification of the objective world comes to determine so much of social experience, 
however, it also means truth cannot be a matter only of identification, however 
successful, but must also be about what identification misses. This includes, above all, 
‘the need to lend a voice to suffering’, because suffering cannot only be measured or 
understood by cognitive means, yet is the standard by which people judge happiness - or 
lack of it. Suffering and its expression do not have to be justified according to normative 
modes of rationality in order to be true. Subjective attempts to express suffering, or other 
forms of affective experience, can therefore also act as forms of objective truth to the 
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kinds of rationality sustaining social normative practices.  
 
Attempts to control the objective world, then, are a consequence of self-
preservation. Adorno’s ‘negative’ turn from this rationality is towards affective 
dimensions of understanding the world depending not only on its control, but also on 
how self-preservation must mean mutual understanding. Mimesis is one such way of 
understanding and coping with the objective world in ways not immediately demanding 
its control and, significantly, encouraging the spontaneity of understanding towards the 
object. The truth of the mimetic dimension of experience, then, is the moment of mutual 
experience not dominated either by the necessity of self-preservation, or the subjugation 
of the objective world and others to ideological subjectivity. This is the rational 
component of the attempt to ward off suffering and of the desire to salvage experience 
from its determination by ‘instrumental’ rationalising, and return them towards truths in 
the contradictions between inter-subjective objectivity and the contradictions in 
subjective natures, beyond this.  
 
What, then, finally, is the ‘truth of the subject’? In the context of examining 
conceptions of truth through the possibilities of self-determining subjectivity, I have 
suggested key elements in this study of Adorno’s thought that a truth of subjectivity is in 
the understanding that contradictions pertaining to any object of knowledge – including 
subjectivity itself - reveal more than any definitive effort to resolve any of these in 
isolation. I maintain that understanding this must be a key component of the possibility 
of self-determination. Ideological efforts to purify or otherwise ‘resolve’ subjectivity in 
reconciliation with any single objectively given truth by definition restricts access to 
truths arising from the contradictions immanent to such efforts. The truth of the 
subjectivity experiencing the objective world is therefore similarly compromised, as are 
possibilities for the self-determination of its experience.   
 
Rather, failure to absolutize subjectivity itself reveals an objective truth 
potentially providing new avenues of reflective freedom and permitting original and 
creative ways of expressing and responding to these. From the perspective of this thesis, 
a key to the truth of freedom is where conflicting perspectives and forms of articulation 
contradict each other in ways revealing the shortcomings of subjective identity and 
personal ideology, the ramifications of which are paramount in any contemporary 
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politics. Simultaneously, possibilities of subjective freedom and rational self-
determination remain in the notion that human self-preservation itself depends on both 
the immediate necessities of identification and ideology, and recognising the ways these 
fail to encompass truth. The strength of the subject with regards to Adorno’s philosophy, 
then, pertains to overcoming identitarian thought grounded in the imperative of self-
preservation to reconceptualise experience in ways that may actually complement self-
preservation, but by expressing it in ways circumventing the repression of consciousness 
or of others as an aspect of its truth. With regards to the concrete examples given in this 
thesis of instrumental forms of rationality, this strength also pertains to the active 
mediation of those forms of social rationality that structure and determine experience, 
not least at the socio-political level, to strengthen the possibilities for self-determining 
thought, and possibly, political action. Pace Adorno, then, the self-determining ability to 
use the ‘strength’ of the subject to break through the fallacies of constitutive subjectivity 
remains an ineluctable component of any truth that can be ascribed to subjectivity. This, 
as I hope to have demonstrated with this thesis, is a ‘fundamental’ truth of the subject. 
 
In concluding, I now turn to a brief consideration to suggest how Adorno’s 
‘negative’ dialectics may continue to be developed at the theoretical level in the future, 
with reference to a suggestion by Žižek that negative dialectics and the Lacanian 
psychoanalytical notion of the ‘Impossible Real’ may be thought concurrently and in 
tandem as theoretical tools investigating the truth of subjectivity.   
 
8.2. A Theoretical Suggestion 
 
In the Introduction, we saw how Žižek ascribed (critique of) the ‘inconsistency’ 
of negative dialectics to its emphasis on reflection that produces a ‘truth-effect’ through 
its failure to circumscribe experience of the objective world with any conclusive 
(‘ideological’) finality. This truth-effect is a function of conflicting attempts across 
historical constellations to demarcate objects of knowledge which ‘fail’ in claims to forms 
of conclusive truth, but contribute, through experience, to articulating how non-identities 
with how the object is known both point towards its existing conceptual and ideological 
misidentification, and reveal new ways of conceptualising its experience. 
 
Such a truth-effect, however, is contingent on the subjectivity in question. What 
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is the truth-effect of experience on the subject, and what can the truth of this experience 
amount to? This thesis has emphasised ways of thinking about truth relating specifically 
to experience - and the ways these fall short - in contrast to the study of the subject from 
objectifying perspectives that often underplay social (‘mediated’) forms of experience 
altogether. However, the truth of subjectivity as an area of inquiry cannot be reduced to 
subject-centred perspectives either, but must be a function, simultaneously, of the 
subject’s dependence on the objective world, and ways its experience continually changes 
subjectivity itself.  
 
In this light, Žižek has suggested that the dialectical ‘failure’ to grasp the object of 
knowledge that produces the truth-effect of Adorno’s negative dialectics can be thought 
together with Lacan’s psychoanalytical notion of the ‘Impossible Real’. Adorno’s theory 
of ‘constitutive subjectivity’ as ideological requires explanation of the ways reflection fails 
to dominate its object of knowledge to account for the truth of its experience. Such 
accounts can correspond with what Lacan calls the ‘Real’ as an internally subjective, and 
not objective ‘limitation of reality’, as a theoretical extension of negative dialectical 
thought. Žižek suggests that 
 
the Adornian distinction between immediately accessible “positive” objectivity and the objectivity 
targeted in the “priority of the objective” is the very Lacanian distinction between (symbolically 
mediated) reality and the impossible Real [of the object of knowledge]. Furthermore, does the 
Adornian notion that the subject retains its subjectivity only insofar it is “incompletely” subject, 
insofar as some kernel of objectivity resists its grasp, not point towards the subject as 
constitutively “barred” [$, in the Lacanian algebraic scheme]  (Žižek 2001, p.88)?  
 
Distinctions between ‘immediately given “positive” objectivity’ and Adorno’s ‘priority of 
the objective’ have formed a substantive part of this study. ‘Positive objectivity’ refers to 
the objective world as it appears given in the immediate sense to the individual. It is 
‘positive’ because its experience is reconciled with the predominating conceptualisation 
through which its properties are identified, which may in turn develop into instrumental 
forms of rationalising ignoring their own mediated character. The objectivity prioritised 
by Adorno, by contrast, is the ‘negative’ form of experiencing the objective world, 
because it grants epistemological priority to the object of knowledge and refuses to 
reconcile its experience with its conceptualisation in any dominant or conclusive manner.  
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What does this mean in terms of the Lacanian distinction between ‘symbolically’ 
mediated reality, and what Lacan calls the ‘Impossible Real’? A brief outline of the 
Lacanian categories is required to contextualise Žižek’s passage and what they mean by 
the ‘Impossible Real’: The ‘Real’ is one of three central categories in Lacan’s 
psychoanalytical scheme, which stands opposed to the ‘Imaginary’ and the ‘Symbolic’. 
The ‘Imaginary’ relates to the formation of subjectivity at the level of initial self-
identification occurring earliest in life, prior to infants being able to employ language or 
describe concepts. The ‘Imaginary’ is therefore the stage where individuals-as-infants are 
unable to identify the objective world conceptually beyond how they immediately 
experience their subjectivity. It follows this self-identification remains part of the ego 
individuals retain into adulthood.   
 
The ‘Symbolic’, by contrast, refers to the objective social ‘order’ of language and 
other aspects of existence determined through language, e.g. politics, law, ethics, religion, 
science, etc., and which provide the basis for the identity-formation of individuals. The 
Symbolic order is where individuals learn to distinguish between themselves and others, 
between subjectivity and the objective world, between concepts and objects, etc., and is 
the realm where they experience social reality. It is therefore the universe in which 
individuals experience their lives, and in which issues of meaning, truth, and subjective 
needs are normatively determined according to mediation between their identification in 
the Symbolic order (according to a specific culture, e.g., in the West, in the form of 
legislation protecting individual rights, and the language expressing these rights), and 
their subjective interpretations through experience.  
 
The Real, however, is that which is ‘outside language and inassimilable to 
symbolisation. It is “that which resists symbolisation absolutely”’ (Evans 1996 p. 159). 
Lacan’s distinction between the reality of the Symbolic order and the ‘Real’ is that 
“‘reality’ denotes subjective representations which are a product of both symbolic and 
imaginary articulations’ (ibid. p.161), whereas the ‘Real’ cannot be known because it 
exists beyond both the imaginary aspect of the ego, and the symbolic realm of conscious 
experience of the objective world. The Real is therefore ‘impossible’, because it both 
cannot be imagined by the subject-in-itself, and its truth cannot be accounted for in any 
absolute sense by conceptualisation taking place in the Symbolic Order. It is therefore 
eternally beyond the reach of subjectivity and its conceptualisation, both of itself and of 
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the objective world. The Impossible Real, then, is what always remains of the reality that cannot 
be conceptualised.  
 
Žižek suggests, then, that Lacan’s distinction between the Symbolic order and the 
‘Impossible Real’ is equivalent to the distinction Adorno draws between immediately 
given positive objectivity, and the ‘non-conceptuality’ he targets in his priority of the 
objective. A sense of how this is so can be drawn from the latter part of Žižek’s passage. 
The ‘Adornian notion that the subject retains its subjectivity only insofar it is 
“incompletely” subject, insofar as some kernel of objectivity resists its grasp’, refers to 
two ideas suggested in this thesis:  
 
The first is what Adorno’s ‘priority of the objective’ means for efforts to 
conceptualise experience in the first place. The dependence of subjectivity on both 
objective nature and the immediate social world means the ability to conceptualise 
objects of knowledge is always already constrained, both by limitations imposed by 
specific socio-historical experience, and by the nature within subjectivity itself. 
Concurrently, the subjective formation occurring in the Lacanian dialectics between the 
Imaginary realm of ego formation and the Symbolic realm of language and social 
normativity similarly creates its own limitation of objective reality: on one hand, the 
subject overcomes limitations of its identity through the normativity and convention of 
socio-historical experience. Yet, conversely, it cannot objectively overcome its specific 
socio-historical experience other than by attempted recourse to the ‘Imaginary’ ego. Pace 
Adorno, this ego consists of elements of the subject’s nature that remain un-reconciled 
with its socio-historical experience, such as its personal (Imaginary) proclivities, or ways 
it may resist dominant social norms for reasons of prejudice, tradition or genetics, and 
are hence equally part of its identity. 
 
Second, it was established that the ‘priority of the objective’ means the ability of 
individuals to conceptualise identity in its own right must be constrained. As there is 
always objectivity that is unattainable in the conceptualisation of experience, this gap 
between experience and its conceptual identification is filled by what Adorno (broadly 
speaking) considers to be ideology. One way to consider this is how subjectivity 
necessarily identifies its ego formation with the symbolic universe of language, social 
norms, and so forth, in what becomes its identity. Individuals, however, cannot entirely 
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avoid the kind of constitutive subjectivity that impresses its own concepts onto the world 
ideologically because a measure of objectivity always eludes them. This means subjectivity 
attempts to ‘close the gap’ between itself and the measure of objectivity it cannot attain 
with its own subjective concepts. In so doing, subjectivity is ‘constituted’ precisely 
because of the objectivity it cannot attain – and for Adorno, in so doing, subjectivity 
becomes ideological.  
 
For Žižek, then, this Adornian notion of an ‘incomplete subject’ points towards 
the Lacanian concept of ‘the subject as constitutively “barred” [$].’ The ‘barred subject’ 
in Lacanian theory is the division of the subject by language - meaning, the subject is 
divided, on one hand, by its access to, and identification of, social reality (the Symbolic 
order) through language, and on the other hand, by the ‘Impossible Real’ of the objective 
world that cannot be encapsulated by language, or reduced to ways experience may be 
conceptualised. This means language - the primary tool of identification - not only 
provides access to the wider everyday (social) reality of individuals, but also acts as one 
limitation on the ‘Impossible Real’, suggesting the idea that the constitutive subjectivity 
occurring through identification of the objective world is also, partially, a result of a 
(necessary) subconscious effort to ‘limit’ reality, among other things to maintain the 
continuity – and identity - of personal consciousness. 
 
This subjective ‘limitation’ of the objective world – paradigmatically, then, due to 
the identification necessary to buttress the continuity of consciousness - is also in one 
sense what Adorno’s critique of ideology is intended to attempt to overcome (without 
denying its necessity). This attempt reflects possibilities of self-determination in ways 
reflection remains open to its experience of the object, acknowledging that the truth of 
this experience also depends on contradictory ways its conceptualisation can be 
construed. The ‘negative’ dialectical turn toward ‘non-conceptuality’ addresses this in its 
attempt to retain the spontaneity in experience from domination of the object for the 
identifying purposes of constitutive subjectivity. How, then, briefly, do these theories 
correspond? 
 
If the ‘Impossible Real’ is that which ‘resists symbolisation absolutely’ beyond the 
social reality that ‘denotes subjective representations which are a product of both 
symbolic and imaginary articulations’, it is therefore also experience which cannot be 
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subsumed by conceptualisation, beyond dialectics between the symbolic order and the 
ego, and any positive, socially objective, or subjective, resolutions of these. Similarly, 
Adorno’s ‘negative’ dialectical turn is towards non-identity between how the subject is 
objectively determined, where reflection cannot only be self-determining (the Symbolic 
order), and the conceptual activity occurring on the subjective side which attempts to be 
self-determining (in contradictions between needs of the imaginary ego and the objective 
determination of experience in the symbolic order). In this sense, an aspect of the truth 
of the subject’s self-determination could be thought to lie in what cannot be apprehended 
in its efforts to identify experience – or, in other words, the truth of the ‘Impossible Real’ 
of experience. 
 
The additional dimension of Adorno’s non-identity between truth that can be 
established by rational, objectifying or scientific means, and the content of the historical 
experience in which such forms of rationality arise, but whose truth these cannot by 
themselves account for, and which may be available to the understanding through other 
dimensions of experience and expression, may also potentially be explored in terms of 
the ‘Impossible Real’. For example, mediation through language at the symbolic level not 
only allows for expression of needs and desires resulting ‘positively’ in social norms, but 
also points towards how such norms simultaneously repress other aspects of experience 
that cannot be expressed according to dominant symbolic norms at a specific socio-
historical point in time. Attempts to express these experiences, however, e.g., in art, 
creative contributions to the normative or political processes of society, or other 
unexplored modes of expression, may themselves point towards elements of reality 
unaccounted for in the dominant normative discourse of the symbolic order. The notion 
of the ‘Impossible Real’ of the subject divided against itself could thus be considered in 
parallel to the non-conceptuality towards which Adorno orientates his conception of 
freedom.     
 
The notion of parallels between these theories is too broad to examine in depth 
at this final stage of the thesis, particularly considering the scope necessary to take 
important ideas in psychoanalytical theory and Adorno’s theory into simultaneous 
account (beyond Adorno’s own psychoanalytically influenced observations). I do suggest, 
however, that the question of the ways and degree to which a theory in psychoanalysis 
such as Lacan’s ‘Impossible Real’, and the social concerns of Adorno’s negative dialectics 
Prospects Beyond Ideology: Reason, Freedom and the Truth of the Subject – 
Towards Political Models for the Critical Thought of Theodor W. Adorno 
 
 267 
do correspond, however, and how they might be combined as theoretical apparatuses 
across multiple other fields of research – such as the political - would, at a minimum, 
make an adequate candidate for further inquiry in the field of Adorno’s theory proper. 
Future research in the field of critical theory and specifically Adorno’s philosophy may 
be pursued, therefore, i.) at the theoretical level, with reference to developments in 
certain areas of psychoanalytical theory, while ii.) at the practical level, socio-political 
models extracted from Adorno’s critiques and possible political suggestions arising 
thereof may continue to function as important components in continuing critical 
mediations between the subjective self and the objective world. It is to these dual 
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